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INTR0DUCT10N 
We have already declared our intention... of restoring 
the greatness and independence of France, and this 
covers those parts of the Empire which have declared, 
or may declare, for General de Gaulle... 
Lord Halifax (November 1940)* 
But now a new source of trouble arose in that old seed- 
bed of Anglo-French misunderstanding, the Levant. 
Duff Cooper + 
According to the political maps, the British and French 
Empires were at their zenith on the eve of the Second World War. 
The previous world conflict had certainly given much impetus to 
nationalist movements and obliged the metropolitan powers to make 
concessions in some colonial quarters. 
1 Nevertheless Britain and 
France, while paying lip-service to notions of self-determination, 
had actually extended their overseas possessions by acquiring 
most of the old Ottoman and German empires under the guise of 
League of Nations mandates. In the Middle East, where the British 
themselves had encouraged an Arab revolt against the Turks, both 
Britain and-France had to reckon with increasingly articulate and 
volatile nationalist pressures. Some compromises were necessary, 
but even here the metropolitans were rulers in all but name. On 
the eve of the Second World War, despite the currents of anti- 
colonialism, Britain and France still controlled the two greatest 
overseas empires in the world. 
2 
All this was struck into the hazard by the catastrophic 
events of 1940. Suddenly Britain and France were facing defeat, 
and were in desperate need of the loyalty, manpower and facilities 
of their empires. In contrast to the First World War, these great 
colonial powers suffered a military collapse in May-June 1940. 
The much-vaunted French army was overwhelmed, metropolitan France 
War Cabinet memorandum, in F0371/24361/C13251. 
t Old Men Forget (1953), p. 351. 
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was eclipsed, and Britain was driven into precarious isolation. 
In many of their overseas territories, serious new doubts arose 
concerning the prestige and credibility of Britain and France. 
The ultimate exposure of their imperial impotence came in 1942, 
when the Japanese swept through South East Asia, unchallenged 
by the French in Indochina and undeterred by the inadequate 
British forces. The humiliation of the Europeans was crowned by 
the fall of Singapore. 
Long before the Japanese onslaught, however, the disaster of 
1940 created a tortuous imperial predicament for the French and, 
consequently, for the British. The French empire was decapitated. 
Before France fell, there had been talk of continuing the war from 
North Africa and other strongholds, where many troops, arms and 
ships were still available. But Petain, Weygand and others 
dismissed this idea in favour of the Franco-German armistice, 
which left the French fleet and empire intact. The new Petainist 
government at Bordeaux (subsequently at Vichy) set about consoli- 
dating its authority throughout the empire, insuring that the 
French proconsuls accepted the armistice and the new regime. 
The French colonial rulers were in a painful and anomalous 
position. It was now their task to uphold the Imperium of a nation 
which was itself defeated, humiliated and occupied by a foreign 
power. To make matters worse, they were faced with conflicting 
appeals made in the name of France. On one side lay Vichy 
legitimacy, the French military establishment and the compensating 
image of Petain; on the other there came de Gaulle's dramatic call 
to repudiate the armistice and use the resources of the Empire to 
avenge the honour of France. It was a cruel and paradoxical choice: 
on one hand, an abject but well-subscribed legality; on the other, 
a bold but illegitimate call to defy the invaders of France. * 
By the autumn of 1940, the French colonial governors - most 
of them military men - had recovered from the initial shock and 
confusion of the French defeat, and had in most cases accepted the 
* De Gaulle made personal appeals to key figures in the empire, and 
declared his readiness to fight under Nogues, the commander of North 
Africa. But only General Georges Catroux, in distant Indochina, 
rejected Vichy's settlement with the Axis. 
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authority of Vichy. Some of them did so with their colonial em- 
barrassment in mind. Pierre Boisson, High Commissioner of West 
Africa and a staunch Petainist, saw the Free French cause as a 
threat to the stability and future of the empire. "Dissidence is 
a very contagious disease for which the whites will pay in the 
end", he declared. "Movements that do not respect hierarchy carry 
within themselves the ferment of dissolution". 
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Nevertheless a vital handful of French colonial authorities 
responded to the Free French ideal and gave it some territorial 
substance. By mid-September, a few resolute men like Governor 
Eboue and Colonel Leclerc had secured Chad, French Equatorial 
Africa and the Cameroons for Free France. Smaller gains included 
various island groups, but the biggest prizes - North Africa, the 
Levant, and West Africa (the latter important for the battle of 
the Atlantic) - still eluded de Gaulle. 
The fall of France and the Vichy-Gaullist imperial contest 
presented Britain with new dangers and dilemmas. Her first anxiety 
was the fate of the strong French navy, which was to be demobilised 
under Axis supervision. Isolated and heavily dependent on her naval 
supremacy, Britain could not allow the great French battleships to 
be placed under Hitler's dubious guarantee. On 3 July, Operation 
Catapult was implemented to secure the neutrality - or in the last 
resort the destruction - of all accessible French warships. 
Persuasion worked with the French squadron at Alexandria, but at 
Mers-el-Kebir (Oran) there was a tragic engagement in which many 
hundreds of French sailors were killed and several French battle- 
ships eliminated. 
Mers-el-Kebir symbolised the terrible completion of that 
Anglo-French estrangement wrought by Hitler's blitzkrieg in the 
West. Vichy retaliated by bombing Gibraltar and breaking off formal 
relations with Britain on 5 July. A month later an exchange of 
letters between Churchill and de Gaulle formalised the finances and 
Allied status of Free France. 
' There followed the Free French 
successes in central Africa, which London welcomed as a great boost 
to de Gaulle's enterprise, and a useful air link with the Middle 
ýL 
East. These gains were followed up by an attempt on Dakar, the 
great port and naval base of French West Africa. Churchill was 
anxious to rule out the possibility of U-boat bases along this 
Atlantic coast, and de Gaulle saw a slim chance to extend his 
cause right through this region to Morocco. The War Cabinet was 
prevailed upon to risk the wrath of metropolitan France. In Sep- 
tember an Anglo-Free French amphibious expedition sailed for West 
Africa, but misfortune, poor security and Boisson's stiff resistance 
thwarted the attempt on Dakar. Churchill faced the music and stood 
by de Gaulle in Parliament, and Vichy bombed Gibraltar again. 
Despite these aggressive and pro-Gaullist acts, however, the 
curious status of France and its empire led Britain to perform a 
delicate balancing act in the autumn of 1940. To the disgust of 
the single-minded de Gaulle, shadowy and tenuous communications 
passed between London and Vichy. In order to limit the damage that 
could be done if Petain collaborated fully with Germany, certain 
assurances were offered concerning the restoration of French 
sovereignty and the integrity of the French empire. Beneath the 
cruder realities, the long view taken in London was not without 
some genuine sentiment. Churchill's radio appeal to the French on 
21 October, for all its characteristic rhetoric, reflected the 
constant B. B. C. theme that Britain had no plans to annex French 
colonies: "Do not imagine, as the German-controlled wireless tells 
you, that we English seek to take your ships and colonies.... We 
do not covet anything from any nation". 
5 
At the end of October, one Professor Rougier, an emissary 
from Petain, was received in London. He was told that the French 
empire would be restored to France if she refrained from allowing 
the Axis to take over her naval and air bases. On 7 November the 
British Ambassador in Madrid was asked to explain to the Vichy 
Ambassador that "our aim is and always has been... to ensure the 
restoration of France... including those territories which at present 
look to the Free French movement. We covet no inch of French terri- 
tory for ourselves". The essence of this assurance was repeated 
Sý 
several times in November 1940, and at the end of that month the 
Vichy Ambassador in Madrid was handed an aide-memoire to the effect 
that Britain had no plans to annex French territory: 
His Majesty's Government would recall that they 
have already declared their intention, when 
victory is achieved, of restoring the greatness 
and independence of France, and that this covers 
those parts of the empire which have declared or 
may declare for de Gaulle. 
In return for these assurances, London asked Vichy to maintain the 
neutrality of its fleet at Toulon and its colonial bases, and to 
refrain from attacking Free French colonies. 
6 
These were the early expressions of an imperial policy which, 
despite the changing circumstances of a six-year war, Britain was to 
follow and to extend with a general consistency throughout the 
French empire. The spirit of these early pledges was reiterated when 
later complications arose, such as the Japanese expansion and the 
American hostility to European imperialism. 
7 The general pattern, 
beneath the confusions and tragedies of the Vichy-Gaullist dichotomy, 
was one of imperial solidarity in the face of common threats! Thus 
Syria and the Lebanon, Madagascar and Indochina (despite the 
Americans) were entrusted to Gaullist administrations by the British 
forces which occupied these areas. The British, despite the chronic 
suspicions of de Gaulle, showed a broad sympathy for the French 
empire throughout the war. This was particularly striking in Indo- 
china, where British troops held the ring (and were execrated by the 
Americans and the Viet Minh) until French forces arrived.! 
For present purposes, the politics of the Anglo-American 
landings in North Africa (November 1942) may be omitted, for even 
here there was no question of France itself being supplanted, and 
Roosevelt's anti-Gaullism caused no more than a temporary flaw in 
the pattern of Britain's policy. Throughout the war, Britain pursued 
a policy of respecting the basic framework of the French empire, en- 
trusting to de Gaulle the administration of captured Vichy colonies 
and assisting him to maintain the Imperium of France. On the whole, 
it is beyond dispute that Britain avoided any temptation to annex 
French territories, and made an immense logistical and diplomatic 
contribution to the restoration of the French empire. Even de 
Gaulle could not substantially dispute this generalisation. There 
was however one glaring exception, one case in which Britain was 
repeatedly accused of exploiting the French predicament and under- 
mining the French position. That exception was the Levant. 
The French mandates of Syria and the Lebanon - the Levant 
States - were created after the collapse of the Ottoman empire. In 
1919, Britain and France proceeded by prior agreement to award 
themselves the former Turkish domains in the Middle East, despite 
Britain's contradictory promises to the Arabs, with whom Lawrence 
had advanced to Damascus. Britain acquired Iraq, Palestine and 
Transjordan, while the French gained Syria and the Lebanon, where 
they had longstanding cultural interests. Having seized these areas, 
Britain and France had them officially designated as League of 
Nations mandates. Under this mitigating mantle, they exercised their 
notions of power and empire in the Middle East. It was a volatile 
inheritance. In the Levant, the French could only impose their 
authority by naked force, expelling Lawrence's former Arab comrades 
from Damascus in 1920. Even greater force was used in 1925/6 to 
suppress a determined Arab revolt in Syria. The British were also 
troubled by ethnic confrontations and insurrection in Palestine. 
Beyond these internal difficulties, Britain and France soon 
proved to be jealous and uneasy neighbours in the Middle East. This 
incompatibility was rooted in the dubious origin of their mandates, 
their artificial sub-division of the Fertile Crescent* and their 
pursuit of contrasting colonial attitudes within the Arab world. 
The rich culture of France became an insular chauvinism when exported 
to the Levant, where the French pursued their miSsiot civilisatrice. 
On one hand, this meant a network of schools, hospitals and cultural 
institutes; public utilities; improved communications; and a vast 
body of civil and commercial legislation. Conversely, it meant the 
imposition of a foreign ecda upon proud and ancient peoples. This 
............ 
The post-war settlement in the Middle East was more favourable 
to the British than the original Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. 
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intrinsic affront was aggravated by an elaborate and condescending 
French bureaucracy, originally designed for the less-advanced 
Muslims of the Maghreb. The cultured bourgeoisie of the Levant were 
further alienated by the arrogance and mediocrity of most French 
officers. Thus the lofty vision of an extended French civilisation, 
with its implicit threat to the indigenous culture, was entrusted to 
some rather unworthy "missionaries" in whose hands it was reduced to 
an overbearing chauvinism. These problems were intensified by the 
creation of an enlarged Lebanese state in which the Maronite Chris- 
tians were given disproportionate privileges at Muslim expense. In 
personal, social and political terms, Franco-Arab relations were 
thoroughly unsatisfactory. 
French concern for this state-of affairs tended to be. 1inked 
with grievances against the neighbouring British, whose aims and 
methods were of a different character. British rule in the Middle 
East was less high-minded but usually more tolerable. Its main 
concerns - oil, the Suez canal and strategic military bases - were 
distinctly worldly. London preferred to let individual enthusiasts 
think about the mind and the spirit. This official lack of noble 
intentions had the ironic effect of making British rule less offen- 
sive to the Arabs. (It is significant that the disastrous exception 
occurred in Palestine, where London's support for the Zionist ideal 
confounded British pragmatism). Britain also had a long experience 
of indirect rule in Egypt, and a vague pro-Arab tradition which was 
often promoted in the mandates by men with a genuine respect for 
Arab culture. 
10 
On the whole, relations with the Arabs were more satisfactory 
in the British mandates, and critics of French rule were not slow to 
make irksome comparisons. It was, perhaps, inevitable that the keen 
Arabists among Britain's mandatory officers should take a dim view 
of French policy in the Levant. Their attitude was typically expressed 
by Glubb Pasha* in his report of a meeting with the Free French 
General Collet, who had served in Syria for 23 years: 
' The British Commander of Transjordan's Arab Legion. 
The principal differences which I noticed between 
Collet and myself were not so much personal as national... 
Wherever the British have penetrated, we meet British 
officers who believe the Bedouins, the Kurds, the 
Ghurkas... to be the most splendid fellows on earth. The 
French do not share this passionate interest in other 
races - they only praise individuals or communities in 
so far as they have become Gallicized.... 
If there is one Frenchman in Syria who has lived most 
of his life with Muslims, it is Collet. Yet I found him 
essentially antipathetic to the Arabs. It seems hopeless 
to imagine that the antipathy between the Syrians and 
the French can ever be overcome... 11 
It was natural enough that such British "Arabophiles" should 
condemn French colonial aims, which certainly de-valued Arab culture. 
But the French were highly sensitive to criticism emanating from 
the British sphere, and it was equally natural that they should see 
in this the aspirations of Lawrence's disciples. Since men like 
Kirkbride, the British Resident in Amman, were veterans of Lawrence's 
enterprise, this suspicion was only too plausible. It was deepened by 
the fact that Arab notables throughout the region were given to 
drawing similar anti-French comparisons. 
12 All the tangled rivalries 
and suspicions which had preceded the Anglo-French settlement in the 
Fertile Crescent were recalled and rekindled by the polemical con- 
trasts between French and British rule. 
Comparison and contrast created an atmosphere of resentful 
and jealous competition. On the French side, the conviction grew that 
the British were making an appeal to Arab goodwill at the expense of 
the French. A hostile interpretation was therefore placed upon the 
events which showed that Britain was ready to concede a limited in- 
dependence in some areas of the Middle East. From the French perspec- 
tive, these concessions were frequently incompatible with the dream 
of an extended European civilisation. For the British, however, it 
was not so hard to make cultural, social and political concessions. 
Once these were seen as the key to Arab goodwill, British pragmatism 
and native opportunism made a virtue of these concessions. Thus, the 
Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 transformed the mandate into a lopsided 
alliance, and the Iraqis henceforth conducted their own internal 
affairs within the (considerable) limits of Britain's strategic 
requirements. Good relations had been established with the kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, there was some relaxation of direct control in 
Transjordan, and in 1936 there came the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. With 
the sorry exception of Palestine, the British appeared to be 
reconciling their requirements with the emerging ideals of Arab 
independence and unity. 
13 
These developments tended to set French rule in an even more 
unfavourable light, and made an increasing anachronism of Arab 
affairs in the Levant States. The modest political devolution allowed 
by the British was therefore resented by the French. Conversely, the 
British execrated the French for their ill-disguised satisfaction 
over the Palestinian revolts in 1929 and 1936-8. Arab insurgents 
were harboured and assisted by the Syrians, and the French con- 
spicuously failed to discourage this frontier game. Perhaps the 
British forgot that in 1925 the Syrian rebels had found similar shel- 
ter in Transjordan, but the French had not forgotten. 
In 1936, disillusioned with their vision of Overseas France 
and troubled by new disorders, the French yielded to the tide and 
negotiated treaties with the Syrians and Lebanese. These were modelled 
on the Anglo-Iraqi agreement, and were eventually approved by the 
Syrian and Lebanese Chambers. Ratification was required by the end of 
1938, but after a reactionary campaign by mandatory officials and the 
Right in France, the French refused to complete the treaty. The 
resulting hostility and bitterness in the Levant was completed in 
1939 by the cynical French cession of Alexandretta to the Turks. Once 
France was at war with Germany, this ominous situation was placed in 
a kind of deep-freeze. The French suspended the Levant constitutions 
indefinitely, built up the Army of the Levant under Weygand and 
cracked down on any hint of political agitation, 
14 
At the time of the Franco-German armistice, then, Anglo- 
French mandatory rule in the Middle East was still continuing, though 
mitigated in some areas and subjected to serious strain in others. 
Franco-Arab affairs were poisonous, and this widened the gulf which 
separated the French and British authorities in the Middle East. 
rC 
The French already saw Britain's prudent patronage of Arab aspira- 
tions as a plot to manouevre France out of the Levant, while the 
British deplored the bruising effects of a chauvinistic French 
colonial mentality. Before a single shot had been fired in the 
Middle East, it was evident that if there was to be an Anglo-French 
imperial understanding, its Achilles heel would be the Levant. 
In 1940, the senior French authorities in the Levant, swayed 
by Weygand and Petain, reluctantly accepted the armistice and re- 
mained neutral towards their southern neighbours, the British. This 
suited the latter, who were increasingly hard-pressed as the Anglo- 
Axis conflict spread through the Mediterranean to the Middle East. 
But laissez-faire did not last. In June 1941, after Axis aircraft 
had been allowed to use Syrian airfields, Anglo-Free French troops 
invaded and occupied the Levant States. British troops henceforth 
predominated, as most of the pro-Vichy troops refused-. to join de 
Gaulle and were repatriated. Nevertheless, political affairs and 
the civil administration werg entrusted to the Free French. 
It was a desperate and maladroit enterprise. Militarily in- 
adequate but anxious to acquire the Levant, the Free French promised 
independence and an end to the mandate in return for Syrian support. 
Once ensconced in the Levant, however, the Gaullists installed 
paper republics and insisted that the mandate was still valid. 
Nationalist agitation increased, and the British - who were publicly 
associated with Free French promises - insisted on further conces- 
sions. Elections were held in 1943 and resulted in clear nationalist 
victories. The new Lebanese government, despite internal ethnic 
differences, promptly and formally repudiated the French mandate, and 
an ugly crisis ensued. The French imprisoned the Lebanese Cabinet, 
dissolved the Chamber and installed a puppet President. The British 
intervened and secured the restoration of the Lebanese government, 
but the mandate issue was unresolved. The Levantines sought further 
concessions, the Gaullists a treaty to secure French privileges. In 
1945, the arrival of French reinforcements sparked off another con- 
flict which culminated in the indiscriminate shelling of Damascus. 
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This time the British army moved in and took over the control of 
public order and security throughout the Levant. French authority 
was effectively displaced, and by September 1946 - after more 
wrangling - all European troops had left Syria and the Lebanon. 
It is immediately obvious that the fundamental British policy 
towards the French empire broke down badly in the Levant. Yet it is 
no easy matter to account for this curious affair, and its causes 
have been hotly disputed. To gather the available evidence, the 
inquirer is obliged to forage in a minefield of polemics created by 
the original contenders and their apologists. There, for all the 
distortions, special pleading and oversimplification, lie many useful 
insights and valuable clues. 
Three distinct and contrasting points of view have been ex- 
pounded. The Francophiles, including Eden and Duff Cooper, argued 
that one ruthless man exploited the legacy of Anglo-French rivalry 
and the temporary British advantages in the Levant to destroy the 
French position. That man was Major-General Sir Edward Louis Spears, 
Britain's Minister Plenipotentiary to Syria and the Lebanon. Once a 
distinguished Francophile himself, Spears had ably supported the 
Free French enterprise and accompanied de Gaulle to the Middle East 
in 1941. There the two men fell out, and Spears became a fervent 
Arabophile. (See Chapter Four). As one writer claimed in 1945: 
It is quite certain that had General Spears not 
followed a policy of deliberate provocation, there 
would be no French-Syrian problem at this moment. 
But the position of France in Syria and in the 
world was so weak... that the moment seemed pro- 
pitious for giving the coup de grace to its influence 
in the Levant. The temptation was there, and General 
Spears, ignoring the remoter consequences of such an 
attitude, succumbed to it unreservedly. 15 
De Gaulle and his supporters, whilst attributing to Spears 
all kinds of sinister activities, are not content with this explan- 
ation. In their view, Churchill and Spears were master and man, and 
the latter was simply the most effective tool of a British policy 
of securing Arab goodwill at the expense of the French mandates. 
"Their game", wrote de Gaulle, was 
I 
settled in London by firmly established services, 
carried out on the spot by a team without scruples 
but not without resources, accepted by the Foreign 
Office, which sometimes sighed over it but never 
disavowed it, and supported by the Prime Minister, 
whose ambiguous promises and calculated emotions 
camouflaged what was intended.... British policy 
would therefore endeavour, sometimes stealthily and 
sometimes harshly, to replace France at Damascus 
and at Beirut. 16 
This sweeping accusation is flatly contradicted by the Arabo- 
philes. They claim that the collapse of the French mandate had nothing 
to do with sinister British machinations, which were really a product 
of the Gallic imagination. As one of Spears' regional officers, 
Colonel William Stirling, wrote: 
In the eyes of every Frenchman I was tarred with 
the Lawrence brush and assumed to be working 
against the interests of France. They never realised 
how much I had done to protect their interests.... 
I steadily adhered to the policy laid down by my 
chief, -General Spears. No action of mine ever harmed 
the relations between the Arabs and the French. 
Stirling, a former colleague of Lawrence, was well acquainted with 
Syrian affairs. In common with his fellow Arabophiles, he held that 
French tribulations in the Levant were self-inflicted and that 
France's ignominious eviction was a piece of poetic justice: 
France. . . held Syria under the mandate for over 
twenty years, during which she was supposed to 
teach and guide the people... to prepare them for 
eventual self-government. This she never began to 
do.... Is it to be wondered at that the Syrians 
[grew] more and more restless, and more and more 
determined to rid themselves of the dead hand of 
France? 17 
According to this viewpoint, the upheavals of 1941, the hollow 
promises made by the Free French and their failure to change the 
character of French rule completed the downfall of a mandate which 
was already discredited and living on borrowed time. Accusations of 
British perfidy in general, and Spears' guilt in particular, are 
therefore dismissed as irrelevant and misleading. 
131 
There are varying degrees of truth, however distorted and 
partial, in these common explanations of the Levant affair. All, of 
course, vindicate their own camps rather too neatly. Thus Spears is 
made the scapegoat for much British bungling; de Gaulle omits the 
profound failure of French policy in the Levant; and some of the 
Arabophiles would have us believe that they behaved like broken- 
hearted saints in Syria, dutifully implementing a policy which they 
privately abominated. 
The half-truths and contradictions of these partisan versions 
have not been sufficiently overcome by the available histories of 
this Anglo-French imbroglio. This is largely due to the lack of 
documentary evidence at the time of writing, rather than any lack of 
industry. Another kind of documentary problem occurs in the case of 
the so-called Official History, which seems to suffer from tunnel 
vision. 
18 Based too narrowly upon one departmental source, it tends 
to support the myth of Spears' villainy by its uncritical para- 
phrasing of bureaucratic opinions which were often ill-founded. (See 
Chapter Eight in particular). 
It has recently become possible to provide a far more detailed 
account of the Levant affair. This is not to say that all the docu- 
mentary problems are solved. "No French equivalent'. to the material. 
now available in England was open to the present writer. Nor is it 
to be expected that files from the Levant would have passed unscathed 
through the Vichy-Gaullist ordeal. There will always be some gaps, 
on both sides of the Channel. Nevertheless a wealth of fresh docu- 
mentary evidence has become accessible in England. Nearly all of the 
relevant files of the British government are now open, and more 
private papers and memoirs may now be consulted. Of these, the most 
extensive and valuable are the diaries and papers of General. Spears. 
The following pages, therefore, are an attempt to construct 
a more fully documented and detailed account of the Anglo-French 
relationship in the Levant from 1941 to 1945. Wherever possible, 
original documents are quoted and the dramatis personae are allowed 
to speak in their own words. Even so, in terms of sheer quantity, 
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only the tip of the documentary iceberg appears. If more of the 
original atmosphere and mentality has been re-captured, and if 
the wartime voices are more readily heard and considered, this 
approach will have been justified. A narrative form has been used, 
partly to emphasise that much can only be explained in the light of 
the war situation with its pressures, confusions and improvisations. 
Interpretation and analysis accompany the unfolding narrative, and 
the significance of various events and attitudes is reiterated 
and weighed in the conclusion. 
Within this purpose, and inseparable from it, is an attempt 
to understand Sir Edward Spears and to establish his role. The Anglo- 
French collision in the Levant involved some remarkable personalities 
on both sides. The most striking character of them all was Spears, 
the man at the centre of the controversy. His papers and diaries 
throw new light on his own activities and upon the whole Levant 
dispute, and full use has been made of this source. In particular, 
I have tried to depict and interpret Spears' dramatic break with de 
Gaulle, and the ex-Francophile's subsequent view of his role in the 
Middle East. This innings on the sticky wicket of psychology was 
clearly necessary. The sudden and fateful change in Spears' attitude 
was to loom large in the Levant affair. A non-polemical explanation 
was well overdue, and with the aid of new sources I have attempted 
to provide it. 
Finally, much space has been devoted to the year 1941. Within 
the period of the Anglo-Gaullist occupation of the Levant, no other 
year was so packed with crucial events and fateful decisions. 1941 
produced the terms of reference for all the ensuing Anglo-French 
disputes and confrontations in the Levant. 
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Chapter One "A COMMITMENT OF AN AWKWARD KIND" 
Voila le commencement de la fin. 
Talleyrand 
Allenby gave me a telegram from the Foreign 
Office... and told me to translate it to the 
Emir: but none of us knew what it meant in 
English, let alone in Arabic... 
T. E. Lawrence* 
In the autumn of 1940 Vichy France had consolidated its 
position in the greater part of the French Empire. This was a 
bitter blow to de Gaulle and a further anxiety for the British, for 
it left several strategic territories in the hands of men who seemed 
only too susceptible to Axis pressure. Among these areas, the French 
mandates of Syria and Lebanon soon forced themselves on the attention 
of both the British and the Free French, though not always for the 
same reasons. 
From the British viewpoint, the Levant States assumed an 
increasingly dangerous significance after June 1940. For in that 
month, while France was being overrun, Italy declared war. Mussolini's 
decision immediately threatened the whole British position in the 
Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. At that time 
the British Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, Wavell, had a mere 
50,000 troops, while Italian forces in Libya, Eritrea and Ethiopia 
numbered half a million. 
1 
In these circumstances the British could not be indifferent 
to developments in the Levant States, which quickly came under the 
authority of Vichy. If, for instance, enemy forces were granted 
facilities in the Levant - as they soon were in Indochina - then the 
British would have been disastrously outflanked. In London, these 
bleak prospects were outlined to the War Cabinet's Middle East 
Counittee: 
* Seven Pillars of'Wisdom (1926), p. 683. 
IF 
British policy in the Middle East has hitherto 
been based on the assumption that Syria and 
the Lebanon would remain... under the effective 
influence of France. This assumption has been 
shaken by the capitulation of the Bordeaux 
Government and the disappearance of France as 
a great Power.... 
Strategically speaking, the whole British 
position in the Middle East, including Egypt 
and Arabia, will probably be untenable unless 
Syria and the Lebanon are under friendly 
control or failing that British control. 2 
Vichy intentions in the Levant were not easy to predict, and 
a Delphic ambiguity characterised the diplomatic scene in the French 
mandates. British consular officials had never been feted but they 
were at least acceptable until June 1940. Then the French attitude 
changed "almost overnight" to distinct hostility, and by the end of 
June the Consulates in Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo existed in a 
state of antagonism with the French. (The Beirut Consulate was 
obliged to move inland to Aley, as its presence in a Vichy port was 
unacceptable). Yet when Vichy broke off formal relations with Britain 
in July, these Consulates continued their anomalous existence in a 
kind of diplomatic limbo. 
3 
In their official statement of 2 July,. the British made their 
attitude clear to all Levant-watchers, including Arab opportunists 
and-covetous neutrals like Turkey: 
His Majesty's Government declare that they could 
not allow Syria or the Lebanon to be occupied by 
any hostile Power or to be used as a base for 
attacks upon those countries in the Middle East 
which they are pledged to defend, or to become 
the scene of such disorder as to constitute a 
danger to those countries. They therefore hold 
themselves free to take whatever measures they 
may in such circumstances consider necessary in, 
their own interests. 4 
By November 1940, the Mediterranean arena had been further 
complicated by Mussolini's attack on Greece, and the Levantine 
question-mark still remained. At that point Churchill told his Foreign 
Secretary that Britain must 
Ii 
obtain control of Syria by one means or another 
in the next few months [but] until we have dealt 
with the Italians in Libya we have no troops to 
spare for a northern venture. On no account must 
Italian or Caitiff-Vichy influences become or 
remain paramount in Syria. 5 
The Mediterranean threat was temporarily reduced by resolute 
action in North Africa, where an Italian army was destroyed and its 
tattered remnants driven out of Cyrenaica in February 1941. To the 
south, as well, British troops were soon gaining the ascendancy in 
Italian East Africa. 
The Duce had signally failed to sweep the British from the 
shores of the eastern Mediterranean, but his formidable German ally 
now took a hand, and the overall situation soon became more desperate 
than ever. The trouble began when Hitler sent Rommel's mechanised 
contingent to succour his woebegone partner in Libya. Wavell had 
meanwhile been ordered to stop the British offensive, and to send 
a better-equipped expedition to Greece instead. Sensing his opportunity, 
Rommel turned an armoured reconnaissance into an audacious assault 
and the British were driven pell-mell out of Libya. By mid-April, the 
defiant garrison at Tobruk was the only reminder of Wavellts 
inconclusive victories. It was a month of cruel futility, for the 
Greek expedition proved to be a disaster. By the and of April, the 
Germans had overrun Greece and subjected the British forces to a 
Balkan Dunkirk. All their tanks were lost and . 2,000 troops fell 
into German hands. 
6 
As Wavell's whole position deteriorated,, Britain's tenure in 
the eastern Mediterranean became dubious. The idea of an Italian 
Syria now paled before the possibility of a German one, and meanwhile 
the Levant States remained in the unpredictable, unreliable hands 
of Vichy. In British calculations, therefore, a Vichy Levant seemed 
at best a nuisance, at worst a Trojan horse for the Axis. It could 
hardly be tolerated indefinitely. 
For strategic reasons, the British had for some time been 
considering a move to secure the Levant States. To this and they 
1D 
were prodded by the Free French, who were even more anxious to 
control Syria and Lebanon. This imperative sprang from the funda- 
mental Gaullist attitude that the defeat of the metropolis was 
not the defeat of France, that the battle must be pursued by 
"Overseas France". It was therefore essential that a significant 
part of the French Empire should remain in the fight: "it was 
essential to bring back into the war not merely some Frenchmen, 
but France". To simply provide British auxiliaries was unthinkable. 
De Gaulle sought for France "the re-appearance of our armies on the 
battlefields, the return of our territories to belligerence... to 
bring our sovereignty out from disaster". 
7 
In pursuit of this vision, de Gaulle made his bid for 
Overseas France, gaining equatorial Africa and being denied West 
Africa, North Africa, the Levant and other territories. This was 
barely enough to make Free France viable, and its adherents strove 
to improve their position in the French territories. In this all- 
consuming quest, any distinction between colonies and mandates 
became irrelevant. 
From September 1940 Gaullist attention was drawn more and 
more towards the Levant, where hope still glimmered. If only the 
Frenchmen there could be won over, Free France would be a substantial 
force based on its own Mediterranean territory. Standing its own 
ground in a vital war zone, it would have a practical strength not 
enjoyed by governments-in-exile in London, and a distinct identity 
which de Gaulle would wield skilfully. Above all, it would have a 
solid fighting force. Such a force already existed in the Army of 
the. Levant, which was 70,000 strong in June 1940. If only de Gaulle 
could prevail over Vichy in the realm of loyalties, this army 
could be the nucleus of a formidable Free France. Looking therefore 
to the eastern Mediterranean, the Gaullists hoped to bring most of 
the Army. of the Levant into. the Free French fold.. 
8 
Yet in the mind of de Gaulle these considerations mingled 
with more Machiavellian anxieties, including his ancestral suspicions 
of British perfidy. De Gaulle felt that, in the Middle East, 
L/ 
political, racial and religious passions and 
ambitions were being sharpened, [that] France's 
positions there were sapped and coveted, and 
that there was, on any hypothesis, no chance 
of her keeping any of them if... she remained 
passive when everything was in the melting pot. 
It was therefore imperative that Free France should raise its 
banner over the Levant, for then 
France would have a chance of bringing an 
important contribution to the common effort. 
Otherwise, with this chance lost, the 
position of France would likewise be lost. 
[If] the Axis won, it would dominate there 
as elsewhere. If the opposite happened, the 
English would take our place. The authority 
of Free France must therefore be extended 
to Damascus and to Beirut... 9 
This attitude was not entirely concealed from General 
Spears, whose liaison duties frequently placed him alongside de 
Gaulle. "He realised the great importance of this theatre in the 
strategy of the war", wrote Spears, "but what he was really concerned 
about was the political future of the States under French Mandate". 
Such unedifying preoccupations rather offended Spears, who viewed 
the Levant States with unabashed military simplicity: "I was 
interested only in the extent to which the British cause would be 
strengthened by their becoming involved on our side. I had never 
visited those countries and knew nothing of their inhabitants". 
10 
From the earliest conceptions of a joint venture in the 
Levant, British and Free French leaders never enjoyed unanimity of 
motivations, emphases or objectives. In addition, both had their 
internal disagreements over the Levant. But it became clear that in 
order to gain the Levant they would have need of each other. As the 
British Ambassador in Cairo later expressed it, Syria was 
a most valuable prize. It we could rally it 
to Free France we should at a stroke establish 
land connexion with Turkey, obtain control of a 
breeding ground of Axis intrigue in the Arai 
world and give an impetus to the Free French 
who would'obtain some troops and material. 
Z2 
This to my mind remains the best solution 
to work for. We cannot occupy Syria for our- 
selves even for duration of the war without 
appearing to break our pledge that we have no 
designs on French Colonial territory. Alternative 
of trying to appease Vichy (would] only give us a 
stable Syria if the Germans allow... 11 
It was in that spirit that the British had first responded 
to Free French schemes to acquire the Levant by one means or another. 
This project began in earnest when the ranking Free Frenchman, 
General Georges Catroux, arrived in Cairo at the end of September 
1940.13 Despite his seniority, this elegant and courteous man. 
appeared readily to accept de Gaulle's leadership. As an old hand 
in Islamic affairs and a former Governor-General of Damascus, 
Catroux was the obvious choice for the control of Free French 
interests in the Middle East. Having arrived in London on 16 
September to join Free France, Catroux was swiftly briefed and with 
Churchill's blessing found himself in Cairo before the month was out. 
Such commendable despatch failed to please de Gaulle, who 
thought he detected a British attempt to unseat him while he was 
away on the ill-fated Dakar expedition. Wiring a sharp response to 
Churchill, he nevertheless refrained from telling Catroux to alter 
his plans. Instead, he received his illustrious recruit at Fort 
Lamy in mid-October. There the correct apostolic succession was 
acknowledged to de Gaulle's satisfaction, and Catroux's Middle 
Eastern position openly ratified. De Gaulle had already been 
mollified to some extent by Churchill's reply: 
From every quarter the presence of General 
Catroux was demanded in Syria. I therefore 
took the responsibility in your name of 
inviting the General to go there. It is of 
course perfectly understood that he holds his 
position only from you.... Sometimes one has 
to take decisions on the spot because of their 
urgency and the difficulty of explaining to 
others at a distance. 13. 
Yet there remained a suspicion that the British leader had been 
14 tampering with the Free French movement. 
23 
On 28 September de Gaulle nevertheless cabled his 
blessing to Catroux: 
I entirely approve of your departure for 
Levant to take action, and. I wish to thank 
you for assuming this very important task. 
I felt obliged to protest to British Govern- 
ment concerning form of its intervention. But 
naturally my reaction in no way concerns your- 
self in whom I have the completest confidence.... 
There is no one more qualified than yourself to 
take necessary action. 
As Catroux had left London the previous day, this belated approval 
had to be relayed on to Cairo. 
is Thus, while it is true in a sense 
that de Gaulle endorsed Catroux's assignment, Catroux did not 
know this until he reached Cairo. His personal account is misleading 
on this point, and in following it, Sachar wrongly asserts that 
Catroux "accepted the assignment only after receiving De Gaulle's 
express approval". 
16 
In sending Catroux to Cairo, Churchill had valued the 
Syrian objective more highly than de Gaulle's amour-propre. But 
Catroux arrived too late to pull off a bloodless coup in the Levant, 
where the promising drift of sympathies had been abruptly halted. 
Careless talk in Syria had exposed the Gaullist elements. Vichy 
moved swiftly to suppress this tendency and strengthen its own 
grip on the Levant. Suspects were arrested and repatriated, 
waverers were relieved of office, and only known Petainists were 
retained in key positions. "In short", wrote de Gaulle,. "the 
movement hoped formt the time of General Catroux's arrival in 
Cairo had not materialised, and [it Was not] likely to materialise 
very soon". 
17 This was the grim truth, as the British Consul- 
General in Beirut tersely advised London on 12 October: "Possibility 
of inducing Gaullist coup'd'etat (mustE be regarded as remote for 
time beingn. 
l8 
The unlucky Catroux had arrived in Cairo only to find that 
the Free French cause had sustained a heavy blow. It was a dis- 
appointing start, and in a personal sense the Vichy measures in 
zý 
the Levant added insult to injury. Catroux had been Governor- 
General of Indochina until the defeat of France, when he refused 
to accept the Franco-German armistice. He was promptly sacked. 
Having lost the first round to Vichy, the aging General set out 
for London to link up with Free France. Now he had come to Cairo 
only to find that, for the second time, Vichy had cut the ground 
from under his feet. 
Nothing loath, Catroux set about resurrecting the Free 
French cause in the Levant. The prospects were bleak, the resources 
pitiful, but life in Cairo had its consolations. Indeed, Wavell had 
Catroux's bulky possessions shipped from Liverpool to Alexandria. 
These included "some Indo-Chinese servants, Siamese cats and 
vastly heavy furniture" and weighed as much as a battery of 
artillery, according to the scandalised Spears, who bluntly asked 
Wavell which cargo should have priority. This Spartan objection 
was ignored and Catroux's effects duly arrived in Cairo. 
19 
At this superficial level, Catroux certainly found the 
British authorities sympathetic and co-operative. 
20 
They in turn 
found the Frenchman well-bred, unfailingly polite and relatively 
pacific. In personal terms it was an agreeable situation, but it 
frequently undermined the interests of Free France. The alliance 
was too one-sided, the British controlled virtually all the 
resources, and in Middle Eastern terms the Free French were very 
small fry. 
21 It was a]nost universally assumed, on the British side, 
that Free French intefests were identical to those of Great Britain. 
If Spears himself could still make this assumption after a full 
year with de Gaulle, how much more could British officials in the 
Middle East? 
22 To the military mind, the Free French were British 
auxiliaries. Catroux's manner lent itself to this easy equation of 
British and Free French interests, and from it the most unfortunate 
consequences were to follow in the Levant. It was not without 
justification that de Gaulle "came to think that LCatroux'ss 




In his initial survey of the situation, Catroux went 
about under the pseudonym of Monsieur Chartier, wishing to be 
fully acquainted with the possibilities before revealing his 
identity to the Vichy French in the Levant. 
24 To begin with, he 
still had some hopes of inspiring a coup, or of inducing a 
massive desertion of Vichy troops across the Palestine frontier. 
To this end, he hoped that his own presence in the Nile delta 
might as as a kind of magnet to the Army of the Levant. Early 
in November he telegraphed de Gaulle; 
I am pushing our propaganda vigorously but 
anonymously. But I consider it necessary at 
once to test French and native opinion in 
Syria by raising my incognito.... I shall 
not try to assume power in Syria unless I 
feel certain of having with me two-thirds 
of the army [of the Levant] . 25 
It was not the last time that Catroux displayed an un- 
warranted faith in the effect of his own charisma on the Army of 
the Levant. Fond of historical analogy, he possibly recalled 
Napoleon's extraordinary conversion of Ney's troops on the road 
to Paris. Unfortunately for Catroilx a stony lack of response ruled 
out any repetition of Napoleonic miracles, and he was forced to 
consider other tactics. Even then he retained a predilection for 
the dramatic throw of the dice. 
Having already referred to "native opinion in Syria", 
Catroux now came forward with a most fateful suggestion, which was 
destined to open a Pandora's box of political trouble between 
Britain and Free France. He decided that the Vichy authorities 
could be overthrown if Anglo-Free French pressure coincided with 
an Arab rising in the Levant States. This could be fomented by 
promising the Arabs independence. During a long discussion with 
Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner in Palestine, Catroux 
confided his latest idea for dislodging the Vichy administration. 
MacMichael had seen quite enough of Arab insurgency on his own 
patch, but he evidently concealed his misgivings from Catroux, 
who found him a good listener. 
26 MacMichael then informed London 





Resident in Transjordan, had also participated: 
I inquired diffidently what inducement 
Chai, tier would propose to offer to the 
Syrians if [their] aid were to be in- 
voked. He said that he would propose to 
offer them independence on something 
like the Egyptian model, that is to say 
independence qualified by the need for 
safe-guarding essential French strategic 
interests. 27 
At the Foreign Office this remarkable report was received 
like manna, for the perplexed personnel of the Eastern Department 
saw in Catroux's remarks a solution to the Syrian problem. They 
had long since explained this problem to the War Cabinet: 
The Arabs would hardly be human... if 
they did not hope, as a result of the 
present difficulties of France to 
secure at the least some relaxation 
of French control in Syria and even. 
in the Lebanon: and at the most complete 
independence for these countries, with 
the substitution of British for French 
protection as a kind of half-way house. 
But "nothing would be more likely to prejudice future Anglo-French 
unity in a wider field than the suspicion that [we] had taken 
advantage of the difficulties of France to whittle down the 
French position 
fin Syria ". 28 
These considerations placed the British in an awkward 
position, because they could ill-afford to show indifference to 
Arab aspirations at a time when Arab goodwill was so badly needed. 
On the Levant question, even Britain's most loyal client seemed 
bent on embarrassing her to the detriment of Anglo-French relations. 
Kirkbride, in Transjordan, saw this at first hand: 
Another chronic source of complication 
was that the Amir (later King) Abdullah 
pursued a Greater Syria policy with 
enthusiasm and persistence [i. e. ] he 
still worked for the reunion of Jordan 
and Syria under a Hashmite king, him- : 
self.... his effort were unceasing and 
no amount of discouragement from His 
Majesty's-Government would stop them: 
Z7 
the result was, of course, that the 
French and Syrians believed firmly 
that the British were egging King 
Abdullah on. 29 
This recollection is certainly verified by the contemp- 
orary documents. As soon as the French administration in Syria had 
accepted the Vichy armistice, MacMichael reported, Abdullah was 
straining at the leash: 
First reaction of the Amir... was to state 
his intention of (a) issuing public 
statement that Transjordan and Syria 
would henceforth be one country under 
Great Britain, (b) preparing forces with 
which to occupy any part of Syria [held 
by] French or from which they could be 
ejected. British Resident took the correct 
line pointing out the disadvantages and 
difficulties and staved him off but knows 
he has sent emissaries to his friends in 
Syria. without telling the British Resident. 
MacMichael added that the "Amir and [his) Intelligentsia ... seem 
to favour the policy of making the position of the French un- 
tenable in order to force intervention by us". 
30 
All this called for a. considerable feat of diplomatic 
juggling on the part of the British. They had somehow to meet Arab 
aspirations without prejudice to the French position and the 
future of Anglo-French relations. It was against this daunting 
background that Catroux had come forward, the deus ex machina who 
with British collaboration would offer to fulfil Arab aspirations. 
*R* 
Catroux's suggestion set in motion certain ideas and 
activities which were highly significant for the subsequent Anglo- 
Free". -French occupation of the Levant. From this point there 
gradually evolved two controversial and unhappy policies: British 
identification with any Free French pledge of Syrian independence, 
and the idea of British personnel making preparatory overtures to 
'2-9 
various Syrians. It is important to observe the origin of these 
ideas in some detail, for they were to become the subject of 
bitter Free French allegations, and were later interpreted as 
the thin edge of the wedge which levered France out of the Levant 
altogether. 
At the Foreign Office, Catroux's idea inspired a minute 
which became the basis for an important telegram to Cairo. Its 
author, P. M. Crosthwaite, thought that Catroux's suggested bid 
for the support of the Syrians would be ineffective "unless we 
get things going beforehand.... The ground must be prepared, 
and above all, they must be prevented from turning to the Axis". 
Such preparation would be politically risky of course, for "the 
promise to do our best to bring about certain changes in a part 
of the world which does not belong to us would certainly be a 
commitment of an awkward kind". Nevertheless, 
if we stick to safety we may get nowhere, 
and General Catroux at least... seems to be 
prepared to go really as far as one could 
wish. General Catroux cannot, of course, 
speak for France [but we cannot] do all 
the fighting and restore the "greatness" 
of France without some sacrifice on her 
part. Nor is the sacrifice involved in 
agreeing to an independent Syria in the 
sense that Egypt or Iraq is independent, 
a very great one. 
That last sentence was certainly not lacking in irony. Crosthwaite 
concluded by noting that it seemed best as far as possible to deal F 
with Catroux, "as hfs own views seem so reasonable", and to leave 
to Catroux himself the delicate task of securing de Gaulle 's 
agreement. 
31 The current Head of Eastern Department felt bound 
to endorse all this, while stressing the need for "great caution". 
32 
Crosthwaite's suggestions were therefore distilled into a draft 
telegram and the approval of the Colonial Office was sought. 
While this reply was awaited, a most apposite wire was 
received from Cairo, in which the views already attributed to 
Catroux were set forth by the man himself: 
25 
We cannot... retake Syria except by force, 
an operation which at the moment is 
neither possible nor desirable. We could 
easily obtain assistance of a native rising.... 
The line to follow at the moment is... to 
create maximum difficulties... by blockade, 
weakening army by encouraging desertions 
by propaganda and, if I consider it necessary, 
by a declaration of a political character to 
be made in name of Free France which would 
promise to Syria instead of a mandate a 
recognition of independence, reserving 
essential rights of France and conceived 
in spirit of treaty between Great Britain 
and Egypt.... 
Please communicate the above to General de 
Gaulle. 33 
This statement was welcomed in London, where Crosthwaite minuted 
that Catroux's scheme to "promise Syria independence on the 
Egyptian model... is distinctly helpful from the point of view of 
our relations with the Arabs". Referring to the relevant draft 
telegram already in the pipeline, Crosthwaite added that if the 
Colonial Office concurred, Catroux's wire "gives us a good 
opening". 
34 
By New Year's Day, 1941, the Colonial Office had indeed 
concurred, virtually without changing a word. 
35 
Early in January 
a long message was therefore transmitted to the British Ambassador 
in Cairo, Sir Miles Lampson. It began by referring to the reported 
desire of certain Syrian emigres in Iraq for "a Round Table con- 
ference between us and leaders of all political parties in Syria, 
at which we would undertake to use our influence after the war to 
ensure the establishment of an independent Syria". Such a conference 
or public commitment, Lampson was told, "seems impossible in 
present circumstances if only in view of French reactions". Never- 
theless it was "important to prevent Nationalists lining up with 
Axis Powers. " . and it would have better effect still in Iraq and 
other Arab countries if they were actually to look to us for 
support". And while it would be unwise to foment a premature Arab 
rising in the Levant. "it seems clear that unless ground is well 
Sb 
prepared beforehand, neither we nor Free French can expect help 
from population in Syria if and when we need it". In spite of 
the difficulties, therefore, 
an effort should be made to establish contact 
now with Syrian refugees in Iraq [and] if they 
appear genuinely anxious to co-operate with 
us, we should consider providing them with money 
for expenses of their organisation. At the same 
time it might be desirable to establish contact 
with other elements in Syria, in particular the 
Druzes. Please consult General Catroux and let 
me know his views as soon as possible. 
Lampson was also asked to obtain "in due course" Catroux's 
reactions to another delicate option, which would be avoided for as 
long as possible: 
we may have to give sane kind of assurance to 
[the Syrians] if further progress is to be 
made; presumably on the lines that we will use 
our influence after the war to bring about the 
independence of Syria on the Egyptian and Iraqi 
model, a solution which I note General Catroux 
himself has in mind. 
Lest Catroux should be unduly alarmed, a comforting thought was 
added on-the nature of independence in the Middle East. "Our 
experience in Egypt shows that it is possible to make concessions 
on these lines without surrendering vital requirements, ' and if 
example of Iraq is less happy, it must be remembered that we have 
no ground troops there". 
36 
It is a pity that Catroux's response to the Crosthwaite 
telegram is still inacessible. * Yet there can be little doubt that 
he expressed general approval of these proposals, which were a 
practical extension of his own plan. The independence proclamation 
was bound to be more effective if the audience had already been 
wooed by a judicious blend of propaganda and bribery. The point 
was taken by Catroux, whose scheme was nothing if not a deliberate 
exploitation of Syrian nationalism, for a later telegram reports 
his specific agreement that the contacting and bribery of emigre 
............. .. 
* See note 36, 
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Syrian leaders should continue. 
37 As for the limitations of 
Syrian independence, the Foreign Office hardly needed to comfort 
Catroux: events were to prove that his definition of independence 
was highly original. 
It is also unlikely that Catroux jibbed at a delicate and 
qualified British participation in this promise of independence, 
as explained by his sympathetic hosts. At this stage Catroux was 
acting in close collaboration with Lampson and Navell, and 
informing de Gaulle almost as an afterthought. Unlike his chief, 
he was the most agreeable of allies, not given to dark suspicions 
of British perfidy. 
38 It took the unhappy aftermath of a joint 
invasion to alert him to the considerable gulf between British 
and Free French interests in the Levant. Even then, according to 
a Beirut eyewitness, he remained "keen on the war effort". 
39 
It would seem that Catroux gave his general assent to 
the proposals in the Crosthwaite telegram. This can hardly be said 
for some British authorities in the Middle East. In Baghdad the 
British Ambassador, Sir Basil Newton, was uncomfortably aware of 
Arab discontent in Iraq and expressed his misgivings. He believed 
that the Syrian nationalists would certainly demand political 
assurances, which would cause trouble for Britain with the Iraqis 
and Palestinians as well as the Free French. In Newton's view the 
Crosthwaite proposals were not only dangerous and ill-advised, 
but pointless: "It-is not clear to me what help his Majesty's 
Government expect to need from the population in Syria". 
40 
From Jerusalem, Sir Harold MacMichael sent'an even stronger 
objection. He regarded the Cätroux plan as shortsighted opportunism. 
The Free French were simply "concerned to outbid Vichy" and would 
impose a cynical treaty upon the Syrians. It would therefore be 
disastrous for Britain to be associated with the scheme. 
41 At the 
Foreign Office, MacMichael's views were briefly summarised: 
,r t' 
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He maintains that we ought to make no 
promises at all to any Syrian party and 
ought not even to associate ourselves with 
promises made by the Free French [because 
independence] would have to be qualified in 
such a way that the proposed solution would 
inevitably be rejected. 42 
These objections were virtually ignored. The above minute was not 
even written until 10 March, by which time the die was cast, and 
British emissaries had approached the Syrians with the heady wine 
of national liberation and personal gain. 
Meanwhile Catroux himself had readjusted his Syrian time- 
tables. While informing de Gaulle that "France will only maintain 
herself in the Levant after the war... on basis of a grant of 
political independence and conclusion of a treaty of alliance", 
he explained that no open declaration on Syrian independence could 
yet be made. It would only 
provoke excitement and possibly. trouble in 
the Levant which we would not be in a 
position either to appease or to control 
against which the army and the authorities 
would form a bloc, and which would risk 
exploitation either by Iraq or Turkey. 
Moreover, it might create trouble on the Palestinian border at a 
time when Wavell was "elsewhere engaged". In the light of all this, 
Catroux concluded, it was necessary "to temporize until the 
situation is more favourable". 
43 
The military' situation certainly demanded a moratorium 
on the public side of Catroux's plan. Even as Catroux wrote, 
British forces were in full cry across Libya, hounding the bewil- 
dered Italian army. It was no time to create disorder in the rear 
or confront the Army of the Levant. This was readily appreciated 
in the Foreign Office, where Crosthwaite minuted that "Wavell 
is probably right in thinking that a public declaration about 
Syria might cause trouble there. We obviously do not want that 
until we are in a position to exploit it". 44 
Nevertheless it was hoped that the Cairo authorities 
would "get ahead now with winning over Syrian support on rather 
-3 -? 
less spectacular lines". 
45 However this plan, although accepted 
in principle, was set aside while Catroux made one more attempt 
to resurrect the dead: on 31 January he wrote to the new High 
Commissioner in Beirut, General Dentz -a former intelligence 
officer in the Levant, a bitter Anglophobe and a confirmed Petainist. 
To this unlikely soul Catroux addressed an appeal to rejoin the 
Allies, (i. e., Britain and Free France), on the understanding that 
French rights in the Levant would be guaranteed and the Free French 
would keep out. 
46 It was an exercise in futility. Dentz regarded 
the Free French as traitors and rebels who represented "all that 
which has killed us: Democratic-Masonic politics and Judeo-Saxon 
finance ". 47 
Catroux's appeal had not been made in isolation. Attempts 
were being made at that time to win over Weygand himself, now in 
command of French North Africa. Hence the decision to postpone any 
approach to the Syrians in case the French proconsuls were prepared 
to do a deal. It was a forlorn hope, but until the Vichy door was 
slammed in their faces, the Cairo authorities were bound to post- 
pone the nationalist tactic. Late in January, Catroux, Wavell 
and Lampson had therefore agreed not to pursue conversations with 
the Syrians until Weygand's stance was established, since this might 
provoke unnecessary trouble for Dentz in Syria* 
48 
*a* 
It was soon clear that neither Weygand nor Dentz would 
co-operate, which left Cairo free to pursue it second alternative - 
to invoke Syrian nationalism and raise a fifth column against the 
Army of the Levant. The Crosthwaite telegram was therefore dusted 
off and its proposals were revived. These were to pursue discussions 
with Syrian emigres in Iraq and if possible "to establish contact 
with other elements in Syria, in particular the Druzes". Some 
ground work had already been done on the first of these proposals. 
Sý4 
As early as 14 December Crosthwaite was aware that the Baghdad 
Embassy had been in touch with the Syrian leader Jamil Mardam. 
49 
These contacts were now followed up and continued until Operation 
Exporter. 
50 
At the same time action was initiated on the second 
proposal, to approach "other elements in Syria", and it was here 
that something went very badly wrong. This indeed was the most 
dubious aspect of the Crosthwaite telegram. It was proposed to 
seek out the Druzes, a formidable people who had offered prolonged 
and bloody resistance to French rule. They occupied the rugged hills 
of the Jebel Druze, an area which, to the exasperation of French 
and British mandatory officials, overlapped the border of Trans- 
jordan. It was inhospitable territory, and only 15 years had 
passed since the Druzes had destroyed a French column 3,000 strong. 
It had taken General Gamelin two months and another 7,000 troops 
to relieve Suweida, on the western edge of the Jebel Druze. 
51 
It was now proposed that this fiercely independent people 
be approached for support against the Army of the Levant. This must 
have been quite a pill for Catroux to swallow. Yet frag the military 
point of view, such an approach was needed before the commencement 
of Operation Exporter: 
if the [Allied) forces were to make straight 
for Damascus, the Druze mountains would be 
behind their right flank and rear. If the 
Druzes were hostile, they would be in a 
position to attack the communications of 
the force advancing on Damascus. 52 
In view of the Druzes' recent performances against Western troops, 
no force advancing northwards towards Damascus could afford to 
ignore them. To make a serious bid for Syria implied, therefore, 
making some arrangement with the Druzes. Catroux may have felt 
uncomfortable about this, but-he could hardly evade the means 
required'to achieve his own ends. 
3S 
In February 1941 the die was cast. Emissaries were 
sent to those "other elements in Syria". Kirkbride himself went 
to the Druzes, while Major John B. Glubb, Commander of Trans- 
Jordan's Arab Legion, crossed the border and "opened communica- 
tions with the tribes on the east of the line Hama-Horns-Damascus", 
53 
It is still not clear whether Catroux fully accepted this scheme 
in the first place, although he accepted the approach to the 
Syrian emigres<in Iraq. And there is no evidence that Catroux 
was specifically informed of the instructions given to Kirkbride 
and Glubb. 
What is clear, up to this point, is that no British 
authority was consciously pursuing measures designed to evict 
France fron the Levant. In London the Colonial Office was acting 
as the junior partner to the Foreign Office, which had asked for 
Catroux's reactions to its suggestions. At the very worst, the 
Foreign Office was doing no more than encouraging the Free French 
to belatedly bless the 1936 Franco-Syrian treaty, which was 
modelled on the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. But Crosthwaite and his 
superiors, remote from the cut and thrust of Syrian affairs, 
assumed that Catroux meant to grant some meaningful independence 
to the Levant States, and that the local peoples would really 
consider this sufficient. On the basis of these dubious assump- 
tions it was thought that Britain could be accepted as a kind of 
midwife at the birth of Syrian independence. 
54 
By February 1941 aspects of the Crosthwaite telegram had 
evolved into the mission of Glubb and Kirkbride, and at this 
point there occurred the first of many disastrous episodes in 
Anglo-Free French relations. For while these men largely succeeded 
in winning the active support of the Druzes and the tribesmen, they 
did so by carrying out anti-French propaganda in which no distinc- 
tion was drawn between Vichy and Free France, and by suggesting 
that Britain would temporarily govern Syria until peace and 
independence were realised. They therefore gained Syrian support 
34 
at a price which was intolerable to Free France. 
According to Glubb, this was all an honest mistake. 
Although he and Kirkbride had long been accused of intriguing 
against the French, Glubb claims that even after the Vichy- 
German armistice they had "abstained scrupulously fron interfer- 
ence in Syria". 
55 
Kirkbride also refers to French suspicions, 
attributing these to a combination of French paranoia and the 
persistent intrigues of the Emir Abdullah. 
56 
Both Glubb and Kirkbride say that they had always kept 
out of the internal affairs of Syria and confined themselves to 
such wholesome forays as calling on the French Governor of the 
Jebel Druze. 57 Until February 1941. "Then suddenly", wrote Glubb, 
we received secret instructions from England 
reversing the situation. We were told to place 
ourselves in touch with the people of Syria.... 
Money was placed at our disposal for this 
purpose. It was agreed that Kirkbride should 
deal with the Druzes and I with the Syrian 
tribes. 58. 
Both men absorbed this complete reversal of policy and energeti- 
cally carried out their orders. "I knew most of the Druze leaders 
personally", wrote Kirkbride, and "not only was their neutrality 
assured but arrangements were made which resulted in most of... 
the Druze irregular catalry coming over to our side as soon as 
hostilities in Syria commenced". 
59 The Syrian tribesmen also 
responded well to the overtures of Major Glubb. 
Apart from financial inducements, Kirkbride and Glubb 
undoubtedly owed their success to bald anti-French propaganda 
Which has been nicely summarised by Glubb himself: 
The Arabs for 25 years past had resented 
the presence? of the French in Syria, but 
the alliance: between France and Britain had 
made it impossible, to oust them. Now by a 
fortunate coincidence, as it appeared to 
the Arabs, the British and French were on 
opposite sides. The hour for the redemption 
of Syria had struck. 60 
3] 
In this simple gospel of national deliverance there was no room 
for fine distinctions between Vichy and Free Frenchmen. Indeed, as 
Glubb rightly remarks, "the difference between the two was one 
affecting their attitude towards Germany, and was a matter of 
indifference to the Syrians". 
61 
Nevertheless, the Glubb-Kirkbride 
propaganda was a serious distortion. of London's intentions, for 
it completely eliminated the Free French from Syrian affairs, and 
implied that the Levant States would owe their independence purely 
to the British. 
When these activities came to light, the most acrimonious 
dispute flared up between the British and Free French. De Gaullep 
citing Glubb's activities and the recruitment of the Druzes, 
declared that Britain was playing a game 
settled in London by firmly established 
services, carried out on the spot by a 
team without scruples but not without 
resources, accepted by the Foreign Office... 
and supported by the Prime Minister.... 
British policy [was] to replace France at 
Damascus and at Beirut. 62 
The activities of Kirkbride and Glubb certainly gave this impression. 
Yet it is now clear that when they received their instructions 
London was pursuing no such policy. 
What went wrong? Glubb himself has offered an explanation 
which once seemed perfectly reasonable, given the considerable 
incompetence and con! usion in Cairo: 
In the preparatory work undertaken before 
the invasion of Syria, it had been assumed 
by one and all that French control of Syria 
was at an end.... It was just one more of 
those misunderstandings.... Presumably in 
London the Free French had been promised the 
control of Syria.... Apparently the commanders 
in the Middle East were not aware of the 
promise. Certain it is that no mention of it 
was made to us. [Hence propaganda inevitably 
took the form of the lLration of Syria from 
French control. 63 
31 
On second thoughts, however, this statement merely deepens the 
mystery. It also clouds the'issue by referring to some specific 
promise, as though control of Syria was ever disputed. In the 
end British forces were employed only because all possibilities 
short of invasion had been exhausted and the Free French alone 
were too weak to defeat the Army of the Levant. But there was 
never any dispute about who would govern a liberated Syria. Free 
French intentions were clear all along, and British acceptance 
of them was the pre-condition for Catroux's presence in Wavell's 
bailiwick. 
The most controversial feature of Glubb's explanation 
is, however, the clear implication that he and Kirkbride were 
unaware of Free French intentions and were not informed that the 
Free French would govern Syria after the campaign. The trouble 
with this claim is that Catroux's intentions were certainly 
known to Kirkbride. He had been present three months earlier 
when Catroux had confided his plans to MacMichael. 
64 Kirkbride 
himself says that prior to the invasion he was given 
two preparatory tasks, (a) to contact the 
leaders of the Druze community... and (b) 
to assist General Catroux... to get into 
touch with certain French officers in 
Syria who were believed to. have Gaullist 
sympathies. 
Ironically enough, he described Catroux as "impressive, with 
sound ideas". 
65 
Kirkbride knew that `Catroux was bound for Damascus and 
that his destination had been agreed in London. Glubb's assertion 
that "no mention of it was made to us" is therefore highly 
ambiguous. It is unlikely that Glubb himself was unaware of the 
Free French scheme. It would appear that he learned from Kirkbride 
what Catroux had confided in Jerusalem three months earlier. When 
recently reminded of this Jerusalem meeting, he said 
3L 
I did hear something about that. Catroux 
was proposing to beguile the Syrians! I 
must admit we felt a great resentment. It 
seemed like 1920 all over again - another 
double-cross. 
It is also apparent that Glubb and Kirkbride discussed their 
instructions in February 1941, for the division of labour (Glubb 
to the tribesmen, Kirkbride to the Druzes) was "a commonsense 
arrangement between us", according to Glubb. 
66 
Kirkbride and Glubb were not unaware that the Free French 
intended to eontrol. Syria as soon as the Vichy authorities were 
unseated. Yet this was consciously omitted from their message, 
for they carried out anti-French propaganda which made no 
exception of Free France, and in effect they represented Britain 
as the sole liberator of Syria. 
It is difficult to find a satisfactory explanation for 
this episode. To the Gaullists, unable to reconcile Foreign Office 
assurances with the behaviour of British agents in Syria, it was 
simply proof of "an English. policy of encroachments on our domain"* 
67 
It was perhaps inevitable that the Free French should draw this 
conclusion. They were nevertheless mistaken, for the Glubb-Kirkbride 
propaganda was a serious distortion of the Crosthwaite proposals. 
A more complex explanation is required, and although some evidence 
is still withheld, the general outlines are already clear. They 
throw light on this and many subsequent misunderstandings in the 
Levant. Ultimately the answer lies as much in the confused nature 
of the British presence in the Arab world, as in the attitudes of 
Glubb and Kirkbride. 
Whitehall did not have a simple grasp of the situation in 
the Middle East. Since 1914 it had become entangled in a web of 
contradictions. Britain's Arab empire was now an amorphous mosaic 
of mandates and 'alliances' run by different London bureaucracies. 
Moreover, Britain was floundering in a -morass of tribal, pan-Arab 
and Zionist aspirations. As &result, British`polic]? was a'polite 
c 
term for a daily balancing act. With no distinct goal - in an 
area seething with contradictory aims - British policy had a 
Galilean flavour: "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof". 
As an exasperated Whitehall official wrote in 1941, the British 
should have been 
taking Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and 
the Lebanon as the unit, and trying to clear 
our ideas as to what the future of those 
territories ought to be. We must try to 
devise some practicable ultimate aim to- 
wards which British policy should be directed. 
When we know what we want [: ] , we shall 
have a clearer idea of what our day to day, 
or month to month, policy should be... 68 
This state of affairs -a presence in search of a purpose - 
meant that undue powers and initiatives had devolved upon Britain's 
local representatives. When war came again to the Middle East, these 
responsibilities were increased by the obvious need for action 
relevant to the flow of events, for few military actions were 
without some political significance. Thus in the administration of 
Middle Eastern territories, the regional tail often wagged the 
metropolitan dog. This centrifugal tendency was strengthened when 
Whitehall officials proved inadequate. A case in point was C. W. 
Baxter, who was "useless as Head of Eastern Department" and "a 
bone-head" according to one Foreign Office mandarin, while Spears 
called him "the wettest thing I have ever come across". 
69 
The subtle shift in responsibilities from Whitehall to 
various Middle Eastern centres was aided by the unwieldy organis- 
ation of Britain's Arab empire. As mandates, Palestine and 
Transjordan cane under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office. 
The former was governed by the High Commissioner, the latter care- 
fully monitored by his subordinate Kirkbride, who was attached to 
the government of Abdu]1ah. Egypt and Iraq, the 'independent' 
allies of Great Britain, were politically garrisoned by ambassadors 
reporting to the Foreign Office. Under war conditions, such dis- 
guised imperialism gave these diplomats enormous responsibilities. 
9 
This patchwork administration of the Middle East made a distinct 
and unified British policy even more unlikely, leaving more 
initiative in the hands of the men on the spot, and encouraging 
local interpretations of British policy and interests in the 
Middle East. "There are too many would-be Lawrences in these 
parts", observed Spears in 1941, only to become one himself. 
70 
Finally, the war situation superimposed upon this 
political mosaic a unified command which pursued its regional 
military purposes. Military strategy often had the most profound 
political repercussions, but it constantly outreached any single 
civilian authority in the Middle East. * Politico-military liaison - 
never a happy affair - was hopeless when a centralised military 
headquarters was expected to deal with a battery of ambassadors, 
high commissioners and residents reporting to separate departments 
in London. Soldiers became policy-makers in such circumstances: 
the result of unevenly divided responsib- 
ilities was that the military were forever 
tempted, and seldom resisted the temptation, 
to formulate policy in spheres quite beyond 
military responsibility. This tendency was 
accentuated by the growth of all sorts of 
Intelligence services [which] tended to 
suggest policies of their own... 71 
It is against this background that we must account for the 
activities of Glubb and Kirkbride. To begin with, it is apparent 
that Glubb's "secret instructions" did not come directly "from 
England" at all. 
72 In London the matter was controlled by the 
Foreign Office, which had already shot its bolt - the Crosthwaite 
telegram. This had been shelved in Cairo while overtures were made 
to Dentz and Weygand. "In view of the reply from Cairo", minuted 
Crosthwaite on 8 March, "we decided for the time being to hold 
73 
our hand". Yet Glubb's instructions were received in the latter 
half of Februazy. 
74 They certainly did not come from England. 
* Churchill attempted to correct this situation in July 1941 by 
the appointment of a Minister of State to represent the War 
Cabinet in the Middle East. 
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With the shelving of the Crosthwaite proposals, Cairo 
had taken the lead, and far away in the Foreign Office Baxter 
eventually recorded that 
The latest proposals from Cairo... are 
that we should try to keep the Syrian 
parties in play by doling out a little 
money all round, but should avoid entering 
into any political commitments... 75 
The matter was being left to Wavell, Lampson and Catroux. Although 
there was nothing in the "latest proposals" to which Catroux really 
objected, it is not hard to see how they could have inspired the 
orders given to Kirkbride and Glubb. Without alerting the Vichy 
authorities, they brought certain Syrian parties into play, dis- 
tributed money and - only too well! - avoided political commit- 
ments" 
In their memoirs, Glubb and Kirkbride indicate that 
their orders came from the military authorities. Thus, as the 
Druzes were a potential military threat, "Kirkbride undertook to 
establish relations with the Druze leaders in order to prevent 
such an eventuality! '. 
76 They were certainly in a receptive mood. 
"The Druze have been active of late", reported Kirkbride himself 
in January, "in angling for British intervention in Syria and for 
offers for the assistance of the Druze people in that eventuality". 
77 
Glubb's own orders also reflected a military purpose. As the 
leader of an allicä force, Glubb had earlier suggested 
that while the regular forces advanced directly 
upon Beirut and Damascus, another force should 
move up the Desert east of the Druze mountains.... 
The General Staff had already had the same idea. 
While, therefore, Kirkbride established re- 
lations with the Druzes, I opened communications 
with the tribes on the east of the line Hama- 
Homs-Damascus. 78 
The implication of Glubb's whole account is that the February 
orders came from military authorities in Cairo. Kirkbride also 




The military origin of these orders throws some light 
on the mystery. The general liaison problem in the Middle East 
has already been noted, along with the tendency for various 
military authorities to overlook or encroach upon political areas. 
There was also the breezy assumption that Britain and Free France 
had synonymous objectives. Lastly there was the vast tangle of 
proliferating sub-sections within Middle East Command, wherein 
the left hand hardly knew what the right hand was doing. In the 
case of military Intelligence - and the Glubb-Kirkbride assignment 
clearly belonged in this category - this was especially true. Under 
these circumstances it was only too easy for orders to be issued 
which, through ignorance or indifference or even maverick intent, 
brushed aside Free French aims in Syria. General Headquarters at 
this time was noted for its serious inefficiencies and lack of 
co-ordination. 
As a result Glubb and Kirkbride were permitted to take 
no account of the Free French position and to contradict the policy 
of co-operation implied by Catroux's position in Cairo. They had 
the freedom to use the most locally effective line of. propaganda, 
which was "the liberation of Syria from French control". 
so This, 
and the considerable sums of money which they distributed, clinched 
the support of the Druzes and the desert tribesmen: "the work was 
done mainly by persuasion", Kirkbride insisted, "but General 
Headquarters seemed to consider that bribery was necessary, and 
rather against my will some 200,000 pounds were provided for dis- 
tribution to the leaders". 
81 
To the, twoEnglishmen in Amman, this task was not unwelcome. 
Both Glubb and Kirkbride were keen Arabophiles. They had a genuine 
respect for Arab culture and civilisation, sympathy for Arab 
aspirations, and a belief that Britain could and should guide the 
Arabs through their transition from Ottoman bondage to modern 
independence. They were not proud of their government's earlier 
dealings with the trench, which had led to the repressive French 
acquisition of Syria and Lebanon. They were incensed by Catroux's 
ýý 
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plan to exploit Levant nationalism - with British collaboration - 
and looked on this scheme as a new betrayal of Arab aspirations. 
Accordingly Glubb and Kirkbride must have considered 
their instructions with great satisfaction. There were no Vichy/ 
Gaullist distinctions, no stipulations about a Free French 
administration. By simply carrying out their orders, therefore, 
they were opposing Free French designs. * In the absence of political 
guidelines, their anti-French propaganda was the most effective 
interpretation of their immediate task. If these orders were in- 
jurious to Free French plans, of which they happened to have first- 
hand knowledge, this was not their fault. They could safely argue 
that in the absence of distinct instructions they were not bound 
to snatch Catroux's chestnuts out of the fire. Besides, what could 
they hope to achieve across the border if they merely announced 
the imminent replacement of one set of Frenchmen by another? 
Vichy/Gaullist distinctions were patently meaningless to a Druze 
or a Bedouin. A clear path was open, and Glubb and Kirkbride took 
this path with a will. 
The Glubb-Kirkbride affair was an ominous overture for 
Anglo-Free French relations in the Levant. It was also a disastrous 
by-product of Catroux's original idea of exploiting Syrian nation- 
alism. In this sense his half-baked suggestion had already proved 
to be unhappy. Developed by Crosthwaite, volleyed back and forth 
by the Foreign and Colonial Office men, it was eventually lobbed 
into Wavell's court,! where a very muddled game was in progress. 
As the idea circulated through Middle East Command,, its Free French 
raison d'etre was obscured. When the Glubb-Kirkbride instructions 
emerged in February 1941 they bore no resemblance to their Free 
French grandparent. 
* Despite extensive searches, no trace of these orders has been . found. Any such document in Cairo may have been destroyed on "Ash 
Wednesday" (1 July 1942). On that day, when Rommel seemed poised 
to take the Nile delta, the Cairo air was thick with the smoke of 
burning files hastily destroyed by the British authorities. 
c5 
The 3lubb-Kirkbride mission was distinctly useful when 
the time came to fight in Syria, but for Anglo-Free French re- 
lations it was a stumbling-block. Without frustrating Free French 
plans to control the Levant, it nourished the myth of a ubiquitous 
network of ArabophHles. Ironically it was not so much relentless 
British teamwork - as de Gaulle claimed - but the dilapidated 
machinery of British power in the Middle East which allowed such 
incidents to occur, 
However, recriminations were all in the future. As the 
winter receded, Middle East Command seemed largely preoccupied 
with other theatres; Catroux bided his time, looking for some 
chink in Dentz's armour; and de Gaulle made the arduous journey 
from London to central Africa, and on to Khartoum and Cairo. 
With him came General Spears, whose first comments from Cairo 
were only too pertinent: "Lack of liaison in many directions 
strikes the observer here as being a serious evil", he told 
Churchill. "Good relations between individuals are no substitute 
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Chapter Two OPERATION EXPORTER: THE DECISION TO TAKE THE LEVANT 
if the Germans can pick up Syria and Iraq with 
petty air forces, tourists and local revolts we 
must not shrink from running equal small-scale 
military risks, and facing the possible 
aggravation of political dangers... Churchill* 
The harder you strike at Vichy, the more 
necessary it is to safeguard the interests 
and feelings of France. de Gaulle + 
De Gaulle and Spears arrived in Cairo on the first day of 
April 1941 -a critical month for British fortunes in the Mediter- 
ranean and Middle East. On the very next day there was an anti- 
British coup in Iraq. On the third, Rommel took Benghazi. Three days 
later the Germans invaded Greece and began to overpower its British 
defenders. By 11 April Rommel, had driven Wavell's forces out of 
Libya and was menacing Egypt. The whole perimeter was shrinking 
rapidly, and in the rear the Iraqi coup raised the spectre of Arab 
disaffection and insurrection. 
With these heavy anxieties Wavell had little time or desire 
to ponder the Syrian question. This did not deter the single-minded 
de Gaulle, who raised the matter on every possible occasion. For the 
Free French leader, there was no more vital subject than the Levant. 
De Gaulle was not unaware of Wavell's difficulties, and privately 
sympathised with ; the hard-pressed Commander- in-Chief .l Nevertheless 
he considered that, it was only by rocking the boat that he could 
get anything done, for at that time Free French prospects in the 
Levant looked particularly bleak. 
A sort of laissez-faire atmosphere seemed to have evolved 
between Damascus and Cairo, and this naturally left the Free French 
cause in the doldrums. Dentz, like Wavell, had quite enough problems 
to handle, and neither man wanted trouble on the Palestinian border. 
* Churchill telegram to Wavell, 21 May 1941, PREM 3 422/6. 
+ message to Churchill in Spears tel., 6 June 1941, PREM 3 422/6. 
s-/ 
The Vichy High Commissioner, walking the tightrope of neutrality, 
had had a difficult winter. He had endured on one hand a stream 
of British and Free French propaganda, and the economic hardships 
of a British naval blockade. On the other hand he had been 
afflicted by the presence of Otto Werner von Hentig, Ribbentrop's 
specialist in Arab affairs, who had exceeded his fact-finding 
brief and blatantly courted the nationalists in the Levant States. 
For the benefit of Arab leaders Hentig screened the film 
Sieg im Western, on the German conquest of France, and suggested 
that the French mandate was as defunct as the League of Nations. 
He went on to raise the possibility of a new Arab Empire, and 
among other things spread the rumour that 20,000 French refugees 
were to be settled on lands which would be taken from the Syrians. 
a 
Dentz was fully aware of these activities and was not slow to 
blame Hentig when anti-Vichy demonstrations began in Damascus at the 
end of February - shortly after Hentig's departure. The disturbances 
were sparked off by the food crisis and inflation, but when 
nationalists called a general strike in Syria and Lebanon, political 
issues began to take precedence. Faced by demands for the return of 
representative government and the resurrection of the Franco-Syrian 
treaty of 1936, Dentz was forced in mid-March to negotiate with the 
nationalists. Early in April he established a facade of 
representative government in the Levant States in an effort to 
defuse the political issue. 
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The embattled Frenchman was inclined to blame the Germans for 
the crisis, and on 5 March he voiced his suspicions to the American 
Consul General in Beirut, who commented that "six weeks ago Dentz 
would not have mentioned the Germans at all or would have accused 
the British of fomenting the disturbances. " In the face of Hentig's 
blatant subversion of French mandatory authority, and the extensive 
German propaganda and espionage network-- in the Levant, Dentz 
continued to blame the political crisis on the Germans. 
4 
SZ 
This situation led to a modest detente between Dentz and 
Wavell, for the latter was by no means pleased with the upheaval in 
the Levant. While British forces were away in Greece, Wavell wanted 
no emergency on the Palestine border. The Cairo authorities therefore 
decided to relax the British blockade and alleviate a situation which 
in their opinion could only be exploited by the Germans. On 19 March 
the economic blockade was lifted. Further steps were taken to assure 
more adequate food supplies for the Levant, and by the end of April 
a commercial treaty had been concluded with Dentz. 
5 
Rommel's advance 
through Cyrenaica added more weight to Wavell's argument that he 
could not afford to have a Syrian crisis on his hands. "Syria is most 
perplexing", Lampson told Churchill on 8 April: 
The trouble is that... we do not at present want 
disturbance there which might call for British troops 
so badly needed elsewhere. Wavell, Catroux and I are 
therefore agreed that we should play for time by 
offering a barter agreement, try to keep the Arab 
leaders quiet by money and advice and letting the 
French authorities know that we are out to help them 
keep order. 6 
This was a remarkable volte-face. Catroux's original idea had 
been to foment and exploit disorder in the Levant to achieve a Free 
French takeover. He had now conceded that this was untimely, and 
that for the moment Dentz was not to be troubled. Lampson's 
telegram continued: 
Wavell and I have for some time favoured a declaration 
by de Gaulle and Catroux at an opportune moment in 
favour of Syrian independence after the war.... Catroux 
felt this should be made from strength and not from 
weakness and that we should wait until we can spare 
troops from Palestine perhaps in a few months time... 
In putting the Wavell argument into, Catroux's mouth, Lampson was 
employing a certain artistic licence, for Catroux was accepting a 
fait accompli. 
De Gaulle and Spears were accepting no such thing. As Lampson 
admitted, de Gaulle "evidently wishes a more active policy 
[but] 
possibility of spontaneous movement from inside in favour of Free 
French has been extremely remote for some time past. "7 This was almost 
certainly the case, but it was hotly disputed by de Gaulle and Spears. 
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On 10 April Spears sent a long report to Churchill, wildly 
claiming that "Seventy per cent of the junior officers and N. C. O's 
are said to be inclined towards the Free French movement". 
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From 
a Free French point of view, de Gaulle simply could not afford to 
accept Wavell's position on Syria. Free France sorely needed the 
Levant and its French soldiers, but Wavell's policy could only 
consolidate the Vichy position there. This might give British 
forces a breathing space to deal with Axis troops in Greece and 
Libya, but it could also mean that the Levant would be lost to 
Free France. 
Behind this immediate Free French need there was an even 
more fundamental concern in the far-ranging mind of de Gaulle. 
This was that the whole French position in the Levant could be 
frittered away if the States were left in Vichy hands much longer. 
Dentz was already in deep trouble with the resurgent nationalists, 
who-found it doubly irksome to be subjects of a defeated and 
impotent nation. Worse still, the Vichy regime seemed to be allowing 
the Nazis a free hand to undermine the Idea of the French mandate, 
and to openly confront Arab leaders with the humiliating anomaly 
of being ruled by defeated foreigners. If this state of affairs 
continued, it could only be a matter of time before France was 
evicted from the Levant altogether. 
First and foremost a French patriot, de Gaulle strained at 
the leash in his anxiety to reach Beirut and Damascus, stop the rot, 
patch up the French image and reassert France's "historic mission" 
in the Levant. It was at this time that de Gaulle's long-range 
Syrian objective first. became evident to Spears, a relatively 
uncomplicated win-the-war man. The Englishman now began to see 
that while de Gaulle "realized the great importance of this theatre 
in the strategy of the war... what he was really concerned about was 
the political future of the States under French mandate. "9 It was 
one of the first signs of a great gulf which was to separate the 
two men forever. Yet for the moment they were a formidable 
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combination and a thorn in the side of Wavell's staff. De Gaulle's 
ultimate motivation may have been the resurgence of France as a 
world power, but he shared with Spears an immediate concern for 
the success of Free France in the Levant and against the Axis. 
Spears therefore provided robust support as the Frenchman summoned 
every available argument against Cairo's prevailing policy of delay. 
** 
The most powerful argument was that "it was essential to ensure 
that the Vichy Government did not have it within its power to allow 
the Germans to get a grip on the Middle East". If, for instance, 
the Luftwaffe gained the use of Syrian and Lebanese aerodromes, 
the whole British position in Egypt could be made untenable, and 
both the Suez canal and the Mediterranean lost. Wavell was not 
unaware of this gloomy possibility, but without the resources to 
take Syria, he believed that to aggravate Dentz's problems would be 
to play the Germans' game for them, since Hentig and his ilk were 
clearly bent on exploiting the trouble between Dentz and the 
nationalists. Therefore Dentz's hand had to be strengthened rather 
than weakened by British actions. 
De Gaulle was not impressed by this reasoning. In his view 
it rested on the fallacious assumption that Dentz, and the Petain 
government, could be relied upon to stand up to the Germans and 
observe a genuine neutrality. But de Gaulle asserted that "Dentz 
would get what he could and give nothing in return" and could only 
be relied upon to carry out the orders of the Vichy government, which 
was all too vulnerable to German pressure. The current economic 
and political appeasement of Dentz could therefore guarantee nothing. 
Only a Free French takeover in the Levant could guarantee that the 
pass would not be sold to the Axis. 
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De Gaulle's conclusion was simple. If there was a real 
danger of losing all by doing nothing then the allies had little to 
lose by a bold gamble. He "believed he could rally the French 
in the Levant provided he was helped to carry out his propaganda 
and his agents were given facilities and the movement of Vichy troops 
into Palestine, both singly and in large bodies, was encouraged... " 
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Spears endorsed de Gaulle's argument and fully agreed that the risk 
was worth it. His report to Churchill concluded that "we ought, even 
at some risk, to endeavour to rally Syria to the Free French cause. 
It is only when this occurs that we can hope to have achieved 
security for ourselves in Syria". 
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There was some weight in the de Gaulle-Spears contention that 
Vichy neutrality was a false refuge, and two more forceful advocates 
could not have been found in all the Middle East. They certainly 
overwhelmed the comparatively invertebrate Catroux, who soon found 
himself running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Catroux 
had reluctantly bowed to Wavell's assertion that for the time being 
nothing could be done about Syria, only to find his formidable chief 
taking up the cause which he had temporarily abandoned. Under this 
stiffening influence he began to find his original voice again, and 
according to Spears he "echoed" de Gaulle's feeling that prompt 
action was required. On 5 April he even accompanied Spears to 
Jerusalem to press the argument upon MacMichael. 
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Caught between his acceptance of Wavell's position and his 
Free French interests, Catroux had got himself hopelessly compromised 
by 15 April, when an Anglo-Free French conference was held on the 
Levant question. In the presence of Wavell, Longmore (R A F)). 
de Gaulle, Catroux and Spears, Lampson called for details of the 
Free French plan. Catroux promptly replied that two British divisions 
(one mechanised) plus the Free French troops should forthwith 
concentrate on the Palestine border and advance into Syria! This 
ludicrous suggestion effectively ruined all that de Gaulle and Spears 
had been saying and invited the worst possible conclusions about 
Free French competence, for the requisite British divisions simply 
did not exist. 
Spears was thunderstruck. The exasperated de Gaulle recovered 
himself sufficiently to say that British intervention at this point 
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was undesirable since propaganda tactics and moral persuasion were 
required to rally French troops in the Levant, whereas an 
unprovoked British attack would certainly be resisted. All that 
he required from the British was a decision to resume the 
blockade and to present a stern face to Dentz. But Catroux's faux 
pas made it only too easy for the British to dismiss Free French 
submissions. The only glimmer of hope came in the remarks of Sir 
Arthur Longmore who expressed the RAF's anxiety that the Luftwaffe 
might be allowed landing rights in Syria. 
14 
Discussion switched to Syrian and Lebanese attitudes, the 
recent concessions made by Dentz to the local nationalists, and 
whether Free France could match or surpass what Vichy had to offer 
the Syrian peoples. 
De Gaulle, asked if he would make declaration 
in favour of Syrian independence answered such 
a declaration now would only show weakness since 
he was not in a position to enforce it. He was 
however prepared to make such a declaration 
safeguarding however strategic needs at the 
moment he took over control of Syria. 15 
De Gaulle added that in any case the Arabs were unlikely to be 
impressed by Dentz's offers since similar promises in the past had 
come to nothing. * The meeting concluded with de Gaulle urging that 
Free French troops be concentrated in northern Palestine as an 
additional pressure on Dentz. 
16 
Later that day, Spears had a further discussion with Wavell 
on Syria. Intent on exploiting Longmore's useful remarks, Spears 
dwelt on the danger of enemy aircraft operating from Syrian 
aerodromes. He argued that "unless preparations were made 
immediately to deal with a possible landing of German aircraft in 
Syria, it might be impossible to retrieve the position". As a 
first step, Spears repeated de Gaulle's request for a Free French 
concentration in Palestine, asserting that it would be "obvious" to 
Dentz that they were there to combat any German landing in Syria. 
* This could only refer to the ill-fated 1936 Treaty and was a 
remarkable admission from the man who was to say, with such 
indignation, that the word of France needed no guarantee. 
(See page -76). 
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Though too polite to point out that Dentz might reasonably draw 
darker conclusions, Wavell could not be shaken. Even Spears was 
forced to desist. 
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Sensing the futility of any further representations in 
Wavell's stronghold, de Gaulle left Cairo the next day and returned 
to Brazzaville. Spears, who went with him, agreed that there was 
no point in repeating the same things to the same people any longer. 
"He believed... that he had done all he could to further his case 
in Cairo", wrote Spears. "Indeed it seemed to me his further 
presence would only tend to lead to friction". This was equally 
true for Spears himself, whose vigorous apologetics had aroused 
resentment at Wavell's headquarters. 
18 
De Gaulle was confident that he had read Vichy aright, and 
that under German pressure they would soon be acting the Trojan 
Horse in Syria. On reaching Brazzaville, he told Churchill that 
the Syrian situation 
is becoming bad from the Arab. point of view, in 
co-ordination with the Arab agitation in Iraq.... 
Moreover, there is no reason not to expect the setting 
up of enemy air bases in Syria if the German offensive 
in the Middle East calls for it. I do not think that 
the policy of consolidating Vichy in Syria by 
concessions... is a good one. 19 
xKx 
Ironically enough, events in Iraq and Syria were about to 
give fresh momentum to Free French hopes, to demolish the Cairo 
policy and to vindicate the Gaullist arguments that Dentz was 
unreliable and that enemy aircraft could operate from Vichy Syria. 
As a result Churchill and the War Cabinet were obliged to force a 
reversal of policy upon the reluctant Wavell. Laissez-faire attitudes 
were discarded as London decided to scrape up a motley invasion 
force and make a desperate bid to take the Levant. 
This train of events was set off by the revolt in Iraq, a 
formally independent country still somewhat stifled by the British, 
her old mandatory rulers. The situation had become increasingly 
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irksome to Iraqi nationalists and a storm had been brewing for 
years. In March 1940 Rashid All al-Gaylani became prime minister 
and implemented a distinctly independent policy. He refused to break 
off diplomatic relations with Italy and called for a revision of 
the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty by which Britain enjoyed a number of 
military and strategic privileges. At the same time he began to 
cultivate friendly communications with the Axis powers, and 
Baghdad became a centre for Axis intrigue and propaganda. 
Tension increased throughout 1940 but the situation was 
temporarily alleviated by Rashid Ali's abrupt resignation on 31 
January 1941. Although supported by an anti-British military 
cabal ("the Golden Square") he had not sufficiently carried 
cabinet and parliament with him in his hasty re-alignment of Iraq. 
Rashid All was replaced by General Taha, who proved more 
susceptible to British pressure. In March 1941 his foreign 
minister (Tawfic as-Suwaydi) was summoned to Cairo, to be 
sternly told by Eden himself that "Great Britain required a more 
co-operative attitude, and in particular, the immediate breaking 
off of relations with Italy". 
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Evidently affected by the Head 
Prefect's homily, Tawf ich went home and persuaded Taha to suppress 
the Golden Square. This move backfired disastrously and the defiance 
of the Golden Square developed: into a coup d'etat which swept Rashid 
All back into power on 3 April, at the head of a "Government of 
National Defence". 
Both Britain and the Axis were caught off balance by these 
events. The British were naturally inclined to regard its coincidence 
with German attacks in Libya and Greece as proof of a concerted 
plan, but from an Axis point of view Rashid Ali had jumped the gun, 
and would just have to cope with any British reaction as best he 
could. So unexpected was the coup that the new British ambassador, 
Sir Kinahan Cornwallis arrived in Baghdad on the very day that 
Rashid All assumed power. The latter strengthened his position by 
an astute constitutional charade which included, a pledge to abide 
by the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. 
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Britain's response eventually took the form suggested by 
Cornwallis, which was to call Rashid Ali's bluff. Cornwallis 
informed him that, in accordance with the Treaty, Britain wished 
to land a considerable force of troops at Basra, on the Persian 
gulf, and move them through to Palestine to reinforce Wavell's 
position. At the same time Rashid Ali was assured that London 
would recognise his new government in the wake of such genuine 
respect for Britain's Treaty rights. On the other hand an Iraqi 
refusal would violate the treaty and justify a drastic military 
response by the British, who would then have fresh troops on the spot. 
Appreciating this neat dilemma, the Iraqi cabinet agreed to 
co-operate, and a convoy of Indian troops disembarked at Basra on 
19 April. At this point Rashid All turned the spotlight on British 
intentions by requesting that troops be moved rapidly through the 
country and that no large concentration of British ground troops 
in Iracj be allowed. This request was brushed aside. Rashid Ali 
retaliated on 28 April by refusing permission for a second troop 
convoy to disembark at Basra. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was now in 
shreds, and although the troops landed unopposed, Iraqi forces 
invested the RAF base at Habbaniya, in the Baghdad region. Fighting 
began there on 2 May with an RAF bombardment of the Iraqi positions, 
and the siege was soon abandoned. A week later the first German 
and Italian aircraft, refuelling in Syria and Lebanon en route, 
entered the fray. But there were never enough of them, and by the 
end of May the RAF was unchallenged over Baghdad. 
With insufficient Axis support, Rashid Ali's venture 
succumbed to an old imperial pattern: dour defence by a beleaguered 
garrison, the arrival of a relieving force, the collapse of the 
revolt. In this case the decisive relief came from the meagre 
resources of Middle East Command, while the Indian troops held a 
bridgehead at Basra. "Habforce", a hastily-assembled Anglo-Arab 
column, crossed 500 miles of desert from Palestine and reached 
Habbaniya on 18 May. The RAF and the relief column were enough to 
tip the scales. By 30 May Habforce had fought its way to Baghdad 
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and Rashid Ali's supporters deserted him. As Churchill put it, 
"a friendly Government" was duly installed in Baghdad, which lost 
no time in breaking all ties with the Axis. 
21 
By a narrow margin, the British had won the race for Iraq. 
Swift and determined action had broken Rashid Ali, whose Axis 
friends (pre-occupied with Greece, Crete and Libya) had contented 
themselves with'limited air support. Such symbolic involvement 
had been a double blunder. The Axis had not only lost face in the 
Arab world; worse still, their form of assistance had disastrously 
compromised Vichy Syria. This caused a reversal of British policy 
there in favour of the Gaullist line and led to another improvised 
invasion which toppled Dentz and - at last! - brought the Free 
French to the Levant. 
Well before dawn on 8 May 1941 Geoffrey Furlonge, a British 
consular official in the Lebanon, was disturbed by the sound of 
aircraft overhead - flying east. At that hour Furlonge was able to 
evade the usual telephone control and call Jerusalem, alerting 
British headquarters. It was the first of many reports which 
reached the British concerning Axis aircraft in Syria. The RAF soon 
confirmed the presence of the Luftwaffe on Syrian and Lebanese 
airfields. 
22 The Germans, it seemed, were at the back door - and 
Vichy was holding it open for them. 
The "appeasement" of Dentz, and Foreign Office hopes that it 
might secure a stable and neutral Syria, had been futile. 
23 
From 
Cairo, Spears* fired off a stinging reproach to Eden: "At your end 
are the Vichy fans, the Darlan backers, the Trust Dentz boys... still 
the oracles they were when I left ? ". 
24 
And in response to the 
final straw being clutched at in Cairo - Dentz's reported readiness 
to resist German landings - de Gaulle had roundly told Wavell that 
To imagine that Dentz could give orders for resistance 
to the Germans is a. pure illusion. Dentz will not make 
a stand against Vichy, and the arrival of the Germans 
in Syria, if it occurs, will take place by collaboration 
between Vichy and the Germans. 25 
*Spears was. back in Cairo on 3 May, while de Gaulle returned 
on the 25th. 
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The illusion of Vichy neutrality did not last long. On 
3 May the American ambassador in Vichy had approached Marshal Petain 
on behalf of the British, and was told that "collaboration by France" 
would not go "beyond the requirements of the armistice agreement". 
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This assurance was meaningless, for that very day the German 
ambassador, Abetz, suddenly asked that German planes be allowed to 
land in Syria en route to Iraq. Under pressure to help Rashid Ali, 
the Germans were passing on the pressure to Petain. Vichy sought to 
make a virtue out of its dismal necessity, and in return for stopover 
facilities in Syria, Darlan extracted several concessions from Abetz, 
including the liberation of French prisoners and the reduction of 
occupation forces in France. To gain these points, Darlan threw in an 
undertaking to defend Syria in the event of a British attack. The 
essence of the matter was settled between Darlan and Abetz on 4 May. 
Formal details and further negotiations followed quickly, culminating 
in Darlan's discussions with Hitler and Ribbentrop in Berchtesgaden. 
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Meanwhile the buck had been passed on to the unlucky Dentz, 
who had just announced his readiness to resist a German landing in 
Syria. 28 On 4 May he was advised that German assistance to Rashid Ali 
was imminent: 
If formations of German aircraft should seek 
to land on your airfields or should fly over 
your territory, it would be expedient to con- 
sider that France is not in the position of a 
neutral power with respect to Germany. 29 
In the face of this oblique advice Dentz was at first inclined to stick 
to his guns, and replied accordingly. There was a quick and unambiguous 
response from the Vichy war minister: 
In the event of overflight by German or Italian 
planes, abstain fron any counteraction. If certain 
of these planes land at your air-bases, let them.... 
British planes may on the contrary be attacked 
by all means. 
This was followed up on 6 May by an order from Darlan to give the 
German aircraft "every facility". Dentz, the dutiful soldier, bowed to 
the inevitable. His obedience was soon reinforced by more detailed 
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explanations and instructions from both Darlan and Petain. 
*** 
At Middle East Command,, the hard-pressed Wavell was now 
confronted with an additional crisis. The Syrian question had come 
to the fore just as he was preparing the defence of Crete, a 
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counter-attack in Cyrenaica, and the relief of Habbaniyah and 
Baghdad. Strained to the limit by these endeavours, the British 
commander was now troubled by requests for action in Syria. 
On 27 April the Chiefs of Staff, worried by the build-up of 
German airborne forces in the Aegean (which were actually 
destined for Crete), had asked what forces could be spared for 
Syria. Wavell had indicated that the cupboard was bare. A single 
brigade group could be provided if and only if he was not asked to 
provide troops for Iraq. 
Bombarded on all fronts by requests for reinforcements and 
equipment, Wavell resolved not to take sides against arithmetic: 
he stubbornly repeated the unpleasant logistical facts and refused 
to be stampededinto Syria. On 4 May he bluntly told Spears and 
Catroux that "he had always been opposed to having anything to do 
with Iraq and that intervention in Syria meant dispersal of effort 
and therefore defeat". 
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At a conference the next day Wavell stood his ground, despite 
the current report that Dentz was prepared to resist a German 
landing. In the light of this report Catroux wanted to contact 
Dentz and secure, if not his conversion to Free France, at least 
his co-operation against the common foe. If Dentz withdrew into 
the Lebanon, Catroux wanted to advance into the Syrian vacuum and 
rally all the Vichy troops he could find. Wavell was unimpressed. 
Catroux's suggestions still presupposed British manpower and 
equipment which the Commander-in-Chief could not and would not 
allocate to a Syrian campaign. He "reiterated that the loss of Syria 
would be better than the risk of being beaten in detail owing to 
our intervening with inadequate forces. " 
The conference began to tail off into separate and abstract 
utterances. Lampson spoke of the political impact on the Arab world 
of a German occupation of the Levant. Longmore painted a dark 
picture of Axis air superiority in the Middle East based on 
control of Syrian airfields. Spears strove to enldrge this theme 
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arguing that the threat could only be averted by early and 
determined action on the ground, but Wavell had cclearly become 
immune to Spears' intercessions. "Nothing was decided", wrote 
Spears. "It was extremely depressing". 
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For poor Catroux, convinced that his moment in Syria 
had come, the futility and inertia of this conference were 
too much. With great emotion he declared that he could not stand 
idly by while Syria was written off: 
Catroux said 
[he] 
would present himself at frontier 
with Free French forces... and send a message to 
Vichy troops to following effect: "Join me in 
attacking invader. If you will not do so at least 
give me free passage to fight France's enemy. If 
you refuse to fight the Germans will you dare to 
fight us? Will you shoot Catroux? " The French 
will have tricolours on their chests.... 33 
This melodramatic outburst had no visible effect other 
than embarrassment on Catroux's audience, and the Frenchman was 
soon to learn that his own countrymen would indeed fight him 
where they would not fight Germans. Nevertheless his appeal worked 
when the above telegram, reporting the conference from Spears' 
point of view, reached Churchill. In appealing to the Prime 
Minister over Wavell's head (and in effect behind his back), 
Spears had shrewdly predicted the response. Churchill was the 
last man who would abandon Syria to the Axis without a struggle, 
and he was incensed by Wavell's attitude. 
Spears' timing'was crucial, for the Prime Minister was still 
seething over a previous signal from Wavell suggesting that a 
military sujpression of Rashid All was too risky and that Britain 
would just have to negotiate terms in Iraq. To Churchill this was 
rank defeatism. "I am deeply disturbed at General Wavell's attitude, " 
he had told his Chiefs of Staff on 6 May. "He seems to have been 
taken as much by surprise on his eastern as he was on his western 
34 flank.... He gives me the impression of being tired out. " 
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Hard on the heels of these sentiments came the Spears 
telegram, with more evidence of Wavell's misgivings and reluctance 
to run risks. Churchill's indignant reaction soon reached the Chiefs 
of Staff. "A supreme effort must be made to prevent the Germans 
getting a footing in Syria with small forces.... It is no use General 
Wavell being vexed at this disturbance on his eastern flanks. The 
Catroux plan should certainly not be excluded.. : 
35 The Prime Minister 
followed this up on 9 May with a signal to Wavell which marked a 
milestone in the long Free French trek towards Syria: 
You will no doubt realise the grievous danger of 
Syria being captured by a few thousand Germans 
transported by air. [We) believe that Admiral Darlan 
has probably made some bargain to help the Germans 
get in there. In face of your evident feeling of lack 
of resources we can see no other course open than to 
furnish General Catroux with the necessary transport 
and let... his Free French do their best at the moment 
they deem suitable, the RAF acting against German 
landings. Any improvement you can make on this would 
be welcome. 36 
The only improvement Wavell häd in mind was the suspension 
of the whole quixotic adventure. He had more than enough trouble in 
mid-May: Operation Brevity, his makeshift offensive against Rommel, 
had just begun; the German assault on Crete was expected daily; and 
his relief column was fighting its way through Iraq against heavy 
numerical odds. Nevertheless the Syrian question was now exercising- 
Churchill and the War Cabinet. London's attitude had become more 
crucial than Wavell's, and this shift marked the real turning-point 
for Free French ambitions. It was London, on 14 May, who authorised 
the bombing of Axis aircraft on Syrian airfields. 
In the wake of Churchill's 9 May telegram, Wavell could no 
longer flatly reject Free French arguments and requests, -although he 
remained convinced of the folly of this Syrian venture. In the hope, 
perhaps, that Churchill would lose interest in a Syrian fixture, 
Wavell attempted to play out the over without provoking any more 
bouncers. He politely received Catroux on 14 May and, in what Spears 
called "a most satisfactory interview", agreed that 
General Catroux is to broadcast from Jerusalem 
informing the French in Syria of German penetration. 
His later propaganda will depend on circumstances. 
(2) Catroux is to prepare leaflets... to be dropped 
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over Syria. (3) The Free French... in Palestine 
will remain there. They are on the railway and 
can be moved to the frontier rapidly. In any 
case this is the only form of transport available. 
(4) Should the response to the propaganda be 
satisfactory, IWavell] will give the Free French 
all the support he can in view of the circumstances 
at the time. 37 
In reality, however, this was a change of tactics rather 
than attitude. All that Wavell had really conceded was an 
intensification of Free French propaganda. The maintenance of 
Free French troops in Palestine would if anything release some 
of his thinly-stretched British forces to bolster the internal 
security of Palestine while Habforce was away in Iraq. Wavell 
had even avoided committing any of his motorised transport. Any 
further effort on his part was pledged only if Catroux's 
propaganda succeeded, and Wavell privately considered this to 
be unlikely. This scepticism. was in sharp contrast to Catroux's 
renewed optimism and excitement. "I am today addressing an appeal... 
by leaflets and by radio", he informed de Gaulle, 
explaining to [the Army of the Levant the dishonour 
of this assistance to the enemy, exhorting it to take 
up arms and letting it know that,.. I am at the gates 
of Syria with my troops to support it. 38 
Nevertheless, it was CatrouxIs impulsiveness which exposed 
Wavell's procrastination and brought down a Churchillian ultimatum 
to act against Vichy Syria or resign. On 18 May Catroux approached 
Wavell with "certain information" that Dentz was about to 
withdraw into the Lebanon and abandon Syria to the Germans. "He 
declared that the road to Damascus was open and that it was urgently 
necessary... to send a force into Syria immediately. He was most 
insistent that I should issue orders to this effect there and then". 
Wavell recalled. "I insisted on verification of the Free French 
information before acting on it' 
9Catroux, 
who was accompanied by 
Repiton (his informant from Jerusalem) and Spears, was most put out. 
69 
Wavell therefore agreed to discuss the matter again on the 
following morning. 
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The subsequent conference of 19 May was little more than a 
dismal variation of the 5 May meeting. Wavell (according to both 
Catroux and Spears) repeated his refusal to march into Syria 
forthwith, declaring that the German presence in the Levant did 
not "present an immediate or a mortal danger to Egypt" and that 
he was unwilling to intervene unless satisfied that most of the 
French troops would indeed change sides. This apparently unnerved 
Catroux, who was after all being held to his agreement of 14 May, 
and his response was lacklustre. That left Spears vigorously 
supporting a half-hearted plea - an experience he did not relish. 
His only ray of hope, was the stance taken by Air Marshal Tedder, 
who said that "the possession of the Syrian platform would give 
the Axis powers aerial mastery of the Middle East'! %41 
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The main result of Catroux's dramatic "news" and Wavell's 
response was a further flurry of signals to London. Immediately 
after the morning conference, Tedder entered the lists with a wire 
to Portal, the RAF Chief of Staff, warning him that if "land action 
was not possible we had to face the probability of a considerable 
enemy air force operating from Syria". 
42 
This effectively 
supported the signal which Spears had fired off the night before 
to Churchill and Eden: "We are surely not going to allow the 
Germans to take over Syria by default.... If the only troops 
available are the Free French, why not use them? What is the use 
of wondering whether the British might be more popular if there 
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are no others? It is Hobson's choice". 
In sharp contrast, Wavell had just told the Chiefs of Staff 
that the Free French alone would be quite inadequate and could only 
aggravate the situation. And since they were all he had for a 
Syrian venture now that he had despatched Habforce from Palestine, 
the whole idea was unrealistic: "Hope I shall not be landed with 
Syria commitment unless absolutely essential", Wavell pointedly 
* Tedder had replaced Longmore. as the RAF chief in the Middle East. 
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concluded. "Any force I could send now would be painfully 
reminiscent of Jameson Raid and might suffer similar fate". * 
Although Wavell had sent this signal on the evening of 17 
May, he was obliged to attend the morning conference on the 19th 
without the benefit of a reply, a fact which rendered the 
conference futile. Returning to his headquarters, Wavell found 
that there was still no reply from the Chiefs of Staff. He 
therefore requested an immediate decision from London. Was his 
own view to prevail, or should he accede to Free French wishes 
anyway? 
44 In a subsequent wire he warned against any reliance 
on "vacuum that may be created by withdrawal of French into 
Lebanon, which now seems unlikely". 
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The long-awaited reply from the Chiefs of Staff crossed 
with Wavell's urgent query, and implicitly answered it. The answer 
astonished and upset Wavell: 
It appears... that atmosphere is at present favourable. 
It will certainly deteriorate if we do nothing, and 
we should soon have the Germans in complete control 
of Syria with all that that entails.... it appears to 
us that there is no option but to improvise the 
largest force that you can manage without prejudice 
to the security of the Western Desert, and be 
prepared to move into Syria at the earliest possible 
date. Whether the initial operation should be 
undertaken by British troops alone [or] an Anglo- 
French force or even by the Free French must be 
left to you.... 46 
Wavell's additional query made no difference. On the 20th London 
confirmed that Catroux was to be given all possible assistance. 
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Wavell was not slow to infer how the Chiefs of Staff could 
possibly describe the situation as "favourable". "All reports from 
trustworthy sources... agree that effect of action by Free French 
alone likely to be failure", he retorted on 21 May, in a last attempt 
to procrastinate: 
This Boer War analogy. recalled an abortive. attempt 
by a small British force to foment a local uprising. 'The Jameson Raid 
was an embarrassing failure. 
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Am making preparations for combined British and 
French operation if situation favourable but you 
must trust my judgment in this matter or relieve 
me of command. I am not willing to accept that 
Catroux, de Gaulle or Spears should dictate 
action that is bound seriously to affect 
military situation in Middle East. 48 
Wavell's superiors were taken aback by this angry ultimatum and 
appeared ready to back down. The unhappy Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, Sir John Dill, conveyed this feeling to Churchill 
on the same day: "we must either allow Wavell to carry out the 
policy which he believes to be sound or relieve him of his 
command. My own feeling is that at this juncture we should trust 
Wavell. It is no time to make a change". 
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Churchill flatly disagreed, and he was clearly undismayed 
at the prospect of losing Wavell. Exasperated by all the dithering 
over Iraq and Syria and humiliated by the collapse of his beloved 
Greek adventure, Churchill was already considering Wavell's 
replacement, and now he was stung by the allegation that the Free 
French were calling the tune in London. The Prime Minister's 
pugnacious stance carried the day, and he fired off a stiff 
rebuke to Wavell. "You are wrong in supposing that policy decided 
by Chiefs of Staff arose out of any representations made by the 
Free French leaders'-, he dedlared, baldly omitting Spears': "It 
arises entirely from the view taken here by those who have the 
supreme direction of war and policy in all theatres". The 
reprimand continued 
Our view is that if the Germans can pick up Syria 
and Iraq with petty air forces, tourists and local 
revolts we must not shrink from running equal small 
scale military risks, and facing the possible 
aggravation of political dangers from failure. For 
this decision we of course take full responsibility, 
and should you find yourself unwilling to give 
effect to it arrangements will be made to meet any 
wish you may express to be relieved of your command. 
Churchill elsewhere admitted that Wavell had cause for complaint 
about Spears' telegrams. See Appendix A. 
. 
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The dispute ended with this ultimatum. Wavell accepted the 
position and prepared to enter Syria, knowing that Catroux's 
'farmed political inroad" (as Churchill fancifully called it) was 
conceived on the basis of faulty intelligence and wishful 
thinking. Even as Churchill reiterated London's support for the 
Catroux plan, the report on which it was based was shown to be 
worthless. A chastened Catroux heard the grim facts from Colonel 
Collet, commander of Vichy's Circassian cavalry, who had slipped 
across the frontier to arrange the defection of his force. From 
this source Catroux learned 
(a) that there has been no withdrawal from Syria 
to Lebanon (b) that on contrary Vichy troops are 
preparing to resist attack... (c) that troops and 
cadres will obey orders to resist. 
In the light of these Unpalatable facts, Spears advised London that 
"the possibility and extent of opposition to an entering force would 
be greater than the reports so far... indicated". This understatement 
camouflaged the fact that "the Catroux plan", which had been thrust 
upon Wavell, was demonstrably useless. 
51 Catroux himself was forced 
to advise de Gaulle that British forces would now be indispensable 
if Syria was to be taken at all. 
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These dismal tidings were no surprise to Wavell, who had 
never trusted Free French information and had little faith in 
Catroux's troops. A true Stoic, Wavell sensed that although the 
Collet report logically undermined London's decision on Syria, it 
was futile to re-open the whole question. Reconciling himself to 
the ancient and local tradition of making bricks without straw, 
Wavell began to form a British invasion force. Replying to Churchill 
on 22 May, he attributed his original reluctance to the unreliable 
nature of Free French information and stressed that a tougher task 
lay ahead than Catroux had imagined. Nevertheless he was now 
"prepared for action against Syria". In this new resolution Wavell 
suddenly emerged. as an exponent of the RAF position that, above all, 
the Levant was a potential enemy aerodrome: 
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The whole position in Middle East is at present 
governed mainly by air-power and air bases. Enemy 
air bases in... Cyrenaica, Crete, Cyprus and Syria 
would make our hold on Egypt difficult. 
One of his army's prime objects was, therefore, "to keep [the 
enemy] from establishing himself in Syria". 
53 On 27 May Wavell 
presented London with an outline of Operation Exporter, his plan 
for the occupation of Syria. 
In terms of military significance, the Levant had entered 
the "urgent" category since the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq. 
As London began to consider specific militar7'measures in Syria, 
the political ramifications thrust themselves afresh upon the 
attentions of the War Cabinet, and they were forced at last to 
grasp the nettle of Arab politics. On 19 May Churchill set the 
pace with a note entitled "Syrian Policy", the vigour of which was 
matched only by its simplistic crudity. "If we can bold our own in 
the Western Desert and in Crete", Churchill began, "the invasion 
of Syria must take first place in our thoughts. For this, we must 
have an Arab policy". 
enemy] from establishing himself in Syria". 
53 On 27 May Wavell 
presented London with an outline of Operation Exporter, his plan 
for the occupation of Syria. 
This bald statement was the prelude to some remarkably 
dubious assertions and suggestions: 
The French have forfeited all rights in Syria since 
they quitted the League of Nations.... Furthermore, 
none of our promises to de Gaulle cover mandated 
territories. Therefore... we should give them [only] 
one more chance.... 
If the French Army in Syria will came over to us 
and work with the Free French forces till the end 
of the war, we should refrain fron raising the 
question... of the Mandate.... If, however, LDe tz 
is defiant] we must get the Syrian Arabs on our 
side. For this purpose we should proclaim that the 
French Mandate has lapsed [and establish] an 
independent Sovereign Arab State in Syria in permanent 
alliance with Turkey... and Great Britain. 
In the latter case, Vichy troops were to be repatriated or interned 
while the. Free French would simply be locked out of the Levant 
* This was erroneous. See Appendix S. 
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altogether! Churchill was actually proposing that any future French 
presence in the Levant be entirely dependent on the incumbents' 
readiness to rally to Free France or at least to become British 
auxiliaries. This, by all the current indications, was tantamount 
to abolishing the French mandate at the stroke of a British pen - 
and in that case, the "position would have to be put squarely to de 
Gaulle, but his reactions should not affect our course". This 
breezy assertion certainly under-estimated de Gaulle's determination 
to hold the Levant for France, and the lengths to which he would go. 
Churchill's parochial contempt for Arab affairs was transparent 
in his next remarks: 
I am not sufficiently acquainted with Syrian affairs... 
to formulate a plan for the creation of the Syrian 
State, but I cannot doubt that our Islamic experts can 
easily do so. 
The effect of our Proclamation, if followed by a 
wise decision as to Arab personalities, might well 
gratify the Arab race and rally them to a strong 
Nationalist movement to expel all European masters, 
or would-be masters, frag their country. 
Churchill, who clearly meant that such a development would be a 
Good Thing, had evidently forgotten that in the Arab world the most 
visible "European master" was Great Britain! To be capable of this 
oversight at the height of the Rashid Ali revolt was simply 
breath-taking, 54 
It certainly dumbfounded the polished diplomats at the Foreign 
Office, whose initial reaction to Churchill's bruising irruption was 
one of dismay and exasperation. This gave way to feverish activity 
as the Foreign Office prepared a most significant set of proposals 
which Eden presented to the War Cabinet on 27 May. While this reply 
eliminated the warst Churchillian fallacies, a distinctly tough 
residue survived, resulting in a harder line than the Foreign Office 
itself would have initiated. 
"The Prime Minister has asked that our Arab policy should 
now be reconsidered", Eden began, tactfully deflecting the 
implication that no clear policy existed. "We [must make decisions 
of the. utmost impÖÖrtance relating to the future of Syria. Our 
decisions must fall within the framework of the wider policy which we 
wish to adopt towards the whole Arab world". Proceeding to specific 
cases, Eden circled warily around the Palestine question and arrived 
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at the crucial Syrian decision: 
I recommend that the Free French should be given 
a chance to win over Syria to our side. Should 
it once become clear either that the Free French 
are unwilling to make a declaration promising 
Syria and Lebanon their independence, or that a 
declaration, when made, is not going to bring 
Syria over to us, we should hold ourselves free 
to turn from the Free French towards the Syrian 
Arabs. We should then ourselves make a declaration 
promising Syrian independence. This might well be 
timed to harmonise with a British advance into 
Syria. 
"There should not be insuperable difficulties about 
setting up an independent Arab Government in Syria", Eden 
continued, noting that its "independence" would have to be propped 
up by Britain and Turkey. After dealing with other Arab countries, 
Eden summarised his recommendations, which included: 
(b) Syria. If the Free French can do nothing, we 
should declare ourselves in favour of Syrian 
independence..... (e) Public support of the idea 
of Arab federation, the terms of which it must be 
left to the Arabs to work out. * 55 
With the presentation and acceptance of this paper, a 
crucial idea had evolved in British policy towards the Levant. 
Hitherto any political declaration was to be made by the Gaullists. 
"in favour of Syria independence after the war". Now London had 
resolved that independence should be immediate and that, if the 
Free French appeared ineffective, Britain should make her own 
declaration as she advanced into the Levant States. 
This was a much less accommodating attitude towards the 
Free French. A month earlier, the Head of French Department in the 
Foreign Office had minuted that "the authorities in Cairo are 
* Two days later Eden gave effect to "(e)" in his Mansion House 
speech, declaring that "many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab 
peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In 
reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No 
such appeal from our friends should go unanswered.... the cultural 
and economic ties between the Arab countries and the political ties 
too should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government... will give 
their full support to any scheme that commands general approval". 
(Copy in SPRS 11/5, last sentence marked by Spears). 
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agreed that our ultimate aim should be to get Syria for Free 
French. This is, in my view, the best solution. The French have 
always been suspicious about our designs in Syria and our 
attitude towards the Pan-Arab movement". 
56 This view, endorsed 
in ascending order by the Foreign Office mandarins, had received 
Eden's blessing at the time. It had now been watered down 
as events compelled the Foreign Office to give priority to Arab 
aspirations, in spite of French suspicions. The Rashid All revolt 
and the German advances had narrowed down the British options. 
In Cairo, as in London, the military decision to enter 
Syria and Lebanon raised unavoidable questions about the future 
political status of the Levant. Given the unsettling effects on 
the Arab world of the Rashid Ali revolt, and the largely British 
composition of the invasion force, * what were to be the political 
tactics and objectives of Operation Exporter? In broad terms, there 
was already an Anglo-Free.. 'French agreement to implement Catroux's 
independence tactic when the opportunity presented itself. This 
determined the general direction of political tactics, but the 
original concept was embellished to accommodate the mood of Arab 
politics and the major role which had now been assigned to British 
troops. 
On the Free French side, Catroux outdid himself with a 
proclamation of immediate independence for the Levant States, 
to be secured in a formal treaty between Free France and the 
Levant States. In drafting this proclamation he was edited from 
afar by the Foreign Office and from rather too near by Spears, whose 
schoolmasterly vigilance he was wont to avoid by pleading a 
pressing dinner engagement. Spears even claims authorship of the 
actual proclamation delivered on 8 June 1941, which was produced 
The Exporter force initially consisted of the 7th Australian 
Division, the 5th Indian Brigade, and an assortment of Scots Greys, 
Cheshire Yeomanry, and other British units accompanied by the 
Legionnaires, Marines and Senegalese under Free French command. 
Towards the end of June more Anglo-Indian forces were thrown in, 
together with the Arab Legion. 
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on 20 May by Catroux and eventually approved by the Foreign 
Office 
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This included the statement 
I have come to terminate the mandatory regime 
and proclaim you free and independent. You are 
therefore henceforth sovereign and independent 
peoples.... Your independent and sovereign status 
will be guaranteed by a treaty which will also 
define our reciprocal relations... 58 
When de Gaulle returned to Cairo at the end of May he accepted 
this proclamation as Catroux's own work, unaware of the British 
tutelage behind it, which he would have considered intolerable. 
Meanwhile on the British side there emerged a proposal to 
endorse Catroux's proclamation of independence in an official 
statement, which would also disavow any British ambitions in the 
Levant other than the war effort itself. Thus on 19 May, when 
Wavell urgently requested a directive from the Chiefs of Staff, he-also 
asked that any military intervention in Syria should be heralded by 
a Free French proclamation of independence, endorsed by Britain. 
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This was no startling innovation. It was a particular 
adaptation of a principle and practice which was well established 
between Catroux, Wavell and Lampson, and was based on the 
Crosthwaite telegram of January 1941. In this document, it will be 
recalled, the Foreign Office had clearly initiated British 
identification with any Free French declaration of Syrian 
independence. It had even suggested the possibility of a British 
assurance that Catroux's independence pledge would be honoured. 
Moreover. Catroux had clearly accepted British association with his 
overtures, and in consultation with Wavell and Lampson he had 
endorsed British contacting and bribery of Syrian Arab Leaders, 
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Catroux had therefore accepted a significant British involvement 
in the internal affairs of, Syria already. It was this somewhat 
ill-defined situation which had spawned the Glubb-Kirkbride mission. 
Principle and, practice were firmly established, and no great leap 
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was required to propose British association with Catroux's impending 
proclamation. 
Nor was there anything sinister in such a proposal emanating 
from Wavell's headquarters, for the idea was by no means confined 
to British military circles. It was well-aired among all the relevant 
authorities in Cairo, and for once Wavell, Lampson and Spears seemed 
to be in full agreement. * Britain was currently suppressing an Arab 
revolt, she was the main imperial power in the Arab world, and she 
was to be the main invading force in a restive and well-armed 
territory. Her intentions had to be clear and welcome, and in the 
circumstances she could hardly be expected to entrust her threadbare 
integrity to a group of Frenchmen whose authority and motivation 
was debatable.. From their Baghdad and Cairo reports, the British knew 
how seriously Nationalist opinion in these 
countries regarded the future of Syria in 
particular and how much the failure of the 
French to ... implement 
[the 19361 treaties was 
condemned. Hitherto this had merely served to 
make the French unpopular; but once Great 
Britain was. in... these countries, odium would 
fall on her if she failed to make the Free 
French behave more correctly towards them. 61 
Nevertheless the British guarantee was not designed purely to 
prevent any Free French prevarications. Free France was not a 
recognised government, and at this stage its authority to act in the 
name of France was simply a Gaullist doctrine. In announcing her own 
endorsement to Catroux's proclamation, Britain was perhaps endorsing 
the moral authority of Free France. But above all she was making her 
intentions quite unequivocal, ruling out the possibility that, in 
some future betrayal of Syrian aspirations, she could simply argue 
that the Free French promise lacked the weight of any constituted 
government. Although the guarantee was partially designed to keep the 
Free French on the straight-and-narrow, the British clearly did not 
anticipate any monumental backsliding. A covering statement of 
British intentions was entirely reasonable in the current Middle 
Eastern circumstances. 
* See Appendix C. 
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None of this cut any ice with de Gaulle when he arrived 
back in Cairo, and the ensuing row over the British guarantee 
occurred not because the British were suddenly seeking some 
unprecedented involvement in Syrian affairs, but because this 
principle was new to de Gaulle personally. He had not been fully 
informed about Catroux's co-operation with Wavell and Lampson and 
had not personally accepted any British role in Syrian internal 
affairs. * As a result, he viewed the British proposal as a sudden 
and sinister intrusion upon a purely Free French reserve, and 
reacted strongly. "Hardly had the decision to go into Syria been 
taken when already the British let their intentions be seen", wrote 
de Gaulle: 
Sir Miles Lampson requested that the proc- 
lamation should be made both in the name of 
[Britain and of] Free France. I opposed this, 
naturally. [He] then insisted that the text 
should mention the British guarantee given to 
our promise. I rejected this request, on the' 
ground that the word of France had no need of 
a foreign guarantee.... It was easy to see that 
our partners wanted to create the impression 
that, if the Syrians and Lebanese received 
independence, they would owe it to England... 
Spears made a brave attempt to persuade de Gaulle that Britain's 
proposal would actually enhance the prestige of Free France, 
but if de Gaulle was impressed (as Spears implies) he quickly 
reverted to his instinctive suspicions of British perfidy. 
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* The liaison between Catroux and de Gaulle left a lot to be 
desired, and this was one of many cases where the British, thinking 
that they had an understanding with "Free France", had only a 
personal understanding with Catroux, who was frequently disavowed 
by de Gaulle. The Crosthwaite telegram had never been sent to de 
Gaulle, because,, as Crosthwaite minuted, "General Catroux will 
presumably not be able to go very far without consulting General 
de Gaulle, but as his own views seem so reasonable... I think 
we might leave it to General Catroux to raise that particular 
difficulty". [6/12/1940 minute, F0371/24592/E3103 ]. Unfortunately 
this assumed far too much about the degree of consultation 
between the two men. 
f* 
// 
De Gaulle's veto forced the British to prepare a separate 
public statement endorsing Catroux's proclamation and affirming 
their political disinterest in Syria. * While de Gaulle could not 
prevent its release, he wrote to Lampson on 3 June reiterating 
that political interference would not be tolerated. The British 
statement, he repeated, was unnecessary "in so far as it concerns 
[our] promise of independence". And if the contingencies of war 
led to trouble between the Free French and Syrians, then the British, 
bearing in mind "the recent events in Iraq", should not feel bound 
to participate in the "solution". Free France, de Gaulle concluded, 
took the view that "any political settlement in Syria" was entirely 
a matter for the French and Syrians to resolve. 
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As a piece of Machiavellian foresight and an exercise in 
euphemism, this letter makes interesting reading in the light of 
the harsh methods used by the French to impose their "solution" 
in the Levant after 1919 - methods which the Gaullists attempted 
to repeat after Operation Exporter. But if de Gaulle ever hoped 
that this letter would give him a free hand in Syria, he was soon 
disillusioned. It was not good enough to assert that the word of 
France needed no guarantee. This might have been a Gaullist 
article of faith, but it was also a highly unrealistic view of 
France's image in the Levant. Since 1919, the Syrians had had every 
reason to distrust the French. In any case, de Gaulle was begging 
the question by referring to "the word of France" for he lacked 
any authority (or desire) to sign away a square metre of French 
territory. The British, as Spears rightly observed, "had to bear 
in mind that de Gaulle's constant assertion that "Free France". was 
identical with France took in no one apart from the Free French 
and de Gaulle in particular". 
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Hardly had the British and Free French agreed to differ over 
the proclamation of independence when a fresh dispute broke out over 
Catroux's prospective title. De Gaulle was proposing to appoint him 
* Catroux's proclamation did riot - as Mickelsen asserts - contain 
a reference to the British guarantee. See Appendix D. 
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High Commissioner in which case he would seem to formally succeed 
Dentz as the mandatory ruler of the Levant States. Behind this 
titular dispute there lurked the fundamental conflict between 
Britain and Free France about the respective political and 
administrative roles they were about to assume in the Levant. On 
4 June Spears warned Churchill that trouble loomed large: 
General de Gaulle has evidently realised we might 
use our guarantee to make him go further than he 
intended in the path of granting freedom to the 
Syrian populations.... 
. no interference of any kind will be brooked 
[by 
de Gaulle] ... 
... If we are compelled to stand by unable to act 
or even advise whilst negotiations... of the most 
difficult kind are taking place between the new 
French rulers in Syria and the natives our prestige 
will be further undermined. 
... I submit that we cannot disinterest ourselves of 
this question even on military grounds. If trouble 
breaks out between Free France and Syria it may 
be very embarrassing to us [ and could spread 
through the Arab world] . 
De Gaulle's letter to Lampson had certainly put the cat 
among the pigeons, and Spears was sure that the Frenchman was not 
bluffing. "De Gaulle's intransigent attitude is well illustrated 
by [his remark] dYou are going into Syria because I consent!... it 
reflects his attitude of mind". Spears accordingly asked Churchill 
to intervene by requesting a more collaborative approach from de 
Gaulle: 
... There are no advantages in leaving the matter 
over for later discussion. If and when de Gaulle 
disposes of large bodies of troops in Syria he 
will be even more intransigent.... 
[In Syria] we are dealing with two worlds, the 
French and the Arab. The former once rallied is 
of little interest to us.... 
... Finally de Gaulle insists on alluding to Catroux 
as "Haut Commissaire". [This term] is obnoxious to 
all Syria. A word on this-subject to de Gaulle 
would be very helpful. 65 
On 5 June Wavell endorsed these sentiments. "De Gaulle is not being 
easy". he told Churchill, "please see Spears'[above telegram] on 
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which I hope you will act especially as regards term High 
Commissioner for Catroux, which would go far towards destroying 
effect of proclamation". 
66 In another signal on the same day, 
Wavell repeated his anxiety: 
Have just received telegram from Wilson* to effect 
that use of term High Commissioner by Catroux 
will cause grave trouble and will create doubt 
as to our intention towards inhabitants. Efforts 
by Spears to move de Gaulle at this end have 
failed. 67 
Later that day, Churchill responded to these appeals with a brief, 
urgent message to de Gaulle: "I must ask you in this grave hour not 
to insist on declaring Catroux High Commissioner of Syria". 
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Outgunned, de Gaulle replied through Spears on the following 
day, announcing that Catroux's designation would be Delegate-General 
and Plenipotentiary. At the same time he stressed that Catroux's 
proclamation provided for a treaty "which will establish (Consacrer) 
the right and special interests of France.... 
Any policy which appeared to sacrifice these 
rights... would be bad and dangerous from point of 
view of French opinion.... In this grave hour for 
us as well as for you, I call your very special 
attention to this point which does not always 
appear to me to be well understood locally.... 
The harder you strike at Vichy, the more necessary 
it is to safeguard the interests and feelings of 
France. 69 
This was the signal for Churchill to reply more fully along 
the lines suggested by Spears on 4 June. In doing so he took into 
account a further message of 5 June from Spears, reporting a more 
satisfactory conversation with de Gaulle. The unlucky Spears had been 
obliged to explain to de Gaulle, who was "upset", why British troops 
were to precede Free French troops in the first advance into Syria. 
Narrowly avoiding yet another dispute1spears somehow persuaded an 
"unusually receptive" de Gaulle that this was a purely military 
measure designed, in view of the enemy's reported attitude, to avoid 
a fratricidal bloodbath. De gaulle was evidently so distracted by 
this prospect that he absently promised to make no trouble over 
* General Sir Henry Maitland ("Jumbo") Wilson, the British Commander 
in Palestine and Transjordan, was commanding Operation Exporter. 
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future negotiations with the Syrians. He confided to Spears his 
personal agony over his enemy-compatriots in Dentz's army. "I am 
sure that this is true", concluded Spears. "A word of affection 
and comprehension from you would tend to smooth over the many 
difficulties that, whatever happens, are bound to arise". 
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Churchill's telegram to de Gaulle, on the eve of Operation 
Exporter, was both diplomatic and definitive of the British outlook: 
... my best wishes for success of our joint enterprise in the Levant.... You will, I am sure, agree that 
this action, and indeed our whole future policy in 
the Middle East, must be conceived in terms of 
mutual trust and collaboration. Our policies 
towards the Arabs must run on parallel lines. 
You know that we have sought no special advantages 
in the French Empire and have no intention of 
exploiting the tragic position of France for 
our own gain. 
I welcome therefore your decision to promise 
independence to Syria and the Lebanon, and as 
you know I think it essential that we should lend 
to this promise the full weight of our guarantee. 
I agree that we must not in any settlement of 
the Syrian question endanger the stability of 
the Middle East. But subject to this we must 
both do everything possible to meet Arab 
aspirations and susceptibilities.... 
... At this hour, when Vichy touches fresh 
depths of ignominy, the loyalty and courage of 
the Free French save the glory of France. 71 
The stage was now set for Operation Exporter. Despite some 
last-minute anxieties in London, and a message from Dentz to say 
that the Germans had cleared out of Syria, the invasion went ahead. 
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In the dawn of 8 June 1941, Australian troops advanced in two 
columns into the Lebanon, while the Indian and Free French troops 
moved into Syria. Catroux, his hour come round at last, added his 
stirring rhetoric to the cacophony of battle: 
Honour does not permit the Levant tobe delivered 
to the enemy without. a fight.... French soldiers 
of the Levant: are there those who would block 
my route when I march against the enemy? Are there 
those who would [turn] against me the weapons which, 
these recent days, have not been used against 






There were. The Army of the Levant put up a ferocious resistance, 
and fighting between Gaullist and P6tainist was particularly brutal 
and bitter. Atrocities against prisoners were frequent. 
Despite this stiff resistance, the Allies made modest progress 
at first. By 12 June the Free French were within ten miles of 
Damascus, while the Australian columns had taken Marjayoun in the 
centre and crossed the Litani river beyond Tyre on the coastal route. 
At this point there was a strong Vichy counter-attack, Marjayoun 
was re-captured, and the Allied advance did not resume for a week. 
Nevertheless Dentz's efforts faded as Vichy reinforcements failed 
to materialise, while a new British threat appeared in the east. 
Habforce, having crushed the Iraqi revolt, moved through the Syrian 
desert, while Slim's 10th Indian Division advanced along the 
Euphrates. Dentz began to falter, and his main motivation - the need 
to play to the German gallery for the sake of metropolitan France - 
began to wear thin as proposals for Luftwaffe intervention broke down. 




































heavy bombardment of Vichy's coastal positions. On 21 June the 
Australians entered Damascus. Dentz still held strong positions, but 
by early July he had lost 6,000 men and most of his aircraft. On 
12 July his envoys approached the British for an armistice. 
"Thus ended the most unpleasant campaign for all concerned", 
wrote Wilson, "as our troops were fighting an army which might have 
been on our side". To the bitterness of civil war were added the 
complications and suspicions engendered by the presence of the 
British in this jealously-maintained French territory. 
74 This 
situation was aggravated by the opportunism of the local peoples. 
Slim's experience in Deir es Zor was typical: 
I was greeted by a distinguished-looking Syrian 
in European dress [whoj welcomed us, the British, 
as deliverers, and trusted the French would never 
return. I made no comment on this nor did I 
confide in him that I thought General de Gaulle 
might have different views. 75 
An'armistice was signed at Acre on 14 July, the substance 
of which was as unhappy for the Free French as the date itself. Even 
the gods seemed to think so. They allowed an inebriated Australian 
journalist to fuse all the lights within a three-mile radius, 
obliging the brass hats to conclude their proceedings around the 
headlights of a motor cycle. The day's indignities were completed 
by another Australian who souvenired Catroux's magnificent 
gold-leafed kepi. 
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If the circumstances of the armistice were absurd, the 
terms were disastrous. The document did not even refer to the Free 
French, nor. was Catroux allowed to sign it. Vichy's local auxiliaries, 
the Troupes Speciales, were placed under British command. Dentz's 
surviving equipment was also acquired by the British. In their 
determination to have no dealing with Gaullists, the Petainists 
preferred to hand over everything to the very power whose designs 
on the Levant France had always suspected. There was no mention of 
the mandate or of the independence of the Levant States. Vichy troops. 
a 
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theoretically could choose to change sides rather than be 
repatriated to France, but in reality there was little choice: a 
secret protocol between Wilson and de Verdilhac** denied the Free 
French a fair opportunity to win over their recent antagonists. 
It was an almost unbelievable conclusion to what Churchill 
called a "joint enterprise". Practically every Free French 
objective had been lost in these unilateral terms, and Wilson seemed 
to be at pains to exclude them. The Acre convention "amounted to a 
pure and simple transference of Syria and Lebanon to the British"77 
and effectively buried the hopes which de Gaulle had expressed to 
Churchill on the eve of the armistice: 
[As] our joint operation in Syria draws to happy 
conclusion I... express to you my conviction that 
we shall shortly find a solution, as regards the 
organisation of Franco-British relations in the 
East, which will be satisfactory alike [for] the 
rights and interests of France in Syria and 
for] original inter-Allied military command 
in that theatre of operations. 78 
Any such hopes in the mind of de Gaulle were dashed by the 
14 July armistice, to be supplanted once and for all by his chronic 
suspicions of British perfidy. In retrospect, he concluded that even 
while the British and Free French were preparing to launch Operation 
Exporter, 
their political rivalry was taking shape behind 
the facade. In Cairo, Jerusalem and London], 
we could perceive the quivering activity of a 
specialised personnel which saw... the prospect 
of realising plans of action long since prepared. 
Events... put Great Britain in possession of such 
a hand of trumps, political, military and economic 
that she [could] not refrain from playing them on 
her own account. 79 
To a man like de Gaulle, the terms of the armistice made this 
conspiracy theory almost irresistible. It will be seen, however, that 
the Acre agreement was not the result of some vast, premeditated, 
imperial plot on the part of the British. An unhappy coalition of 
circumstances and human limitations contributed more to the fiasco 
* General de Verdilhac, field commander of Vichy forces in the Levant. 
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of 14 July than any malevolent intent. * Distant and inadequate 
canmunications, confusion, unavoidable haste and improvisation, 
poor politico-military liaison, personality clashes, prejudice, 
complacency and downright incompetence were the true villains. 
Yet while much of the damage was soon repaired, the Acre convention 
was a blow from which Anglo-Free French relations in the Levant 
never fully recovered. 
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Chapter Three DE GAULLE CONFRONTS THE BRITISH: THE ARMISTICE 
AFFAIR AND THE OCCUPATION OF THE LEVANT STATES 
War is much too serious a thing to be left 
to military men. Clemenceau 
Enter the Constable of France. Henry V, iii. 7. 
By the end of June Damascus had fallen, the Allies were struggling 
towards Beirut, and new British forces were advancing into Syria from 
the east. De Gaulle felt it was time to remind Churchill of the acute 
political dilemma created by Operation Exporter. "It is the first time 
that British forces united to those of Free France are penetrating into 
a 
rFrenchl territory", he pointed out. Moreover, "tendencies of British 
policy in Syria have rarely coincided with 
[those] 
of French policy". 
France and the world would therefore be watching: 
If, to the satisfaction of Vichy, Berlin and Rome, 
our common action in Syria and Lebanon seems to result 
in diminution of the position of France.... effect on 
the opinion of my country will be disastrous. I must 
add that my own effort, which consists in maintaining, 
morally and materially, French resistance at the side 
of England.... would be gravely compromised. 
In the light of these dangers, 'de Gaulle stressed that "all local 
British authorities" in the Levant should tread most carefully, and 
not carry out a "displacement of authority to the detriment of France 
or a sort of control of the authority of France". 
1 
Alas, the most virtuous behaviour on the part of all British 
personnel in the Levant could not have got de Gaulle off the horns of 
his dilemma. The attitude of. Vichy and the Axis, who were bound to 
indulge in some propaganda about British imperialism, was hardly an 
adequate criterion. Moreover, by 'its very nature, the "common action" 
in the Levant inevitably diminished the position of France. It was 
nonsense to deny this when the French Mandatory forces were being over- 
thrown by their old regional rivals, the British, aided by renegade 
Frenchmen who had publicly declared their intention to terminate the 
do 
mandate. Now that the die was cast, de Gaulle seemed to be 
shrinking from the implication of his own commitments and having 
second thoughts - on the wrong side of the Rubicon. At the Foreign 
Office, Sir Horace Seymour commented that "a proper safeguarding of 
the French position" (vis a vis'other European powers) would be one 
of Britain's aims in the Levant. "There must however necessarily be 
some 'diminution of the position of France' if independence is 
granted and de Gaulle must have known this when he proclaimed the 
promise of independence. He cannot have it both ways". Eden agreed. 
2 
De Gaulle's reluctance to come to terms with his position 
boded ill for the immediate future. In his personal agony over 
fighting his old comrades and incurring the charge of betraying French 
interests in the Levant, de Gaulle was almost impossible to please. 
He developed a tendency to blame his difficulties too readily upon 
his British allies, and too little upon the painful logic of his 
position. This attitude demanded a remarkable sensitivity, breadth 
of vision, even infallibility, on the part of the British. Thus, 
when they erred de Gaulle read too much into their shortcomings. 
And when they erred abysmally, his reaction was even stronger. * 
These tendencies emerged when a Syrian armistice was -, 
considered. De Gaulle himself raised this question in the first week 
of the campaign. He correctly anticipated that Dentz would request 
the repatriation of the Army of the Levant, and he was particularly 
concerned to prevent this. Explaining these things to London on 13 
June, Spears added: '. "It is necessary to have Armistice terms ready 
- de Gaulle, Clayton and I are agreed on a text which will be sub- 
mitted to General Wilson. If he agrees it will be forwarded". 
3 
This was immediately followed by another Spears telegram to 
Churchill, containing a personal message from de Gaulle: 
.... If Dentz asks for an armistice, I think he 
will ask to re-embark his troops to send them 
back to France. In my view this should not be 
accepted at any price. All the troops must remain.... 
The only engagement we should accept would be [to] 
force no officer or man to serve in the Free French 
forces without his consent. Naturally all the 
material must be handed over intact. 4 
* c. f. Appendix D. 
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Having petitioned the Prime Minister yet again, Spears went on 
to arrange an agreement between Wilson and de Gaulle on the terms 
of the armistice. It embodied de Gaulle's wish to prevent any 
wholesale passage of Vichy troops back to metropolitan France, and 
gave the Free French maximum opportunity to swell their ranks by 
"rallying" their current adversaries. This tentative accord included 
the following undertaking on the part of General Wilson: 
In view of the fact that the only interest of 
Great Britain in Syria is to drive out the enemies 
of both Great Britain and France, I have delegated 
to General Catroux, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Free French forces in the East, the task of settling 
on the spot the destination of officers and men, of 
weapons and of the ancillary services as well as 
war materials of all kinds. 5 
Unfortunately the Wilson-de Gaulle agreement sank without 
trace, for Spears had quite exceeded his authority, and had ignored 
a Churchillian edict that his communications on military affairs must 
be cleared through Wavell's headquarters. * And this time Churchill did 
not intervene on the side of his unorthodox appointee. The above signal 
was sent to Cairo and London in the hope that the Wilson-de Gaulle 
agreement would be used as a basis for the armistice. Instead of any 
thanks, however, Spears received a stinging reprimand from General 
Arthur Smith, Wavell's Chief of Staff, for his unauthorised inter- 
ference in the business of Middle East Command, and his breach of the 
ruling on military communications. Spears, who saw himself as an honest 
broker rather than a meddler, replied that the 
terms were first put forward by de Gaulle.... then 
shown to GOC [Wilson] who made some suggestions 
accepted by de Gaulle. 
It was realised by all this was a question for 
Commander-in-Chief and GOC directed me to send 
su ested terms to Middle East. I repeated telegram 
toLWar Office ... do you not wish such telegrams to 
be repeated to London for information? 6 
This explanation did not satisfy Wavell and Smith, who were as 
exasperated with Spears' armistice terms as they were with his piratical 
methods. They condemned the provisional Wilson-de Gaulle terms as an 
* See Appendix A. 
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unacceptable basis for any armistice with Dentz. At Wavell's head- 
quarters there was a firm conviction that the Army of the Levant must 
be repatriated, and this was given qualified support by the Foreign 
Office. It nevertheless came as a nasty shock to Spears and de Gaulle, 
and on 16 June Spears replied indignantly to Middle East Command: 
General de Gaulle... holds very stro ly that he 
should be consulted as to the terms 
[because] 
future dealings with the Vichy Army in Syria... 
will be governed by the Armistice terms. As these 
will bind him it is only right he should be con- 
sulted beforehand concerning their scope... 
Never to de Gaulle's knowledge was repatriation 
promised to the Vichy troops either in propaganda 
leaflets or otherwise. If however any such promise 
had been made it could only have applied to those 
individuals who did not resist. 7 
This signal was also repeated to the War Office and was soon seen by 
Churchill. But the Prime Minister himself had considered repatriation 
an acceptable option in his paper on Syrian policy, and he did not 
oppose it now. He confined himself to a brief minute to Eden on 18 June: 
"He [de Gaulle] should certainly be consulted beforehand". With this 
response, de Gaulle and Spears were;. effectively isolated - Churchill, 
the Foreign Office, the War Office and Wavell all agreed that at least 
some of the Vichy troops would have to be repatriated. 
8 
e 
While the British were under no specific obligation to repatriate 
any French soldiers, there were several reasons why this course of action 
was favoured. At Middle East Command there was a desire to secure the 
stability of the Levant as quickly as possible and reduce the demands on 
Wavell's thinly-stretched resources. Some of the forces tied down in Syria 
were badly needed in the Western Desert, where Wavell's latest offensive 
(Operation Battleaxe, 15-17 June) was ending in a precipitous retreat 
from Halfaya Pass, leaving Rommel a foothold in Egypt. In these:. menac tg 
circumstances, Wavell told a Service Chiefs' meeting on 18 June that he 
regarded the French Army of the Levant as "an unmitigated nuisance" and 
that the best thing that could happen would be its removal from Syria "as 
quickly as possible". 
9 British readiness to repatriate Vichy troops would 
obviously render negotiations with Dentz less difficult and drawn-out, 
and help secure an armistice more rapidly. 
* As Crosthwaite later reiterated, "we are not at war with Vichy, and if 
we were, the action which we should clearly have to take would be... to 
intern all but the most careful&y selected volunteers for the duration". 
- minute of 26 July 1941, F0371/27302/E4140. 
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London also favoured repatriation. Its policy was shaped by the 
curious fact that Britain was not at war with Vichy France. However 
absurd this was to any soldier in Syria, it was no idle casuistry. 
There was a profound difference between a localised conflict in the 
Levant and outright war against Vichy France, with its strong position 
in North Africa and its great fleet anchored at Toulon. For Britain, 
still alone in her struggle with the Axis, it was no time to drive 
Vichy any further into the arms of Hitler. * Thus far, Exporter was 
an anomalous, localised conflict, and London was anxious to end it 
quickly and quietly. Sir Miles Lampson had even told war correspondents 
to drop military terminology and perform an exercise in euphemism 
avoiding any suggestion of a French defeat. 
10 
Operation Exporter had already taken Britain to the brink of 
war with Vichy and London was anxious not to give the pro-Axis elements 
in France any more ammunition in their pursuit of full collaboration 
with the Germans. A magnanimous settlement in the Levant would ease 
the situation, and the generous treatment of captured Vichy troops was 
the obvious starting point. This was confirmed towards the end of June 
in secret talks with a Vichy emissary in London. This agent went on to 
tell Churchill's government on behalf of Pkain that French civil 
servants in the Levant would be instructed to co-operate with the Free 
French forces and that, in settling the Syrian conflict, Britain was 
expected to take this gesture into account. Churchill's reply was 
cordial. Stressing Britain's honest intentions, he pledged that 
"without prejudice to Arab independence" France would continue to be 
the privileged European power in the Levant, a fact which de Gaulle 
would simply "keep alive" during the war, and that Britain would not 
allow the French Empire to be whittled away when the war ended. "So try 
your best", he exhorted Petain, "to feel your way through the detestable 
difficulties by which we are both at present afflicted". 
11 
* Although by mid-June, the British were convinced that Hitler meant to 
attack Russia and not simply blackmail her, there were no great hopes 
in London of-gaining a powerful new ally, as it was generally thought 
that Russia could not withstand the Webmacht for much longer than 
Poland had done in 109. 
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These wider concerns were fatal to de Gaulle's hopes of 
keeping the French troops in Syria and rallying most of them to 
the Free French cause. His argument was not without force, for he 
rightly claimed that repatriation meant having to fight some of the 
same battle-hardened troops again, in North Africa. Nevertheless de 
Gaulle had to swallow the proposal that French troops remaining loyal 
to Petain would be repatriated. On 16 June he was still arguing through 
Spears that repatriation was neither necessary nor advisable. By the 
19th, however, he had conceded to Wavell and Lampson that while 
"all those who are willing to serve with the Allies shall be able to 
remain freely.... All those who are unwilling shall be repatriated 
when circumstances permit". 
12 
On 19 June de Gaulle had been "consulted" in Cairo, though this 
basic courtesy had been extended more by local good luck than London's 
good management. Certain peace feelers had been put out by Dentz 
through Engert at the American Embassy at Beirut, and on 19 June Lampson 
received a Foreign Office telegram giving details of this development. 
The signal was designated 'for the Commanders-in-Chief' but Lampson's 
assistant, Michael Wright, argued that a copy should go to de Gaulle. 
Wavell wanted to send a reply immediately, but finally agreed to de 
Gaulle's participation. Spears was therefore summoned to put the 
matter to de Gaulle, for Lampson was worried that the Frenchman might 
make trouble over the proposal contained in the telegram to repatriate 
Vichy troops. At 11 p. m* the various parties gathered under Lampson's 
roof and agreed on a set of armistice terms to be put to Dentz. Their 
text was then sent to the Foreign Office through Lampson. De Gaulle's 
acceptance of this text was amplified in a separate note handed to 
Lampson and Wavell during the meeting. 
13 
He unequivocally accepted the 
principle of repatriation for those who were unwilling to join the 
Allies, provided that they were given a genuine choice. At the same 
time, Lampson's wire affirmed de Gaulle's right to have his own 
14 
representative at the negotiations alonside the British. 
While this detailed Anglo-Free French text was being prepared 
in Cairo, another reply had already been prepared at the Foreign Office, 
where the need to consult de Gaulle had apparently been dismissed. 
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London was anxious to capitalise on Dentz's approach, and any reply 
had to follow a tortuous route from the Foreign Office to Washington's 
State Department (via the British Ambassador), on to Engert in Beirut 
and so eventually to Dentz. On the morning of 19 June the Defence 
Committee accepted the Chiefs-of-Staff opinion "that the situation in 
Syria should be cleared up as soon as possible". Eden (unaware that the 
Cairo terms were about to arrive on his desk) therefore read out a reply 
to Dentz prepared by the Chiefs of Staff and the Committee for Foreign 
(Allied) Resistance. These terms were accepted by the Defence Committee 
and London's reply was sent on its roundabout way to Beirut. * Churchill 
did not ask whether de Gaulle had been consulted. 
15 
Apart from the stipulation that de Gaulle should be represented 
separately at the armistice convention, the London terms were almost 
identical with those prepared in Cairo. Yet the London telegram proved 
to be an unhappy piece of work. As far as Dentz was concerned it was 
doomed to oblivion, for the slow progress of the Allies now made a 
ceasef ire appear premature. On 25 June Engert was therefore told that 
"the French authorities did not feel the time had come to negotiate". 
16 
Even the Syrians had begun to say that Hitler would be in Moscow 
t 
before the British were in Beirut. 
17 
Dentz's envoy rejected London's 
terms with ill-concealed contempt. 
If London's terms seemed presumptuous to Dentz, they looked 
sinister to de Gaulle, who thought he detected an attempt to exclude 
Free France from the negotiations. On 21 June he angrily told Eden that 
London's "unilateral and explicit reply" gave the distinct impression 
that "the British Government alone were qualified to answer". De 
Gaulle was the last man to accept such an implication: 
I do not consider myself bound in any manner by.., 
your telegram [and] I abide exclusively by terms of 
telegram whose text I accepted on evening of June 
19th in agreement with the British Ambassador and 
British Commander-in-Chief. 18 
e 
At the same meeting, the Committee heard the suggested Wilson- 
de Gaulle terms of 14 June,. and endorsed the Chiefs-of-Staff's 
rejection of these terms on the grounds that an undertaking to 
repatriate loyal Vichy troops could not be evaded. 
+ The assault on Russia began on 22 June. 
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There was little excuse for London's failure to consult de 
Gaulle before sending terms to Beirut. Eden had been specifically 
asked to do so by Churchill19 The similarity of London's terms, sent 
before the Cairo terms arrived in London, was a lucky accident. This 
did not prevent Eden from claiming that it was a determinant: "I 
regret... that General de Gaulle should feel aggrieved", the Foreign 
Secretary replied: 
we took fully into account the views expressed 
to us by General de Gaulle and the Commander- 
in-Chief, Middle East, respecting terms.... It 
therefore seemed unnecessary to refer text of 
our telegram to Wavell and de Gaulle, as terms 
were virtually identical and the matter brooked 
of no delay. 
This statement was misleading. The only views London took into 
account on 19 June were the ill-fated Wilson-de Gaulle terms of 14 
June - and by no stretch of the imagination could these be called 
"virtually identical". Moreover, Eden's reply continued to ignore the 
question of distinct Free French representation at armistice talks. 
This omission angered de Gaulle at the time, since the question 
was deliberately dealt with in the Cairo text. It is therefore 
curious that de Gaulle does not air this valid grievance in his 
memoirs. Instead, he exaggerates other shortcomings of the London 
telegram, claiming that "Free France was not even mentioned in it". 
This is incorrect. The London text stipulated that Vichy troops be 
given "opportunity to join Free French". De Gaulle's own volume of 
documents bears this out. 
20 Still, the general soundness of the London 
text did not distract de Gaulle from the glaring fact that it had been 
sent unilaterally, which made a mockery of the Cairo consultation. As 
Spears informed Churchill, "de Gaulle was cut to the quick.... that he 
was not consulted 
[by Eden] on the vital question of armistice terms. He 




Hopes of an early ceasef ire had been dashed by Dentz, leaving 
the Foreign Office with nothing to show for its strivings except a 
serious clash with de Gaulle. In Syria and Lebanon the unlucky soldiery 
of two empires battled and blundered through another three weeks of 
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hostilities, while behind Allied lines the authorities were plunged 
into a period of administrative chaos. Somehow, London and Cairo had 
to organise satisfactorily the Anglo-Free French occupation and 
administration of the Levant at a time when communications between 
Cairo and Wilson's headquarters were quite inadequate, when de Gaulle 
was roving about between Cairo, Damascus and Brazzaville without 
advising Spears of his itinerary, Spears was wrangling with Wilson and 
Smith about liaison arrangements for the Levant, Wavell himself was 
being replaced by Auchinleck, and Rommel was at the gates of Egypt. 
At the same time Oliver Lyttelton was being installed at Cairo to 
represent the War Cabinet and weld the many military and civilian 
authorities into some semblance of unity. 
In London, de Gaulle's wrath had evidently had a salutary effect 
upon the Foreign Office, which now attempted to consult Free France in 
the fullest possible sense. On receiving Vichy's counterproposals for 
a British occupation of Syria while Vichy itself retained the Lebanon, 
Eden sought de Gaulle's assent before firmly rejecting the offer. 
22 
This polite gesture went unrewarded since de Gaulle, minus Spears, was 
now pursuing his own affairs all over the Middle East. So was Spears, 
who managed to be in Jerusalem when de Gaulle was in Damascus, and in 
Damascus when de Gaulle returned to Cairo: 
23 This odd form of liaison 
wrecked Eden's attempt to consult de Gaulle, and after a week's delay, 
London sent its own stiff reply to Vichy. "This", observed Crosthwaite 
at the Foreign Office, "is clear proof of the absurd position that we 
have been put in by General de Gaulle's desire to be consulted on all 
points when he is not only not in London... nor even in Cairo; but 
speeding to and fro in the Middle East". 
24 
At the same time; a tactful message (via Spears) inviting de 
Gaulle to return to London had also fallen by the wayside: 
Recent telegrams... suggest dangerous misunder- 
standings may be arising on several points between 
General. de Gaulle and His Majesty's Government. 
Any such misunderstandings are... unnecessary but 
are possibly due to extended absence of General 
from London where policy has to be decided in face 
of rapidly changing situation. 
Prime Minister therefore hopes de Gaulle can see 
his way to returning here soon for general exchange 
of views. Thereafter he could return immediately to 
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Middle East if he so desires. [De Gaulle] should 
also be assured that there is no intention of 
diminishing the support promised and given to 
him and to the Free French movement. 25 
It was Spears' particular task to convey this kind of message to 
de Gaulle, and the wire was addressed to Spears in Cairo. Unfortunately 
he did not return from Damascus until 9 July. By that time de Gaulle had 
left for Brazzaville, and Spears had lost the opportunity to present 
London's invitation to the General. * 
In his wake de Gaulle had left London and Cairo with plenty to 
fret and fume about. On 27 June Cairo learned of two decrees and a 
covering letter to Catroux, issued by de Gaulle in Damascus and 
destined for publication as far afield as London and Brazzaville. 
The decrees declared Catroux "Delegate-General and Plenipotentiary 
of... Levant States" and, more ambiguously, "Commander-in-Chief of 
Levant". The covering letter instructed Catroux, among other things, 
to assume "all powers exercised hitherto by French High Commissioner 
for Levant and all responsibilities incumbent upon him", and stated' 
that "the mandate donferred on France ... must be. carried out to its 
26 
conclusion and the work of France must go on". 
London did. =nöt receive all this text until 30 June, but the War 
Office thereafter lost no time in reacting. "Have these three documents 
been published and if so when and how? " it demanded of Wavell. '"If not 
publication should certainly be deferred.... Were you consulted by de 
Gaulle or Spears..? Letter from de Gaulle to Catroux appears to give 
latter. full powers now exercised by Dentz to exclusion of any British 
control". The Foreign Office also noted that Catroux had been baldly 
designated Commander-in-Chief of the Levant without reference to Wilson 
or the British army. "This is typical of... de Gaulle", observed Mack .+ 
"We shall find him as jealous and suspicious in regard to Syria as any 
Vichy Frenchman - perhaps more so as he feels he has to destroy the 
idea that he is under British tutelage". This was no exaggeration. 
27 
Spears seems to have been in Damascus on his own initiative, 
discussing liaison arrangements with Catroux and meeting Syrian 
notables. His memoirs suggest at one point that he was there on 
Lyttelton's authority, at another that he was there on London's 
authority. But Lyttelton did not set foot in the Middle East until 
5 July, and London clearly expected Spears to be with de Gaulle 
in Cairo. 
+ Head of French Department at the Foreign Off&ce. 
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The following day London heard from Wavell that "Neither de 
Gaulle nor Spears consulted me concerning text of two decrees and 
letter nor do we know if Spears himself was consulted. De Gaulle 
comes and goes between Syria and Cairo without any reference to me 
or as far as I know to General Wilson". Wavell himself considered 
the two decrees "unobjectionable" but deplored "the complete absence 
of any recognition of my authority or that of 
[Wilson]. This is 
quite in accord with de Gaulle's whole attitude", Wavell declared: 
This is that Free French are inheritors of all 
rights and responsibilities of previous Vichy 
Government of Syria.... he remarked that General 
Wilson would have no role to play except as 
Commander of British Troops in a country they did 
not administer [and] on political and economic 
questions [he] would refuse to cede us anything. 
He declines to recognise that there is an Arab 
question at all or that French are unpopular in 
Syria. There are many indications that... Free 
French feel that implementation of promise of 
independence... can wait till end of war. 
Wavell went on to report that, according to de Gaulle, France 
had regained "sovereign power" in the Levant through the medium of 
Free France and the British army was therefore a mere guest in an 
Allied territory. This had been expressed to Wilson in writing. 
Wavell therefore appealed for a clear statement of the British 
position in the face of these swollen claims, and concluded: 
If we give full rein to French aspirations there 
is a real danger of a resurgence of Arab hostility 
to us throughout Middle East on grounds that 
promises to Arabs have again been broken. It 
Jisj 
question of balancing the advantages of a frien ly 
... Arab world against those of a satisfied Free 
French party since it seems most unlikely that 
the ambitions*of the two can be reconciled. 28 
on_receiptý of": iaveli s- telegramChurchill pnompt3y dismissed 
any thoughts, of tact' and . conciliation and reacted with'-ty0ical vigour. 
"It was -never , our intention that the de ; Gaiillists should virtually step 
into the places of the Dentz administration", he told Eden. "Their 
losses and contribution have been only a small fraction of ours. They 
should be given a certain prominence", he went on, 
in order to. show that French interests in Syria 
are safeguarded against any other European power, 
and that we have no desire to supplant France in 
/ C0C7 
her privileged and favoured position in Syria. 
However, all this is but one to four or five in 
our Syrian policy, which remains the independence 
of Syria and all its peoples. No French policy 
which conflicts with this major decision can be 
accepted. It is therefore for de Gaulle... to 
make the same kind of arrangements with Syria as 
we made in the case of Iraq, with the important 
difference that in the ultimate issue we have 
military force behind us and he has not, to any extent. 
29 
These blunt and revealing views were put to Eden in an "Action 
This Day" minute, along with the suggestion that this response, plus 
some account of the controversy, should be wired to Malta - to catch 
Oliver Lyttelton, the newly-appointed Minister of State, on his way to 
Cairo. The Foreign Secretary lost no time in providing Lyttelton with 
an outline of the situation, pointing out that 
de Gaulle's attitude is wholly incompatible with 
arrangements made with him before action in Syria 
began.... Catroux was to accompany Allied forces, 
Cto handle] negotiations to give effect to Free 
French proclamation... and that his advice would 
be sought in all dealings with the administration 
and Governments of Syria and the Lebanon; but that 
until treaty or treaties referred to in the procla- 
mation were concluded and so long as British forces 
were in occupation of the country final decision 
would rest with Commander-in-Chief. 
Eden threw in Churchill's vigorous note almost unaltered and wired 
the lot to Lyttelton, who was currently enduring the austere company 
of Sir William Dobbie, the Bible-Wielding Governor of Malta.:: Lyttelton, 
who was soon to encounter de Gaulle at his formidable worst, had at 




After a hair-raising night flight from Malta, Lyttelton 
arrived safely in Cairo on 5 July, determined to straighten out 
the ramshackle edifice of British administration in the Middle East. 
His functions were to "represent the War Cabinet on the spot and... 
carry out its policy and use its authority for that purpose". 
Specifically, he was to find means of "relieving the Commanders-in- 
Chief as far as possible of those extraneous responsibilities with 
which they have hitherto been burdened" and of "giving Commanders- 
/o( 
in-Chief that political guidance which has not hitherto been 
available locally". He was also charged with "settling matters 
within the policy of His Majesty's Government but involving 
several local authorities". The prime example of this duty was 
cited as "Relations with the Free French". This was already 
proving to be a masterly understatement. 
31 
It was a daunting task, but Lyttleton, an able and 
confident man, lost no time in exerting War Cabinet authority in 
Cairo, where all was change and transition. On the day of his 
arrival, he was obliged to tell de Gaulle that while "Britain had 
no designs on the rights and interests of France in the Levant", 
there must be no more tinkering with armistice terms - de Gaulle 
would have to abide by the terms he endorsed in Cairo on 19 June. 
32 
The following day, after talks with both Laanpson and Middle East 
Command, he replied to Eden's Malta telegram. "The Civil 
Administration of Syria cannot be carried out satisfactorily if 
at all without the active co-operation of the French Civil 
officials", he reported, opining that "we'supported... Catroux's 
proclamation which provided for him to assume the powers, 
responsibilities and duties of France in the Levant and we must 
honour our word". Lyttleton added that British needs could be 
safeguarded by the continuation of British martial law, that 
Catroux's treaties with the Syrians and Lebanese would presumably 
modify the position of French officials vis-a-vis the local peoples, 
and that dealings with Catroux ought to be "liberal and not 
niggardly". 
33 
Churchill himself, disturbed by Lyttleton's vagueness over 
the Syrians and Lebanese, quickly replied. Whilst endorsing 
Lyttleton's views on administrative relations with the Free French 
in the Levant, the Prime Minister reiterated that "the main point" 
was 
to gain the Arab world by establishment and 
proclamation at earliest of Syrian independence in 
whatever form is most acceptable. Your 
[reference 
to this] is far from adequate. Our policy is to 
give the Syrian Arabs independence... 
.. the Arabs bulk 
far more largely in our minds 
than the Free French, and there can be no question 
of any lengthy delay in negotiating treaties which 
satisfy them and convince them that they have not 
merely exchanged one set of Frenchmen for another. 
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Churchill's idea of any lengthy delay was clearly implied: 
Catroux's proclamation says "as soon as possible". 
This should mean that within a few days of the 
Vichy French surrendering prompt and vigorous 
negotiations should begin, and be pressed 
earnestly and swiftly to a conclusion. 34 
This was an impossible timetable, even if the Free French, the 
Syrians and the Lebanese had achieved some meeting of minds, 
which was unlikely and in fact never happened. Still, the Minister 
of State was left in no doubt whatsoever about London's priorities 
and aims. 
Before any questions of independence could be tackled, there 
was a Vichy French army to be dealt with, disarmed and repatriated. 
Anticipating a ceasefire in the Levant, London corrected the earlier 
affront to de Gaulle. On 9 July the Defence Committee decided that 
"the armistice terms, as drawn up by the Commanders-in-Chief in 
the Middle East and accepted by General de Gaulle, should now be 
adopted for communication to General Dentz". 
35 The Foreign Office 
accordingly wired instructions that Dentz was to be handed the 
Cairo terms of 19 June "which are the only terms in which de 
Gaulle has concurred". 
36 
By this time Dentz had appröached the British for a discussion 
of armistice terms, and London had made amends with de Gaulle by 
giving clear instructions about the 'correct' terms. No sooner was 
this matter settled than there appeared the first signs of another, 
and far more serious, clash with de Gaulle. On 9 July Washington 
reported Vichy's stipulation that "General Dentz should only have to 
negotiate with British Military representatives and not with any 
representatives of de Gaulle". 
37 This flatly contradicted the 
Cairo terms which London had just endorsed. It will be recalled 
(see Chapter 2), however, that one of the worst features of the 
Acre armistice was the exclusion of the Free French from the signing 
of the armistice. How could this happen within a few days of such 
" clear instructions from London? The new Commander-in-Chief, 
Auchinleck, was in full agreement that the Cairo terms should be 
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put to Bentz - which makes the subsequent Acre fiasco even more 
difficult to explain. 
38 The following account documents a sorry 
tale of bungling and sheer negligence on the part of General Wilson, 
compounded by Catroux's inadequacy, poor communications with 
Lyttelton, and London's short-sighted expediency. 
On 11 July Auchinleck reported that he had discussed the 
coming negotiations with Wilson on the basis of the Cairo terms of 
19 July. 
39 That evening Auchinleck further reported that he had now 
heard from Dentz: "He requests rendezvous for Plenipotentiary on 
the understanding that he is authorised to negotiate only with 
British representatives to exclusion of those of any allied force". 
Auchinleck added that he and the Minister of State were considering 
their reply. 
40 Around midnight Lyttelton cared their response to both 
Dentz and the Foreign Office. De Gaulle himself could have asked no 
more: 
Dentz's message raises the issue of participation 
of Free French in the negotiations. I entirely 
agree... that we must insist on this and after 
discussion with Commanders-in-Chief, the following 
reply has been sent. 
"... the British Commanders-in-Chief can accep no 
reservations regarding plenipotentiaries Cndj 
unless General Dentz's plenipotentiaries present 
themselves with a flag of truce... offensive action 
will be resumed... " 
GOC [Wilson] has been instructed to aria s for 
representation of Free French. 41 
Lyttelton and Auchinleck had stood their ground admirably, despite 
the pressure to end the Syrian campaign as soon as possible, and they 
had not failed to direct Wilson accordingly. On the morrow, however, 
Lyttelton was surprised to receive a terse wire from Churchill, 
disavowing the stance taken in Cairo: 
Negotiations should not be allowed to break down 
merely on the point of form as to who Dentz will 
surrender to. We have adopted terms agreeable to 
the Free French, but their presence should not 
constitute a fatal obstacle to our getting them. 
Of course if you can get them in all the better. 42 
This telegram alone could have been enough to cause all the subsequent 
trouble over the armistice, but Lyttelton had the courage to ignore it. 
(O yc 
"I am no Nelson, and see well with both eyes, but I decided to 
let my telegram ride.... I confess to having passed an uneasy night", 
he recalled. Churchill's wire was not only "unfair to the man on the 
spot", as Lyttelton later remarked, but also ill-considered and 
short-sighted. 
43 
The stage was set for a trial of will in Acre, for Vichy had 
declared the Allied terms unacceptable, since they implied 
"recognition by French Government of Free French movement", while 
Wilson had been told to insist on Free French participation. 
44 
The latter, however -a breezy apolitical pragmatist - avoided trouble 
by physically including Catroux in his delegation but officially 
excluding him when it came to initialling the agreement. This 
satisfied the Vichy delegates. Catroux, who lacked his leader's 
stormy intransigence, allowed himself to be politely brushed aside. 
His convenient co-operation enabled Wilson to give Lyttelton an 
acceptable account of the proceedings at Acre. As a result, the 
Minister of State passed on the following message from Wilson to the 
Foreign Office : 
Discussions with Vichy French representatives were 
satisfactory. The crux of the situation is evacuation 
of Vichy troops. in their own ships to France. .. 
Terms are very favourable to the Allies... L: 
j 
I repeat if Vichy French can get their passage 
back to France all will be all right. 45 
Wilson's term "satisfactory" actually covered a multitude of sins 
but the unlucky Minister was in no position to see this. Wilson had 
simply, and ambiguously, indicated that Catroux was present at the 
discussions. The poor communications system left Lyttelton at the 
mercy of Wilson's discretion, which proved to be a most unhappy 
arrangement; As Lyttelton recalled: 
The task of getting the Armistice terms into 
proper order... was made much more. difficult and 
baffling because I had to stay in Cairo, to be in 
touch hour by hour with London, and my only quick 
means of communication with Wilson in... Acre was 
by the Army telephone via Jerusalem. It was 
difficult to hear or be heard on this line. 46 
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There was no reason whatsoever for Lyttelton to suspect, at that 
stage, that Wilson had disregarded the spirit of his instructions 
concerning the Free French representation at Acre. It was 
reasonable for Cairo to assume that Wilson had insisted on a proper 
Free French involvement in the talks, and had prevailed upon de 
Verdilhac to accept this. After all, Wilson had the upper hand, and 
he had Auchinleck's authority to resume hostilities if the Vichy 
delegates refused the British terms and conditions. 
Thus Wilson was allowed to carry on, undetected and uncorrected, 
to conclude an armistice which was a serious affront to Free France. 
He seemed to think that by involving Catroux in these proceedings 
he had ruled out any Free French renunciation of the Acre terms, 
but in this breezy assumption Wilson completely under-estimated 
de Gaulle and utterly failed to grasp the issues at stake. * Cairo 
had its first indications of what was happening when Wilson sent on 
the text which had been initialled by himself and de Verdilhac on 
13 July. Here were the crass clauses by which Vichy auxiliaries, 
guns, supplies, indeed the Levant itself, were simply handed over to 
the British. Wilson had even styled himself GOC of British rather than 
Allied forces - for which he was quickly corrected by Auchinleck. 
47 
Wilson had presented Cairo with a fait accompli and, by involving 
Catroux,..: he. had done, enough-to prevent : Auchinleck and'. Lytteltoü from 
taking the drastic step of disavowing his activities. Auchinleck, a 
newcomer to the Middle East and to Anglo-Free French relations, could 
hardly be blamed for thinking that Catroux's acquiescence meant that 
Free France was satisfied. As for Lyttelton, his hands were now tied 
by the knowledge that Churchill himself had endorsed Wilson's actions 
in principle, and would undoubtedly do so in practice if the work of 
his favourite General was"-repudiated. '. Churchill himself must therefore 
Why was Wilson so concerned to satisfy de Verdilhae? He was anxious 
to end Syrian operations without any further delay, for the slow 
progress of EXPORTER had inconvenienced Auchinleck and raised questions 
about his own captaincy. It is also. likely that, after-the abortive 
Wilson-de Gaulle agreement, Wilson had swung too far the other way in 
order to avoid a similar "mistake". If so, he lost the opportunity to 
explain this by breezing over the whole question in his memoirs. More- 
over, like Wavell, he was fed up with the whole French problem. With 
the conservative instinct of most British generals, Wilson was. uneasy 
about de Gaulle (technically a rebel) and more at home among the French. 
military establishment, who "just did their duty"Fand conveniently 
loft politics to the politicians. 
loh 
take some responsibility for Cairo's acceptance of Wilson's 
armistice on 13 July, for he had roundly told Lyttelton to leave 
the Free French out of it, if necessary. 
Cairo therefore contented itself with a few minor corrections 
to the 13 July text, unaware that the worst was yet to come. "General 
Wilson reports Verdilhac absolutely refused to use terms Vichy French 
and Free French", Auchinleck told London: 
It was impossible to arrange for Catroux to initial 
agreement as this would have wrecked talks. Catroux 
most helpful during talks. Wilson hopes to get 
Catroux [to] sign final agreement but if this is 
impossible it is pointed out that Wilson's signature 
must be taken to cover the interest of all Allied 
Parties.... 
... General Wilson will take... as orders 
Etha' 
if it is impossible to get Catroux's signature to 
the agreement he should be requested to hand a 
signed statement to General Wilson stating that he 
is in agreement with the terms and endorses them in 
the name of General de Gaulle. '.. 
The Minister of State who attaches particular 
importance to... the above has seen and concurred 
in... this telegram. 48 
Wilson now had a free hand and he proceeded to spring upon his 
Cairo superiors the secret Protocol, attached to the final agreement.. 
of 14 July, which amounted to a fundamental betrayal of Free French 
interests: ` On 14 July Wilson wired Auchinleck to report that the 
armistice had been 
Signed... in spirit of cordiality. Separate confidential 
protocol prepared which does not form part of convention 
and which is not for publication in any fora, regulating 
conditions under which Vichy troops may be approached 
to join Allied. Catroux has signed letter agreeing to 
terms of convention... 49 
It was explained to London that "Only difficulty concerns Free French 
personal access to Vichy troops but leaflets and loudspeakers and 
individual choice agreed to. Catroux agrees". 
50 
This was quite 
misleading, for the Protocol was not seen by Catroux, who "had agreed 
to one thing and one thing only, not to send officers into the [Vichy] 
Camps". 51 Butt(the Protocol went far beyond this. It banned all 
personal contact between Gaullist and Petainist, confined Free French 
spokesmen to the use of pamphlets, loudspeakers and wireless, and 
invoked the assistance of the British on the side of the Vichy 
The Protocol embodied the requests made by de V. erdilhac. Its 
precise origin remains obscure. 
/07 
authorities. 
52 This farcical arrangement in no way corresponded 
to the genuine individual choice stipulated in the original Cairo 
terms which Wilson had been ordered to implement. If Catroux was now 
to achieve Free French recruiting aims, he would have to be nothing 
less than a miraculous new Joshua, marching round the camps with a 
loudspeaker to bring down the walls of Petainism. 
53 
The secret protocol had reduced the Acre agreement to the 
level of a cruel joke, and there was bound to be serious trouble with 
de Gaulle. "I am afraid our excellent friend, Jumbo Wilson, has rather 
blundered", observed Lampson in his diary. 
54 "I was greatly incensed 
that no reference had been made to me about this secret clause" 
wrote Lyttelton. 
55 Spears fumed in his diary that the armistice 
was "wet", the protocol "preposterous", and that the British had 
been fooled. On 17 July he conferred'in Ain Sofar with Wilson and 
Catroux, this time on Lyttelton's authority, and observed that 
"General Wilson, animated by the best.; of intentions, completely 
failed to realise the importance of most of the decisions arrived 
at 
[in Acre] ". 56 Spears thereupon. iimpressed the disastrous 
implications of Wilson's dealings so forcefully upon the latter that 
the two men forthwith fell out. "As can well be imagined", Spears 
recalled, "the atmosphere was somewhat strained. Jumbo, very much on 
the defensive, started off with a suspicion I did nothing to allay that 
the Armistice terms of which he had seemed... quite proud, did not 
appear in the same light to the Minister of State". Catroux, 
to Wilson's further discomfort, took the opportunity "to refute 
as far as possible all the points he had imprudently agreed to at 
Acre, which he now... realise[d33'Would infuriate de Gaulle". 57 
* 
What, if anything, was to be done about the Acre agreement, 
which was so utterly and unjustifiably bad for Free France? London 
offered no satisfactory answer to this question. At the Foreign Office 
is Spears reminisded that Wilson "could be very caustic" but Spears 
himself frequently employed a devastating sarcasm. In his memoirs 
he says that Wilson, in his ascent to the rank of Field-Marshal,. was 
"levitated by hot air alone and propelled by a strong breeze 
from 10 Downing Street".. 'FiilfiUkent, p. 90. 
/ow 
Baxter wrung his hands ineffectually. The armistice, he noted, 
"scarcely recognises the existence of the Free French and gives 
them no rights whatever.... [hei' full opportunity to recruit from 
the Vichy forces... has practically gone by the board". Having made 
these admissions, he bleated that it was "too late" for the 
Foreign Office to do anything about it. 
58 
A note from Eden to 
Churchill condemned the same shortcomings in the Acre text and 
admitted that "terms do differ in certain important respects from 
those which we 
[i. 
e., the War Cabinet Defence Committee]. ' had 
previously agreed", but again concluded "there is nothing we can do 
about it here". This note was not even sent, for Eden discussed the 
matter with Churchill verbally. 
59 
Their discussion took account of an ominous wire from de 
Gaulle to Catroux which gave notice of the impending hurricane from 
Brazzaville: 
I hope that you have not been led into signing this 
armistice.... I do'not approve of these terms as to 
which I have moreover never been consulted... I am 
obliged to take steps to place responsibility publicly 
on the shoulders of the British.... I will also study 
to what extent you have achieved points which were 
vital for us... 60 
This message had the effect of silencing eloquent consciences in 
London, and a stiffish, unrepentant attitude emerged. On 17 July 
Eden sent a sort of "our-man-in-Acre-can-do-no-wrong" wire to 
Lyttelton which, by implication, suggested that no British errors 
were to be admitted to de Gaulle. Lyttelton was advised instead to 
tell de Gaulle "that he himself appointed Catroux as his 
plenipotentiary", and to "make what use you can of the extent to 
which Catroux had been associated in the negotiation and conclusion 
of the Convention and Protocols". Eden added that it might be 
"advisable to send for General Spears, who in previous crises has 
been able to exert a most useful influence upon de Gaulle". 
61 
As for Churchill, he prepared a message for de Gaulle "to 
be used or not at 
¶yttelton' s discretion [since) it may be right 
to let Cae Gaulle] know where he gets off'. Churchill' confessed 
/0? 
himself "grieved" that de Gaulle did not find the Acre Convention 
agreeable, and went on to blame the hard fighting in Syria largely 
upon the Free French, adding that "the antipathy of the Syrian 
people to the French, whether Vichy or Free, is strongly marked". 
This would merely have set off a series of bitter charges and 
counter-charges, and Lyttelton wisely consigned Churchill's un- 
statesmanlike message to the oblivion of his files, 
62 
London had recognised that its undertakings to General de 
Gaulle had not been carried out, and yet there was no attempt to 
rectify this failure - only a bloody-minded defensive reaction 
to the first signs of Gaullist criticism. This is, perhaps, 
indicative of the plight of a junior ally in its dealings with 
a more significant power, although de Gaulle was to teach the 
British that virtual powerlessness itself could be turned into a 
weapon. * If anything more satisfactory was to be done, it was left 
to British representatives in Cairo. Fortunately, Lyttelton and 
Spears - both resourceful men - had by now become acquainted, and 
"got on like a house on fire". These two had already joined forces 
in an endeavour to repair at least some of the damage done at Acre. 
On 16 July, Spears' diary recorded his 
Talk with Lyttelton, who is extremely worried about 
Armistice terms, and at prospect of facing de Gaulle 
on so bad a wicket - proposed myself that there was 
only one thing to do and that was to go and look 
into question myself... He jumped at it. 
It was fortunate that Spears, with his unique understanding of Free 
France, was also a willing horse. He promptly flew off to Beirut to 
see Catroux and Wilson and, despite his cutting manner with Wilson, 




Lyttelton recalled that "when French power was at a low ebb, 
decisions were... taken without consultation or agreement with [de Gaulle]. He never let this pass: he pointed with passion to 
anything ham-fisted or maladroit or impolite which we had done. By 
these means... he became respected and, since the English... hate 
scenes, and hate being exposed as clumsy, inconsiderate or disloyal, 
he built up a position. which no amount of emollient diplomacy 
could have gained". - Chftdoa, p. 249. 
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Spears' solution was to point out that the Protocol would 
have to be interpreted in the light of the Convention itself, which 
laid down the Allied right to attempt to rally the Vichy troops, 
and in Article 8 stipulated that "All means of communication" were 
to be assumed by the Allies. Thus the restrictions on personal 
contact contained in the Protocol flatly contradicted the Convention, 
and were therefore to be "interpreted" as an indication that Free 
French proselytising was to be done along orderly lines laid down 
by the British, who would chaperone Free French access to the 
Vichy troops! This splendid piece of casuistry was readily accepted 
by Lyttelton, who informed Churchill and the Foreign Office that 
Spears had produced a formula for getting round the Protocol, which 
in any case had not been seen by Catroux and "was included without 
any reference to me". Lyttelton thus hoped to "succeed in 
persuading General de Gaulle... that his essential requirements 
have been met. But he has been sending acidulated messages to 
Catroux... and I expect trouble with him". 
64 
Lyttelton's anxiety was obvious in a further wire to London 
on 20 July. "I expect to see General de Gaulle tomorrow", he reported: 
I have had a message from him welcoming Spears' 
appointment as head of liaison in the Levan] 
but expressing dissatisfaction with the Armistice 
terms.... If it were not for the Protocol I 
should feel on very solid ground with him... 65 
*** 
That afternoon de Gaulle flew in from Brazzaville, and 
Lyttelton's worst fears were quickly confirmed. In a preliminary 
evening skirmish with Spears, who attempted to deflect the Frenchman's 
fury, de Gaulle threatened to withdraw Free French troops from British 
command, execrated Catroux as a spineless Anglophile, and virtually 
disintegrated over the Protocol. On this point Spears fully 
sympathised and was, of course, able to cite his formula for 
nullifying the Protocol: "At the end of what had in fact been a 
letting-off of steam by de Gaulle", Spears recalled, "I rather 
4 rß 
flattered myself that I had taken the edge off his spite, but 
in this I was wrong as I soon found out". 
66 
Ab 10 a. m. the following morning, in what was arguably his 
career-best performance, de Gaulle stalked into Lyttelton's office 
in a towering rage, denouncing the armistice and abominating all 
things British. "General de Gaulle was white with suppressed passion. 
He.... continued in a violent tirade until about half-past twelve", 
recalled Lyttelton, who found the playing-fields of Eton no real 
preparation for this sort of thing. 
67 Even Spears, hardened by a 
year's liaison with de Gaulle, was startled by the man's demeanour: 
"He looked frightful... as if he had not slept for a week". 
68 
De Gaulle lost no time in exposing the gulf between the Acre 
Convention and the Cairo terms of 19 June, to which he had agreed. 
On this awkward wicket Lyttelton could only reply that Catroux 
" had given his assent to the Acre text, and that the Protocol was 
admittedly "a mistake". This was about the only apology de Gaulle 
ever received, and he was not noticeably impressed, despite 
Lyttelton's assurance that Spears had "been able to nullify the 
effects of the Protocol". Brushing aside Lyttelton's courteous 
attempts to achieve a rational discussion, de Gaulle produced a 
document formally withdrawing all Free French troops in Syria from 
the command of the British. Lyttelton handed it back, declaring it to 
be "an ultimatum which could only be read as terminating the alliance". 
Amidst fresh volleys of Anglophobia the document lay in no-man's-land 
while Lyttelton refused it and de Gaulle refused to withdraw it. 
Eventually the British Minister brightly indicated that the time 
had come for luncheon and a. siesta, and cordially invited de Gaulle 
to return at 6 p. m. to "make a serious attempt to agree". At a loss 
for once, the Frenchman grudgingly agreed. 
69 
There was no siesta for Lyttelton and Spears, who were under- 
standably alarmed by the extremity of de Gaulle's reaction. Together 
* There were only four men present: de Gaulle, Lyttölton, Spears and 
the Free French General de Larminat, an escapee from Syria in.; 1940, 
a staunch supporter of de Gaulle and altogether a tougher proposition 
than Catroux, whose position in the Levant he seemed to covet. 
"/l2 
with Michael Wright and Henry Hopkinson (Lyttelton's diplomatic 
aide), they prepared to respond, if necessary, to de Gaulle's 
threats. Wright had even heard that de Gaulle intended to have 
Dentz arrested. Auchinleck was informed of the possibility of de 
Gaulle going to Syria to issue independent orders to his troops, which 
would quickly bring them into conflict with the British forces, while 
the presence of the Vichy troops would cause even greater chaos. It 
was agreed that de Gaulle must be prevented from going to Syria until 
some settlement was reached. Lyttelton, Spears and Hopkinson then 
called on Lampson "in a state of Some agitation.... all out for de 
Gaulle's blood", and set up the machinery for cutting off the Free 
French leader. He was to be denied the use of wireless and telegraph 
and, if necessary, deposed in favour of Catroux - in. which case 
de Gaulle would be "shut up" in a British prison. 
70 
These drastic measures never saw the light of day, for at 
6 p. m. when de Gaýlle returned he "had completely changed and 
although difficult was, comparatively speaking, amenable". 
71 
There 
was a reasonable talk about the Operational relationship between 
Free French forces and the British command, and about the civil 
administration of-the Levant. De Gaulle eventually appeared to agree 
with the current arrangement", after Lyttelton's insistence that an 
"attitude of suspicion was intolerable and that I was unwilling to 
listen to any statement... that the military authorities would use 
the security of their troops 
[to 
gain] political advantages for 
Great Britain". Finally the Minister reverted to the Armistice, 
pointing out that. a Free French representative had been appointed to 
the Armistice Commission and that the Spears formula would render 
the Protocol harness. 
Lyttelton rounded off this extraordinary day by sendinga 
clear account of both interviews to Churchill and the Foreign Office, 
omitting the afternoon's emergency conferences. "I have telegraphed 
at such length", he concluded, 
113 
because we are by no means out of the wood and 
there are... numerous points upon which bitter 
controversy may again break out.... After our 
first conversation yesterday both Spears and I 
felt that a complete breach was inevitable and 
that our minimum military requirements could not 
be safe-guarded as long as General de Gaulle 
remained leader of the Free French. Our fears 
may still prove well founded... 
Lyttelton's final remark was understandable: "If this is a specimen 
of how diplomacy has to be conducted I feel glad that I did not 
embrace it as a career". 
72 
London also received a stiff telegram from de Gaulle, 
strongly objecting to the Acre Convention and indicating that 
definite counter-measures would be taken. "I hope that you 
personally", he told Churchill, "may feel that Lhiý considerably 
aggravates my difficulties and will have consequences which I deeply 
deplore". 73 If this hope was anything more than rhetoric, it was 
vain. Churchill was prepared to humour de Gaulle in a 'superficial' 
way, but not to rethink his views on the Syrian question. "Your 
attitude towards de Gaulle is strongly approved", he replied to 
Lyttelton: 
There is no real chance of his releasing us from 
our obligations to him as he would do in persisting 
in such an ultimatum as you properly rejected. Do. 
not therefore allow him to upset or impede our 
policy in Syria. On this basis you should do your 
utmost to keep him in a good mood, making full 
allowance for the difficulties of his position. 74 
Keeping de Gaulle happy while preventing any alteration or 
deflection of British policy in the Levant was a tall order, as 
Spears and Lyttelton were painfully discovering in Cairo. After de 
Gaulle and Lyttelton had agreed to thrash out agreements covering 
the interpretation of the armistice and the joint occupation of 
the Levant, their lieutenants, de Larminat`" and Spears, met on 23 
July. Negotiations revolved around a paper prepared by de Larminat 
and endorsed by de Gaulle. Spears considered some of de Larminat'. s 
proposals worse than the do`Gaulledocument rejected by Lyttelton, 
ýý j`" 
and "a good deal of very straight talking" eventually led to a 
modification of the Free French position and an agreement on most 
points. Spears, de Larminat and their respective aides then brought 
their work back to Lyttelton and de Gaulle and a final agreement 
was reached, not without further haggling. Spears grumbled in his 
diary that de Gaulle had the best of these exchanges, that Lyttelton 
was more inclined to give way, and that Wright "would give everything 
away.... I was more aggressive, the only one to take on de Gaulle and 
I stirred him up". 
75 
1 
The so-called Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements were concluded 
on 25 July. They consisted of an "Interpretation" of the Acre 
armistice and two Enclosures on "Collaboration between British and 
Free French Authorities in the Middle East". 
76 These were 
negotiated, drawn up and concluded entirely in Cairo and were not - 
as Lyttelton's memoirs suggest - cleared in advance by Eden and the 
War Cabinet. The Interpretation owed much to Spears' original 
proposal for negating the Wilson Protocol, and Lyttelton was hardly 
exaggerating when he informed Spears that the negotiations as a 
whole "could hardly have succeeded without you". 
77 
In reporting 
to Churchill the successful conclusion of the agreements, Lyttelton's 
pleasure was evident: "Considering this fish took out the entire 
line on Monday and looked likely to carry away the whole tackle, I 
feel some relief that after playing it up and down the pool for three 
days it is now on the bank". 
78 
Lyttelton's celebrations were obviously premature, for the 
fish himself was expressing considerable satisfaction with the 
proceedings. "After some hard toings and froings", de Gaulle told 
the Free French Delegation in London, 
I concluded... an arrangement with Lyttelton.... 
We have thus the means of acting effectively 
on the V'chy troops and of taking possession of 
the CwarJ material.... Lyttelton is writing me 
a letter recognising our. entire sovereignty over 
the Levant States. All this is a solid satisfaction. 
//S 
De Gaulle was so flushed with success that he even made another 
attempt, by direct appeal to Churchill, to prevent the 
repatriation of Vichy troops altogether - despite his own 
agreement to this in June. This telegram evoked nothing but an 
exasperated snort in London, and there the matter ended. 
79 
De 
Gaulle's triumph was further reduced by a reply from the Free French 
Delegation, which criticised and disapproved of his methods: 
it cannot have escaped our Allies that the 
immediate decisions which you [took] , thus 
engaging officially the responsibility of the 
French Empire Defence Council, were taken and 
communicated [to the British] before seven of 
the nine members had been consulted.... We fear 
lest this may tend to diminish... the weight 
of your declarations. 
... the British responsibility 
[for Acre terms was] 
not exclusive, on account of the presence of 
General Catroux. We cannot therefore totally and 
unilaterally repudiate the issue... of an 
enterprise carried on in common. 
De Gaulle was frankly advised, in the event of further British 
"errors", to appeal to the British to make the realities conform to 
their declared policies. "Acts of rupture", however, were to be 
avoided. 
80 
The recipient of this sober advice was not noticeably 
persuaded to change his analysis, of the British or his method of 
dealing with them. Having completed his arrangements with Lyttelton 
in Cairo, de Gaulle promptly set off for the Levant to satisfy 
himself that Free French rights and requirements were being met. At 
the end of July, the Levant was understandably a chaotic place, and 
in so far as events conformed to any guide-lines, they were still 
Wilson's rather than Lyttelton's. It was one thing to produce the 
Lyttelton- de Gaulle agreements in Cairo, and quite another, and 
harder, thing to implement these terms in all the prevailing 
confusion of an Allied occupation. It certainly could not be done 
overnight, but de Gaulle was evidently reluctant to concede this. 
on discovering the inevitable British misdemeanours and failings, the 
localised disputes and misunderstandings - which included, a dangerous 
I/b 
Anglo-Free French confrontation in the Jebel Druse - de Gaulle 
gave the British authorities a taste of his Cairo performance. 
Early in August these fresh Gaullist eruptions brought Lyttelton 
hastening to the scene to impose his edicts upon British field 
officers and resolve a number of inflamed questions on the spot. 
ýi 'e 
By mid-August, de Gaulle was able to review a wholesale 
revision of the Acre Convention and the arrangements for the joint 
occupation of the Levant States, a revision achieved at the highest 
official levels and also in the field. De Gaulle was convinced that 
his intransigence, above all, had brought about these drastic 
reversals of fortune. Rather unwisely, he expressed this conclusion 
to Spears, who informed London: 
The General confided to me [that] the methods 
employed by him of late in dealing with us had 
proved very successful. These he described as 
extremely firm. Truth compelled me to disillusion 
him and it had, I said, been very painful to me... 
to watch antics that had not only generated 
dislike but caused anxiety concerning his mental 
balance. 81 
Yet there was more truth in de Gaulle's assertion than the 
sarcastic Spears was prepared to admit. It was de Gaulle who had 
swooped down from his Brazzaville eyrie and savaged the Acre 
Convention, magnificently dismissing the fact that his own 
Plenipotentiary had accepted it. London, while admitting that Allied 
policy had been violated, had not volunteered to lift a finger in 
the correction of this agreement. The damage was repaired entirely 
in the Middle East, and in each case repairs were carried out in 
the wake of de Gaulle's apocalyptic outbursts. Thus it was almost 
inevitable that he should attribute his success to a stormy 
intransigence, and although this was less than fair to Spears and 
Lyttelton, there was much truth in this conclusion. 
It was, however, a dangerous conclusion for General de 
Gaulle to draw, for it encouraged in him a tendency and a conviction 
which did great injury to Anglo-Free French relations in the Levant - 
and elsewhere. This tendency was keenly observed by the British 
Consul-General in Brazzaville: 
our conduct of the war cannot always conform to 
[de Gaulle's] own views.... If he is allowed to con- 
tinue too long in the frame of mind which links [his 
many] perplexities first to British obtuseness, then 
to British policy, and finally to British perfidy, he 
will end by becoming so completely the victim of his 
own single-mindedness that he will never be able to 
rid himself of the burden of distrust and dislike of 
Great Britain which he is at present unconsciously 
binding on his own shoulders. 82 
Something like this was clearly happening to de Gaulle, but it was 
not all groundless paranoia. His suspicious nature had succumbed to 
a series of maladroit decisions and actions on the part of the 
British authorities. The British themselves bore much responsibility 
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Chapter Four THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS 
in spite of all that he did to help us at the 
start, General Spears was destined one day to 
turn away from our enterprise and to begin 
fighting against it. de Gaulle, i. 105 
Where civilization entailed the corruption of 
[indigenous] virtues and the creation of a 
dependent people, I decided, I was opposed to 
civilization; and upon this resolution I based 
the conduct of my administration. 
J. M. Coetzee* 
De Gaulle was not the only man who hurried to the Levant as 
soon as the agreements with Lyttelton were settled. On 25 July 
Spears, who had been asked to establish Anglo-Free-French liaison 
there (and generally to clean out the Augean stables), left Cairo in 
"a frenzied rush by air to Jerusalem". The following day he and his 
little cavalcade of assistants made their way north by road from 
Jerusalem. 1 It was to be a highly symbolic journey for Spears. 
Nineteen centuries had passed since another forceful personality had 
taken the road to Damascus and to a historic change of mind, but 
even Paul of Tarsus had not repudiated his old cause with such a 
remorseless consistency as General Spears was to manifest. 
In the twelve months preceding the Syrian campaign, Spears had 
pioneered Anglo-Free French liaison with great vigour and skill. 
2 In 
1942, however, a Foreign Office mandarin was complaining about "the 
sinister influence of that charlatan Spears" who was allegedly working 
"to smash de Gaulle" and "to wreck Anglo-Free French relations". 
3 
On the face of it, these were incredible and preposterous 
accusations. Spears had known and loved France all his life. A witty 
master of French language and literature, he was devoted to the 
cause of Anglo-French solidarity. Renowned for his liaison work in 
World War I, he continued to enjoy the friendships formed at that 
* Waiting 'for fhe'Barbarians (1980), p. 38. 
I 
time with prominent Frenchmen. As Conservative Member for Carlisle 
from 1931 and a staunch supporter of his old comrade Churchill, 
Spears was known in Parliament as "the Member for Paris". 
4 
In May 1940 he was given the rank of Major-General and became 
Churchill's envoy to the embattled Reynaud government in France. There 
Spears was doubly appalled to witness the collapse of his beloved 
France and the bitter poisoning of Anglo-French relations. 
5 
When 
all was lost, he left Bordeaux with the recently promoted General de 
Gaulle, identifying with those Frenchmen who had resolved to fight on. 
As Churchill depicted it, Spears snatched de Gaulle from under the 
very noses of the Petainists who would have arrested him. Thus, on 17 
June 1940, de Gaulle 
drove to the airfield with his friend Spears to 
see him off. They shook hands and said goodbye, 
and as the plane began to move de Gaulle stepped 
in and slammed the door. The machine soared off 
into the air, while the French-police and officials 
gaped. De Gaulle carried with him, in this small 
aeroplane, the honour of France. 6* 
Spears carried with him a vision of ongoing French resistance, and 
played an invaluable part in the launching of the Free French movement. 
De Gaulle acknowledged that at the beginning, "when so many others 
considered my enterprise an encumbering adventure, Spears had 
immediately understood its nature... It was with ardour that he had 
taken up his mission to deal with Free France and its leader". 
7 
Spears threw all his energies into the task of Anglo-Free 
French liaison. In what he saw as a great common cause, this vigorous 
man was ready to defy any soldier, politician or civil servant whose 
parochialism obstructed him. He continually challenged "the 
conventionality of the official hierarchies", wrote de Gaulle, and 
"to speed up routine he brought into play his intelligence, the fear 
inspired by his biting sallies of wit and, lastly, the charm he knew 
8 
how to display on occasion". In the year that followed de Gaulle's 
A Churchill seems to have used'some artistic licence in telling this 
story. De Gaulle points out that the plane had been placed at his own 
disposal by Churchill, and writes that Spears declared that he would 
"accompany" de Gaulle on this plane back to England. "There was nothing 
romantic or difficult about the departure", according to de Gaulle. 
- de Gaulle, 1.86. 
123 
/ 2- Y, 
dramatic opening broadcast of 18 June 1940, Spears was tireless 
in his commitment to the Anglo-Free French war effort. 
And yet, for all his shining record as a Francophile and a 
vigorous champion of Free France, the truth was that by the end 
of July 1941, Spears was deeply disillusioned with de Gaulle and 
the Free French. He certainly made no secret of his disenchantment. 
General Wilson observed that "within a few weeks of the signing of 
the Armistice at Acre [Spears] suddenly turned bitterly anti-French. 
Up to that time nothing could be too good for them". 
9 During the 
latter stages of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle negotiations in Cairo, 
Lampson noticed "at each interview 
[that Spears] is the most violently 
in favour of having done with de Gaulle once and for all.... 
Spears struck me as very bellicosely minded vis-a-vis de Gaulle. 
I told him I thought he ought to go slow". 
10 Spears himself 
admitted that he was "aggressive" towards de Gaulle and had taken 
him on and "stirred him up". 
" 
It is evident that Spears' Francophilia had been subjected to 
tremendous strains, and de Gaulle's savage assault on all things 
British was the last straw., Since the fall of France, Spears' whole 
pro-French world-view had been propped up by the Free French 
movement, which for a time softened the blow of 1940: 
The French defeat had been to me very like a 
personal humiliation. I had been bewildered, 
for the French soldier of the First World War 
had been my pal.... 
I had a horrible vision of the great Nazi 
banners.... I wondered if Paris could survive 
such a desecration, and felt that if it happened 
she would never again be the same to me. 12 
Spears was, as Sachar suggests, a somewhat Quixotic man. * Shocked, 
and repelled, he viewed the fallen France as a chivalrous knight 
viewed the violation of his betrothed. But for a time the pure and 
* Sachar, p. 289. Concerning the fall of France, Spears wrote of 
Weygand: "no solution occurred to him. The splendour of fighting 
to the end ä la Vercingetorix was a vision not vouchsafed to him"; 
and of Petain himself, "If the old man. persisted in believing all 
was lost, I hoped to win-him over-to the thesis that we should.. at 
least die- well, 'thÖütit'en'beäüte". `-'Assignment td'Catastrophe, 
ii. 20,83. What Spears was suggesting on such occasions is almost 
incredible and is certainly Quixotic, to say the least. 
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heroic concept of Free France preserved in Spears' mind the honour 
of France, and held off the full effect of his repulsion and 
contempt for 
that strange class of Frenchmen who had 
developed a vigour in defeat which had not 
been apparent when they were defending their 
country, and... embraced their downfall as if 
it was a new religion of which Petain was the 
Prophet and Laval the High Priest. 13 
This precarious state of mind could not last, for it 
required Free French efforts and interests to be practically 
identical to those of the British, and wholly separate from the 
sordid pursuits of the Vichy people. These twin assumptions were 
duly shattered. They went down before the visible, and ineluctable, 
expansion of de Gaulle's political consciousness. He was "inevitably 
moving beyond the position where his sole concern was to make war, 
and was, harassed by the political problems bound up with military 
decisions". 14 Spears himself had noticed the conträst. between his 
own and de Gaulle's approach to the Levant States. "He was absorbed 
by calculations of how his own movement and France would be 
affected if they rallied to his cause. I was interested only in 
the extent to which the British cause would be strengthened". 
15 
Spears' disillusioning was almost completed during a row over 
London's abortive armistice terms of 19 June: 
"You think I am interested in England winning 
the war? said de Gaulle I am not. I am only 
interested in France's victory". "They are the 
same", I retorted. "Not at all", he answered, 
"not at all in my view". 
Spears confessed himself "taken aback" by this drastic statement. De 
Gaulle repeated these views in a particularly offensive way in July, 
16 first to Spears and then in-his explosive confrontation of Lyttelton. 
spears had 'taken enough', and he came out - fighting. To add' insult : -to 
injury, de Gaulle was abusing the only two Britons who had, on their 
own initiative, tried to do anything to help the Free French recover 
some of the ground they had lost at Acre. For their pains they were 
hearing themselves and their embattled country reviled by a Frenchman 
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whose organisation and position depended largely upon British 
assistance. This was too much for Spears, a man of Churchillian 
patriotism who, despite his own flair for deadly sarcasm, was 
deeply sensitive to personal criticism, ingratitude or any 
failure to recognise his efforts. * To the astonishment of his 
colleagues, among whom he had always been the Francophile 
par excellence, he began to lash out at de Gaulle. Something 
of the resentment, bitterness and sarcasm with which he 
retaliated have been preserved in this passage: 
Truth compelled me to disillusion Cde Gaulle 
and it had, I said, been very painful to me who 
had helped build him up as an international 
figure to watch antics that had not only 
generated dislike but caused anxiety concerning 
his mental balance. 17 
As one of Spears' confidants had noted, he-was beginning 
to favour the removal of de Gaulle. In reporting the Frenchman's 
reluctance to accept British martial law (despite the clear case 
for this in the agreements hen had just signed with Lyttelton), 
Spears wired on 5 August: 
General de Gaulle would... do a Samson act 
and threaten to bring down the Free French 
movement.... 
The threat is no doubt serious, but perhaps 
not serious enough to risk jeopardising our... 
position in the Middle East or in the Arab world. 
If de Gaulle ceased to be prepared to act as 
our ally we should have in mind someone else 
whom we could recognise as leader of the Free 
French. 18 
This idea originated on the afternoon of 21 July, when Spears hid 
been prepared to "depose de Gaulle and inform the whole Free French 
* Here are two examples of this characteristic, taken from Spears' 
diary. The first refers back to the work done by Spears during the 
fall of France: "I am fed up, working very hard and no thank yoüs. 
R. Campbell [yas, covered with flowers and I did most of the work 
at Bordeaux". (15 June 1941). And in Damascus, during Operation 
Exporter: "Rather annoyed no sign made me when great fuss made 
about Jumbo Wilson.. tMi] told my appointment [with Catrouxj put off 
till 8.30 - Took A. D. C. apart and said I was Ambassador to Free 
France. Catroux%came personally to apologise [and I saij I 
thought Britain had always looked after de Gaulle and him well.... 
He is giving me his own office in the town". (1 July 1941). - Spears Diary, SPRS I. 
f 
movement that all pay and emoluments would be made through 
Catroux". 
19 
Spears' priorities on 5 August contrast sharply with his 
previous approach to the Levant enterprise: as late as 8 July he 
declared that "the Syrians should clearly understand we are 
wholeheartedly backing the Free French.... the whole cause of 
Free France is in the balance. The great chance of the movement 
is Cto] make a good job of Syria". Moreover, Spears had opined, 
If we take over effective control of Syria with 
a mere Free French facade De Gaulle and his men 
will be finally classified as British mercenaries. 
I can guarantee that the morale of the Free French 
Forces... will fall to pieces if their belief 
that they are engaged in a French Crusade... is 
shattered. 20 
The distance between this attitude and the views he 
" expressed in August reveal something of the remarkable 
transformation which Spears had undergone, something of the 
fateful road he had travelled. The concept of a "French Crusade" 
certainly tells us more about Spears than it does about the 
mentality of the Free French troops, not to mention some of their 
-officers. The great change evident in all his communications after 
July confirms the conclusion best stated in his own words: "A 
lifetime steeped in French feeling, sentiment and affection was 
falling from me. England alone counted now". 
t 
De Gaulle's own attitude to Spears' activities likewise 
indicates that the two men fell out after the Lyttelton-de Gaulle 
* Ironically, this does not apply to de Gaulle himself, who had 
indeed embarked on a sort of crusade to save France. But his 
approach to this staggering task necessarily owed more to 
Machiavelli than Don Quixote, and Spears could not stomach sane 
of the means, or the personnel, used to this end. 
t Assignment to Catastrophe, ii. 47f. Spears penned these words in 
the context of the fall o France, but he wrote in 1954 and the 
whole book is. pervaded with the hindsight . of. disenchantment and 
contempt. Although this process began. with the fall of France, 
Spears' words belong most of all to the summer of 1941. 
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confrontation. As late at 18 July - and this at a time when 
de Gaulle was enraged by the Acre Convention - he informed 
Lyttelton that 
I am happy to learn that Major-General Spears 
would be in charge of arranging British liaison 
with the French Delegate-General in Syria 
Lebanon [sic] . Spears has often proved to 
me his comprehension and ability. 21 
But by mid-August de Gaulle was thoroughly alarmed at the prospect 
of Spears being stationed in the Levant. On 15 August Lyttelton 
informed Churchill of de Gaulle's intention to "ask that someone 
other than Spears should head the Mission in Syria and perhaps 
that there should be a new head of the whole Mission.... 
LHeJ 
maintains that Spears misled him... by sending him at Brazzaville 
a reassuring telegram about the armistice terms". 
22* 
Given Spears' 
Herculean labours for Free France, this was a shabby-excuse for 
such a drastic request, and de Gaulle himself knew, from the 
subsequent explanations in Cairo, that Spears' telegram was sent 
in good faith and was only rendered misleading by the unexpected 
follies of Wilson in Acre. His real reason was that he and Spears 
had fallen out, and de Gaulle was rapidly realising the extent 
of Spears' disenchantment with Free France. "He looks askance at 
this mission", reported Spears on 16 August, (and is] genuinely 
perturbed by fear he might became estranged fron me". 
23 
And 
Spears recorded that de Gaulle 
had. pressed me to return to London saying that 
we had worked up the Free French movement 
together and it was a pity to stop. When I told 
him T'must. obey my orders he evidently made up 
his mind that I would represent something much 
too strong... 24 
What he later described as "the insane assaults of de Gazelle's 
ugly temper" had brought Spears, with a profound shock,. to the 
end of a long road. 
25 Free France was the only device preserving 
his pro-French mentality from the repulsion he felt at the sordid 
* Lyttelton went on to defend Spears. 
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and sorry spectacle of Vichy - and now his vision of Free France 
was disintegrating. Like a dam through which a hole has been torn, 
his Quixotic vision broke under pressures it could no longer resist. 
As Spears began to tackle affairs in the Levant -a hotbed of 
corruption, exploitation and opportunism - his old distinction 
between Vichyites and Free Frenchmen broke down utterly. This 
breakdown completed the disintegration of Spears' French-flavoured 
world and his bitter separation from the Cross of Lorraine. 
*** 
The French mandates of Syria and Lebanon were no place for 
an idealist who called France "that beautiful and gallant embodiment 
of all civilisation". 
26 Conversely they were the perfect place for 
an ex-Francophile to be finally convinced that his affections had 
" been misplaced. For the Free French, unable to provide the 
manpower necessary to run the two countries, had fallen back upon 
the old (Vichy) administrators, removing only a handful of the most 
notorious Axis sympathisers. The remainder "rallied" to Free France 
and generally were confirmed in their old positions, to the 
consternation of the Syrians and Lebanese, The result, as before, 
was a "shockingly bad administration" stocked by '! third rate" 
personnel. 
27 
The disposition of these so-called 'rallies du biftek' was, 
from an Allied point of view, dubious. Slim recalled a classic case. 
After his capture of Deir es Zor, he inspected a parade of local 
officials: 
I caught sight of a French officer in uniform 
standing at the back.... When I reached him, it 
was explained to me that up to a couple of hours 
ago he had been the Vichy chief of police; he was 
still the chief of police but... was now a staunch 
de Gaullist. I was a little suspicious of so speedy 
and opportune a conversion and resolved to keep 
an eye on him. 28 
* Some did not even rally, and remained in the anomalous position of 
Vichyites temporarily co-operating with Free France in order to keep 
up the French position - and their own. 
Y 
Slim's feelings can readily be imagined, and yet there was no 
real alternative available at the time. Neither the Syrians and 
Lebanese nor the British could have provided the number of 
trained personnel required to step into all these positions, even 
if the Free French had been ready to accept this drastic turnover. 
29 
De Gaulle and his subordinates flatly rejected any such suggestion, 
of course, and were largely blamed for the process by which, in 
local terms, Free France simply became Vichy writ large. 
Spears himself was predictably disgusted with the spectacle 
of the so-called Free French administration of the Levant States. 
"From the first", wrote Sir Geoffrey Furlonge, "Spears had seen, 
and reports from all over the country confirmed, that a majority 
of the local populations only wanted to be quit- of the French". 
Spears quickly became an "enthusiast for the cause of Syrian and 
Lebanese independence". His zeal. was intensified not only "by 
his personal quarrel with de Gaulle" but also "by the attitude 
of the local Free French, many of them former Vichyists". This 
Instant Gaullist- administration, acutely sensitive to the charge 
of "selling out" the French position over-compensated in their 
endeavour to refute this accusation: 
they adopted an exaggerated position in which 
every evidence of French control or power was 
emphasised and every British action or achievement 
denigrated or suppressed, which was galling. 
This attitude enraged Spears and rapidly finished off his old 
distinction between Vichy and Free Frenchmen in the worst possible 
way, in that he now regarded Free France (at least in the Levant) 
as no better than Vichy. The result was highly significant. "Within 
a few weeks of Spears' arrival... no one under his orders was any 
longer urging the locals to come to agreement with the French on the 
lines London had laid down". 
30 
Spears quickly became a champion of Syrian and Lebanese 
independence, confounding the expectations of all who knew his 
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previous record. Thus in August 1941 Furlonge went to meet 
Spears with "considerable apprehension" on account of Spears' 
Francophile reputation. Furlonge himself, after seven years in 
Beirut, was no great admirer of the French Mandate, and he told 
Spears "quite frankly" what he thought of the French in the 
Levant. To his surprise, however, Spears was most receptive: 
"I was encouraged to find him very sympathetic", Furlonge 
recalled. 
31 
It was not only his escalating feud with de Gaulle and 
his contempt for the French authorities which drew Spears to the 
cause of Syrian and Lebanese nationalism. It would be wrong to 
interpret all his subsequent actions simply in terms of a 
personal vendetta, for there was a positive side-to the coin as 
well. This was Spears' emergence asa genuine and Lealous 
Arabophile, which he was to remain for the rest of his life. The 
Arab world* was new to Spears, and his introduction and first 
impressions were rendered more favourable by his British advisers, 
and by the Levantines themselves, the latter employing a judicious 
and effective flattery. 
32 Arab civilisation - which had once 
spread as far as France - had nothing to learn from the French 
about protocol and hospitality, and this point was not lost on 
Spears. He warmed to his new environment, and the aspirations of 
the Syrians and Lebanese, who presented themselves as the victims 
of French oppression, proved irresistible to him. 
Here was job satisfaction with a vengeance, for Spears 
had been placed at the sharp end of the British determination to 
see that the Free French promise of. independence was honestly 
carried out. The nationalist movement filled to perfection the 
vacuum left by his old ideals, while British policy (or rather 
part of it) gave him acharter to pursue his new cause. The 
* For present purposes, terms like 'the Arab world' are meant to 
include the Lebanese. Although the Lebanon was in one sense a 
Christian enclave, this proved to be surprisingly irrelevant in 
the whole question of the struggle for. independence from France. 
To the immense discomfort of the French, it was the Lebanese 
nationalists - both Christian and Muslim - who precipitated the 
first great confrontation with Free France in 1943. 
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Levantines encouraged Spears to see himself as their champion, 
and he was to play this part with a vigour they could scarcely 
have anticipated. While this role required Spears to throw down 
the gauntlet to the French, which he did with considerable 
panache, there can be no doubt that he supported the Syrians 
and Lebanese out of genuine conviction, which was no less real 
for being recent. His was the zeal of the new convert: the man 
who professed himself "fed up" in June was once again a man 
with a mission. 
33 
He had not been hatched out in a chancery 
(as he scornfully wrote of one of his Foreign Office adversaries) 
and he had little time for the career diplomat's watchword, 
point de zele. * A warrior rather than a diplomat, he had found a 
cause to fight for and an underdog to defend. 
This is not to imply that Spears was simply a naive 
zealot who rode forth indiscriminately to launch himself 
against the nearest windmill. The Arab world had a most persuasive 
case to present to any Englishman with a sense of justice. There 
was some truth in Churchill's complaint that every Briton in the 
Middle East ended up as a partisan of the Arabs. (though Churchill 
himself seemed reluctant to. explore this phenomenon). 
34 
The Arabs, 
despite their military and political weakness, had maintained 
much of their rich and noble civilisation, and few educated men 
were able to resist its fascination and diversity. It was therefore 
a standing rebuke to British Arabists that their own country had 
dealt so shabbily with these people in the settlements that 
followed World War'I. "It was all pretty immoral", concluded 
Spears, joining a. great chorus of British Arabists: "there can 
be no doubt that the pledge 
[of independence to the Arabs was 
quite unambiguous and was clearly violated by the creation of 
35 MandatesP. 
Despite the violent controversy over Palestine, the 
French mandates of Syria and Lebanon were in many ways the most 
* "Oliver Harvey, pale., correct, obviously.. hatched out in a 
chancery" - Spears, AÄuignment to'CAtästtriophe, ii. 185. 
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blatant case of aggrandizement in the Middle East, and they had 
been ruled with an amazing cultural arrogance in the name of 
France's -'civilising mission'. This was inevitably conveyed to 
Spears as he formed his first impressions of the Levant situation 
and its place in the Arab world. * In this process, his British 
advisers played a significant part by providing Spears with an 
overview of his new parish. While his response to the situation 
was strongly coloured by his own characteristics, it was his 
British advisers who gave Spears his fundamental interpretation 
and analysis of the Levant. and, indeed, the whole question of 
Britain's role in the Arab world. Spears thus gained the benefit 
of their combined knowledge and understanding, which was vast - 
and inextricably woven into this overview was a"sympathy for 
the nationalist cause and a marked disapproval o? the French 
attitude in the Levant. 
This is not to suggest that anything as sinister and 
calculated as an Arabist conspiracy (as in Gaullist demonology) 
was at work in these briefings and discussions. It is clear, 
however, that the speed with which Spears made up his mind 
about the Levant owed much to his local advisers. Of these, 
the most important were Furlonge (Beirut) and Gardiner (Damascus), 
while John Hamilton, a noted Arabist, helped Spears to complete 
his wider picture of the Middle East. Hamilton at one stage was 
considered for Spears' own job in the Levant, but as Spears noted, 
"His knowledge of Arabs ýis\ a positive disadvantage... it will 
make the French suspicious". Spears liked and admired Hamilton, 
36 
and took him along as his assistant and adviser on Arab questions. 
Gardiner and Furlonge, the senior British consular 
officials in Syria and Lebanon respectively, gave Spears an 
indispensable introduction to local affairs and personalities, 
* Although Spears had spent 2-3 July talking to Syrian notables 
in Damascus, and although one had opined that "to treat with 
Free France is only to treat with individuals", Spears had 
concluded that well-meaning EnglisimRen only made trouble for 
Free France by meddling with Syrian grievances. It was weeJ'' 
later that Spears began to view the French mandate in a completely 
different light. - Spears Diary, -1-5 July, SPRS'I. 
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as Spears soon acknowledged. "Gardiner is rendering very 
noteworthy services", he informed London on 12 September: "I 
can say the same of Colonel Furlonge at Beirut... His intimate 
knowledge of the country and its personalities has been of the 
greatest use to me. I deem myself extremely fortunate in having 
found here two such valuable collaborators.. 
37 
Furlonge, the 
only survivor of Spears' main advisory trio, recently commented 
on their early collaboration. Spears, he said, "needed very badly 
local guidance" and on receiving it he "picked up the whole 
situation quickly". Furlonge's acquaintance with Lebanese 
personalities was put to practical effect: "I was able to pick 
out... people like Chamoun and introduce them to Spears", 
Furlonge recalled, adding that Spears very soon established a 
rapport with these up-and-coming nationalists. 
38" Spears was 
clearly indebted to his Arabist advisers for the 4"äy, in which 
he quickly grasped the situation and decided what his own stance 
was to be. 
*** 
In Augjst: 1941 the new General Spears emerged. His 
rift with de Gaulle widened into a great gulf as the two men 
clashed head-on in the Levant, and his attitude to the Vichy French 
spilled over into a contempt for the Free French as he beheld the 
former becane the latter throughout the Levant. At the same time 
the dubious nature of this administration was underlined by the 
grievances of the Syrians and Lebanese themselves, which Spears 
heard with increasing sympathy as a fuller picture of the 
situation was unfolded to him. He emerged as a whole-hearted 
Arabophile, warmly disposed towards the leading nationalist figures 
and convinced that British policy (and British interests) required 
him to espouse their cause by coaxing some genuine form of 
independence from the reluctant and suspicious French. As early as 
f3S 
5 August Spears was suggesting that Britain's Arab position 
had to be preserved, even if it meant the collapse of Free 
France. * 
This profound personal transition occurred in the midst 
of the utmost turmoil and frantic activity in the Levant. With 
his customary vigour Spears threw himself into the task of 
creating some kind of order, at least in British affairs. From 
the first he was necessarily more than a liaison man, acting 
in effect as Lyttelton's lieutenant in the Levant and asserting 
an authority that far exceeded the limits suggested by his 
official role. Spears was not the man to sit back and stoically 
observe chaos. Employing his considerable air of authority he 
plunged into action, now pulling his military rank, now invoking 
Lyttelton's Cabinet authority. 
As early as 17 July Spears had told London how he saw 
his imminent task, describing the Levantine upheaval in 
extravagant terms and implying the need to assert wide authority 
there: 
Success difficult to achieve. Disaster possible. 
If my relationship with the Minister of State 
were interfered with, would feel unable to 
undertake this most difficult task. 
The problem is 
(a) to prevent the country going up in smoke, 
(b) to help to make out of Syria a solid bloc 
which will provide a safe base for our armed 
forces... 
This object is to be achieved in a county where 
(a) native interests often are [conf lictingJ 
(b) Population is now to a great extend armed. 
(c) French of all categories intensely disliked. 
(d) Free French very jealous of the British. 
(e) Free French authorities are often in conflict 
with each other. 
(f) Complete dearth of administration officials. 
(g) A great many British unconnected elements 
intensely distrusted by the French upon whom 
the natives will endeavour to play. 
Out of this some order is to be created keeping 
the country as French as possible while safeguarding 
vital British interests. 
* See page 12.6, 
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Above all it is necessary to avoid civil 
disturbances which [migh ] spread beyond Syria 
and [necessitat e3 using force against those very 
Arabs whose goodwill we are so anxious to 
cultivate. 
Spears added that if de Gaulle was given a free hand in the 
Levant in his current mood "the country would be out of hand 
within a fortnight". Having defined a situation which clearly 
required his special qualifications, Spears bluntly concluded his 
tour de force: "I repeat that I could not think of undertaking 
such a task] unless I felt that the Minister,.., who is aware 
of local conditions, gave me my directives without outside 
interference". The Foreign Office, for the time being, took the 
hint. 
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Having secured his base and protected 1Tis, rear, General 
Spears advanced into the complications of the Levant. He was faced 
immediately with a dangerous Anglo-Free French confrontation in 
the inflammable Druse country, and another shouting match with de 
Gaulle in Beirut. The Jebel Druse, ever a highly sensitive issue 
between the British and French, was the subject of a special 
section of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements which called for 
Catroux to concert with Wilson on all important measures relating 
to order and security there. Wilson had sent a British brigade to 
occupy Soueida, the main Druse centre, and this force had duly 
occupied the French Residency and hoisted the Union Jack in place 
of the tricolour. This unfortunate performance, indicative of the 
thoughtlessness which prevailed before the Lyttteijo -+de-Gaulle 
terms. could be translated into realities, enraged de Gaulle and 
Catroux. The latter, clearly stiffened by de Gaulle's presence, 
promptly despatched a Free French battalion to Soueida without 
consulting Wilson. The two forces were soon confronting each other 
and a conflict seemed likely. 
Its verbal equivalent certainly broke out between Spears 
and de Gaulle when the latter ventilated his feelings about the 
situation. "The conversation", Spears informed Lyttelton, "took 
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on the tone of your first meeting with the General. He gave 
every evidence of having lost control and declared brutally 




A month earlier 
Spears would have deplored Wilson's procedure in the Jebel Druse 
and leapt to the defence of Free French interests, but now, as his 
diary reveals, he saw the affair as a challenge to British 
authority: 
I sent... a message through Catroux... that 
either French troops marching into Soueida 
were under British command, in which case they 
were guilty of an act of indiscipline... or 
the Free French were a completely independent 
force, in which case I did not see why the 
British Government should be responsible for 
thee] pay,., ... 
This message reached de Gaulle as well as the Free French commander 
in Soueida, and its belligerence, combined with the tough attitude 
of the British commander in Soueida, showed de Gaulle that he was 
up against a stiffer combination than the British had proved to 
be in Cairo. According to the disgusted Spears, de Gaulle 
was on the point of giving way when I heard 
that orders had come to [the British commander 
in Soueidaj to hoist down his flag and evacuate 
the Residency. The, position has thus been 
incredibly badly handled and de Gaulle will 
have the impression that once again he has, by 
holding out, scored over us. 41 
This retreat, as Spears saw it, reflected the instructions 
sent by Lyttelton in response to the report of de Gaulle's fresh 
grievances. The Minister of State had evidently decided to show 
the "soldiers" where they got off. Spears was therefore told to 
discuss with Wilson de Gaulle's statement that 
obstacles are being placed in his way by British 
military . authorities.... 
Wilson should ensure 
that nothing of the kind takes place [an; ý issue 
categorical instrutions to all concerned to 
collaborate fully with the Free French and give 
generous effect to their wishes whenever possible, 
and make it perfectly clear in their general 
attitude that Free French are our allies and 
friends. 42 
*lRickelsen consistently omits this kind of statement. See Appendix D. 
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Spears received this telegram at Ain Sofar, Wilson's pleasant 
headquarters in the cool mountain slopes above Beirut, and 
passed on its galling contents to the British Commander-in-Chief, 
who duly ordered his Brigadier to pull out of the Residency in 
Soueida. 
Three days later Catroux arrived in Ain Sofar for 
talks with Wilson and Spears. (The latter's mood was not improved 
by an illness which had kept him hors de combat for two days). 
The conference of 2 August revolved around the implementation of 
the command arrangements made in the Lyttelton-de Gaulle 
agreements. In the previous week de Gaulle had gone so far as 
to renounce any British right to impose martial law, and claimed 
that French troops were no longer under British command because 
the Syrian campaign was over. This clearly broke the Cairo 
agreements, and to the astonishment of Wilson and Spears, Catroux 
baldly reiterated de Gaulle's views and stated that "there is 
no reason why the British military authorities should have any 
special rights". The meeting lasted from 8.30 a. m. to 1 p. m. 
and got practically nowhere. Spears was amazed by Catroux's 
uncharacteristic mettle and wrongly assumed that the Frenchman 
was merely "so frightened of General de Gaulle that he is 
standing up to us in a way he has never done before and against 
his own better judgment". At this point Spears lost his temper 
and dispensed with the Queensberry rules: "I hit him on the raw 
by reminding him that the British Treasury, which was paying for 
everything, might have something to say. [He] answered in an 
offended way that... France would pay all she owed in the end". 
43 
These abortive discussions made it painfully clear 
that the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements had not even begun to 
apply in the Levant. The Free French, on discovering that they 
were not taken seriously by the British occupying authorities, had 
responded drastically. De Gaulle was not the man to wait pdtiently 
while changes decided in Cairo percolated slowly through to' 
British officers in the Levant. Nor did he have much faith that 
Y 
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this process had even been set in motion. He regarded the Levant 
situation as a breach of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements, and 
responded by repudiating other sections of the agreements in a 
manner calculated to cause maximum inconvenience. His rejection of 
British command threatened to create the very situation which Spears 
and Lyttelton had laboured to avoid in Cairo. As Spears noted at Ain 
Sofar: "we are still up against this question of command and I do 
not see how we can avoid having a showdown in imposing our will - 
but Lyttelton will have to do this". 
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In this instance, however, de Gaulle had a shrewder under- 
standing of Lyttelton, for the Minister was thoroughly fed up with 
Wilson's men, he was sensitive to the implication that he had not 
followed through his deal with de Gaulle, and he was inclined to see 
Gaullist difficulties in a more sympathetic light. Free French tactics 
worked: within a week Lyttelton arrived in the Levant to enforce his 
edicts and patch up relations with de Gaulle. He also had a bone to 
pick with the Vichy Generals, and these two purposes mingled in his 
approach to the latest troubles. "The British", he recalled, referring 
to Wilson's officers, "seemed at the time to be more in sympathy with 
the regular Vichy officers... than with the Free French". 
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Lyttelton was having none of this. In the presence of Wilson 
he reprimanded the Vichy head of the Armistice Commission for a number 
of abuses, and rebuked Wilson for his indulgence towards the Vichy 
officers at the expense of the Free French. The most serious offence 
had occurred when the Vichyists shipped some fifty British officers 
to France on the eve of the armistice. On London's authority Lyttelton 
ordered the arrest of Dentz himself, pending the return of the 
British prisoners. This had the desired effect. 
Having made his displeasure clear to Wilson, Lyttelton turned 
his attention to de Gaulle, who was partially mollified by the 
Minister's firm handling of Dentz and the British military clique. 
There were some awkward questions to be dealt with, and Lyttelton's 
determination to meet Free French requirements wherever possible led 
to some fresh concessions. Spears was considerably irked: 
lfO 
Lyttelton... was so evidently anxious to propitiate 
de Gaulle, so determined to avert at all costs a 
repetition of the [clash in Cairo, that... I became 
quite critical of the manner in which, together with 
bons mots, he threw bouquet after bouquet at de 
Gaulle in the best battle of flowers style. 46 
To Spears' disgust, Lyttelton conceded one of the command points 
which Catroux and de Gaulle had so hotly disputed with him. It was 
henceforth accepted by the British that martial law could only be 
imposed by the civil authority, namely Catroux. Britain's military 
position in relation to the Free French now depended purely upon 
the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements "and a further agreement of 9th 
August". 
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Lyttelton rounded off his dealings with de Gaulle by means 
of another letter, repeating "the assurances that Great Britain has 
no interest in Syria or the Lebanon, except to win the war" and 
extending to Free France "our full sympathy and support". 
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These delicate and crucial negotiations, conducted in de 
Gaulle's Beirut office, did not pass without an absurd reminder of 
the British army's indulgent attitude to Vichy officers. Down at the 
harbour, de Verdilhac himself was being farewelled in fine style. His 
arrival was heralded by an Australian military band doing the 
Marseillaise. The strains of this performance echoed through the 
streets of Beirut, interrupting de Gaulle in mid-sentence, but at 
the quayside the show went on. Two strapping companies of Australian 
infantry, each one flanked by one of de Verdilhacts female friends, 
awaited the Frenchman's inspection. De Verdilhac cheerfully saluted 
the guard of honour, kissed each lady, stepped aboard and gave one 
final salute to the British staff officers, who seemed pleased. Once 
more a zealous version of the Marseillaise reverberated through 
Beirut, to the acute embarrassment of Lyttelton, who had now heard 
the cause of all the fanfare. So had de Gaulle. "The British are in- 
comprehensible! " he cried in exasperation. Lyttelton, who had just 
arrested de Verdilhac's superior, could only agree. No doubt the 
Australian infantry expressed similar views, in their pithy way, 
49 
This quayside comedy was indicative of the stark contrast 
between the treatment of the Free French and the silly chivalry ex- 
tended to Vichy officers, who had just fought the British with a 
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ferocity seldom evident in 1940. It certainly confirmed Lyttelton's 
decision to see some of the British commanders scattered throughout 
the Levant and personally stress the status which the Free French 
should be accorded. His travels took him as far as Deir es Zor, on 
the distant Euphrates. There he found General Slim ensconced in the 
French Residency and flying the Union Jack. He also found another 
guest - the Free French Resident-elect. This man was treated with a 
friendly courtesy by Slim's staff, but it was clear that nobody had 
realised, or been instructed, that the guest should have been the 
host. Lyttelton enjoyed meeting Slim, but remembered his mission: 
I told the General that I feared he would have 
to move out of the Residency before long, and 
hoist the French rather than the British flag. 
He looked a little grim, but saw the point. 
Before leaving, Lyttelton had a rare opportunity to see things 
through Free French eyes. A friendly Gaullist showed him the latest 
guidelines issued to Free French officers concerning the British in 
Syria. The latter were divided into three: Iles gentlemen', who were 
trustworthy; Iles good fellows', an unknown quantity; and Iles gens 
de 1'intelligence service', a sinister and ubiquitous corps of Arab 
sympathisers! It was a quaint but grim reminder of Gaullist anxieties. 
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Before returning to Cairo, Lyttelton took one further measure 
to reduce misunderstandings about the British presence in Syria. Since 
February there had been increasing British activity among the Druse 
and the desert tribes, and this had reached a peak by July, as Glubb's 
Arab Legion and other elements operated in Syria. The work of Glubb 
and Kirkbride was extended by other Arabist officers, who dis- 
tributed large sums of money in continuation of Kirkbride's approaches 
in the Jebel Druse. This had led Spears to complain, before his break 
with de Gaulle, that there were too many would-be Lawrences at large. 
De Gaulle had left Lyttelton in no doubt that the Free French 
viewed these activities in the worst possible light. The Minister, 
assuring de Gaulle that they were the result of crossed wires rather 
than some vast British plot, lost no time in putting some teeth into 
his assurances. He gave instructions that Glubb should for the moment 
/z 
return to Amman, and that the British agents in the Jebel Druse 
should clear out of Syria altogether. "The French", he informed 
London, "allege that Glubb in particular has been very active 
in saying that French control of the Desert is a thing of the 
past". To reassure de Gaulle, Lyttelton asked Wilson to send 
Glubb back to Transjordan. 
51 Given Glubb's military services 
since the Iraqi revolt, London found this order a little harsh, 
and Lyttelton was obliged to explain himself further: "I share 
your. regret that it is inadvisable for 
[Glubb to re-visit Syria 
at present", he replied. "But for Lnow his] presence in Syria 
would be so misinterpreted by Free French as to defeat its 
object. French suspicions of British policy in Syria are 
unfortunately of long standing'!. 
52 it 
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Back in Cairo by mid-August, Lyttelton reported to London 
that de Gaulle was now "almost persuaded that His Majesty's 
Government intends to play straight with Free France in Syria". 
53 
This gave no visible satisfaction to Churchill, who wanted to 
know whether de Gaulle intended to play straight with Britain. 
In London there was a first-class row brewing over de Gaulle's 
Syrian antics, and the unlucky Lyttelton - who had really done 
well - found himself out of step with his own Prime Minister. 
On the assumption that he could satisfy de Gaulle and settle any 
anomalies in the Levant, Lyttelton had bravely shelved several 
stiff warnings which Churchill had addressed to de Gaulle. This 
was much too optimistic, as de Gaulle's own words reveal. Reporting 
* During a mid-September visit to Amman, Lyttelton took the 
opportunity to explain the position personally to Glubb. The 
Minister had to make this next journey to assure the Amir's 
Government that Transjordan was not being left behind in the 
current political evolution. Lyttelton did this by frankly 
pointing out that places like Iraq and Syria, where the mandates 
were supposedly ended, were no more independent than Transjordan! - 
See "Note of discussion between the Minister of State and the 
Prime Minister of Trans-Jordan" in C0831/59/77241; Lyttelton, 
Chan do p. 255ff. 
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to Free French headquarters on 12 August, he claimed that the 
British showed "no knowledge of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle 
agreement" until the Minister's personal visit: 
He expressed many regrets to me and has given 
such orders that things are now at last taking 
an acceptable turn.... 
But there is at work in this country a fanatical 
group of British Arabophiles supported by the 
Prime Minister and the Colonial Office. [They] 
saw in the Syrian affair the opportunity for 
driving France out... 
The part played in this affair by Spears has 
been ältögether'miSdhievöüs änd disquieting... 54 
These embedded suspicions and exaggerated grievances were 
not to be removed by brief discussions and a few sharp orders to 
his subordinates, as Lyttelton soon learned when de Gaulle lapsed 
into public Anglophobia before the month was out. The subsequent 
row in London, and the shots fired by Churchill, had a most 
significant effect in the Levant. They restored the initiative to 
Spears and powerfully encouraged his pro-Arab stance after the 
dampening effects of Lyttelton's intervention. 
Hearing of de Gaulle's wrathful descent upon the Levant, 
Churchill had warned that if the Frenchman created any dangerous 
situation in the Levant, Anglo-Free French relations in toto 
could be destroyed: "It might be well if you could let him see the 
gulf on the edge of which he is disporting himself", he told 
Lyttelton. 55 This message came just before Lyttelton's departure 
for Beirut, but he considered its contents ill-timed. Thereafter 
Churchill was further annoyed to receive yet another Gaullist 
demand that no more Vichy troops be shipped home. De Gaulle 
could not believe that most of the Vichy soldiers preferred to 
go home, and this wire denounced the British for preventing all 
contact between Vichy and Free French troops. Churchill dismissed 
the charge as "insolent", directing his staff to add this 
telegram to a growing file of de Gaulle's transgressions. 
56 
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Towards the end of August de Gaulle came through Cairo 
en route to Brazzaville and London, and was tackled by Lyttelton, 
who now wished to correct his over-conciliatory image. "I... 
took the opportunity of questioning him closely about the 
[independence] negotiations in Syria and his future intentions", 
Lyttelton told Churchill. De Gaulle, who resented this monitoring, 
retorted that "the Arab world as a whole was more concerned with 
the Jewish question in Palestine than with matters of Syrian 
negotiations. I had no difficulty in hitting his half-volley out 
of the ground", Lyttelton boasted, though some might have called 
it a bouncer. 
He had already reported de Gaulle's latest surprise move, 
which was to forbid Catroux to have any dealings with him. De Gaulle 
argued that Lyttelton was the War Cabinet incarnate and should 
therefore deal with the leader of Free France, not his 
subordinates; thus, while de Gaulle was in London, he could 
discuss any important matter with the British Government itself, 
of which Lyttelton was simply a distant representative. Referring 
to this again, the Minister opined that "orders given to Catroux... 
are a prelude to some manoeuvres in London as a result of which 
de Gaulle hopes he will be able to get concessions... over my head". 
Churchill immediately replied that 
any difficulties you have had with de Gaulle are 
due to his belief that he has me on his side... but 
his recent conduct has affected my relations with 
him. I regret that you did not convey to him... 
the note of warning which I struck. 
And the following day, 28 August, Churchill amplified this statement 
in a further reply: "If de Gaulle interview at Brazzaville is 
authentic, he has clearly gone off his head. This would be a very 
good riddance. 
[De Gaulle, on reaching Brazzaville, had aired his 
Anglophobia to an American journalist and was even quoted as saying 
that England was afraid of Darlan's fleet De Gaulle has put 
himself entirely out of court". 
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Churchill had now come very close to severing his 
relations with de Gaulle altogether, a course which Spears was 
continuing to suggest. Even the Foreign Office jettisoned its 
customary restraint in a memo to Churchill on the subject of 
de Gaulle's behaviour in Syria: 
de Gaulle has been the cause of much difficulty 
and friction since the end of the Syrian campaign... 
[His] chief concern [was] to insist on French 
interests in Syria to the exclusion of all other 
considerations. He re-appointed numerous Vichy 
officials who were avowedly anti-British and who 
were mistrusted and disliked by the local 




than reliable bof 
stiffening 
"the 
attitude of General Catroux, who... had shown greater 
readiness to co-operate... 
This account would have given Spears as much satisfaction as he 
derived from Churchill's response, for the summary concluded: 
Most of these difficulties have been ironed out 
by [Lyttelton ]. This happy result, according to 
de Gaulle, was only achieved by his firmness... 
which enabled him to obtain 90% of his demands. 
This statement-compelled General Spears to 
inform him that his extraordinary behaviour had... 
caused doubts about his mental stability. 58 
Spears could not have wished to be quoted at a better time. 
The above report confirmed Churchill's decision to fire a 
Parliamentary broadside at de Gaulle's pretensions in the Levant. 
On 2 September, the day after this memo, he sent his proposed 
statement to the Foreign Office. Churchill's draft was volleyed 
backwards and forwards by the Whitehall mandarins until Cadogan, 
who had minuted that "I am not quite clear what it means", decided 
that it was all right! 
On 9 September, therefore, Churchill stood up in the House 
of Commons and defined the British position on the Levant question. * 
"Syria shall be handed back to the Syrians", he declared, "who will 
assume at the earliest possible moment their independent sovereign 
rights. We do not propose that this process of creating an 
e'e 
-Churchill persistently referred to the Levant States as "Syria". 
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independent Syrian Government shall wait till the end of 
the war.... There is no question of France maintaining the same 
position which she exercised in Syria before the war". And, 
having repeated Britain's disinterest and her acceptance of a 
certain French privilege in the Levant, the Prime Minister warned: 
There must be no question even in wartime of a mere 
substitution of Free French interests for Vichy French 
interests. The Syrian peoples are to come back into 
their own. 59 
This, as the Foreign Office officials had expected, was not at all 
to de Gaulle's liking. "The same British circles... are still 
at work, even here", he informed Catroux from London. "The speech 
made yesterday by Churchill... is bad from this point of view". 
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In a way de Gaulle was right, for the essence of Spears' new 
outlook had, through the Foreign Office, reached the Prime Minis` 
at a crucial moment. Spears' position in the Levant was powerfully 
reinforced by Churchill's well-publicised statement. 
Three days after this speech, Churchill and de Gaulle met 
at 10 Downing Street. The Prime Minister, after rebuking de Gaulle 
for leaving "a trail of Anglophobia behind him" repeated the 
well-worn formula that Britain had no ambitions in Syria except 
to win the war. In the next breath he added that Syria was a 
key factor in the Arab world, and that Britain could not "allow" 
any serious trouble to arise in the Levant. Later he reiterated 
that "the political situation in Syria must be so handled as to 
give the Arab world a real measure of satisfaction". De Gaulle, 
adjusting neatly to an atmosphere of inadequate avowals, denied 
any suspicion of selfish British motives in Syria and assured 
Churchill that the Free French would abide by their promises to 
the Arabs. 
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Both in Parliament and his own office, the Prime Minister 
had given a fair account of British policy, which was anachronistic 
in its assumptions and contradictory in its aims. To support the 
aspirations of the Syrians and the privileged French position was 
ý7 
a logical absurdity, for the clearest Syrian aspiration was to 
get rid of the French. The fatal flaw in Churchill's thinking was 
his inability to see beyond the analogy of Iraq, despite the 
recent events there. His idea of independence in the Middle East 
was expressed in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, which was that 
a Mandatory had the right to expect military facilities and 
other privileges, in short a continuation of special influence, 
in the territory of the former Mandate. This odd definition of 
independence had passed muster in previous decades but had now 
had its day, and the French had lost their last opportunity to 
implement it in 1936. This only began to dawn on Churchill when 
the United States flatly refused to recognise any special 
privileges for France in the Levant, and he quite failed to see 
that the Syrians themselves were no longer prepared to accept the 
limited independence of an Iraq or an Egypt. µ 
There was also a misleading ambiguity in the formula that 
Britain had no ambitions in Syria except to win the war. This was 
an honest assurance in so far as it meant that Britain did not 
intend to acquire the Levant and supplant France. But in Churchill's 
own wisecrack, the English never draw a line without blurring it, * 
and Britain certainly had oblique political ambitions in the 
Levant. He virtually admitted this to de Gaulle by speaking of 
what Britain would "allow" there. The blunt fact was that London 
hoped to restore some of its threadbare integrity in the Arab 
world by honouring its guarantee of Syrian independence. De Gaulle 
quickly spotted the suppressed premise in Churchill's inadequate 
formula, and observed that London "wanted to create the impression 
that, if the Syrians and Lebanese received independence, they 
would owe it to England". 
62 Giving satisfaction to the Arabs was 
certainly Britain's main aim, as Churchill repeatedly stressed to 
Lyttelton, though he failed to realise that this would cost France 
her whole position in the Levant. France would have relatively 
little interest in regional opinion once the tide had turned finally 
against the Axis in the Middle East. Britain, however, would still 
have an enormous concern for Arab opinion, and with Palestine yet 
* House of Commons speech, 16 November 1948. 
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to be untangled, she would need all the goodwill she could get. 
Satisfying the wider Arab world was a purely British aim in the 
Levant, unblushingly imposed upon Free France. ` 
The platitudes of British policy in the Levant were 
unrealistic and self-contradictory: Syria was to be independent but 
the French must retain their military, economic and cultural 
facilities, which were anathema to the Syrians; France was to keep 
a special position in the Levant, but she must give the Syrians 
an independence which they would immediately use to evict France; 
and Britain had no imperial ambitions in the area, but then again 
she did, for she must preside over Franco-Syrian relations in such 
a way as to please Arab leaders throughout her own Muslim Empire! 
Given this policy, so riddled with fallacies and shaky 
assumptions, the best diplomat in the world would have been doomed 
to fail. Not surprisingly, Churchill's policy statement suffered 
a fate similar to that of the Bible during the Reformation - every 
polemicist quoted those parts which most firmly supported his own 
view. Spears (often described as a latter-day Jesuit) led the field 
in expounding selected Churchillian proof-texts, and by mid- 
September he had collected a veritable arsenal of these. Churchill's 
latest statement had certainly reinforced Spears' position. 
Indeed, when at last he wrote a personal account of his Middle 
East mission, Spears put Churchill's September speech on the very 
first page. "I carried out the policy laid down by the Prime 
Minister to the best of my ability and understanding", he declared. 
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*** 
In the Levant itself, the thorny question of independence 
talks between the Free French, the Syrians and the Lebanese was 
taking up a lot of time and energy. The process had begun with the 
customary Anglo-Free French squabble. Lyttelton, thinking that 
Britain's pledge to the Levantines was best guarded by having an 
observer at the negotiations, had requested Catroux to allow Spears 
to attend any conferences on independence. This produced nothing 




but a refusal and another Gaullist eruption about British meddling 
and violations of French sovereignty. Lyttelton had second thoughts, 
and decided that "the presence even of a British observer.... 
would inevitably lead to some responsibility being attached to us 
for the negotiations, which may fail or take an undesirable turn". 
This revised opinion had the added attraction of avoiding another 
confrontation with de Gaulle, who had just told Wright that "he 
hoped that LCairo would not press a request for the presence of 
a British representative which he could not admit". Lyttelton 
therefore proposed to tell de Gaulle that the matter would not be 
pressed. The Foreign Office concurred, noting that the Syrians 
and Lebanese "would undoubtedly attempt to enlist the support of 
the British observer whenever differences arose-with the Free 
French", which would be a Bad Thing. 
64 De Gaulle-undoubtedly 
agreed, since Spears himself was to have been the observer. 
All this, however, assumed that the Levantines were prepared 
to have serious talks with the Free French. When Hopkinson asked 
de Gaulle if he expected difficulties with the actual negotiations, 
the Free French leader had replied that the main difficulty was 
"to find the people with whom to negotiate". 
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Hopkinson soon saw 
the point. Within a month he was telling London that it was 
"unlikely that any Syrian politician wishes to negotiate a treaty 
with the Free French at the present time". He explained that the 
Syrians "cannot understand what de Gaulle represents", that they 
wanted to avoid commitments which might prevent them from getting 
a better deal later, and that the nationalist bloc which had 
negotiated in 1936 had now split up. 
66 
Spears put this more forcefully. Following the publication 
of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle letters, he reported that Syrian and 
Lebanese leaders now realised 
that they must treat with the French, if anybody, 
and opportunist elements may now do so. But it has 
not increased their real desire for a treaty with 
the Free French. Many are convinced that the Germans 
will return at no distant date and Come havJ 
decided to play for time... 67 
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In another report he added that some politicians were saying that 
the original Anglo-Free French proclamations could not bind them 
since they were not consulted and the proclamations themselves 
were based on shaky assumptions. Such people, Spears added, "do 
not consider the present time propitious for negotiations and 
there is reluctance to be tied to a 'movement' which has no status". 
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It was soon evident, however, that there were some local 
figures who were prepared to be more accommodating, and it was 
among these that Catroux was looking for likely candidates to head 
the new regimes. De Gaulle had hoped to see Hashim al-Atassi, who 
was closely associated with the abortive 1936 Treaty, appointed 
as the new President of Syria. On 4 September, however, Catroux 
wired that Atassi was clearly unsuitable and that he, Catroux, 
was "looking for a combination that would be more moderate in 
spirit" and representative of various regions within Syria. When 
de Gaulle repeated his preference for Atassi, Catroux replied on 
14 September that "the recall of Atassi would have meant... the 
return of intransigent nationalism to power and the exclusion of 
us from the guidance of affairs". Catroux then advised that he 
was about to proclaim the independent republic of Syria, with the 
distinctly opportunist Sheikh Taj ad-Din al-Hasani as President. 
"The political question is carefully avoided in this text", 
Catroux added, and "there is the affirmation that only the 
conclusion of a treaty of friendship with Free France will confer 
a definitive character on Syrian independence". 
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Catroux was pleased with himself. He had coolly side-stepped 
the whole question of independence negotiations, for the moment at 
least, and he had backed his own greater experience of the Levant. 
Above all, he had kept Spears completely in the dark and presented 
the British with a fait accompli. Spears was considerably irked 
to have lost this early round of his long and stormy contest with 
Catroux. To add insult to injury, his complaints about the 
inadequate reference to economic arrangements, which Catroux 
deemed sufficient to satisfy the British that Syria would operate 
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within the sterling bloc, were dismissed. Catroux calmly indicated 
that he had already discussed this with Michael Wright in Damascus, 
to their mutual satisfaction. 
Spears bitterly reported the whole affair to Cairo and London: 
how Catroux had papered over the nationalist fissure with some of 
the trappings of independence, such as a Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and National Defence; how he had been denied any 
information about the nature of Catroux's dealings with the 
Syrians; how Catroux had undermined his argument for a postponement 
by using the fundamentally British line that postponements would 
reflect on Free French sincerity; and how he had been insufferably 
by-passed through Catroux's collaboration with Wright. Lyttelton's 
reply gave him no satisfaction: "Bride has been hurried to the 
altar with an indecent haste. It is true that the wedding has 
not been blessed... by your immediate presence, but nevertheless 
let us hope it will have been made in heaven". Given the hollow 
nature of the new Syrian regime, which was little more than an 
elaborate puppet show, it was a trivial analogy. There was no 
restoration of constitutional processes, no seriods shift of 
powers to the Syrians, and Catroux remained High Commissioner in 
all but name. 
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After some minor last-minute adjustments, and an attempt by 
de Gaulle to delay the proclamation until some reference to the 
Mandate was included, Catroux published his manifesto of Syrian 
independence on 27 September 1941. It was in many ways a 
masterpiece of euphemism, and any specific reference to the 
continued juridical fact of the Mandate would have given this away 
completely. The proclamation was not short, ä la Napoleon, but it 
was certainly obscure. Two months later Catroux finalised a 
parallel arrangement in the Lebanon whereby M. Alfred Naccache, 
a malleable and accommodating figure, became President of a 
government which was no more constitutional or independent than 
its Syrian counterpart. Nevertheless these governments were duly 
recognised by Britain. 
The realities of the political situation were mote apparent in 
a December message to the League of Nations, which gave formal notice 
that de Gaulle himself has assumed French mandatory responsibilities 
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in the Levant and advised that 
He has invested General Catroux with the powers of 
High Commissioner for France in the Levant.... 
Catroux has proclaimed the independence of Syria 
and the Lebanon [but] this does not affect the 
legal position resulting from the Mandate, as 
this position can only be modified after the war.... 
Catroux continues to exercise the powers of High 
Commissioner... 71 
This revealed what the Free French position had been all along. 
The difference between de Gaulle and Catroux over the Syrian 
proclamation was merely one of style, for the latter had carefully 
preserved the realities of French power beneath the lofty rhetoric 
of his manifesto. As de Gaulle told Eden on 19 September, 
The Mandate could not be suppressed by a stroke 
of the pen.... The position of the French in 
S as ria in this respect was exactly the same LBritain's) 
in Iraq... it would be impossible to 
allow the control of foreign relations to pass 
exclusively into Syrian hands. 72 
And on 1 October, the Free French leader had told Churchill and 
Lyttelton* that Catroux's declaration of Syrian independence "must, 
from the standpoint of international law, be regarded as provisional, 
since the Free French movement had no international status and no 
power to negotiate the termination of the mandate". Churchill, who 
clearly regarded "juridical considerations" as a nuisance factor, 
replied that the "ultimate fate of the territories would certainly 
be confirmed and completed". 
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Meanwhile Spears had been showing that he, too, was more 
concerned with the immediate fate of the Levant States. British 
recognition of Catroux's Syrian regime forced him to accept the 
creation of a similar pseudo-independence in the Lebanon, but 
throughout the autumn of 1941 his contempt for Free France had 
intensified, and he peppered London and Cairo with hostile reports. 
These catalogued the endless sins of the Free French, their utter 
unreliability as Allies, even their fifth-column tendencies, and 
strongly hinted that for military security and their own good they 
should be levered out of the Levant altogether. Even the trivial 
* The Minister of State had come to London for a brief series 
of consultations. 
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and the bizarre became an occasion for Spears' philippics. One 
such wire reported that General Monclar (a noted wild man of 
the Foreign Legion) and a Free French Colonel had been "unwise 
enough to intervene" in one of the many street brawls between 
Australian and Free French troops, with the result that both 
officers were beaten up. After alleging that Monclar had laid 
about him with a lead-weighted stick before being felled, Spears 
proceeded to extrapolate wildly about Free French trouble-makers, 
conspirators and fifth-columnists. 
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Despite these verbal excesses, Spears succeeded in 
disturbing the Prime Minister. On 25 September Churchill told Eden 
to do something about it: "A series of disquieting telegrams, of 
which the attached is a specimen, are coming in from Syria. Now 
is the time, while the Minister of State is at home, to clear up 
these difficulties and have a plain policy". The attached was 
Spears'latest wire, of which Churchill had underlined the following: 
we must be prepared to take an ever-increasing 
hand in the direction of affairs.... [British 
influence is fought at every step with greater 
venom, one cannot help feeling, than either Vichy 
or the Germans would arouse.... Until we hold 
firmly the main levers of control we shall be 
building on shifting sand in Syria. 
British control was necessary, Spears asserted, "if this country 
is to provide a safe basis for military operations in the future, or 
indeed if conditions are not to become chaotic". Eden accordingly 
convened a large inter-departmental meeting, which was swayed by 
Lyttelton's view: "The Minister of State [ aid he was not 
convinced that the disquieting tone of recent telegrams from 
General Spears was altogether justified. He thought that the position 
in Syria was improving greatly". 
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This marked the beginning of a more critical appraisal on 
the part of the Foreign Office, but Churchill continued to give 
full weight to the bulletins emanating from his old comrade in 
Beirut. London had not yet grasped what had happened to Spears, 
or the extent of his bitterness towards the Gaullists. Nevertheless 
Spears' telegrams and messages throughout that autumn gave strong 
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indications of his intensifying antagonism towards the Free French 
in the Levant. In September he asserted that Catroux wanted to 
establish some form of communication with Vichy, that the Free 
French were "a doubtful element in our midst", that de Gaulle had 
"dictatorial tendencies" and that to allow any Vichy-Free French 
liaison was to risk the subversion of the Levant. Free French 
forces were being poisoned against Britain, Spears claimed, in "the 
foetid moral atmosphere prevailing here amongst the French 
civilian population saturated as it is with opportunism, rotted 
by petty corruption". A few days later he enlarged on the subject 
of Catroux's overtures to Vichy, claiming that "we now have proof 
that Free French leaders are not above going a considerable way 
in undesirable negotiations without letting us know". It was apt, 
Spears concluded, "that the Free French adopted the double cross 
as their emblem". 
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In October, after clashes between the French and the tribal 
dissidents in the Jezireh, the region beyond the Euphrates, Spears 
called for the imposition of British martial law. In London, de 
Gaulle managed to avert this, despite strong evidence of 
provocative and brutal misrule in the Jezireh, and despite the 
strong representations made by Spears, who declared that 
The French have been given every chance. They have 
Failed with the Natives, they have failed to co- 
operate with us Land] this is too dangerous and too 
unsatisfactory to continue. The issues at stake are 
too important to give people who have. failed... 
another chance. The French have not changed and do 
not intend changing... 
Churchill was sympathetic, but Eden allowed himself to be persuaded 
by de Gaulle that "the situation was by now so far restored that 
measure proposed was in any case unnecessary", and the threat of 
British martial law faded away. Such effective interventions by de 
Gaulle in London brought a stinging rejoinder from Spears, who 
alleged that "the Free French Fuhrer carries all his points at 
home". 
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The cup of bitterness and repulsion overflowed in November 
as Spears beheld the Free French creation of another puppet regime 
in the Lebanon. His feelings poured out in a letter to Lyttelton 
on 25 November, which seemed to sum up all that had happened to 
him in 1941: 
.,. 
I am sure it is difficult for you, even in Cairo, 
to realise the horrible feeling engendered in those 
of us who have responsible positions here at seeing 
the Lebanon handed over more and more to the tender 
mercies of the Free French. 
Spears now regarded the Free French not as Crusaders, but as 
unprincipled riff-raff: "the only white troops they have got 
[are] the Foreign Legion, all the others varying in hue from 
cafe-au-lait to the darkest cafe turc't. Free France was & "farce". 
but what upset Spears most of all was his helplessness in the 
current political scene: "We are besieged by people who protest.... 
and yet we have to stand by and see it all happening, unable to 
do anything". It was now becoming a matter of personal integrity, 
he declared: 
One feels as if we were holding down the Lebanon 
to be raped by Free France... I might add that 
this friendly service is only rewarded by a kick 
in the pants. I can think of no better definition 
of getting the worst of both worlds.... 
This, he claimed, was how the people of the Levant were coming to 
view the British role, and he found it "singularly unpleasant" 
to be "the embodiment of such a policy". 
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Spears' sympathies were entirely with the local people, 
and he saw it as a moral and personal imperative that* he should 
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champion their cause and resist the cynical Free French consolidation 
in the Levant. At the end of 1941 he was chafing under the 
restrictions of his position and his inability to prevent the 
creation of Catroux's puppet regimes. Yet these paper republics 
became the very means by which Spears came to exercise wider powers 
in the Levant. What had seemed a triumph for the Free French was 
at best a Pyrrhic victory, for Spears himself was chosen to be 
the British Minister to the new republics, in addition 'to retaining 
his old position as Anglo-Free French liaison chief in the Levant. 
On 11 December he left Beirut and made the long journey to 
London, where he was to take a well-earned rest, to be knighted, and 
to arrange with the Foreign Office the details of his new appointment 
in the Levant. Despite his ill-health, Spears carried his Cause 
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straight into a meeting of the War Cabinet's Syrian Committee 
and gave a powerful tour de force on the whole situation in the 
Levant. He told the Committee that the "policy of supporting 
the Free French had never been understood by the local peoples.... 
they had been promised a change in the regime but in fact no 
change had, in their eyes, taken place". On the grounds that all 
Frenchmen in the Levant were despised, that their administration 
was bad, that security was endangered, and that the area was 
strategically vital, Spears called for a change of policy in 
the Levant. If the Syrians and Lebanese did not receive genuine 
British support for their independence, he warned, they would 
lose faith in the Allies and "serious disturbances" might break out. 
De Gaulle, he added, should be prevented from interfering- 
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It was a fitting conclusion to a year in Which Spears' 
Quixotic vision of Free France had been dispelled by the shock 
of de Gaulle's Anglophobia and the visible adulteration of Free 
France in the Levant. The nominal transformation of the old 
administration into the Free French administration was probably 
necessary, but Spears had witnessed it with all the dismay of 
Orwell's animals peering through the farmhouse window at a 
shameful metamorphosis: he looked from Vichyist to Free Frenchman, 
from Free Frenchman to Vichyist, but he could no longer see the 
difference. His long affair with France expired amid the sordid 
pragmatics of the Levant. In its place had arisen the fledgling 
cause of the Syrians and Lebanese, who appealed to him to champion 
their freedom. Henceforth Britain's pledge to the Levant States, 
elevated into a sacred utterance, became his new mission. Spears 
returned in 1942 with extended powers and opportunities to make 
the Levant an asset to the Allies, to encourage the Syrians and 
Lebanese, and to relentlessly harry the French. 
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Chapter Five THE SIEGE OF CATROUX'S ANCIEN REGIME 
For what is wedlock forced, but a hell, 
An age of discord and continual strife? 
Henry VI (I) v. 5. 
Empire is a state of affairs even when the 
imperial power is not formally constituted 
as such. 
The period from the instalment of Catroux's client republics 
to February 1943 was marked by perpetual Anglo-Free French disputes 
and a swelling opposition to the disguised hegemony of the French. 
Local dissatisfaction (championed by $pears) and the disapproval of 
the wider Arab world exposed Catroux's regime to growing pressure, 
and the British soon realised that Arab nationalism would not be 
taken in by Catroux's version of independence. The Delegate-General 
was obliged to spend much of his time performing an inspired exercise 
in evasion and procrastination, but his efforts to deflect increasing 
pressure - much of it British - could not succeed indefinitely. By the 
spring of 1943 Catroux had played his last cards and was resigned to 
political gestures which were bound to weaken the Free French grip on 
the Levant. Despite varied and resourceful tactics on the part of 
Catroux and de Gaulle, their disguised version of the old mandatory 
regime failed to survive. The Free French blamed this failure largely 
upon General Spears, who tracked Catroux tenaciously and flushed him 
out of many concealments. And when de Gaulle made another dramatic 
appearance in the Levant, it was Spears who offered the most unflagging 
opposition to her versatile tactics. 
At the beginning of 1942, Catroux was filled with misgivings 
at the very idea of Spears returning to the Levant with a wider 
brief. On 2 January, in conversation with Lyttelton, Catroux was 
informed of the possibility that Spears might be appointed British 
Minister to the new Syrian and Lebanese republics. Catroux replied 
* George Lichtheim, Imperialism (1971), p. 10. 
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that "he would be obliged to raise the greatest possible objection 
to the appointment of General Spears", on the grounds that 
his presence in S ria had greatly accentuated 
the difficulties 
LbetweenJ 
the Free French and 
the British authorities. Moreover... Spears had 
occasionally acted... in a discourteous and 
threatening manner, and while this conduct had 
perhaps to be overlooked in the head of an ill- 
defined mission, it would be quite intolerable 
in an accredited British Minister. 1 
These remarks, Catroux stressed, should not be repeated to anyone 
except Eden. Lyttelton accordingly sent them on-to the Foreign 
Secretary, but if Catroux was hoping to pre-empt the Spears appoint- 
ment, he was too late. In London the liaison mission had been handed 
over to Mr Charles Peake and absorbed into the Foreign Office, while 
Spears, who was taking sick leave, had accepted the dual role of 
British Minister to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments and Head of 
Anglo-Free French liaison in the Levant. 
Informing Lyttelton of these changes, Eden stressed that 
Spears was "keen to return to the Middle East" and that, "after the 
valuable services Spears has rendered in Syria" there could be no 
question of cancelling the appointment in deference to Catroux's 
belated objections. 
2 In any case, such objections had been brushed 
aside earlier by the need to give Spears some prominent post to 
compensate for his replacement in London. For Lyttelton himself had 
expressed some doubts about Spears' appointment. On 5 December he 
had told Eden that Spears 
is generally much disliked by Free French. He also 
makes mountainous protests about molehill incidents 
and this irritates Catroux. Part of this is indica- 
tive of his bad health. As a result the Free French 
do not co-operate as frankly with us as they other- 
wise might. If, therefore, Spears shows any dis- 
inclination to accept the post and if you can find 
him another good job I should recommend that he should 
not be pressed to remain. I repeat that if he accepts 
the post I can work with him... 3* 
This warning, from a man who had frequently commended Spears' services 
in the Levant, was not taken too seriously by Eden. Spears' old image 
as a Francophile still lingered, Free French susceptibilities were 
* This is wrongly ascribed to Lampson in Woodward, Foreign Policy, iv. 221. 
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becoming tedious, and any odd behaviour could be put down to 
Spears' ill-health. Above all, Spears had to be given an important 
job if he was to be quietly detached from his liaison mission in 
London, and with Churchill looking on in the interests of his old 
comrade, Eden had to offer Spears something big. Under these cir- 
cumstances, a few rows with Catroux were not allowed to upset the 
deal arranged by Eden and Churchill. Spears was duly knighted, 
given his handsome appointment in the Levant, and granted generous 
leave in England. 
The new appointee was eagerly anticipating his return, and 
was alert to the possibilities of his dualist role. "We will have 
a lot of fun when I get back", he told Hamilton, his Arabist friend 
in Beirut. "It certainly is the oddest diplomatic hand that has ever 
been played". 
4 If he hinted at his intentions to a friend, he made 
them even plainer to the foe. During a dinner given by de Gaulle in 
March, Spears asked point-blank why Catroux was not giving any real 
measure of independence to the Republics in accordance with his 
promises. The exasperated de Gaulle replied that this was purely 
his concern, but Spears retorted that Britain had guaranteed Free 
French promises and could not ignore the serious repercussions in 
the Arab world which would follow such a breach of promise. When de 
Gaulle reiterated his own views, Spears declared that 
in that case there were likely to be quite serious 
difficulties in the Levant, as I happened to be 
accredited to two independent Republics and not to 
puppet Governments existing on General Catroux's 
and General de Gaulle's favour. 
This astonishing outburst, at the sort of gathering where Spears was 
noted for his charm and wit, was a declaration of private war. 
5 
The British Minister had got off to an ominous start before 
he had even presented his credentials in Beirut and Damascus. His 
appointment had been strongly contested by Catroux, with whom he 
would have to consult constantly, and he had left de Gaulle in no 
doubt that he would press the Syrian and Lebanese cause to the 
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embarrassment of Free French formalities. De Gaulle and Catroux 
inevitably drew some dark conclusions from the fact that such 
a man had been appointed to represent Britain in the Levant. 
These impressions were deepened by Spears' first moves 
in the Levant itself. Within a few days of his return he had 
presented himself formally to the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents, 
but pointedly failed to pay Catroux the sort of official visit 
which the Delegate-General had a right to expect as the repre- 
sentative of the French Mandate. The message was clear - Spears 
no longer recognised the mandate. It was not simply an oversight, 
for Spears had used a similar tactic when he refused to attend 
Catroux's ceremonies of Lebanese independence in November 1941. 
He had now hit upon a more effective move, which was to take this 
pseudo-independence literally and thereby dismiss the French mandate 
as a dead letter. Catroux could not openly deny Spears' premise - 
that independence was genuine - but he had somehow to refute his 
conclusion. This could only be done by saying that the mandate still 
existed as a juridical fact, which was of course awkward, for it 
raised suspicions and doubts about the worth of Catroux's indepen- 
dence decrees. Nevertheless Spears' tactical literalism soon forced 
the Free French tostress the continued validity of the mandate. 
In the Levant, Catroux angrily proposed to ignore Spears 
until his own position had been recognised, while in London de 
Gaulle complained to Eden about the snub. The battle was joined, 
and Britain's first requirement in the Levant - tranquillity - was 
thus denied from the outset. 
6 Spears kept up the pressure in his 
first discussions with Catroux in April. Stressing that Britain 
hoped to see an extension of the independence she had guaranteed, 
he asked Catroux to refrain in future from invoking the mandate, 
since it was "legal fiction" now that independence was granted! 
Full collaboration with Britain, he breezily asserted, was the only 
way Catroux could continue to maintain French prestige now. 
7 
This condescending advice did not impress Catroux any more 
than a wilder statement which Spears apparently made, though he 
left it out of his own report. This was that the Free French were 
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isolated and out of favour in London, where their usefulness as 
Allies was no longer accepted, and their influence on metropolitan 
France was regarded as negligible; as for de Gaulle, he was surely 
a disappointed man who would soon abandon his failing enterprise. 
This mischievous blend of half-truths did not shake Catroux, who 
saw it as an attempt to bustle him into submissive collaboration. 
8 
Although the Foreign Office made disapproving noises when 
this conversation was reported, it still treated Spears' first 
general report on the Levant with great concern. This report depicted 
a disgruntled population alienated by Catroux's puppet regime, and it 
claimed that French prestige was being maintained at the expense of 
the war effort. Spears therefore urged that elections for a more 
representative government should be promised by a definite date, and 
that Catroux should be compelled to act in a more Allied spirit. 
9 
The Foreign Office accordingly asked Spears, Monckton* and 
Auchinleck whether immediate changes ought to be made in the Levant 
administrations. Spears promptly replied that an interim government 
of bureaucrats should be installed at once, pending elections which 
should be promised by a definite date. He was supported by the Middle 
East War Council+ which recommended that an election date (no later 
than December 1942) should be announced soon. 
10 From this point on, 
both London and Cairo began to press the reluctant Free French to 
announce and hold general elections in the Levant States, and mean- 
while to make some immediate and substantial administrative changes. 
These opening moves were indicative of all that was to follow 
until February 1943, when the elections were finally announced. 
Throughout this period, Anglo-Free French affairs were marked by 
* Sir Walter Monckton, Acting Minister of State from 26 February 1942 
(when Lyttelton left to become Minister of Production) until the 
arrival of the new Minister, R. G. Casey, on 4 May, 1942. Casey, 
formerly Australia's Minister in Washington, was the subject of heated 
exchanges between Churchill and the Australian Prime Minister, John 
Curtin, who saw links with America as more important that notions of 
the Empire. See PREM 3 305/2. 
+ This consisted of the Minister of State, the Commander-in-Chief, 
Lampson, MacMichael and several others including Spears. 
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perpetual rivalry, squabbling and nasty incidents on a local, day- 
to-day level, and by a series of clashes and crises on the highest 
levels. Of these, the Spears-Catroux struggle was only the most 
durable and visible. This context prejudiced virtually every Anglo- 
Free French concern in the Levant, with the sole exception of the 
wheat scheme. This was a co-operative success and a positive contri- 
bution to the war effort. Spears himself recalled that in this instance 
"I had the pleasant experience, which lost nothing because of its 
novelty, of working in great harmony with Catroux". 
11 
Originally, the wheat scheme was neither a success nor a 
case of satisfactory Anglo-Free French teamwork. It began in the 
autumn of 1941, when Spears and Lyttelton became concerned at the 
possibility of serious food shortages in the Levant. Crops had 
been poor, and the hoarders and speculators were at their old, 
ruthless game. Lyttelton decided to take them on, Having obtained 
80,000 tons of wheat, he released this without warning, below black 
market prices. The idea was to force a sudden drop in the price of 
grain, which would compel the hoarders to release their stocks lest 
they be by-passed completely. This measure had worked elsewhere, 
Lyttleton assured Spears - but it failed utterly. The Minister 
of State had under-rated the Syrian merchants and reckoned without 
the vast gap between rich and poor in the Levant. The speculators 
simply bought up to 80,000 tons, added it to their stocks and carried 
on. As one eye-witness observed, the Levant was "a profiteer's 
paradise and a poor man's purgatory". 
12 
This was the situation which Spears inherited on his return 
to the Levant. Lyttelton had gone, and now that the wheat scheme had 
failed the French - who had originally been associated with it - 
were calling it a purely British affair. Spears returned to find that 
the wheat scheme had been maliciously dubbed le Plan Spears. This was, 
ironically, to give him enormous prestige in the Levant, for he 
turned the initial disaster into a resounding success by producing 
an alternative Spears Plan for the 1942 crop. His basic idea was to 
collect the wheat directly from the growers in return for cash. By 
securing the co-operation of the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers, many 
of whom were big feudal landlords, Spears largely overcame the age- 
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old Levantine ability to hide the harvest from conquerors and 
occupying powers. In gaining this local co-operation, Spears had 
to use all his resources to persuade the Syrians and Lebanese 
that Free French participation would not mean a return to the old, 
brutal methods of requisitioning. He had to work just as hard to 
prevent Catroux from releasing his savage Gardes Mobiles among the 
villages where grain was not forthcoming. The last thing that 
Spears wanted was a series of local uprisings at a time when 
British forces had their hands full with Rommel, and he called 
in Casey, Auchinleck and Wilson to reinforce the arguments he was 
putting to Catroux. 
The problem was aggravated by Catroux's sensitivity to the 
question of Free French prestige in the Levant. This, he argued, 
would be damaged if the British were put on an equal footing with 
the French in a purely internal matter. Catroux repeated this view 
to Casey during a conference in Cairo on 11 May, but was bluntly 
told that the wheat scheme was not a private Free French concern 
but an issue which gravely affected the entire Middle Eastern war 
effort. Spears himself was fond of stressing that the wheat 
gathered in Syria should be measured against the lives of British 
sailors who might have to deliver foreign grain to the Levant. Now 
Catroux heard it from the Minister of State, who added that Free 
French amour-propre could surely not be advanced as a reason for 
impeding the war effort, and if it was, the British would be 
forced to set up the wheat authority without the Free French. 
Then Auchinleck joined in, demanding to know whether Catroux 
had some higher priority than winning the war, and stating that 
any failure by the civilian authorities to feed the population of 
the Levant would simply force the British Army to do the job in 
the interests of maintaining drder. When Wilson added that he had 
already ascertained that his army could do the job, Catroux gave 
up the uneven struggle. He was in any case "fairly keen on the war 
effort", according to Furlonge, and the views expressed in Cairo 
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undoubtedly helped him to reconcile himself to an Anglo-Free 
French wheat scheme in the Levant States. 
The Wheat Office, or O. C. P. (Office des Cereales Panifiables), 
was duly established in May 1942, with representatives from Syria, 
Lebanon, Free France and Britain, whose decisions were subject to 
the discretion of Spears and Catroux. As a sop to Gaullist 
susceptibilities, final decisions were to be published as decrees 
emanating from the Delegate-General of Free France in the Levant. 
After another crisis with the Syrian Cabinet, which Spears only 
averted by assuring the Syrians that British officers would be 
present throughout the countryside at every stage of the scheme, 
the O. C. P. was officially launched on 23 May. 
By this new "Spears Plan", the total tonnage to be 
collected from each region was estimated, an official price was 
fixed, and the wheat was collected by O. C. P. personnel at the 
threshing floors in return for direct cash payments. There were 
of course great difficulties over corruption in high places, and 
one unlicensed wheat lorry was even found to be consigned to 
Madame Catroux! The smuggling of wheat across the Turkish border 
and the operation of a black market could not be entirely stopped. 
Nor could the bribery of local officials. Nevertheless Spears, who 
seemed to revel in this battle of wits, had a few tricks up his 
own sleeve. "To make the O. C. P. work" wrote Coghill*, "a man 
had to be ruthless, unscrupulous and able to turn a Jesuitical 
blind eye on scandalous means that could... justify the end. Spears... 
seemed to have all these qualities". 
Spears needed such resources by the end of July, when a 
serious shortage of bank notes deprived the O. C. P. of its chief 
attraction to the peasant-farmers - cash payments on the spot. 
While Spears attempted to satisfy the rural population with hastily- 
printed bank promissory notes, the Syrian politicians - mostly 
great landowners or merchants who made enormous profits under the 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, Head of the British 
Security Mission in the Levant States, 1942-1945. 
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old system - began to show signs of withdrawing their support from 
the O. C. P. This development was followed by an attempt on the part 
of Catroux, who suddenly confronted Spears with a host of Free 
French officials, to resort to a massive show of force and 
terrorise the villagers and growers into producing their hidden 
harvests. 
In this crisis, Spears showed great determination and wit. 
He reduced the target figure for Syria, and then insisted that a 
supreme effort must be made to reach this figure. Having borrowed 
an inhospitable Red Sea island called Kamaran, he warned 
that offenders would henceforth be deported without exception. Once 
this message had been delivered to all the big landlords and 
merchants, Spears went to the Syrian Prime Minister, a noted 
landowner, and announced that despite the man's exalted office 
he would be the first to inhabit Kamaran if the quotas for his own 
region were not met. The following day, Spears added, he and Catroux 
would accompany the Syrian on a tour of his lands and villages, to 
see if the wheat was coming in. The result was almost miraculous. 
Grain poured in faster than the O. C. P. could sack it, while the 
Prime Minister went on the pressurise his fellow-culprits in Syria 
to good effect. His efforts were enhanced by the well-publicised 
spectacle of a group of affluent hoarders being banished to Kamaran. 
These moves effectively ended the crisis, and by September 
it was obvious that the O. C. P. had been a distinct success. In 
contrast to 1941, not a single ton of wheat was imported into the 
Levant. This meant one less task for the hard-pressed Allied 
shipping, and it also generated the refreshing anomalies of agrarian 
justice and Anglo-Free French co-operation in the Levant. This was 
very largely a personal success for Spears, who had overcome a series 
of obstacles in the establishment and implementation of the O. C. P. 
scheme. "It was his tireless energy and drive", Coghill recalled, 
" [whic j made the O. C. P. work". This achievement was recognised by 
his Middle East colleagues and by Churchill himself, but the Foreign 
Office showed little interest in Spears' wheat scheme. * This was 
* Spears makes this claim in his memoirs, and the files of the 
Foreign Office bear it out. 
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short-sighted, for Spears had not just helped the war effort - he 
had prevented any serious food shortages, and past events had 
shown that this was the most fundamental cause of disorder in the 
Levant. If at a later stage the Foreign Office blamed Spears 
for disorders of a political nature, it should also have 
recognised that Spears effectively ruled out any serious civil 
disturbances at a time when the British were in desperate trouble 
with Rommel in Egypt, and could ill-afford any more serious 
difficulties in the Arab world. 
13 
There were, however, some aspects of the Anglo-Free 
French wheat scheme which were less fortunate. In his memoirs 
Spears condemns Catroux, who "could only assess events as factors 
in an imaginary Anglo-French power struggle", for persistently 
treating the whole project as a blow to Free French prestige. 
Yet this was not all imagination on Catroux's part. The following 
extract from Spears' diary indicates that the Frenchman's fears 
were well-founded: 
Catroux came to see me at my house.... The 
atmosphere was very cordial, and I have a feeling 
that for the time being at least I have got the 
French where I wanted them, i. e., that I am being 
consulted on equal terms on all important matters 
concerning these countries.... All this is entirely 
due to the one great show-down over the Wheat 
question. Catroux has realised that he cannot govern 
the country without me, and having realised this has 
become amenable... 14 
Behind the facade of co-operation, behind all the protestations 
that nothing mattered half as much as the Allied war effort, there 
was clearly a contest, a rivalry and a question of comparative 
prestige in the eyes of the local peoples. 
15 
**** 
Despite his misgivings about increased British involvement 
in the affairs of the Levant, Catroux had given his general support 
to the Anglo-French O. C. P. for practical reasons - the need to 
cope with food shortages and to make some contribution to the Allied 
I If 
war effort at a time when resources were thinly spread. No such 
considerations, however, swayed the Frenchman in other areas, and 
he continued to resist British encroachments on his domain. In 
particular he reacted sharply to Spears' demand to be consulted 
on equal terms in all important matters. On the subject of 
elections, Catroux's resistance took on a more subtle character, 
Realising that London now supported this idea, Catroux was too 
clever to put up any outright opposition to general elections. He 
fell back upon a series of delaying tactics and red herrings, and 
at first the wheat scheme itself and Rommel's alarming drive into 
Egypt offered him useful arguments for postponing any announcement 
of elections in the Levant States. * 
The French had nothing to gain and much to lose if any 
open elections were held in the Levant, for they had long since 
alienated most of the populace to an extent which no sudden fit 
of liberalism could repair. Nevertheless Catroux had to do something 
about the woebegone image of his so-called republics, which had, 
as he admitted to de Gaulle, "disappointed public opinion". At the 
end of April the Delegate-General informed de Gaulle that he 
intended to restore the "constitutional machinery" which had been 
suspended when France declared war in 1939. This simply meant re- 
opening national assemblies which were little more than debating 
clubs. "I do not", Catroux added, "want to proceed to elections as 
desired by Spears". De Gaulle endorsed Catroux's proposal. "Naturally", 
he agreed, "elections cannot be imagined in the present strategic 
situation". 
16 
These modest plans were immediately disrupted by the 
British belief that elections were necessary. At the end of April 
the Foreign Office had endorsed the Middle East War Council's call 
for elections to be held before the end of 1942, and for more 
immediate economic and administrative improvements. On 4 May the 
new Minister of State, Casey, had arrived in Cairo, and within a 
week he was holding talks with Catroux, Spears, Auchinleck and 
In January 1942 Rommel had driven the British two-thirds of the 
way across Cyrenaica. On 26 May he attacked again, and advanced 
350 miles across _. 
Cyrenaica and Egypt. By 30 June he was a 
mere 60 miles from Alexandria, at Alamein. 
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Wilson. In these decisive talks, Catroux not only agreed to co- 
operate in the wheat scheme, but also conceded the principle that 
elections should be held before the end of 1942, subject to the 
approval of General de Gaulle. In explaining this volte-face to his 
chief, Catroux reported that Casey and his colleagues had been 
adamant that elections must be announced in the near future for 
the sake of order and security in the Middle East, as Egypt and 
Iraq had refused to recognise the current regime in the Levant, and 
Axis propaganda was exploiting this dissent. He had therefore seen 
that such an announcement could not be avoided "without damage", 
and had provisionally conceded in the name of Allied solidarity. 
De Gaulle and his London colleagues, who were aware that the 
American press had announced the Catroux-Casey agreement as definite, 
decided (for the time being) to agree to elections late in 1942. 
Nevertheless de Gaulle insisted that they should be announced "as late 
as possible", and in the name of France alone. This left the Free 
French a certain latitude which de Gaulle and Catroux were able to 
exploit. 
17 
On 8 June, during a visit to Free French troops under 
Auchinleck's command, Catroux informed Casey of de Gaulle's 
stipulations. When Casey repeated his request for an early 
announcement concerning elections, Catroux suggested that Eden 
should approach de Gaulle himself with this request, which effectively 
shelved the matter for another fortnight. 
18 When the Minister of 
State returned to the question on 23 June, his own position had 
been somewhat eroded by Rommel. As he told London : 
Catroux said that the problem was now further 
complicated by recent developments in the Western 
Desert which had caused nervousness in the Levant... 
Once the announcement of elections was made, the 
country would enter into an electoral period and the 
position of the Governments would become still more 
difficult. 'hereforei-3 the announcement should be 
delayed until the military situation had become 
more clear. 
Casey thought that there was "considerable force" in this argument, 
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and reached a provisional agreement with Catroux that, provided 
the German threat had been met, and the grain supply secured 
through the wheat scheme, elections would be announced at the 
beginning of August, at which time the governments would be 
reconstructed, and the actual voting would take place in mid-September. 
All this, Catroux insisted, could not be finalised without de 
Gaulle's agreement. And when Casey, in his profound ignorance of 
Levantine politics and society, stressed that the elections must be 
patently. - fair, Catroux's response was interesting. "He agreed", 
reported Casey, "but pointed out that the course of the elections 
would have to be guided so as to ensure that pro-Ally Governments 
were returned". 
19 
In Beirut, Spears was annoyed and offended to learn of these 
"more or less final decisions" being made without his participation, 
and complained about Catroux going over his head. He also feared 
that the inexperienced Casey had allowed Catroux a free hand to 
"guide" the elections along Free French lines: 
This is Catroux's way of saying that he intends 
to rig the elections so as to ensure a Government 
of Free French puppets, and I think it a pity 
that this statement of his was apparently not 
challenged. 
Spears was not the man to let this sort of thing pass, and he 
tackled Catroux with his customary vigour, stressing that "Elections 
rigged by the French" were totally unacceptable. 
In Cairo, it was Hopkinson's turn to be surprised, since Spears' 
complaints had been addressed to him. "I don't believe for a moment 
that Catroux intends to fake the elections", he minuted. "I shall 
be interested to hear the result of General Spears' conversation with 
General Catroux. I hope and trust he was not provocative". 
20 This 
hope, like Hopkinson's touching faith in Catroux's political purity, 
proved to be vain. Spears had spoken to Catroux like a Victorian 
schoolmaster, and the polished Frenchman - who already had to 
endure the supervision of his formidable wife - was tired of Spears' 
tactless tutelage. 
Catroux's simmering exasperation came to the boil in their 
next confrontation. In July, protests against the shortage and high 
price of bread had precipitated a crisis in the Lebanese Cabinet, 
and Catroux settled this by making some Ministerial changes and 
appointing a new Prime Minister. As Catroux made these adjustments, 
Spears awoke to the fact that he was not, after all, being consulted 
as an equal in all Levantine affairs. Reacting hastily, Spears 
conveyed a blustering message to Catroux, but the effect was not 
what had been anticipated. . 
Catroux sent him a stinging letter of 
rebuke, a copy of which went to Casey along with Catroux's formal 
complaint that 
to the Levant and to the enemy, the British Minister 
is now the man who has assigned himself the task of 
destroying French influence in Syria and the Lebanon... 
It is clear that this belief would not have taken 
root or spread if General Spears, restricting himself 
to his proper role and respecting the agreements, had 
abstained from interfering in political and admini- 
strative affairs and had shown more restraint in 
expressing his opinion and his ideas. 
Spears claimed that his verbal message had been distorted by Boegner, 
Catroux's political aide, and cited the wheat scheme as proof of his 
desire to assist and co-operate with Catroux. This failed to mollify 
the Frenchman. He repeated that Spears' "intimidation" was intolerable 
and refused to have any further dealings with him. 
21 
Casey did what he could to pour oil on these troubled waters. 
After a series of meeting with Catroux and Spears in Cairo, in which 
both men made conciliatory noises, Casey gave Catroux a letter 
stating that 
General Spears has given me a categorical assurance 
that he has in no way set himself the task of 
destroying French influence in Syria and the Lebanon 
and obstructing your activities.... 
[He] fully. recognises the special position and 
rights which you enjoy as Delegue General... 22 
In return for this satisfaction, however, Catroux found that he had 
at best won a Pyrrhic victory, since he had to assure Casey 
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that once the predominant political position of the 
representative of France was acknowledged he admitted 
fully the right of H. M. Government to interest them- 
selves in the affairs of the Levant in the conditions 
arising out of the war and to be kept fully informed. 
Catroux found himself being questioned closely on the meaning of this 
assurance, and all the contradictions of the Anglo-Free French 
presence in the Levant emerged in the subsequent discussion. 
Catroux left Cairo with a written assurance that his position 
and prerogatives were respected, and that Spears had no desire to 
obstruct or threaten him. Yet he had been obliged to concede that 
"Spears was accredited to the two States and-has the right to inter- 
vene [sic] in all matters affecting British interests". He had also 
conceded that the formation of the Lebanese Cabinet was a case in point, 
that it might be necessary to take up with him the suitability of the 
appointees, and that in future Spears ought to be informed in advance. 
All this implied that, apart from his overbearing manner, Spears had 
been right all along. The possible military repercu3sions of virtually 
anything that Catroux did as Delegate-General clearly made nonsense of 
his "special position" except for ceremonial purposes. The same con- 
siderations also gave Spears a sweeping justification for including 
all prominent Levantine affairs in his bailiwick. 
23 
On 5 August the Minister of State addressed himself once more 
to the well-worn subject of elections. Reminding Catroux of their 
agreement of 24 June, Casey declared that "the time has now come for 
action", and called on Catroux to make the election announcements in 
the Levant forthwith. 
24 Casey was never to see a reply to this wire, 
but three days later, when de Gaulle arrived in Cairo, the British 
Minister received a reply of a different sort altogether, 
General de Gaulle had been watching developments in the Levant 
with an increasing displeasure. The O. C. P., the election issue and 
the activities of Spears were all, in his view, a flagrant violation 
of French sovereignty and a concerted effort to undermine the French 
position in the Levant. He said as much to Eden on 28 July, and 
declared that he could no longer delay his planned visit to Free 
French territories, which he had twice postponed. The next day de 
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Gaulle called on Churchill and stated that he was anxious to get 
to the levant where, he said, Spears was making trouble for the Free 
French. Churchill promptly replied that while Spears had many 
enemies, he had one friend - the Prime Minister. He added that the 
independence of the Levant States was said to be a sham, and the 
populace discontent. De Gaulle retorted that they were at least as 
satisfied as the people of Iraq, Palestine or Egypt. On this note 
the Frenchman set off for the Middle East. There was "no reason", he 
remarked, "why we should let ourselves be despoiled in silence". 
25 
He made this attitude painfully clear when he arrived in Cairo 
on 8 August. Once more he strode into the Minister of State's office, 
but this time it was Casey who received the first broadside: 
General de Gaulle ... came to see me, uncompromising 
and intransigent. There was a frightful row. He 
accused us of trying to. oust the French from their 
position in Syria and the Lebanon.... The discussion 
degenerated into an undignified shouting match, he 
in French and I in English. 
The shouting began when Casey seized the opportunity to tackle de 
Gaulle about the need to announce the elections in the Levant. States. 
De Gaulle bluntly retorted that "there will be no elections this year 
in Syria or in the Lebanon" and launched into a diatribe about British 
interference. Rejecting the whole argument about effects on the war 
effort, de Gaulle declared that Britain had no legitimate role in the 
internal affairs of the Levant and should mind its own business. 
This time, however, de Gaulle found Cairo's response tougher.., 
thanks to the presence of Churchill himself, who was currently sacking 
Auchinleck. After consulting Churchill, Casey sent for Catroux and 
told him that de Gaulle's attitude was completely unacceptable, that 
the elections must be held, and that Churchill himself would intervene 
if necessary. Catroux quickly assured Casey that de Gaulle was not 
seeking a quarrel, and thereafter Casey received an indirect apology 
from de Gaulle. It was soon clear, however, that de Gaulle was not 
at all apologetic about the election issue. 
26 
On 12 August the Free French leader set off on something like 
a royal progress through the Levant States, treating the local notables 
with great pomp and ceremony. He studiously ignored most British 
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personnel and openly insulted several Spears Mission officers in 
the provincial centres. As Coghill observed, de Gaulle 
ran true to form and in all his speeches and 
behaviour mentioned only France, not one reference 
to the Allies - made the most unfortunate references 
to France's "historical" interest in Syria, the 
mandate, and immature or premature independence... 27 
De Gaulle's speeches cleverly embellished and exaggerated French 
status in the Levant. In Beirut, for instance, he told a Franco- 
Lebanese audience that independence was an accomplished fact, and 
that the necessary treaties of friendship and security were 
"tacitly signed" by the relationship already achieved between 
Free France and the new republics. In the present war conditions, 
of course, it was not "just or possible to have recourse to free 
popular consultations". The day would come for that, and France 
was eager to see it dawn, but the time was not yet ripe. Meanwhile, 
although enemy propaganda and certain fumblers in "the democratic 
camp" sometimes created difficulties, Free France* would not allow 
her position to be undermined and encroached upon. Spears, who 
attended this speech by invitation, did not miss the oblique 
reference to his own activities. 
28 
De Gaulle's impressive appearances throughout the Levant 
were only the visible side of a two-pronged move to restore the 
situation for Free France and to throw the British hounds 
completely off the scent. Behind the scenes, he set to work to 
divide his critics and exploit the differences and distances 
between the various British authorities. Constant practice had made 
de Gaulle something of an expert at playing off one British Minister 
or Department against another. Now, by seeing many individuals and 
adopting a variety of attitudes, he inspired a bewildering shower 
of signals between London, Cairo and Beirut, and created enough 
confusion among the British to win Free France a breathing-space 
in the Levant. 
e From July 1942 de Gaulle's movement was officially designated 
"Fighting France" (Lit France Combattante), a term which occurs 
in some of the documents quoted hereafter. Others, however, continue 
to refer to "Free France" in the period after July 1942. For the 
sake of convenience, I do likewise. 
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This game began straight after de Gaulle's confrontation with 
Casey. Singling out the sympathetic Michael Wright, the Frenchman 
adopted his most disarming manner. "Well, here we are back in the 
unfortunate atmosphere of last summer", he sighed, adding that these 
disputes detracted from the Allied war effort. De Gaulle suggested 
that there were really only two difficulties in Syria - the election 
issue and the behaviour of Spears. After apologising for his 
outburst in Casey's presence, de Gaulle explained that his zeal to 
safeguard French territories sprang from his anxiety to keep French 
opinion sympathetic, and thus ensure support for the Allies if a 
second front opened in Europe. Nevertheless, he assured Wright, his 
intentions in the Levant were honourable. While these States were too 
immature to run themselves in wartime, France would soon grant them 
"the same full measure of independence 
[which Britain has given to 
Egypt and Iraq". This was shrewd, especially as the conversation was 
reported to Churchill, who still thought that Iraq was an adequate 
model for Middle Eastern independence. 29 In the Levant, however, men 
like Furlonge and Spears knew that the Syrians and Lebanese would 
never sign such a treaty. 
Next on de Gaulle's list of impressionables was Mr. Gwynn, 
the acting United States Consul-General in Beirut. Here the Frenchman 
really let himself go, raising the possibility of a complete rupture 
between Free France and Britain. On this occasion he claimed that 
"the time had not yet come" for independence in the Levant "and 
might not come for many years". Meanwhile, however, the British 
seemed bent on eliminating France from the Eastern Mediterranean. 
There would have to be a rapid and fundamental change in British 
policy, and 
the British representative, General Spears, would 
have to go, although he anticipated and feared strong 
opposition by the British Prime Minister in that 
regard. Should the Prime Minister refuse to acquiesce 
it would mean the end of all collaboration. 
Gwynn said that this seemed unthinkable, but de Gaulle "affirmed his 
determination to see the matter through". De Gaulle was aware that 
Washington's State Department regarded Spears as the nigger in the 
Syrian woodpile, and his performance had the desired effect. Gwynn's 
17ý 
alarming report duly landed on Eden's desk, via Washington. 
30 it 
certainly intensified Foreign Office displeasure with its misfit 
man in Beirut: "Spears is busy bedevilling our relations with De 
Gaulle and the Syrians", fumed Eden's Secretary. "However, I think 
Spears is rapidly hanging himself with his quarrels which now 
extend to... the Americans, who have complained about him". 
31 
In Cairo, Gwynn's report was linked with another conversation 
about Spears. This time de Gaulle had invited General Holmes* to 
have a friendly chat about the problems of the Levant. Again, it 
was a shrewd choice. Holmes had seen something of the Free French 
at their best, when they defied Rommel at Bir Hakeim. He knew 
nothing of their less admirable pursuits in the Levant, he had 
clashed with Spears over liaison issues, and he personally disliked 
Spears. 
32 In a "perfectly calm and collected" style, de Gaulle 
explained his whole position to Holmes, claiming that he had just 
asked Churchill to remove Spears, and insisting that he would not 
leave Beirut until Spears went. De Gaulle had not put any such 
specific demand to Churchill, but his statement evoked a sympathetic 
reponse from Holmes, who reported that 
I am... not alone in my considered opinion that 
Spears should go as soon as possible in the 
interests of military security. Every Politico- 
Military problem put forward to the French through 
Spears is doomed from the start. 
His removal might be considered in some quarters 
as hauling down the flag but... it is a necessary 
step towards proper collaboration between Allies. 
The alternative appears to be a complete rupture 
with the French with consequences which... cannot 
be foreseen involving the possible use of force... 
This report was immediately passed on to Casey's office by 
the new Commander-in-Chief, Alexander. There, despite the remark 
that Holmes was new to the complexities of the Levant, his report 
strengthened the feeling among Casey's subordinates that Spears 
might indeed have to go - but not too suddenly, lest de Gaulle 
Lieutenant-General W. G. Holmes, the 9th Army Commander, previously 
commanded Auchinleck's 10th Corps at Mersa Matruh. During Rommel's 
audacious June offensive, Holmes' two infantry divisions were 
stranded by the disorderly retreat of Gott's 13th Corps. Two-thirds 
of Holmes' troops managed to break out at night, but Holmes himself 
was dismissed in the subsequent- shake-up and sent to the backwater 
of 9#h Thrre ynrl nge found him understandabl bitter about 
his dismissal and bored 
gy the humdrum existence of 
x9th Army. 
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should conclude that his ultimatum had achieved this result. In any 
case, it was thought that Catroux would also have to go if a new 
start was to be made in Anglo-Free French affairs in the Levant. 
For a time, however, nothing more was done about these suggestions. 
33 
De Gaulle's final attempt to enlist Anglo-Saxon supporters 
was something of a flop. Early in September there breezed into 
Beirut the American tourist par excellence - Mr. Wendell Willkie, 
Roosevelt's Republican opponent, whom the President had sent on a 
global fact-finding mission. Willkie's style astonished both Spears 
and de Gaulle. "Tell me what is the difficulty between the French 
and the British here", he asked one local expert. "I can give you 
fifteen minutes". 
34 Spears was obliged to summarise the whole 
situation over lunch, but de Gaulle had more time to put his case, 
and argued that "the English found the greatest difficulty in keeping 
their local policies in line with their general policy". This time, 
however, de Gaulle's hospitality backfired. Willkie's reaction to 
the Napoleonic decor of the High Commissioner's office was to suggest, 
back in America, that de Gaulle was aping Louis XIV! Willkie dismissed 
the whole Levant problem as one more quarrel between "two equally 
detestable colonial systems". 
35 
Meanwhile on 23 August Spears had taken a leaf out of de 
Gaulle's book and used the personal approach to strengthen his own 
hand. Hearing that Churchill had returned to Cairo from Moscow, Spears 
flew down to see his old comrade and received a warm welcome. "Louis 
Spears has a great many enemies, but he has one friend", Churchill 
boomed, looking around the luncheon table at Casey,, Cadogan and 
others. After lunch, Spears had a private talk with Churchill, who 
heaped praise, advice and encouragement upon his old friend, along 
with a warning that some people in London were gunning for him. 
Churchill, annoyed by a wire he had received from de Gaulle (see below), 
warmly commended Spears for "keeping up British prestige in the 
Levant". But to keep the Foreign Office quiet, he suggested, Spears 
should be less zealous, ä la Talleyrand, and should reduce the length 
and number of his reports. 
At this point, Cadogan was called in and Churchill proudly 
told the Foreign Office mandarin all about Spears' splendid wheat 
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scheme which had saved so much Allied shipping. On the vexed 
question of elections in the Levant, Churchill first conceded the 
Gaullist point that "with the Germans so near" it was not a good 
time for an election campaign. However, he agreed with Spears that 
there was no harm in announcing that elections were to be held - 
which was what Casey had originally agreed with Catroux. When 
Churchill had gone, Spears had a further talk with Cadogan, who 
seemed to have "little knowledge or interest" in the Middle East. 
Forgetting Churchill's fresh advice, Spears told Cadogan that he 
felt a certain pressure to report matters in such a way as to please 
London, which was obviously folly and which he would never do. The 
uncomfortable Cadogan murmured his assent. 
36 
By the end of August de Gaulle's volatile presence in the 
Levant was becoming an issue in itself, and leading to a top-level 
row in which he almost broke with Churchill's Government. In a 
series of exchanges between de Gaulle on one side and Churchill 
and Casey on the other, matters rapidly escalated until there was 
nothing for it but to review the entire Anglo-Free French situation 
at the highest level in London. In all this brinkmanship, few 
besides Spears noticed that the undertakings given by Catroux in the 
Levant, which were already overdue, were quietly shelved until the 
Allies' family feud was over and the broken crockery replaced. 
37 
On 14 August de Gaulle sent Churchill a formal protest about 
the state of affairs in the Levant. In this wire the Frenchman 
alleged that the British Government was breaking its agreements 
not to encroach upon the French position in the Levant, and was 
constantly interfering in internal affairs there. This in turn 
encouraged the Arab world to believe that serious differences had 
arisen between Free France and Britain, which only helped the enemy. 
De Gaulle also suggested that Free French forces in the Middle East 
resented any signs that they were being disinherited in the Levant 
while they were pre-occupied with the fight against Rommel. He 
called on Churchill to restore and renew their agreements in the 
Levant States and end the abuses he had witnessed. 
38 
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In Cairo, a reply was prepared for Churchill by Hopkinson 
and Cadogan. When Spears saw this draft, he declared it to be 
"dangerously weak" and argued that de Gaulle should not merely be 
reassured but challenged over his own attitude. More significantly, 
Spears argued that Britain did have at least one clear political aim 
in the Levant , which was to see that its guarantee of independence 
was carried out. Casey agreed that the first draft should be 
stiffened, and Churchill's reply to de Gaulle on 22 August clearly 
reflected the Spears touch: 
Our principal concern in the political sphere is to 
ensure that no policy is adopted which may jeopardise 
our military security or interfere with the prosecution 
of the war. It is for this reason that we expect to be 
fully consulted beforehand on major... developments. 
We are also concerned... that the proclamation issued 
by General Catroux... declaring the independence of Syria 
and the Lebanon and promising that the Mandate should 
be terminated, is effectively carried out. To this we 
are committed in... the whole Arab world. 
None of this, de Gaulle was told, violated any agreement between 
Free France and the British, whose chief aim was Allied victory: 
"any action by our representatives in Syria... is directed towards 
that end". 
39 
De Gaulle promptly replied that this was unacceptable. Much 
of the argument now became repetitive, since de Gaulle was focussing 
on the fact of British involvement, at which he boggled, while the 
British reiterated its reason, which was military necessity. The 
Frenchman, with one eye on Spears, thought that this was a pretext 
for something more sinister. This argument proved to be interminable, 
but de Gaulle now introduced a new complication for the British. He 
raised the question of overall command of the Allied forces in the 
Levant, and pointed out that under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement 
the French were entitled to take over command once their troops 
outnumbered the British forces in Syria. This was now the case, de 
Gaulle alleged, and he would assert his right unless political 
abuses were dealt with. He therefore called on Churchill to reconsider 




When this was duly suggested by Eden, however, Casey 
disagreed. He was not prepared to leave Cairo when another German 
attack was imminent. In any case he thought the atmosphere in 
Beirut was unfavourable for constructive talks, and that de Gaulle 
ought to come to Cairo for a frank discussion. This stance was 
almost undermined by Hopkinson, who suggested a formula whereby 
de Gaulle would accept temporary British partnership in the Levant 
in return for a categorical assurance that France would retain 
her pre-eminence after the war. But Spears, declaring this to be 
"a complete betrayal of the Arabs, and the contrary of our declared 
policy", managed to squash the idea before it got off the ground, 
and Casey sent a firm message to de Gaulle on 29 August. Declaring 
that Anglo-Free French relations had reached "an acute stage", he 
invited de Gaulle to Cairo to seek some solution, as "urgent 
preoccupations" prevented him from leaving Cairo at that time. 
"Failing such a meeting", Casey warned, "I shall be obliged to 
submit the present position... to the Prime Minister". 
41 
De Gaulle had his own pre-occupations, and he refused to 
leave Beirut. Ploughing over the old ground again, he concluded 
that "I shall be extremely sorry if you are unable... to discuss 
this grave matter with me". This gave the Minister of State some 
second thoughts. "Casey keeps on wishing to offer to come here to 
see de Gaulle". Spears noted in his diary: 
Had to get him to authorise me to alter the message 
he proposed to send to de Gaulle in answer to the 
latter's reply of August 30th. I cannot understand 
why all these people are afraid of de Gaulle... 
Once again Spears the strongman thwarted de Gaulle's tactics, and 
Casey forwarded a message in the name of Churchill, asking the 
Frenchman to return to London "with the least possible delay". 
De Gaulle chose to interpret this summons as a polite invitation, 
and said he would come when he could. Nevertheless the situation 
forced him to remain in Beirut at the moment, where he was "still 
prepared to [see] Mr. Casey". 
42 
De Gaulle was naturally disinclined to hurry off at Churchill's 
behest, and he still had some shots to fire. On 5 September Casey 
received an official request for the transfer of Allied command in 
the Levant to the Free French, with the suggestion that this should 
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be effected in five days' time! A mere two days had passed since 
Montgomery had held off Rommel at Alam Haifa, 60 miles from 
Alexandria, and de Gaulle's untimely request produced consternation 
and sheer disbelief among the Cairo authorities. It also produced 
a spate of signals in which the British fell over each other in 
their haste to refute the basis of de Gaulle's claim, which was 
that the Free French now had numerical superiority in the Levant. 
Ninth Army's first figures were wildly inaccurate, and their 
revised version still conflicted with Cairo's figures. "I suppose 
somebody knows what the size of our Army is", observed the 
disgusted Spears. Eventually it was decided that the British land 
forces in the Levant had a majority of about 14,000, and de Gaulle 
was informed that the facts did not support his request. In all 
the fuss, however, Spears was obliged once more to dissuade the 
wavering Casey from coming to Beirut. 
43 
Carrying the tension to its peak, as he put it, de Gaulle 
compiled a massive 40-page indictment of British misdemeanours in 
the Levant and sent it to Casey. In a covering letter he declared 
that Free Franck concessions "served as an encouragement or a 
pretext for British encroachments" and that "British policy... 
here substitutes pressure for collaboration". London had given him 
repeated assurances, "but I find here a practice and facts which do 
not accord with these assurances". De Gaulle's huge memorandum 
condemned the activities of Spears and alleged continual British 
meddling in every aspect of Syrian and Lebanese affairs. Even the 
wheat plan was described as a pretext for large-scale British 
encroachments. 
44 
Having waded through de Gaulle's philippics, Casey's long- 
suffering staff gave the Frenchman more marksfor effort than 
content. So did Spears, who dismissed it as "an extraordinarily 
feeble document". On 12 September Casey sent the Foreign Office a 
summary of de Gaulle's allegations and a strongly-worded, 
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uncompromising rejection of every one of them. Casey concluded 
that de Gaulle seemed to be demanding a whole new deal over the 
Levant. Yet this would still have to safeguard British requirements, 
and some straight talking from Churchill himself seemed to be "the 
only hope of getting de Gaulle to see reason". 
45 
While Casey was deciding to tell the General to take all 
his troubles to London, de Gaulle himself was concluding that the 
time had come to break off the engagement in the Levant and to shift 
the scene of battle to England. The repercussions of his Syrian 
performance were being keenly felt in London, where Churchill's 
patience was at an end, and even Eden had begun to reprimand de 
Gaulle's subordinates, Dejean and Pleven. Pressed by Churchill, 
Eden had instructed the Treasury not to pay the Free French their 
monthly Syrian subsidy until de Gaulle agreed to return to London. * 
Moreover, de Gaulle had now manoeuvered himself into a position 
where, to expedite his return, the British had agreed to re-open 
fundamental questions concerning the Levant. He had therefore out- 
flanked Casey and Spears and transferred the dispute to London. 
This was reason enough'to go, but what finally triggered 
off de Gaulle's sudden departure was the issue of Madagascar - 
another Vichy territory - which the British were now linking with 
the Syrian question. In May the British had seized the harbour of 
Diego Suarez, lest the Japanese decided to use it as an Indian Ocean 
base. In September a larger British force was sent to take over the 
whole island. Thus on 9 September Eden summoned Dejean and Pleven 
and informed them of the Madagascar operations, and of the British 
intention to hand over the administration to the Free French. This 
intention, he said, had been upset by de Gaulle's extreme behaviour 
in Syria, and matters would have to be cleared up before anything 
was done for the Free French in Madagascar. This attitude (despite 
1 On the 9th of every month, the Free French received 1300,000, 
and later in the month another 12-300,000 for their Syrian 
expenses alone. In Furlonge's words "they lived luxuriously 
on the British War Chest, which we found very irritating". 
(Interview, 17 May 1978). 
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Pleven's retort that they were being offered Madagascar in 
exchange for Syria) had some effect on de Gaulle, who was quickly 
informed. 47 On 13 September he spoke to the Press about "the 
complete concord" between Free France and Britain in the Levant. 
"He can talk of nothing now but solidarity between the Allies", 
noted Spears, adding that "the Madagascar bribe is an enormous one". 
De Gaulle has also sent a friendly message to Eden, announcing his 




While de Gaulle was returning to London via Free French 
Africa, Spears was reflecting on the impact of the Frenchman's visit: 
"My worst fears appear to have been realised. Two extraordinarily weE 
telegrams have arrived, one from 
[Cairo] 
and a much worse one from 
the Foreign Office. They appear to be getting out the olive branches 
already". Spears was indignant, and he fired off a strong corrective 
to London. * 
49 "I fear it-is not the case that 
(de Gaulle] has left 
Syria in somewhat chastened mood", he told the ever-hopeful Foreign 
Office: 
On the contrary I am convinced that he feels himself 
to be in an excellent bargaining position and that 
once more rudeness, bullying, blackmail and intrans- 
igence have. proved to be the best means of getting 
his way with the British... 
De Gaulle's visit has done British prestige and 
security great harm and (we must] re-establish public 
confidence in our strength and in our promises. 
Elections are essential.... In view of all that de 
Gaulle has publicly said, [many) conclude that we have 
merely come to a private arrangement with him to keep 
things in play till it is no longer necessary to take 
native opinion into account. 
The Foreign Office, however, now seemed to think that elections need 
Spears' Counsellor, Lascelles, drafted such a stinging reply that 
even Spears thought it too strong and toned it down. Spears and 
his Counsellor, known as "Poison Pen Lascelles" (Fulfilment 5.242) 
appear to have been kindred apdrits in some ways. Lascelles certainly 
had a strong sympathy for the local nationalists, a dislike of the 
Free French regime in the Levant, a tendency to regard the Foreign 
Office as a species of jellyfish, and an ability to articulate tough 
arguments. All authentic Spears qualities! 
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not be tied to a specific date or necessarily held in 1942. Spears 
reminded them that Cairo, despite a perilous phase in the Desert war, 
had thought an election announcement advantageous in August, that 
Catroux had never answered Casey's call for this announcement, and 
that it had long been agreed that to leave the date unspecified was 
to make any election promise futile. "Apart from the decidedly 
favourable turn in the military situation", Spears pointed out, "the 
only new development during the intervening period has been de 
Gaulle's bare-faced attempt to jockey us". 
50 
Churchill strongly agreed with Spears. "The only argument 
against the Syrian elections", he commented to Eden, "was the precarious 
situation in the Western Desert 
[and] this no longer holds.... * our 
policy should be to insist upon a declaration that elections will be 
held before the end of the year". Eden, however, was able to deflect 
the Spears-Churchill thrust by quoting Casey's latest telegram of 
20 September. This stated that any agreement reached in London 
should include an election commitment but should also allow some 
latitude in the timing. Churchill accepted this, and Spears was 
obliged to follow suit. De Gaulle had therefore won a major concession 
before he even arrived in London. 
51 
This indeed confirmed for Spears the-fears that he had 
expressed both officially and privately. "I have little doubt", he 
noted "that 
Ede Gaulle] believes he will obtain not only Madagascar 
but much of what he wants here as well. I also think... he will get 
away with it". Spears, who had always hated anything remotely 
resembling appeasement added that "we are still in the pre-Munich 
stage in our relations with 
[de Gaulle 11.52 
If this was so, there was one aspect of his emotive analogy 
from which Spears could derive some comfort: the pugnacity of 
Churchill. "I think it a great mistake" the Prime Minister told Eden 
on 22 September, "to let de Gaulle into Madagascar, which he will only 
use as another field for anti-British activities. Anyhow we cannot 
* Montgomery and Alexander were building up massive forces at this 
time, in preparation for the decisive October-November offensive 
at Alamein. 
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take any decision until 
[we have dealt] with him about his recent 
misbehaviour". 
53 
Churchill's feelings were certainly not softened 
by his confrontation with de Gaulle on 30 September. "It couldn't 
have gone worse", groaned Harvey. " 
[Eden\ said afterwards he had 
never seen 
[such] 
rudeness since Ribbentrop. Blank refusal to budge 
over Syrian questions, insistence on our evil motives". Churchill 
matched de Gaulle's mood, and when the Frenchman aired his grievances, 
Churchill retorted that the real difficulty everywhere was the 
General himself, who added to British burdens and made trouble 
wherever he went. Tempers were lost all round, and the two leaders 
reached the edge of a complete break. 
54 
Nevertheless, their subordinates on both sides were soon at 
work to find some accord over Syria. Dejean came from the Free French 
camp suggesting that elections be held in the spring of 1943, that 
the French claim for the Levant command might be dropped, and that 
a joint committee be established in London to solve difficulties 
which proved insoluble in Syria itself. Eden thought this was "a 
reasonable basis of negotiation". 
55 As his secretary, Harvey, remarked: 
the de Gaulle row rolls on Lbu t] Dejean said [de Gaulle 
would in fact agree to meet us over various Syrian 
points.... If once the professionals can get hold of 
this again and the prima donnas are kept out of the 56 
ring, we shall soon reach agreement. And Spears must go. 
The eagerness with which the Foreign Office jumped at Dejean's formula 
showed that Spears' anxiety was justified. For such an agreement 
would postpone the elections for at least another eight months, and 
enable Catroux to by-pass Spears and Casey in any dispute by 
appealing to the suggested London committee. In return, the Free French 
would simply drop a claim for overall command in the Levant - but it 
was already clear from the figures provided that this claim was 
invalid according to the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements! 
At the same time, de Gaulle's personal-approach tactics in 
the Levant seemed about to achieve the biggest Free French gain of all - 
the dismissal of Spears. This move, strongly favoured at the Foreign 
Office was now proposed by none other than Casey. It will be recalled 
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that after de Gaulle's conversations with Gwynn and Holmes, Casey's 
staff had taken the view that Spears and Catroux should go if any new 
beginnings were to succeed in the Levant. The moment for this idea 
came when Eden sent Casey a wire reporting Dejean's suggested settlement 
in favourable terms and asking for Casey's views. 
57 
Casey's reply of 
9 October embodied the proposal which his staff now considered 
unavoidable: 
I appreciate that you are doing everything possible 
to create a "new deal" for Anglo-French relations 
in Syria... you will realise however that personal 
relations between General Spears and General Catroux 
have reached an acute stage of bitterness in... the past 
12 months from which they are quite unlikely to recover... 
I believe the "new deal" will have to extend both to 
the rench and British representatives if the future is 
to be anyo improvement on the past. In saying this I 
cast no reflection on the outstanding qualities of 
General Spears for whom I have the greatest respect 
and for whom there must be many other appropriate 
avenues of service. It is a... conflict of personalities 
which... can only be remedied by new appointments for 
both him and General Catroux. * 
This was certainly a pleasant surprise for the Foreign Office, and 
Eden quickly scribbled a note to Churchill on Casey's telegram: "I 
think you should see this. Perhaps we could have a word about it one 
day next week". Churchill agreed to discuss it, but he added that 
"Spears has been right in this business, and I should be sorry to 
see Catroux go". 
58 
The movement to dislodge Spears foundered on the Churchillian 
reef. On 14 October, in a minute which also dealt with Madagascar, the 
Prime Minister made his feelings plain: 
I do not think it would be a good thing to move 
either Spears or Catroux. Catroux gets on quite 
well with our Cairo people and the. soldiers, and 
Spears has certainly defended, with great energy 
and ability, British rights in Syria. 
In the Spears papers at Churchill College, Cambridge, there is a 
very interesting letter from Casey (in SPRS 2738) stating that 
he did not on any occasion recommend or suggest to Churchill, or 
anyone else, the recall of Spears from his post! 
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All that Churchill suggested was some sort of scolding for the two 
naughty boys of Beirut, in which they should be told to behave on 
pain of joint expulsion. In such an event, Catroux should understand 
that "he would have no chance of being transferred to Madagascar". 
59 
This ended de Gaulle's 1942 campaign to get Spears out. But one man 
alone had prevented its success, and de Gaulle had managed to bring 
Cairo and the Foreign Office together in its support. Only Churchill 
stood between Spears and his many critics, and Churchill was to find 
that the demand for Spears' head would not just go away. 
By this stage there were signs that de Gaulle, although 
unable to shift Spears, was winning on several other fronts. He was, 
for instance, getting Foreign Office support for his insistence on 
the continued validity of the mandate. On this point his many public 
references to the mandate had caused a long and heated argument 
between Cairo and the Foreign Office, which had helped to distract 
both from the fact that nothing was being done about an. election 
announcement. However, Casey and his aides became so exasperated with 
London over this issue that they drew closer to Spears once more, a 
result which undid some of de Gaulle's efforts to have Spears removed. 
In July, Casey's staff had become involved in the mandate 
argument which was being volleyed backwards and forwards between 
Spears and the Foreign Office. "When I was in Beirut", minuted 
Bennett, (Hopkinson's assistant), "I ssaw] that they were thoroughly 
fed up with the stupid attitude of the Foreign Office Lve3 the 
Mandate". In Bennett's view, London's bookish emphasis on international 
law was due to their "impression that Syrian and Lebanese independence, 
though slow in developing, is a reality". But any observer could see 
that their independence was "a bad joke, and for all practical 
purposes the country has gone back to the pre-1941 position and is 
run simply as a French Mandate". 
60 
A few days later Casey entered the lists, repeating 
Bennett's remarks and telling the Foreign Office that "the Free French 
have, in spite of their promises and our declarations... succeeded in 
installing themselves in Syria in the position of their Vichy 
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predecessors". This was not at all what was intended, and the issue 
was not simply academic or moralistic. There were serious practical 
implications, because 
Syrian and Lebanese opinion 
Lisa that-we have 
found it expedient to conciliate the Free French.... 
it is therefore essential to preserve confidence 
that we shall not again abandon Syria to the French 
at the end of this war. If that confidence is 
seriously shaken, the last reason for Syrian 
attachment to Allied cause will have vanished. We 
cannot then blame them if they put their money on 
Germany. Moreover... fulfilment of war promises in 
Syria materially affects attitude of Iraq and other 
Arab countries. [This reacts back directly on 
immediate war situation. 
On these grounds Casey said that de Gaulle's attitude to the Mandate 
must not go unchallenged, for it strengthened the impression "that 
we intend to abandon Syria completely to the French after the war". 
61 
Rommel was only sixty miles from Alexandria when Casey put 
these points to the Foreign Office, and the argument became painfully 
relevant when de Gaulle began to emphasise the mandate all over the 
Levant itself in August. Casey's aides grew more anxious and indignant, 
for, as Clayton pointed out, 
De Gaulle has never before been quite so categorical 
... that the Mandate exists and that the independence 
accorded to [Syria is in virtue of and in the frame- 
work of the Mandate.... Nowhere in Catroux's early 
declarations was such a thing implied - in fact, if 
words mean anything, the acquisition of independence 
was a consequence of the termination of the Mandate. 62 
On 7 September Casey tackled London again, reporting that de Gaulle had 
now "carried a stage further his exploitation of continued technical 
existence of the Mandate.... It is impossible to reconcile this with 
Catroux's declaration of June 1941 and subsequent proclamations of 
independence". 63 
The Foreign Office, wedded to its juridical considerations, 
refused to accept Casey's argument and obviously did not regard the 
matter as urgent. Its reply, sent as a low priority wire, did not even 
reach Cairo until 7 October! Its remote and legalistic contents 
dismayed Casey's men. London's lawyers denied any conflict between the 
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continued validity of the mandate and Catroux's declaration of 
June 1941. The latter, they argued, meant "to start on a course 
which would bring the Mandate to an end, not to end the Mandate 
there and then". Moreover, London unblushingly admitted, such a 
meaning had been suggested to Catroux in the first place as a way to 
avoid any later claim that the mandate had suddenly ended on 8 June 
1941.64 
Casey's staff were flabbergasted by this casuistry, which 
was "not only dishonest but extremely short-sighted" in relation to 
the Arab world. 
65 Their feelings were summed up in Clayton's brilliant 
and bitter memorandum: 
we now know where we are goin . At the Syrian round- 
table conference in 1961 [sici the heads of the Foreign 
Office [will claim that the words 'independence', 
'sovereign state', free' etc., only meant to say that 
there would be no serious change in the Mandatory system 
for Syria. The words "desormais vous serez souverains et 
independents" will have been finally expunged' from our 
records.... What has happened to the people who last year 
sent an indignant wire to the effect that "it was never 
the intention of H. M. G. that the Free French should step 
into the position occupied by General Dentz"? 
.. I was just going to date this note 1919, but 
realised that time actually has passed though our method 
of beguiling the lesser breeds outside the law and our 
faculty for saying what we don't mean has not changed. 
I am sorry for our Minister in Beirut. 
On this note, Cairo concluded that nothing more could be done: "The 
F. O. lawyers are a formidable addition to our difficulties", Casey's 
Secretary grimly observed. 
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This was a distinct victory for de Gaulle, and in this case 
the pro-French elements in Britain's contradictory Levant policy had 
prevailed. On the whole, de Gaulle had London's support for his 
position that the mandate was unaffected by Catroux's dramatic and 
calculated declaration of June 1941. Yet this proved to be too clever 
by half. What de Gaulle and the Foreign Office seemed to forget was that 
the Levant, was not populated by devotees of international law but by 
people who were tired of Anglo-French doublespeak. These took Catroux's 
independence proclamations, and especially the British guarantee, as 
undertakings which could not be dismissed except by a naked betrayal 
I3 
of 1919 dimensions. Within a year, the Lebanese precipitated a 
showdown over the mandate question, and de Gaulle's fragile 
legalisms were outflanked by political realities. 
At the end of 1942, however, it was by no means clear that 
any such reversal would occur. In the Middle East, the war had 
receded after the British victory at Alamein, and with it went 
London's most immediate anxieties about support in the Arab world. 
In London itself the Free French were doing well in a marathon of 
tedious and repetitive negotiations set off by Dejean's proposals, 
which the Foreign Office accepted on 8 October. A week later, how- 
ever, de Gaulle removed Dejean in favour of Pleven and talks began 
all over again. After some abortive attempts to replace the Lyttelton- 
de Gaulle text with a new agreement, both parties agreed to fall back 
on the Dejean proposals and abandon the quest for a new 
interpretative agreement on the Levant. 
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By December 1942, according to the original Free French 
assurances, newly-elected governments should Shave 
been firmly estab- 
lished in the Levant States. Instead, the Free French had now agreed 
(in principle) to hold elections in the spring of 1943, and had an 
arrangement whereby intractable disputes were to be referred to an 
Anglo-French committee in London. They also had Britain's public 
commitment to a Free French administration in Madagascar. As a foot- 
note to these gains, they had come within an ace of toppling Spears 
and had successfully re-asserted their Syrian mandate, with the aid 
of the Foreign Office. Much of the credit for all this belonged to 
de Gaulle, whose performance in the Levant had completely upset the 
old arrangements. Catroux had also played his part, and in the winter 
of 1942-43 this old stager led the British a merry dance before he 
finally announced the demise of his ancien regime. 
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Chapter Six 1943: (i) IN DEFIANCE OF VARIOUS MASTERS 
The elections were... a signal defeat for the 
French, and it was to be expected that the new 
governments would not be slow to attack the 
French limitations on their independence. 
G. E. Kirk': 
Ride a cock horse to the Syrian cross, 
To see a fine General ride on his high horse. 
Spears on his fingers and spears on his toes, 
He shall make trouble wherever he goes. 
Ninth Army jingle+ 
In the affairs of the Levant States, 1943 was a year of tran- 
sition and dramatic change. It began with Catroux's last procrasti- 
nations and ended with the triumph of nationalist administrations, 
reluctantly but unavoidably protected by the British. Between these 
contrasts came a curious summer of caretaker governments and a 
growing uneasiness in the Lebanon, where the interim administration 
exceeded its authority, created new confusions, and caused the 
Lebanese elections to be held even later than those in Syria. In 
both states, the polls were delayed until the late summer by Catroux's 
final evasions and by the immense problems of arranging elections in 
an undeveloped and undemocratic environment. Yet it was, above all, 
the Great Election Year for the Levant States, a year when simple 
hopes were articulated and apron strings were torn away. The 
Levantines bluntly repudiated French tutelage, while Spears matched 
their mood with an astonishing assault on the fundamental policy of 
the Foreign Office, whose servant he was supposed to be. It was the 
year in which all parties burnt their boats. 
The year began with little indication of momentous changes, 
for Catroux's regime still survived, and Catroux himself was now 
playing the absentee landlord. In December 1942 the Free French posi- 
tion was that the Delegate-General would make the necessary announce- 
ments in the Levant on the coming elections and the interim care- 
taker governments. But. Catroux had come to London and nothing could be 
*A Short History of the Middle East (1964), p. 207. 
+ Quoted by Walter Lippmann, NCW'York Herald Tribune, 16 November 1943. 
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done in the Levant until he returned. The possibilities of this 
arrangement were not lost on the shrewd Frenchman, who, in the next 
three months, effectively suspended all meaningful action in the 
Levant by simply not being there. 
Catroux returned to Beirut just before Christmas, only to 
inform Spears that he would shortly be visiting the United States. He 
assured the British Minister that he would make the election 
announcements before he left, and agreed that voting should take place 
early in March. In his absence he would be represented by Jean Helleu, 
formerly Vichy's Ambassador to Turkey. The two Frenchmen were to confer 
in Beirut before Catroux left, Spears was told. But Catroux left on 
25 December, without making any announcements, and Helleu arrived on 
the 29th without the authorisation to announce anything in Catroux's 
absence! 
These antics infuriated Spears, who told the Foreign Office 
that "it is inadmissable that a question of such vital importance to 
the Levant States should be allowed to hang fire merely through 
Catroux's fortuitous absence". 
I For once London shared Spears' 
sentiments. Sir Maurice Peterson* summed it all up in a minute of 
9 January 1943 
The Fighting French have promised us twice in writing, 
and many times verbally, that the [election] announce- 
ments... would be made before the end of 1942. They have 
not kept this promise. [Pleven said they wanted to see 
Catroux again before it was done. This is quite absurd 
... since all Catroux has to do is to announce the repeal 
of certain arr$tees suspending constitutional life.... 
This could be done either by Catroux in England or 
perfectly well by. Helleu... 
We know... that Catroux, before leaving CBeirutl took 
the attitude that elections were now less urgent because 
the Axis menace had been driven further off. This is also 
absurd since the Fighting French previously contended that 
elections could not be held because the Axis menace was 
so near. z 
On 12 January Peterson saw Catroux in London and "reproached 
him with his failure to announce the elections before the end of 1942". 
* Deputy Under-Secretary of State Peterson was now handling the 
Syrian problem. He continually crossed swords with Spears, and the 
two almost invariably took opposite positions. Their relations 
deteriorated into something like a private war, with Peterson 
pressing for Spears' dismissal. 
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The Frenchman's excuses were that his short December visit to Beirut 
had been disrupted by Islamic holidays, and that he had been "obliged 
to allow himself some time to 'calm people down' since Sir E. Spears, 
contrary to [his] instructions-had let the electoral cat out of the 
bag". This allegation neatly disarmed Peterson, who had no confidence 
in Spears' discretion, and Catroux got away with a vague "hope" that 
he might still form interim governments in time to hold elections 
in March. He added that he would be leaving London "next week". 
3 
This timetable was as worthless as all its predecessors. 
Another five weeks passed before Catroux returned to the Middle East, 
and in all that time Helleu was only permitted to announce that Catroux 
would be back "in the near future" to make the actual election 
announcements. 
4 
By this time, of course, Catroux had become entangled 
in the tortuous maze of the Giraud affair. " In January he accompanied 
de Gaulle to Casablanca to meet Giraud, Roosevelt and Churchill, and 
in mid-February he spent several days in Algiers before flying on to 
Cairo. 
S While all this was top-priority for the Free French, there was 
no respectable reason why Helleu should not have been authorised to 
stand in for Catroux and get things moving in the Levant. The delay 
reflected the whole Gaullist attitude to political evolution in the 
Levant, i. e., reluctance and condescension. It also reflected the 
desire to instal convenient caretaker governments which would allow the 
French enough latitude to guide the course of the elections (see 
pf. 202,2010. The Free French were apparently unwilling to trust this 
tricky task to anyone else but Catroux. 
On 17 February Catroux arrived in Cairo, where he discussed 
his imminent tasks with Casey, and suggested that the interim 
governments should be nominated by the outgoing authorities to avoid 
the accusation that the elections were being rigged by the Allies. This 
was neat, as the existing governments had been hand-picked by Catroux 
and could make no valid proclamation without his consent as Delegate-General. 
*Operation Torch, the Anglo-American occupation of French North Africa, 
was carried out in November 1942. Free France was excluded from it. 
The five-star French General Henri Giraud was brought in by the 
Americans, who had no time for de Gaulle and hoped to neutralise 
Vichy's 120,000 soldiers. Although things went wrong and the Allied 
landings were opposed, hostilities were ended through the agency of 
Darlan. When Darlan was assassinated there began a complex game which 
ended with the eclipse of Giraud and the triumph of de Gaulle in Algiers. 
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On being asked to keep Spears "fully informed", Catroux agreed, but 
added that while Churchill had disowned any ambition in Syria, he 
hoped that all British authorities there were inspired by the same 
idea! 
This provocative remark preceded Catroux to Beirut and put 
Spears on full alert. 
6 
Nevertheless the Frenchman was at his 
agreeable and conciliatory best when he conferred with Spears on 21 
February, and there were no fireworks. Instead, Catroux agreed with 
every suggestion which Spears made, stressed his pre-occupation with 
North Africa, and said he was "fed up" with election wrangles and 
only wanted to conclude things swiftly and amicably. Spears, at first 
suspicious, reported that Catroux's attitude was "most satisfactory" 
and that the interview was "very friendly throughout". 
7 
The Foreign Office was skeptical about this second Beirut 
honeymoon, and expected another quick estrangement. 
a Yet throughout 
the month which Catroux spent in the Levant before returning to 
Algiers, he co-operated as never before with Spears, while the latter 
returned this goodwill and reserved his aggressive onslaughts for the 
Foreign Office. Catroux was apparently in a great hurry to return to 
North Africa, and he needed Spears' assistance to instal his caretaker 
governments and launch the electoral period. This was no easy task, 
for his long delays had put the political communities into a restless 
and rebellious mood. In the Lebanon, President Nacacche was enjoying 
the considerable benefits of his position and refused to resign, 
representing his personal motives as a blow for Lebanese independence. 
But he reckoned without the unprecedented Spears-Catroux combination, 
and was brushed aside. In Syria, the process coincided with mob 
violence over bread shortages and local corruption. Once again, close 
co-operation between Spears and Catroux helped to restore order and 
enabled Catroux to make tolerable arrangements in Damascus. 
' 
After nine months on the life-support of Free French evasions, 
Catroux's ancien regime finally expired at the end of March, 1943. 
In the Lebanon the restoration of the Constitution, elections, and 
an interim government were proclaimed by Catroux on 18 March. Although 
2o/ 
he had to rush away to Algiers on the following day, Catroux's 
almost identical proclamation to Syria was published on 25 March. 
10 
For the next few months, the Lebanese caretaker was Dr. Ayoub Tabet, 
who, despite his "obstinate and cantankerous nature", was thought 
to be "generally respected for his integrity and independence of 
character". In Syria, the same role was assigned to Catroux's second 
choice, Ata Bey Ayoubi, who was described as a "sympathiser" of the 
nationalist bloc. Catroux had hoped to appoint the neutral Hashim 
Atassi, but this man declined in the face of nationalist opposition 
and the simmering unrest in Syria. 
11 
Catroux's proclamations included the formula "in agreement with 
the British Government", and gave great satisfaction to Spears, who 
proudly told the Foreign Office that they contained "every one of the 
points I have contended were either essential or important if... 
independence was to be real". Moreover, Catroux's appeal to the people 
and his references to freedom expressed "views which we can whole- 
heartedly support". Recalling a year of strife with Catroux, de 
Gaulle and the Foreign Office itself, Spears declared that this happy 
result "justifies the very hard and prolonged struggle I have had in 
the past". 
* 12 
Th. 's struggle had cost Spears more than he knew. His 
relentless harrying of Catroux, his eye-for-an-eye contest with de 
Gaulle, his rows with Holmes and his attitude to the Foreign Office 
had aroused much resentment. While he could still rely on Churchill 
not to disown him, and while he ultimately found a friend in Casey, he 
had many enemies. The process which had finally ended Catroux's 
disguised imperium had damaged Spears as well and there would be no 
" weLt-done. " fron the Foreign Office. Nor would there be much peace and 
quiet, for Catroux's proclamations had unleashed all the clamour and 
intrigue of Levantine politics. 
Apparently it did not occur to Spears that Catroux's attitude was 
determined by his anxiety to get back to North Africa. Spears could 
have found himself in a personal dilemma if he had suspected that, in 
expediting Catroux's return to Algiers, he might have been assisting 
de Gaulle to get a foothold in North Africa, which was a far greater 
prize than the Levant. See Appendix H. 
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On 19 March 1943 Spears made a stirring speech on the radio, 
warmly commending the proclamation which Catroux had just made in the 
Lebanon. Catroux had "spoken as a sincere friend of your country", 
Spears told his listeners, who were receiving their Good News a week 
earlier than their fellow-subjects in Syria. The Lebanon would now 
have "the means to secure a place in the great brotherhood of free 
nations". Moreover, the new Chamber would have no nominated members, 
for Catroux had ruled that all seats were to be occupied by elected 
representatives. * "Your parliament will thus be free, free as ours, 
free as those of the United Nations", Spears orated. 
In making this speech, Spears described the coming Lebanese 
democracy in glowing terms, and indulged in a little propaganda. On 
behalf of England, "the oldest democracy of the world", and as "a 
member of the oldest of Parliaments", he declared that 
a people can claim itself master of its own des- 
tinies only if each citizen, without fear or 
restraint, free from all influence, has been able 
to vote for the parliamentary candidate of his own 
choice. 13 
Alas, if this was the case, then the Lebanon (and Syria, for that 
matter) would be a mere caricature of the independent democracy which 
Spears had depicted. "Anybody would think Sir E. Spears had never seen 
a foreign election", snorted one London observer when the corrupt 
realities emerged and Spears complained. 
14 
There was much ambivalence in Spears' attitude to the coming 
elections. On one hand, despite the lofty rhetoric of his wireless 
speech, he realised that the old local traditions of "government by 
subterranean intrigue" could not be stopped overnight. 
15 On the other 
hand he was anxious to counter one particular version of this - the 
manoeuvres and manipulations of pro-French elements. When faced with 
increasing evidence of French bribery and intrigue, he sought the 
advice of his local expert, Furlonge. Apparently he went so far as to 
ask whether to fight fire with fire, but the astute Furlonge advised 
him not to waste a penny, since bribery guaranteed nothing in the 
Levant and the French would soon discover this for themselves. 
16 
* Catroux had set aside a Catch-22 section of the Lebanese consti- 
tution which stipulated that one-third of the Chamber be nominated 
by the President (himself a French nominee), and that this arrange- 
ment could not be altered by less than 75% of the Chamber. 
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This proved to be sound advice when French expectations in the 
Lebanon were confounded by a nationalist victory. 
Meanwhile the Minister of State had also become aware of the 
nature of Levantine politics, and was now showing a distinctly pro- 
Spears attitude in his dealings with the Foreign Office. At the end 
of 1942 he had gone to London for consultations, and submitted a 
tough report on'the Free French situation. After telling Peterson 
that "the present state of affairs was extremely humiliating to the 
British", he urged the Foreign Office to press the election issue with 
the Free French: "While it might be true that the Elections would not 
be free in the [English] sense... this need not be a serious objection 
so long as the Free French did not deliberately exclude all the 
candidates who happened to favour the British". This was precisely 
Spears' view, and for good measure Casey stoutly defended the Beirut 
Minister on several other troublesome points. 
17 
The developing Spears-Casey axis was to be an important 
determinant in the decisions of 1943, and London did not fail to 
notice the emerging combination. Foreign Office solutions, Harvey 
wrote, were being "questioned by the Minister of State, Casey, and 
by [his deputy, Lord] Moyne.... both have taken to the spell of Spears 
who works ceaselessly to wreck Anglo-Free French relations". 
18 This 
note of hysteria became more pronounced as Casey and Spears drew 
closer in the early months of 1943, and as Spears peppered London 
with alarming political reports, complaints and outright reprimands. 
A great row blew up over several questions of military import 
being settled in London over the heads of Spears and Holmes, and Spears 
roundly told Cadogan that the Foreign Office was letting him down. 
19 
"Eastern Department have for long kept silent", an offended Secretary 
commented in an attached minute for Cadogan. "But there are limits 
and... either Sir E. Spears is out to have a quarrel with the Foreign 
Office or he is so overwrought by the difficulties of his post that he 
needs a rest and a change of scene". 
20 Cadogan sighed: "Spears is a 
20 c, 
trial. But while he remains where he is, we must try not to get 
too worked up about him". 
21 
Meanwhile the Scourge of Eastern Department was giving his 
version to Churchill, as the two old friends motored out to lunch 
at Casey's villa near the Pyramids': 
I had a long talk with Winston and.... told him 
of the difficulties I was having with the Foreign 
Office and that these were very much the same as 
those which Casey was having. I explained... how the 
French short-circuit the Minister of State by 
referring everything to London and how London 
defeats all our efforts by listening to their 
complaints... 
Spears found the Prime Minister "extraordinarily nice and friendly" 
and, conveniently, inclined to abominate all things French: 
With perhaps some slight exaggeration 
[11] 
I said in spite of everything my fundamental 
feelings towards the French nation had not 
altered, to which he replied that his had, that 
he found them either defeatist or arrogant and 
the latter were perhaps the most trying of all. 
De Gaulle was the worst of the lot. 
Finally Churchill invited Spears to write to him, by-passing the 
Foreign Office, if things got too bad. He dismissed Eden's possible 
objections by asserting that "he and Anthony were as one person". 
Nothing could have been further from the truth on the issue of 
de Gaulle and the Free French. 
22 
This experience evidently gave Spears a second wind in his 
contest with the Foreign Office, and after a few more testy telegrams, 
Spears outdid himself with a closely-typed ten-page attack on London's 
whole approach to the Levant issues. On 8 March Casey showed where his 
sympathies lay by agreeing to forward this explosive paper to London. 
He described it as "a forthright hard-hitting memorandum written 
under the cumulative stress of eighteen months of frustration". 
23 
This was a monumental understatement, for Spears had arguably set a 
new record for the most undiplomatic language in the history of the 
Foreign Office. Certainly there can be few British diplomats who ever 
Churchill was in Cairo en route to (North African) Tripoli, and 
to Algiers. 
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accused the Foreign office itself of constituting a Fifth Column! 
Attacking London's assumption that Britain was dealing with 
genuine allies in the Levant, Spears said that the Free French had 
really pursued, at British expense, "the most narrow and selfish 
policy conceivable", which was to tighten their grip on the 
territories wherever possible: 
None has played this game better than General 
Catroux himself who has proved to be a master 
at procrastination and a pioneer in the field 
of sophistry... 
Catroux and his clique [have enjoyed] mysterious 
support in London.... The definition of a Fifth 
Column is, I take it, a body which, consciously or 
unconsciously, impedes or betrays the national effort 
by obeying the suggestions of a foreign authority... 
the enthusiasm of our people on the spot is damped 
down... by the feeling that the French, disposing of 
mysterious powers and influences in London, will 
always in the end get their way... 
Such a state of affairs has come about because de 
Gaulle has been built up on a pedestal every stone 
of which is a retreat, a lack of firmness on our part. 
After a scornful attack on Peterson's argument, that if Britain imposed 
its will within the French Empire then the Americans might do the same 
in Britain's Far Eastern possessions*, Spears returned to his main 
theme: 
As seen from here, it is all too evident that this 
consideration is the overriding one in London: 
anything for a peaceful life. We here could also 
have perfect relations with the French and out 
intercourse could be one long idyll - on one condition: 
that we gave way to them on every point... 24 
The Foreign Office was deeply shocked and offended. In the 
immediate post-Chamberlain years there could be no-. more deadly 
accusation than that of appeasement. This, and the bruising impact 
of Spears' blunt language, brought all of Peterson's professional 
resentment to the surface: 
Spears retorted that American policy in the Pacific would certainly 
not be softened by any British policy in the Levant. 
tob 
my feeling is that we have recently had more than 
enough of General Spears' private representations... 
Indeed the indulgence which is extended to this 
tiresome Member of Parliament, who is quite unsuited 
to hold a diplomatic post, must remain in glaring 
contrast to the [treatment of] mere professional 
diplomats holdings posts of at least equal difficulty. 25 
Eden, unable to deal with Spears as he liked, decided to ignore his 
controversial memorandum altogether. But Spears fired off yet 
another complaint against the Foreign Office on 2 April. On 21 April 
Eden replied that 
If we see the French here over Levantine questions 
we are allowing the French to intrigue with us: if 
we do not see them, we are being insufficiently 
firm. What do you expert a poor Department to do? 
I hope there may now be an end to these con- 
troversies.... You on your side must realise that 
the prevailing wind, so far as all French are con- 
cerned, blows from North Africa and that the handling 
of Syrian questions here... is dictated by consider- 
ations which are quite outside the scope of the 
Eastern Department. 26 
This significant statement of priorities was not well-calculated 
to pacify Spears, who suspected that the Levant States might be sold 
out again in the name of an Anglo-French entente. On the same day, 
Caccia wrote to Lascelles in Beirut and frankly confessed that 
Eastern Department was now being forced to take a back seat: 
the inescapable fact [is] that our requirements in 
the Levant have continually to be considered as a 
part of our policy to the French as a whole. [Thus 
Eastern Department] as the Cinderella of the party 
are apt to have to give way. For instance, if de 
Gaulle is behaving himself, we are told that it would 
be highly undesirable [to have] a first-class row in 
the Levant States. Per'cottra, if we are already in 
the throes of. one of periodic rows with the General, 
we are told that we must not pour oil on the already 
burning fires... 27 
This pathetic confession revealed a state of affairs which helps to 
explain why Spears' favourite adjective for the Foreign Office was 
"wet". Caccia's letter was inside confirmation of the way in which 
de Gaulle had run psychological rings round most of his British 
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contacts and reduced them to an attitude which was inadequate to 
the point of being abject. For however largely Europe loomed in 
any realistic British foreign policy, and however much Anglo-French 
relations had to be the cornerstone of that policy, there was no 
excuse for the deference which was frequently shown to the volcanic 
personality of de Gaulle. It is a measure of his success that a 
Foreign Office Department whose interests collided with the General's 
should describe itself as the Cinderella of the party. For in terms 
of relative power within the anti-Axis alliance, Free France itself 
was a Cinderella. 
The inevitable effect of the communications from Eden and 
Caccia was to confirm Spears' conviction that no effort should be 
spared in opposing Gaullist aims in the Levant and challenging the 
backsliding tendencies of the Foreign Office with regard to the 
Levant and the Arab world in general. The most dangerous implication 
of Caccia's letter was that it would take a first-class crisis to 
arrest London's tendency to downgrade the issues of the Levant: 
The one exception-is, of course, that we will 
always support any measure which [Spears] , the 
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and the Minister 
of State all think urgently and vitally necessary 
for the military security of our troops in the area. 28 
Six months later these words proved to be fateful, and there can be 
no doubt that Spears pondered London's "exception" during the 
November crisis in the Lebanon, when he was urged to make every 
allowance for the French and to counsel the Lebanese not to precip- 
itate a full-scale emergency. But the Lebanese had sensed that some- 
thing drastic would be necessary to finish off the French mandate, 
and Spears knew that they would never get London's support for this 
objective under normal conditions. Therefore there had to be some 
confrontation with the French which aroused the Arab world, ra; se. d 
British anxieties in the Middle East, and re-activated the British 
pledge to guarantee independence in the Levant. This was the logic of 
the situation for the nationalists, and it was too much to expect 
that Spears, who sympathised with the Lebanese and despised the local 
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French, would do anything very energetic to dampen the nationalists' 
ardour. After all, both Spears and Casey had long been adamant that 
the mandate was now a dead letter, and that the Foreign Office was 
being hopelessly academic about it. 
Not all of Spears' energies were directed against his London 
adversaries in the spring of 1943. He was also discovering what a 
feverish level of intrigue had been unleashed by Catroux's pre- 
electoral period, and beginning to realise that in Dr Tabet, the 
temporary Lebanese Head of State, he had inherited another curious 
problem. "Dr Tabet dined with me last night", Spears noted on 17 
April. "Tatet will be extremely difficult. He is an obstinate and 
narrow-minded man with most definite limitations". 
29 
This was the 
standard description for Tabet, who was widely regarded as c an- 
tankerous but honest. As a Protestant and a believer in a pro-French 
Christian Lebanon, he was also something of an enclave within an 
enclave, and a law unto himself. On finding himself at the helm, 
he proceeded to implement some of his pet schemes for administrative 
and social reform. These, according to a Spears Mission report, were 
all very admirable in themselves, but Tabet was so preoccupied with 
them that he began to prolong the pre-election period in order to 
continue his version of Enlightened Despotism. 
30 
By the beginning of May it was evident that Tabet was in no 
hurry to hold the election. At a Press conference on 27 April he 
outlined his schemes for improving the Lebanon and then baldly in- 
vited journalists to debate in print the issue of the election date. 
"It was already clear", the Foreign Office was told, that 
Tabet felt determined in his own mind to resist 
British pressure for early elections, and that 
this device of a press referendum was merely a 
procrastinating manouevre; for the severity of 
the censorship and the control of newsprint is 
such that many newspaper proprietors would hesitate 
to express views at variance with those which Dr 
Tabet is known to hold.... 31 
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Likewise the Spears Mission chronicler recorded that Tabet soon 
proved to be obstructive towards the electoral arrangements: 
Despite constant British pressure on him to fix 
the date of elections, he resorted to one pretext 
after another to avoid doing so; first, so as not 
to interfere with the harvest; then, so that he 
might have time to complete his administrative 
reforms... and lastly, because in his opinion the 
electoral law needed revising. 32 
Further delays were caused by the baffling problem of com- 
piling an electoral register in a land which had no grassroots 
democratic framework. In this sense the coming elections were an 
absurdity. Outwardly they purported to be a literate and rational 
exercise in free choice. Yet the Levant was a by-word for intimida- 
tion, bribery, corruption and Press censorship. Outside Beirut and 
Damascus, the level of illiteracy and ignorance was appalling. Vast 
numbers of voters could not even read the ballot paper. "Even when 
they knew the names they had no idea for what they were voting", 
Pearse snorted. "They did not care much. It was all a huge joke, 
a droll sort of game". 
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Nevertheless Spears and his staff kept up the pressure on the 
reluctant Tabet in the Lebanon. In Syria, where the French had more 
or less written off their hopes of securing a favourable result, it 
was a case of overcoming the problems of poor administration, 
distance and illiteracy in order to obtain passable electoral 
registers. The greatest controversy was in the Lebanon, where the 
French believed that their chosen candidates would win a satisfactory 
majority, and Spears did what he could to block their intrigues. 
British vigilance in these matters became an issue in London after 
the arrest on 26 April of one Rashid Mokaddam in Tripoli. Mokaddam, a 
boon companion of the French Conseiller in Tripoli, was a notorious 
smuggler and racketeer. He was arrested by British military police 
on suspicion of possessing hashish and suborning British personnel 
in connection with the drug traffic. But Mokaddam was also the most 
prominent pro-French electoral candidate in the region, and he had 
been using his local muscle to 'discourage' the opposition and to 
strengthen the chances of other pro-French candidates. Spears and 
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Holmes wanted the man deported, but the Free French insisted that 
this was a disguised interference with the electoral process and 
that Mokaddam must be released. They even threatened to arrest 
his main political rivals to redress the balance. 
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It was against this farcical background that the new Gaullist 
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Massigli, called at the Foreign 
Office on 11 May. He proceeded to complain to Peterson about the 
"great and unnecessary excitement which Sir. E. Spears and his 
lieutenants were showing in view of the approaching elections". He 
also alleged that Spears Mission officers were advising people not 
to collaborate with the caretaker government, a complaint which re- 
flected British resistance to Tabet's electoral procrastination. 
Massigli threw in the revealing comment that "the elections were our 
doing, and that they would serve no useful purpose", but Peterson 
rejected this statement. "I don't see what we are to do with this 
complaint", Peterson minuted afterwards: 
Unfortunately the terms on which we are with Sir 
E. Spears do not permit of us giving him a 
friendly. word of advice, and if we ask for an 
explanation we will draw down a counter-blast 
which will reverberate through Downing Street. 35 
Despite Massigli's attitude to the elections, which was a glaring 
reflection on the official Free French line, it apparently did not 
occur to Peterson that the complaint might have been made to take 
some of the heat off French electoral tactics, which could ill 
afford any close scrutiny. Coghill's security officers reported 
"colossal bribing and intimidation" as the general rule during 
this period. 
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By June 1943 the election issue in the Levant was becoming 
acute, as Tabet continued to tinker with the timing and others, in 
customary fashion, tinkered with the outcome of it all. The Mokaddam 
affair was developing into a heated Anglo-Free-French row, 
aggravated by the unsatisfactory relations between Spears and the 
Foreign Office and the fact that Casey supported Spears. It was 
decided that Casey should come to London for consultations, and the 
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Minister of State in turn decided to bring Spears along with him. 
This did nothing for Spears-Whitehall relations, but it certainly 
helped Casey to cope with the Foreign Office on its home ground. 
Casey and Spears - both Churchill appointees - also took the 
opportunity to emphasise their position during private visits to 
Chequers, to the further discomfiture of the Foreign Office. 
On 25 June Spears went along to see Peterson in Eastern 
Department, and the mutual dislike was confirmed. "There was no 
question of even attempting to discuss the general situation in 
Syria", Spears commented. 
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Two days later, Spears had a long talk 
with Churchill after lunch at Chequers and attempted to peddle his 
whole Anglo-Arab vision. But the Prime Minister rejected the argument 
"that it would be difficult to develop the Middle East satisfactorily 
unless all the countries composing it accepted their directives from 
Great Britain". Furthermore Churchill, who had already warned Spears 
that he supported the idea of a Jewish state, would "not hear... of 
our taking the place of the French in the Levant", as'Spears suggested. 
"The French may have the same position we have in Iraq", Churchill 
stated, adding that the native population would need support for a 
long time. "That guidance", Churchill stressed, "should come from 
the French". 
Although discouraged in his wider vision of the Middle East, 
Spears still received Churchill's backing in his immediate tasks: 
the Prime Minister was deeply indignant at the 
Mokaddam story and said that these French mal- 
practices must stop. He told. me he would give me 
complete and absolute backing in maintaining the 
British point of view... 
In a more personal sense, too, Churchill was still backing Spears: 
He told me innumerable attempts had been made to 
displace me and that many English people had 
pleaded I should be replaced because the French 
so hated me. To this he had always answered that 
anybody could be on good terms with the French for 
about a fortnight if they gave way... that I was 
in fact literally the only man he knew who really 
stood up to them effectually and did not hesitate 
to have a head-on collision if needed; I knew how 
to stop the rot in time... 
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The conversation ended with Churchill abominating de Gaulle and 
expressing "a very poor opinion of the French generally". 
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Two days later, when Casey and Spears met Cadogan, the Cairo 
Minister came out strongly in support of Spears. "Casey was very 
outspoken about Peterson who really is a hopeless case", Spears 
noted, and unwisely went on to conclude that almost everybody except 
Peterson and Baxter was "in sympathy with our point of view". 
39 In 
buoyant mood, and at the request of the Foreign Office, Spears 
prepared a memorandum on Anglo-French relations in the Levant. This 
he proceeded to distribute to Churchill and several other sympathisers 
in London, which was certainly not what the Foreign Office had in mind. 
While this mischief was brewing, Spears went with Casey on 7 
July to visit Churchill once more. Over the whisky and soda, Casey 
launched into a panegyric of Spears' work in the Levant: 
He said that my work was the most trying and 
difficult imaginable and that day by day... I 
had to deal with the most exasperating claims 
of the French, all well calculated to impair our 
war effort. If we had any prestige left in the 
Levant it was, he said, only due to me. 
After this remarkable statement, Churchill added that Spears was also 
"a great author" and asked Casey if he had read Spears' books. The 
author himself reiterated his favourite theme, that the Foreign 
Office was failing to give him proper support. 
The proceedings of this admiration society were interrupted by 
the arrival of Massigli, who had been summoned to see Churchill (to 
the irritation of the Foreign Office) and found himself in the 
presence of a formidable anti-French triumvirate. In fact, Massigli 
was roughly handled, and had to endure Churchill's angry charge that 
"de Gaulle was pursuing his own interests rather than those of the 
Allies or even the real ones of France". The out-numbered Frenchman 
made no attempt to challenge this remarkable statement. The lecture 
continued as Churchill cited the Mokaddam case and warned that in 
future the British authorities would get a lot tougher. Unbending 
a little, Churchill reverted to 
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his thesis that we wanted nothing out of the war 
and certainly didn't want Syria but while we 
recognised French seniority in the Levant... France 
must give the same freedom that we were prepared 
to give Lin Iraq, etc] The P. M. repeated time and 
time again that we had no ambitions on Syria or any 
other French possession... 'There is no reason why 
a solution should not be found' said Winston time 
and time again and he said all these French mis- 
demeanours against us must cease. 40 
There was nothing new in all this sound and fury. It was the 
same old inadequate and contradictory formula, and Massigli might 
well have asked why, if the Levant was still a "French possession", 
the French had to accept British tutelage on major questions of 
independence or minor issues like the Mokaddam affair. But while 
nothing new was suggested, this meeting was significant as an 
instance of British policy in the Levant being handled by old cronies 
who did not bother to inform either the Foreign Office or the 
Cabinet. * It also reveals the continuing Spears-Churchill connection, 
now strengthened by the friendship of Casey, which was frustrating 
Foreign Office attempts to dismiss Spears or at least compel him 
to follow instructions in the normal fashion. 
Tempers were wearing thin at the Foreign Office. "We are now 
reaping; the reward of what we have sown in allowing Sir E. Spears 
to campaign for two years in favour of our replacing the French 
in the Levant", Peterson declared. 
41 "Spears is here on leave, 
intriguing and spreading poison", Harvey noted in his diary. 
42 These 
reactions were mild compared to the feelings aroused by Spears' 
memorandum on Anglo-French relations in the Levant, and above all 
by the way in which he had distributed this controversial paper 
outside the Foreign Office. As Harvey fumed: 
The last straw was a minute [from Churchill] in 
praise of a report by Spears on Syria. This had 
been written at our request for internal consid- 
eration in the Office and Spears... sent it direct to 
the Prime Minister. The paper is in flat disagreement 
with our Syrian policy. Eden] was so furious that 
I feared an explosion... 43 
Churchill himself kept no record of this meeting, and the Foreign 
Office was reduced to asking Spears if he could give an account of 
what passed. On 13 July Spears provided a brief account of the 
Massigli-Churchill encounter which was true to his own diary version. 
"We are entitled to know when representations of this force are made", 
minuted Hankey, Peterson's new subordinate. - F0371/35178/E4070. 
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The contents of Spears' paper were certainly explosive enough, 
and the Foreign Office was bound to view with alarm any dissemination 
of Spears' views. In an astonishing preamble on the future of both 
de Gaulle and metropolitan France, Spears declared that Britain's 
Arab interest precluded any Paris government established "under the 
aegis of French military power from North Africa". A Gaullist take- 
over would mean a Rightist, chauvinist, imperialist France, whereas 
"a popular form of government will not be imperialistic.... The Blum 
government was, I believe, anxious to give up the Syrian mandate". 
All this implied that de Gaulle would have to be broken, which could 
be done by a judicious blend of deliberate policy and favourable 
circumstances: 
His participation in the Committee of National 
Liberation will tend in time to dim his glory, 
our disapproval voiced no doubt by discreet 
propaganda will create doubt as to his position, 
which fundamentally depends upon our backing, and 
contact between this megalomaniac and popular leaders 
must inevitably lead to a clash which will in time 
destroy him... ' 
Having dropped this bombshell, Spears introduced his views on 
the Levant with the obligatory platitude that Britain did not intend 
to supplant France in the Levant. What followed, however, was a 
strong case for doing just that, and Spears concluded by saying that 
any French refusal to toe the line should be countered by the 
imposition of British military government. En route to this conclusion, 
Spears claimed that Britain had continuing interests in the Levant, 
apart from the political one of demonstrating good faith to the 
skeptical Arab world. He went on to give a compelling picture of 
French corruption, misrule and double-dealing, for which the unlucky 
British were getting the blame: "The Syrians cannot understand why, 
having the power to do so, we should not insist that the French keep 
For reasons best known to himself, the Official Historian, in his 
summary of Spears' memorandum, completely omits this preamble, 
although nothing is more relevant to the Foreign Office view that 
Spears was obsessed with the idea of smashing de Gaulle and 
painting all the Eastern Mediterranean red. - Woodward, iv. 260f. 
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their promises". The local conclusion was that these unsavoury 
oppressors were "our proteges whose actions we condone even if we 
do not approve them". Thus, since the Free French were only there 
"because we conquered the country and established them", it was time 
for Britain to call the tune in the Levant. Free France should be 
told to speed up the process of independence, accept British co- 
operation in the economy, and recognise the supreme directives of 
the British military authorities. Failure to accept these points 
should be met by a withdrawal of the "derived" power of the Free 
French administration in favour of a British military government of 
occupation. 
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As Spears had hoped, all this made a strong impression upon 
Churchill, who was in a thoroughly anti-Gaullist frame of mind. "This 
is a very powerful and able paper", he told Eden. "I had no idea the 
French were behaving so tyranically". With that, the Prime Minister 
asked Eden to circulate Spears' paper to the War Cabinet, pending 
a Cabinet meeting on the subject which Casey should attend. 
45 This 
was the last thing that Eden wanted. Churchill was already being 
"unbelievably tiresome" about de Gaulle, and this paper threatened to 
precipitate a repudiation of Free France as well as a disguised 
takeover of the Levant. 
46 It was, perhaps, the closest Spears ever 
came to toppling de Gaulle and achieving an Arabist dream in one 
decisive blow. 
The Foreign Office, scandalised by Spears' piratical ideas 
and methods, was even more alarmed by the Prime Minister's response, 
and, while Spears' paper was held back, a strong retort was prepared 
which described it as defective and invalid as a contribution to 
foreign policy. This reply argued that Britain had no future 
interests in the Levant, beyond the immediate independence question, 
and ridiculed Spears' peripheral approach to the question of future 
Anglo-French policy. It then proceeded to a number of particular 
points, such as French suspicions that Britain sought equal status or 
partnership in the Levant - the sort of thing that Spears was 
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advocating - and warned that "many British officers and officials 
in the Middle East wish to see the French leave the Levant States 
altogether, although this is contrary to the policy of His Majesty's 
Government". Spears himself belonged in this Arabist category, of 
course, and Churchill knew it. Eden was aware of that. 
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Armed with this lengthy rebuttal, Eden sent it to Churchill 
and offered to unravel the whole question with Casey, Spears and 
Massigli rather than trouble the War Cabinet with two such papers 
and a marathon debate. These were shrewd tactics and, with a few 
bellicose qualifications, Churchill agreed: 
I am quite clear that we are being knocked about 
unduly and unfairly by the French... in Syria. I 
should like to feel that our officers there will 
be supported against insolent ill-usage... and 
that our Commander-in-Chief will not have to make 
ignominious compromises when he has overwhelming 
force at his disposal. 
"Moreover", Churchill concluded, as if this were something new, 
I consider that the French position in Syria must 
henceforward be on the same footing as our position 
in Iraq, and that our pledges to the Syrians and 
Lebanese are serious and must be made good. 48 
There they were again, the fundamental contradictions of British 
policy in the Levant, repeated like some incantation. 
The complete inadequacy of these platitudes had still not 
dawned on the Prime Minister. How could the Free French position 
conform to that of the British in Iraq when no-one in the Levant 
wanted to conclude the necessary treaty, and no constitutional French 
authority (except Vichy! ) existed to sign in the name of France? The 
same sort of contradictions governed Churchill's own behaviour during 
this summer of 1943. If Free France was truly recognised as the 
pre-eminent European authority in the Levant, on what grounds could 
Churchill reproach Massigli when some French stooge in Tripoli 
violated British notions of fair play? After all, there were plenty 
of dubious characters in Baghdad or Cairo. Most absurd of all was 
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Churchill's hint that, due to his "overwhelming" military strength 
in the area, the British Commander could simply overrule French 
wishes in such matters. (Holmes had agreed that Mokaddam be allowed 
to stand for election, albeit under heavy surveillance). This kind 
of ham-fisted compulsion could only make nonsense of French pre- 
eminence and wreck any chance of satisfactory Anglo-Frea. French 
collaboration. 
Still, Eden had managed to halt Churchill's latest blunderings 
into the Levantine labyrinth, and was labouring to bring the issues 
back onto the level of sober diplomacy. On 14 July Eden had "a very 
frank discussion" with Massigli, Casey and Spears. 
49 
This meeting 
went over a lot of old ground, although Massigli claimed that some 
of the complaints made by Casey and Spears were new to him. Nothing 
was settled, much was postponed, and Casey's chief complaint, that 
the Free French persistently failed to appreciate the needs of 
military security, was met with the standard response that the 
British put forward all kinds of things under that heading, which 
the French considered as part of the political sphere. 
50 
The last feature of this London interlude was an attempt by 
the Foreign Office to put a tighter rein on Spears by means of new 
standing instructions, Peterson was frankly skeptical about this: 
the leopard cannot change his spots and I have 
very little confidence in Sir E. Spears' ability 
either to understand or to carry out our intentions. 
At present he has been brought to pay lip service 
to the ruling that we are not to aim at turning 
the French out of the Levant. But it is no more 
than lip service... 51 
But there was not much more that the Foreign Office could do. In the 
person of Spears it had a maverick who flatly disagreed with London's 
policy on the Levant and the whole Free French movement, and was 
hardly a representative in the required sense. Yet Spears had the 
personal support of the Prime Minister, who seemed to be equally 
obsessed with British prestige, and dismissed French complaints about 
Spears as the Gaullists' normal response whenever an Englishman stood 
up to them. 
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Eden's revised instructions reaffirmed, with heavy hint, 
that it was not Britain's policy to lever France out of the Levant. 
The main political concern was that the promise of independence 
"should gradually be fulfilled", and although no treaty could be 
finalised until the end of the war, "we should welcome the eventual 
conclusion of a treaty between France and the two States which would 
bring the French position... into line with that which we ourselves 
hold in Iraq". (Neither Spears nor the local nationalists welcomed 
such a treaty). As for any British intervention, it could only be 
justified "for reasons of military security" which Casey and the 
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, considered essential, or "to ensure 
that no action is taken which would imply that the pledges of 
independence are not to be fulfilled". Any British demands, Eden- 
stressed, were to be based on the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements and 
not on the heresy that French powers were derived from the British 
occupation. France's position rested upon the mandate, and Spears' 
views on this matter were not to be advanced or repeated. 
52 
Eden 
then drifted off into the customary contradictions, instructing Spears 
to maintain "a close concern" in all current events, but to do 
everything possible to allay French suspicions of British meddling. 
*** ýi 
Back in the Lebanon, the political scene was one of confusion 
and even menace, thanks to Tabet, who had attempted a blatant piece 
of jerrymandering. Catroux's abolition of nominated deputies had re- 
duced the number of seats in the new Chamber from 63 to 42. Of these, 
22 were allotted to Christians and 20 to Muslims. Tabet decided to 
raise the total number to 54 seats, but in the process he allocated 
another ten to Christians. This 32/22 deal upset the Islamic com- 
munities and raised the spectre of ethnic and religious conflict. 
The Muslim candidates threatened to boycott the elections, and even 
to agitate for the re-absorption of the Lebanon into Syria. 
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Catroux himself, during another brief visit, attempted to 
defuse the issue and to withdraw most of Tabet's powers, but 
Christian lobbying prevented any quick solution. On 20 July, 
however, Helleu took the plunge and decreed the dismissal of Tabet. 
A few days later, Spears returned and supported the Frenchman. He 
also used his rapport with the Lebanese to arrange a compromise 
solution, and the Christian/Muslim ratio was fixed at 30/25. On 
5 August it was announced that the Lebanese elections, which Tabet 
had postponed until September, would be held on 29 August. 
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By this time it was all over in Syria, where the nationalists 
had won an overwhelming victory. Their leader, Shukri Quwatli, 
became the new President of Syria. At the beginning of August, the 
Lebanon buzzed with the news of this anti-French triumph, and 
electoral fever redoubled as the polling day drew near. On 25 August 
Casey told Churchill that the outcome in Syria was largely due 
to Spears' efforts to achieve fair and free polling. 
A Government has been formed that will not lie down 
under French domination.... in the Lebanon [the] 
French are doing everything possible to rig the 
elections and so ensure a French-dominated Government. 
The state of mind of the newly-formed Syrian Govern- 
ment is definitely set against a treaty with the 
French and if a really representative Government 
were to be achieved in the Lebanon they would take 
the same attitude. 54 
By 29 August tension was acute in the Lebanon, but on the whole 
good order prevailed. "The Lebanese elections passed off in compara- 
tive calm", Coghill noted dryly: "only four gunshot wounds". 
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The 
outcome was an unpleasant shock for the French - another nationalist 
victory, and proof that French influence and sectarian propaganda 
had failed. The further delay in the Lebanese elections had upset 
French calculations, for the result in Syria had a dramatic effect 
on opinion in the Lebanon. A strong nationalist consciousness had 
. emerged, surmounting ethnic 
divisions. The new President, Bechara el 
Khoury, was a Christian; the Prime Minister, Riad Solh, a Muslim; and 
the six-man Cabinet represented six different versions of Christianity 
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or Islam: yet all were united in their desire to eject the French. 
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This result was greeted by an elemental outburst of national 
feeling throughout the Lebanon, and the new government found itself 
borne along on a wave of popular enthusiasm. This enabled Riad Solh 
to present the nationalist objectives as the unmistakable and 
irresistible will of the people. In these circumstances there was 
bound to be a head-on collision with the Free French, who were 
struggling to maintain their mandate until a satisfactory treaty 
could be signed. The fact that the Gaullists could not yet sign 
any treaty in the name of France rendered their position still 
more embarrassing in the autumn of 1943. The Levantines knew it, 
and they knew that their position could never be stronger. For the 
moment the French were few and feeble. Catroux had made de-colonising 
noises in desperation, and the British had publicly guaranteed 
these independence pledges. The time had come to assert this indepe- 
dence unequivocally, before the French could re-appear in any force 
and British protection faded away. 
After mutual consultations, the Syrians and Lebanese made 
their bid through the initiative of Riad Solh. At the opening of 
the new Chamber on 7 October, the Lebanese leader declared his 
intention to abolish the mandate by eliminating from the Constitution 
and laws all provisions for outsiders to interfere in the affairs 
of the Lebanon. These, he said, were incompatible with national 
sovereignty, and added that the French language would cease to rank 
with Arabic as the official language of the Lebanon. The Chamber 
and the streets echoed with loud support and enthusiasm for this 
bold declaration. 
For Free France this could only mean surrender or retaliation, 
unless the Lebanese could be persuaded to accept some sort of 
compromise. It was soon evident that they could not. On 12 October 
Helleu tried to tell Khoury that Riad Solh's demands could not be 
conceded unless the Lebanese signed a treaty with the French National 
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Committee. * But Helleu was roundly told, with reference to 1936, 
that the Levant States had no confidence in French Government 
treaties, let alone those offered by Frenchmen who did not 
constitute a government! 
The hitherto pliable Lebanese now seemed to be spoiling for 
a fight, and after this verbal blow Helleu resorted to the written 
word, informing the President on 21 October that the mandate still 
stood and that Riad Solh's proposals were unacceptable. Nevertheless 
the French were prepared to discuss a more gradual path to inde- 
pendence. The reply came that the Chamber would not be fobbed off 
with these dilutions, and that the mandate was now inadmissable, 
given the French proclamations of independence in 1941 and the de 
facto recognition granted to the new republics by most of the 
League of Nations states. 
57 After this riposte, Helleu withdrew 
to Algiers for urgent consultations, while Casey sent another of 
his pro-Spears bulletins to Churchill: 
The French are now showing signs of reacting to 
the blow which their prestige has suffered as a 
result of the elections [and] it is unlikely that 
de Gaulle will allow matters to rest. Spears has 
done a fine piece of work in countering French 
efforts to rig the elections, especially in the 
Lebanon, but they are angry and I foresee trouble 
ahead. 58 
After talks with de Gaulle, Catroux and Massigli on 5 
November, Helleu started back for the Lebanon. On the 8th, hearing 
that the Chamber was about to debate the amendments to the 
Constitution, Helleu sent a desperate message from Cairo, stating 
that he was carrying new proposalst and requesting an adjournment 
of the fateful debate. This was rejected and the Chamber gave over- 
whelming support to the repudiation of the mandate. 
De Gaulle's movement had now evolved into the broader French 
Committee of National Liberation, based at Algiers. Already in 
firm command, de Gaulle became its sole titular President in 
November. 
+ There was nothing very new about them. He was offering to 
negotiate the transfer of such matters as finance and police, 
and to resurrect the 1936 treaty. 
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Helleu and his advisers were infuriated by this defiant 
act, and rumours of an ugly backlash began to circulate. Lebanese 
Ministers, who had earlier been invited to Armistice ceremonies on 
11 November, were curtly advised not to come. A British Intelligence 
report stated that the French were loading bombs onto a borrowed 
Blenheim. Rumour begat rumour. On the 10th, a Lebanese Minister 
told Spears that Helleu would broadcast that evening that the 
Chamber was dissolved and the Government dismissed. Spears 
telephoned Casey and was instructed to tell Helleu that the British 
did not believe this rumour and relied on the French to do nothing 
rash. It was then ascertained that Helleu did intend to make some 
broadcast soon. The worried Spears, who was giving a dinner that 
evening, decided to have a private talk with Helleu afterwards to 
reassure himself that there was no truth in these alarming rumours. 
Even Spears, apparently, still attached some value to the word of 
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Chapter Seven 1943: (ii) THE LEBANESE CRISIS 
the world-to-be intoxicated us.... yet when we 
achieved and the new world dawned, the old men 
came out again and took our victory. 
T. E. Lawrence* 
I had never supposed that the French would do 
anything so abysmally foolish... 
Casey+ 
On the evening of 10 November, after a polite dinner, Spears 
had his private talk with Helleu. Mentioning some of the alarming 
rumours which were circulating, Spears asked for an assurance that 
nothing was amiss. Stressing the great popular support which Riad 
Solh enjoyed, Spears asked the Delegate-Generalt to remember that 
they were allies in a theatre which could not afford serious unrest 
or disorder. Helleu, looking "the very picture of shocked 
deprecation", replied that he was fully conscious of the need to 
maintain good order: 
tI give-you my word of honour -'je vöus'dönne'ma 
paröle*d'hwiteur', he said, 'that the French will 
not only not encourage any disturbances, but will 
discourage any such movement'. Then... he jumped 
up and said once more, 'I give you my word of 
honour, there will be no disturbances'. 
Relieved and deceived by this response, Spears thanked Helleu and 
apologised for having raised the question. These were, he explained, 
difficult and dangerous times. 
1 
When the blow fell a few hours later, Spears was fast asleep. 
He was alerted by the sudden arrival of Khoury's terrified son, who 
reported that soldiers had burst into the Presidential house and 
arrested his father. Spears soon learned that Riad Solh and most of 
his Cabinet had also been dragged from their beds and spirited away 
into captivity by the French. These Gestapo tactics were apparently 
Helleu's idea of discouragement. As Spears informed London: 
*'Seven PillarS1of. Wisdom (1926), p. 22. 
+ Personal'. Experierice'1939-1946. (1962), p. 147f. 
$ Catroux had finally relinquished this title, and was now 
de Gaulle's Commissioner for Islamic Affairs in Algiers. 
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This morning at 4 a. m. the President and all 
members of the Cabinet [who could] be found 
were arrested by Surete agents accompanied 
by French Marines and Senegalese. 
At Bam, in a terse radio message, Helleu announced a decree dis- 
solving the Lebanese Chamber, suspending the Constitution and dis- 
missing the Riad Solh government. In its place, Helleu installed the 
pro-French Emile Edde, Khoury's most bitter rival, as Head of State. 
Many newspapers were suppressed, a curfew was announced, and French 
patrols took to the streets, menacing and ill-disciplined. 
2 
Spears was "right up on his hind legs". At 7 am he had 
telephoned the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, demanding an immediate 
armed intervention by British forces. But the Cairo command was now 
held by his old bete noire, Jumbo Wilson, who was not the man to be 
bustled into anything so hasty and unauthorised. He "proposed to do 
nothing beyond moving some armour up to the Lebanese frontier". 
3 
Undeterred, Spears telephoned Casey and called for the imposition 
of British martial law, 'but the Minister of State refused this 
request and instructed Spears to confine his reaction to a stiff 
letter of protest, to be delivered to Helleu in Casey's name. 
4 
Spears' reaction could be described as typical and his 
attitude was no doubt intensified by the feeling that Helleu had 
pulled the wool over his eyes. It was now painfully obvious to 
Spears that Helleu, on being questioned point-blank within hours of 
the planned coup, had deliberately misled him. In the formal letter 
of protest that day, Spears did not fail to condemn Helleu for 
proving in a matter of hours that his word of honour was worthless. 
5 
It was also true that Spears was concerned for the safety of the 
kidnapped Lebanese Ministers, who had been taken to Rachaya, near 
the mountainous Syrian border. 
And yet, beneath all the righteous indignation, it would seem 
that Spears' emotional reaction also reflected another anxiety. This 
was the possibility that the Lebanese leaders might be compelled to 
explain why, in the past weeks, they had suddenly adopted such 
provocative measures and precipitated a confrontation with the 
French. Such an explanation would, of course, bring out the obvious 
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point that the Syrian and Lebanese nationalists were acting in 
concert, and had decided to repudiate the mandate while Free 
France was weak and pre-occupied. But it might also reveal precisely 
what role Spears had played in the whole affair, and the French 
might even obtain some dramatic confessions implicating Spears or 
at least revealing that his conduct had been unacceptable. 
Coghill, Britain's security chief in Beirut, was convinced 
that Spears had made the most mischievous use of his position. In 
September 1943, Spears seemed determined to "encourage the Cnewl 
Governments to ask for the earth and moon". Then, of the November 
crisis itself, Coghill wrote: 
What a month of bloody wars.... The Lebanese 
Government doubtless backed by Spears Cwho ha 
orders from the Foreign Office earlier telling 
him to try and dissuade the Lebanese Government 
from taking this action. He had at least two 
days and boasts that Riad Solh the Prime Minister 
did nothing without his advice.... I consider 
Spears at least 75% responsible for all the 
trouble... 6 
If this was so, then Spears certainly had reason to be anxious about 
the mettle of the detailed Lebanese leaders. 
There can be little doubt that Spears did support the 
Lebanese in the precipitation of the crisis. In his diary account 
of his departure from the Levant in December 1944, Spears spoke with 
some emotion of the great affection shown to him by the Lebanese, 
and fondly recäiled that "None of the Lebanese gave me away when 
they were imprisoned in Rachaya". 
7 This helps to explain why the 
traditionally less-than-forthright Lebanese suddenly became such 
fearless men of principle, adopting a public stance from which they 
could not possibly retreat without destroying themselves politically. 
Their action, which was neither prudent nor in the normal pattern 
of Lebanese political behaviour, was based on the belief that it 
was the Free French who would have to back down. 
It was Spears, above all, who encouraged them in this belief 
and no doubt emphasised that both he and Casey fully supported the 
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view that the mandate was no longer admissable. This left the 
Foreign Office isolated and remote in its support for the contin- 
uing validity of the French mandate. And since its own represent- 
ative in Beirut failed to give a fair account of London's views 
on the mandate, these views had no local impact. Instead, Spears 
stressed the converse aspect of British policy - the commitment 
to Levant independence - in a one-sided fashion. Ever since March 
1942 Spears had played this game, stressing independence in such 
an absolute and literal way that the very mention of the mandate 
became an irreconcilable contradiction. In this sense, November 
1943 was his masterstroke, for this time the Lebanese had said it, 
and in such a well-publicised way that London could not afford to 
disavow them without arousing the entire Arab world. 
However much Spears may have been motivated by his Arabist 
ideals and his contempt for the French colonial mentality, his 
ensuing attacks on the Free French for endangering public order and 
disrupting the local war effort can only be described as humbug. 
Spears himself had been the cause of some trouble and tension in 
the Levant, and he was clearly implicated in the recent Lebanese 
posturings which had stung the French into reaction. Anyone in 
Spears' position who was really as concerned as he now affected 
to be about tranquillity in the Levant would have made every effort 
to keep the lid on Levantine aspirations until the end of the war. 
However difficult that may have been, the fact remains that Spears 
lifted the lid right off and encouraged the inhabitants of this 
Pandora's box to pour forth and confound the thinly-stretched French. 
Yet Spears was not the man to let this muffle his eloquent con- 
demnations of the wicked and irresponsible French. The fact that 
his own government had locked up plenty of politicians in the name 
of public order, in such places as India and Palestine, was also 
cheerfully ignored by Spears - if it occurred to him at all. 
The dramatic events of 11 November set off a flurry of 
diplomatic activity, and various Middle Eastern capitals felt the 
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storm of protest which arose throughout the Arab world. The 
world press suddenly discovered the Lebanese situation, and a 
rash of half-baked reports appeared in response to the Almighty 
Deadline. Within hours of Helleu's coup, Casey had collected a 
planeload of assorted journalists and sent them on to Beirut, 
where their sheer persistence reminded Spears of a swarm of bees. 
8 
But the newspaper reports were as'nothing compared with the barrage 
of lengthy telegrams from the Foreign Office to its men in Algiers, 
Cairo, Beirut and elsewhere. Spears alone received and sent at 
least 360 wires in the next twenty days. 
9 
There were other messages which were not seen by the Foreign 
Office, for the Spears-Casey team was on the warpath. From the very 
start of the crisis the Cairo Minister became a forceful and 
decisive figure, confounding the Foreign Office mandarin who had 
called him "a lightweight". 
10 As Lord Protector of Spears and the 
Levantines, Casey fired off another of his telegrams to Churchill 
on 11 November: 
You will know of situation in Beirut.... The 
French have grossly overstepped the mark [but 
they] will attempt to saddle responsibility 
in obscure ways on us and probably on Spears in 
particular.... the emergence of strongly 
Nationalistic Governments at the recent relatively 
free elections (for which Spears was largely 
responsible) was the natural reaction after years 
of gross oppression and exploitation.... The 
criminally foolish thing that the French have 
now done has shocked opinion in the Middle East 
[and we need all. the pressure we can bring to 
bear on the French Committee of Liberation at 
Algiers... 11 
At the same time Casey told the Foreign Office that "Helleu would 
only have acted as he has done on instructions from Algiers". It 
was therefore clear that "only Algiers can remedy the political 
situation in Beirut by instruction to Helleu". Casey called on the 
Foreign Office to exert every pressure on Algiers. 
12 
It was certainly true that Algiers would have to undo the 
damage done by Helleu, but it is by no means certain that Helleu's 
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brutal stroke was carried out on de Gaulle's or the Committee's 
instructions. This assumption has often been made, but the 
only evidence is a telegram of support which de Gaulle sent to 
Helleu on the 13th, which Helleu proceeded to wave in front of a 
press conference. He told the journalists that "de Gaulle had 
been in full agreement with the measures taken", but this looks 
suspiciously like another of Helleu's calculated ambiguities. 
13 
De Gaulle's view seems to have been that Helleu's backlash was 
understandable but that circumstances would not permit the French 
to get away with it. 
14 
The action was clearly a blatant contradiction of Allied 
propaganda about freedom and democracy. Yet de Gaulle, ever 
mindful of French prestige and the host of humiliations he had 
suffered for France, could not bring himself to throw Helleu to 
the Anglo-Saxon wolves when that little man had come out fighting 
in the name of France. His message to Helleu was that 
the forceful measures you saw fit to use were 
perhaps necessary. In any case, I must consider 
them as such since you used them. You are covered 
in that respect and we will not disavow you... 15 
While this comes from de Gaulle's own volume of documents, it is 
unlikely that de Gaulle's "full agreement" amounted to anything more 
than this. It was quite enough to comfort the beleaguered Helleu, 
and although he flourished this wire at a press conference he did 
not offer to read it. 
Beyond this, there is nothing but the purely circumstantial 
fact that, on being defied by the Lebanese, Helleu withdrew to 
Algiers, returned to Beirut, and authorised a brutally efficient 
round-up of the Lebanese ringleaders. It has thus been deduced that 
he acted on orders from Algiers. But the move which really seems 
to have unhinged Helleu - Riad Solh's repudiation of the mandate on 
8 November, despite an urgent message from Helleu - occurred when 
the Delegate-General was in Cairo, on his way back. 
There is reason to believe that it was not de Gaulle but the 
resentful clique of old Vichy colonialists in Beirut who planned the 
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backlash. This group, led by Boelen and Boegner, at the 
Delegation-Generale, had often been the subject of complaints by 
Spears and others for their dubious status as Allies. "This gang 
must be liquidated", Coghill had said of them in 1942, but nothing 
was done. 
16 It was this group which on 5 November had aggravated 
the Lebanese situation with the calculated publication of a 
communique, stating that the Free French could not accept any 
constitutional changes made without their prior consent. This broke 
an agreement between Helleu and the Lebanese that there should be 
no publicity during Helleu's absence. The Lebanese had angrily 
retorted by announcing their legal right to amend the Constitution, 
and arranged the fateful debate for 8 November. 
17 It would 
appear, then, that the old Vichyist clique, with their Bourbon 
mentality of learning and forgetting nothing, were seeking a 
showdown with the people they had despised and dominated since 
1919. Their action on 5 November was enough to ensure that Helleu's 
last-minute request for a delay was flatly refused. This humiliation, 
in turn, persuaded Helleu to authorise the repressive measures of 
10-11 November. 
The whole reaction of arresting the Lebanese, publishing 
decrees, appointing a puppet Government and unleashing French troops 
- not to mention the cancelling of Ministerial invitations to the 
11 November Armistice ceremony - must have been planned before Helleu 
arrived back in Beirut on the afternoon of the 10th, It is not clear 
whether Helleu simply agreed, in reaction to Riad Solh's humiliating 
snub, to unleash the backlash. But it does appear that responsibility 
for the coup must be attributed to the colonialist clique in Beirut, 
and to Helleu, not to de Gaulle. It is interesting that all these 
men went within three weeks, whereas de Gaulle had repeatedly 
refused to remove any of them in response to British complaints. 
Boelen, Boegner, and several others, i. e., the men who had actually 
released the 5 November communique, left the Levant altogether. 
18 
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By the 13th, while Helleu was uttering his self-justifications, 
the situation was becoming critical throughout the Lebanon. In 
Beirut, normal activities were at a standstill and Spears was be- 
sieged by delegations demanding British protection and military 
intervention. The inevitable confrontations with French troops became 
worse. On the 12th, Senegalese troops had roughly dispersed a large 
group of Lebanese women outside the American Legation, training their 
weapons on the First Secretary when he came out to remonstrate. On 
the 13th, tensions boiled over into several bloody incidents. 
Outside the British Legation in Beirut, a body of students was 
fired on by French Marines. In Tripoli and Sidon, open season was 
declared on any public gatherings, as French troops fired on 
demonstrators or simply mowed them down with their vehicles. In all, 
about twenty people were killed and another sixty wounded in these 
incidents. Spears began to report signs of a violent reaction, and 
was hard-pressed to persuade various armed groups to restrain them- 
selves. 
19 
In the diplomatic sphere, too, tensions were proliferating. 
In Baghdad, the Iraqi Prime Minister had already told Cornwallis 
that it would henceforth be "impossible for French and Lebanese to 
live in harmony" and that "this was a grand opportunity for 
[Britain] 
to oust 
[the French] from Levant", The Iraqis were becoming restless, 
on the 13th, a lively debate in the Iraqi Chamber became anti- 
British as most speakers stressed that the Free French position had 
been established by British arms and money. Some even described 
the French as "British mercenaries" and there were demands for an 
armed Iraqi intervention to forcibly expel the Gaullists. Similar 
noises were made by the Egyptians, and these developments brought 
a hasty response from the Foreign Office. Cornwallis and Lampson 
were asked to stress 
that we stand by promises of final independence 
given to Levant States and intend to see them 
carried out.... Nothing can damage Arab aspirations 
more than disorders at the present juncture of the war. 
This was debatable,, but it was certainly true that uproar in the 
Arab world at that time would have been acutely embarrassing and 
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inconvenient for the British. 
20 
Such a spectre undoubtedly contributed to the force with 
which London approached the French Committee in Algiers. On the 
12th, London requested the immediate recall of Helleu and the 
release of the Lebanese Ministers. In the temporary absence of 
Harold MacMillan, these demands were put to de Gaulle and Massigli 
by Roger Makins. ' A "rather subdued" de Gaulle began by stating 
that Helleu had been forced to exercise French mandatory rights in 
the face of provocation. Makins replied that the French reaction 
had been out of all proportion to any provocation. He then pre- 
sented London's demands. This drew from de Gaulle a curious threat 
to withdraw every Frenchman from the Levant forthwith, whilst 
publishing his "case" to the world. This gigantic bluff was pre- 
sumably based upon the calculation that the British would then be 
forced to occupy the Levantine vacuum to keep order, thus incurring 
the charge that they had levered the French out despite all their 
claims to innocence. Eventually, after countering complaints about 
Helleu with complaints about Spears, de Gaulle revealed that 
Catroux was being sent to Beirut "with appropriate instructions" 
and would visit Casey en route. 
21 
On the 13th MacMillan returned to Algiers and found that 
his American counterpart, Murphy, was about to deliver a protest 
to Massigli. It was therefore arranged that MacMillan and Makins 
should see Massigli immediately after Murphy's protest. The unlucky 
Massigli, who attempted to tell MacMillan that "complete calm" 
reigned in the Levant, was bluntly asked for a reply to Britain's 
demands. He claimed that Catroux's mission effectively suspended 
Helleu and that the question of the imprisoned Lebanese would be 
dealt with by Catroux in Beirut. 
22 
London's attitude to the Free French did not mean that 
there was unqualified support for the Lebanese. The Foreign Office 
had sent another wire to MacMillan which provided some background 
to the crisis, and attempted to give a balanced view of the whole 
affair. "Present situation in Lebanon has been brought about by 
MacMillan Was the Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in 
North Africa. 
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grave blunders and lack of judgment on both sides". London argued. 
The Lebanese, whose elections had been held as a result of British 
efforts, had "attempted to take the bit between their teeth". 
Fortified by undue British support (a clear reference to Spears), 
the ungrateful Lebanese had embarked on a collision course with 
the French without the courtesy of consulting London. For their 
part, the French had "behaved even more foolishly" by their 
grudging attitude towards the gradual process of independence to 
which they were publicly committed. Catroux's 1941 declarations 
had retained sufficient bargaining counters to make this reluctance 
unnecessary. Now, their "violent attitude towards the Lebanese 
Government" had "put them so far in the wrong that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to make allowance for such provocation as 
they may have received". 
This may have been condescending, but it was by no means 
an apologia for the French. Nevertheless it provoked a vigorous 
retort from Beirut, where Spears detected the work of his old 
adversary, Peterson, and completely lost his temper. "Counsellor", 
he scribbled across this wire in his red ink, "please draft adequate 
reply... It should be of a nature to finish off Peterson once and 
for all". 
23 Lascelles rose to the occasion in the best Spears 
tradition and expressed all the pent-up frustration and anger 
within the Beirut Legation: 
It is depressing to find that attempts are still 
being made... to whitewash the French and to in- 
sinuate that the Lebanese are nearly as much to 
blame... Lebanese are well aware that they owe 
celections] to HM Government alone. They were 
duly grateful to us for this first sign of 
implementation of categorical assurances... made 
to them nearly two years ago, Having acquired a 
fully constitutional Parliament... they made the 
"grave blunder" (your words) of assuming that... 
they were entitled to change their own laws as 
they thought fit. 
You have perhaps forgotten that [in 1941 Catroux 
stated that.. they) -might.: immediatel adopt any 
constitütift the 'chbae. The Lebanese Government, 
having no experience o international affairs, 
were childish enough to suppose that these solemn 
and public promises meant what they said. 
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Moreover, the retort continued, the Lebanese had given plenty of 
notice of their intentions in Riad Solh's speech on 7 October. 
The French had reacted with veiled threats and references to a 
mandate which, "though still technically in existence, we were all 
agreed it was an indecency to assert in practice". The French 
response was to abduct the Lebanese leaders "at dead of night" 
and unleash "hordes of French, native and black troops on an 
unarmed population which, though justifiably incensed... has only 
now begun to show positive signs of getting... out of hand". 
24 
This certainly showed where Spears and his colleagues 
stood, but it cleverly ignored the fact that London itself had 
winked at the dilution of Catroux's extravagant proclamation of 
June 1941, and it twisted London's guideline that public references 
to the mandate were to be avoided. It was the Lebanese initiative 
which forced the French to emphasise the mandate in the autumn of 
1943, against the great tide of popular opinion. It was largely 
because the French mandate was such a vulnerable target that the 
initiative was taken. 
More pro-Lebanese pressure, of a less-impeachable sort, 
came in from Casey, who visited Beirut on the 13th/14th - and 
undoubtedly heard all about Peterson's "wet" telegram. After 
discussions with Spears and Holmes, Casey conducted his own fact- 
finding tour of Beirut, and discussed the situation with key 
figures in the Islamic and Christian communities. He was impressed 
to find that the most heated anti-French sentiments came from the 
Maronite Archbishop, who affirmed his solidarity with Muslim leaders 
and said that if the British let them down "they would take the 
business into their own hands". Even the President of the American 
University expressed the view that "a spark might set the whole 
country alight" and that if the situation was not rapidly restored 
by Catroux, the Lebanese and Syrians would rise and "destroy" the 
French "with great bloodshed". From these interviews, Casey 
reported the general conclusion that it was not some ill-advised 
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British encouragement which had caused the crisis, but rather a 
surfeit of French exploitation and cynicism "which had made even 
the Lebanese worm turn at long last". 
25 
In a further wire to London, Casey argued that in the 
light of this situation, no French procrastination could be 
tolerated. While he appreciated that the British demands in Algiers 
were a bitter pill which the French Committee might take some time 
to swallow, he did not believe that the Lebanese situation could 
be contained much longer. De Gaulle's refusal to disavow Helleu 
had inflated the question of French prestige, and Algiers would 
"play for time hoping that something will turn up to save their 
face. Catroux's mission... is, I strongly suspect, playing for 
time". That was the rub: 
if French are out to play for time, we for our 
part cannot afford to let them do so.... Population 
has hitherto been largely held in check by hopes 
of British intervention. If that hope is too long 
deferred, this check will be removed... 
The result, Casey hinted, would be an onslaught by armed mountain 
peoples, including the formidable Druzes, inspired by the joyful 
prospect of revenge and plunder. Unless the French had met British 
demands by the 17th, or unless the British took over the patrolling 
of the larger towns by that date, the situation could get "irrevocably 
out of hand". The Minister of State therefore told London that 
Algiers should be given this deadline forthwith. Since it was five 
days from the original presentation of the demands, it was "a not 
unreasonable time-limit". 
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In the meantime, London had also mentioned a sort of time- 
limit, but it was allowed to lapse. On the 13th, the Foreign Office 
had told Makins that the French response to his message was "evasive" 
and that it was only by stretching forbearance to the limit that 
they were prepared to await Catroux's arrival in Beirut, provided 
it was no later than the 15th. This message was repeated to Casey 
in Cairo, but that worthy was in Beirut, telegraphing his own time- 
limit to London. 
27 From Algiers, MacMillan reported that he had 
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seen Catroux, who was leaving early on the 14th, and had said 
"with a smile, that there are other ways of dealing with 
Governments than putting them in prison". On that typical note, 
Catroux began his slow progress to Beirut. MacMillan made no 
mention of London's stipulation that Catroux should be in Beirut 
by the 15th, and that arch-procrastinator had already delayed his 
departure from Algiers. 
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So much for London's first time-limit. 
In London, the Foreign Office did not care for Casey's 
specific requests. It thought that British intervention could not 
be confined to limited patrols in the larger towns, and that 
French rejection of the demands would require a stiff response: 
public dissociation from the Gaullists and the imposition of 
martial law in the Levant. But this was a last resort, and mean- 
while the French should be given a little longer to comply. On 
the 15th, Cadogan conveyed these views to the War Cabinet and 
secured its agreement. Casey was duly informed. 
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Meanwhile, the incorrigible Catroux was apprcaching his 
mission at a glacial rate. Arriving in Cairo on the afternoon of 
the 14th, he cancelled a6 pm appointment with Casey, pleading a 
sudden fever. On the 15th he called on Casey and "ploughed over a 
lot of old ground". This exercise, though Casey did not say so to 
the Foreign Office, included the charge that Spears had blatantly 
collaborated with the Lebanese nationalists, and was in fact at 
the bottom of the whole crisis. The solution therefore lay in the 
simultaneous removal of Spears and Helleu. Casey denied all this and 
retorted that French grievances did not begin to jtptify what Helleu 
had done. Pursuing this theme, the Australian urged Catroux to hurry 
to Beirut and effect the release of the Lebanese Ministers before 
the situation became unmanageable, but Catroux was in no hurry. 
Casey declared that any further delay "would make the most unfortunate 
possible impression", but this only allowed Catroux to cloud the 
issue. "He said he could not accept an ultimatum ... to leave Cairo 
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at once". The game proceeded, with Casey labouring the urgency 
of the situation and the acceptance of British demands, and 
Catroux putting up a smokescreen of personality and protocol. 
Invoking "his past record" -a useful device, since Casey's views 
on that score could have started a whole new quarrel - Catroux 
claimed that he was entitled to be left to settle the crisis 
in his own way. 
Later in the day, and again on the morning of the 16th, 
Catroux returned to the office of the exasperated Casey. In a 
confiding tone, Catroux said that 
If Helleu was recalled and Lebanese Government 
restored, it would be regarded as a straight... 
capitulation to Britain with complete loss of 
face to France. There were things that could be 
done and things that could not be done... 
Faced with this unacceptable thought, Catroux said that he might 
be "obliged to recommend that France withdraw entirely from the 
Levant". This Gaullist suggestion and Catroux's personal dilemma 
caused Casey no visible distress. 
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While Catroux lingered in Cairo, Spears was rapidly losing 
what patience he still had in Beirut. On the 15th, Spears' car had 
been stopped in the street while a French officer waved a loaded 
revolver in his face. Spears himself promptly assisted an English 
corporal to overpower the Frenchman. Gleefully relating this to 
London, Spears pointed out that this menacing behaviour was now 
standard practice in the streets of Beirut. He also reported that 
the French were proposing to send a military detachment into the 
mountains to arrest the two Lebanese Ministers who had escaped the 
original round-up. He had restrained the French on the grounds that 
once an engagement began, nothing could stop the whole country 
from rising. Finally, Spears told London that Catroux's time-limit 
had expired, a remark which was 4t true as it was unwelcome. He 
opined that there would be "serious trouble" unless Catroux 
released the Lebanese "unconditionally" within a few hours of his 
arrival. 
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Catroux's slow progress to Beirut made the 16th another lost 
day. Casey's predictions about "playing for time" were clearly 
accurate, and Catroux made no move to release the imprisoned 
Lebanese. The general strike continued, the shops remained shuttered - 
evidence, as Spears remarked, of genuine feelings in the commercial 
climate of Beirut. 
31 
Only the swarm of journalists seemed as indust- 
rious as ever. Most of them, well-briefed and looked after by Spears' 
staff, filed routine reports stressing the plight of the Lebanese 
and the repressive measures of the French. A few went behind the 
scenes. Walter Lippmann suggested that Spears, "Churchill's 
personal appointee", was up to no good. The Daily- Telegraph corres- 
pondent, detecting the Spears-Holmes breach, quoted the local French 
Commander: "My dear friend General Holmes completely agrees with 
me... that if the French and Lebanese are left alone... everything will 
work out satisfactorily". Holmes was certainly busy disavowing Spears. 
He was in friendly communication with Catrouxe and when Gerald Norman, 
the Times correspondent, arrived in Beirut, he was taken to Holmes' 
headquarters. There Holmes told him that he saw no justification 
for British martial law, since there was "no evidence" that the 
French were unable to maintain order. This was a most curious 
statement, but the unlucky Norman was unable to get such sensitive 
material past-the British censorship. 
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On the 17th, London had still heard nothing from or about 
Catroux, and Eden finally decided to impose a time-limit. This one 
was officially blessed by the War Cabinet, and Casey was alerted: 
If... General Catroux has not by the evening of... 
18th November, given. some definite indication 
that French are on the point of complying with 
our demands... you should fly to Beirut on the 
following day... and inform General Catroux 
personally that failing compliance with these 
demands by 10 am on 21st] you are instructed... 
to arrange for an immediate declaration of 
British martial law... 
You should make it plain that in that case 
imprisoned Ministers are to be released... 
e On his return to Algiers, Catroux saw MacMillan and "spoke highly 
of General Holmes' behaviour" - MacMillan tel., 1 December 1943, 
SPRS M. 
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You should also emphasise that this declaration 
of martial law is taken on the grounds of 
military necessity [and] has no political 
implications... 33 
But what were London's precise demands? In a subsequent wire, 
Casey was told that "we are not insisting on immediate re-estab- 
lishment of old Government", and that there was a distinction 
between the release and the reinstatement of the Lebanese. 
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Casey 
took a dim view of this casuistry, and he immediately challenged 
the Foreign Office: 
I have assumed throughout that release of 
Ministers meant their release as Ministers, i. e., 
that reinstatement of Ministers was corollary of 
their release.... 'I feel quite sure that Catroux 
interprets our demand [that way] .I consistently 
spoke to him in this sense here. If their release 
is as private individuals only then (1) What is 
the position... of the President..? (2) Who 
constitutes the Government of the Lebanon..? 
Casey went on to say that such a shabby arrangement would mean that 
Britain condoned Helleu's actions, and it would suggest that if the 
Lebanese leaders did not "come to heel" they would be replaced. 
Casey then played his trump card: "I had a telegram from the Prime 
Minister today in which he asks me amongst other things... "Have 
the Lebanese President and Ministers been released and reinstated"? 
35 
The concept of the release of Ministers was certainly ambiguous, 
but as Casey bluntly pointed out, their release as private persons 
would amount to British acceptance of Helleu's actions and Edde"s 
spurious authority in the Lebanon. This would have put London in 
an absurd position. Casey himself held that release as Ministers 
was the implicit meaning of London's demand, and it seems that he 
made this clear enough to Catroux, for the latter had promptly 
complained that if the Lebanese Government was "restored", France 
would lose face. 
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Casey's use of Churchill's views may have upset the Foreign 
Office, but it was certainly well-timed and effective. So far in this 
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crisis, Eden and his subordinates had enjoyed a rare immunity from 
the usual Churchillian interventions, for the Prime Minister had 
sailed from Plymouth on 12 November - bound for conferences at Cairo 
and Teheran. Now, however, Casey had thrown Churchill's weight into 
the argument over reinstatement, and on 18 November the War Cabinet 
brushed aside Eden's objections and strongly supported the Cairo 
Minister. In this meeting, it was stated that London must support 
the stance adopted by Casey in his dealings with Catroux; that the 
imprisoned Ministers were still considered the de jure Government; 
that they should revert to this status on release; that'London could 
not recognise Edde; and that the time-limit should be extended for 
24 hours to 22 November. Eden, who had brought along a draft telegram 
to Casey stating that immediate reinstatement was undesirable, was 
overruled. 
37 Casey had won the day, and his uncompromising telegram 
had tilted the balance in favour of reinstatement at the War Cabinet 
meeting. Later, the Cairo Minister was to receive personal confirm- 
ation of this in a letter from Lord Moyne, who attended this and 
other Cabinet meetings during the crisis. 
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Meanwhile, Spears had had "lk hours of perfectly cordial but 
sterile conversation" with Catroux in Beirut. The Frenchman insisted 
that Helleu had acted on his own initiative. His action had been 
"impolitic" and, Catroux hinted, was inspired by the "mandatory 
outlook" of the local French. Spears then reminded Catroux that London 
had expected the release of the imprisoned Ministers by now, and could 
not understand his procrastination: 
The only possible conclusion that [London], the 
Lebanese and neighbouring countries could draw 
from these delaying tactics was that he intended 
to use Helleu*s totally inexcusable action as a 
bargaining counter to extract promises from the Lebanese 
bsFor" releasing the Ministers. 
In full cry now, Spears demanded to know on what legal basis "if any" 
the Lebanese had been locked up, and gleefully demolished the various 
answers which Catroux produced. The offended Frenchman then declared 
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that if he were not given a completely free 
hand to negotiate in his own way and in his own 
time the French would withdraw from the Levant. 
He added that in this event he himself would 
fly back to Algiers... 
Spears retorted that "world opinion" might, in that case, conclude 
that "the French did not desire to remain in the Levant unless they 
could exercise dictatorial powers". 
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By the evening of the 18th, Catroux had certainly given no in- 
dication of being on the point of meeting London's demands. He had 
in effect rejected them in his talks with Casey and Spears, and was 
now engaged in a smooth attempt to detach President Khoury from his 
fellow inmates of the Rachaya fortress. It was a typical Catroux 
solution: reinstatement of the President as a sop to local opinion, 
and dismissal of Riad Solh's Cabinet (to be done officially by Khoury) 
to legitimise Helleu's measures and reassert French prestige against 
those who would attack it. But Khoury was not prepared to be a French 
tool, and although "physically weakened" he defended his stance and 
refused Catroux's silky invitation to blame the whole tragedy on 
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the machinations of Spears and a nationalist clique. 
Catroux was still pondering this dignified rebuttal on the 
19th when he became aware of the presence of Casey, who had come to 
Beirut to carry out his instructions. These were unchanged except 
for a day's extension of the time-limit, and they brought the 
Frenchman back to earth with a jolt. At 5.30pm, in Spears' house, 
Catroux was stiffly reminded by Casey that London had requested the 
recall of Helleu and the release of the Lebanese six days ago. The 
Lebanese should "revert to their status prior to the recent crisis", 
Casey added, stressing that London had still received no reply. 
Nevertheless it was hoped that Algiers would accept these demands, 
in which case London would propose a conference between Catroux and 
the Lebanese - in a neighbouring British territory - to seek a modus 
vivendi until the end of the war. This brought Casey to the crux of 
his statement. If the French failed to meet London's demands by 10 am 
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on 22 November, there would be an immediate declaration of 
British martial law in the Lebanon, and the imprisoned Lebanese 
would be liberated by British troops. 
Poor Catroux, who had virtually ruled the Levant for two 
years, was thunderstruck. This was an ultimatum, he pointed out, 
and could only be passed on to Algiers. To receive this personally 
in Beirut, from the two men who had so often prodded him, was too 
much. "This looks like another Fashoda! " he exclaimed bitterly. * 
This splendid analogy was completely wasted on Casey, whose 
native hemisphere was relatively unscarred by Anglo-French imperial 
confrontations. He baldly asked Spears what on earth Catroux was 
talking about, and the abashed Englishman had to dispense a little 
Instant History before the proceedings continued. By this time 
Catroux had recovered his poise, and was taken quietly through each 
clause of the aide-memoire, to avoid misunderstandings. He then said 
that the time-limit was very short, since his wires to Algiers were 
taking longer than expected. Casey replied that these demands had 
been known in Algiers for a week, and in any case he would be 
glad to send things on at top priority through MacMillan. 
There were no more serious objections from Catroux. Rather 
like a subdued schoolboy whose project was late he said that "he 
had not wasted a moment since his arrival in Beirut", But Head- 
master Casey sternly inquired whether he had released any of the 
Lebanese in all this time, which effectively silenced Catroux. 
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The Frenchman's relatively mild reaction may not have been all good 
breeding. Perhaps he had already sensed that Casey had rescued him 
from a serious dilemma, not to mention the wrath of de Gaulle. 
For Khoury's stance had wrecked Catroux's only real chance of a 
settlement in Beirut, which left only the unacceptable alternatives 
of supporting the Beirut reactionaries - which Free France simply 
could not get away with - or backing down to the Riad Solh 
Government. This would have been a monumental blow to French 
prestige which de Gaulle would never tolerate. Now, however, 
' Fashoda, in the Sudan, was the scene of a confrontation 
in 1898 between a small French force and Kitchener's army. 
The French withdrew after receiving a British ulkieatum. 
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Catroux could tell his chief that all his good groundwork had been 
wrecked by the meddling British -a suggestion he did not entirely 
resist when he came to write his memoirs, 
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The next morning Catroux saw Spears again - Casey having 
returned to Cairo - and reported that Algiers' own solution had 
come in shortly after Casey's ultimatum. This was that the 
President was to be released and reinstated, and the Ministers 
released at Catroux's discretion but deprived of office. Spears 
replied that this solution was not likely to impress London, the 
neighbouring Arab countries, or the Lebanese themselves, who would 
continue to agitate until the Riad Solh Government returned. The 
'Algiers solution' would therefore only cause more confrontation. On 
the other hand, if the French disavowed Helleu and cancelled his 
decrees, things could still be smoothed over. Catroux, who was 
"most amenable", agreed. He indicated that if he really had a free 
hand, he would take this line. The newer members of the Algiers 
Committee, he added, "would not have attempted to put the clock 
back". But thanks to de Gaulle and the Old Guard on the Committee, 
Catroux hinted, ha did not really possess plenipotentiary powers. 
Spears kindly refrained from asking whether, in any case, Catroux 
would have used such powers, de Gaulle notwithstanding. Indeed, 
Spears told the Foreign Office that if Catroux had been truly in 
charge of the situation, "it would have been settled by now to our 
satisfaction". 
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On the 21st, London considered reports of Casey's meeting 
with Catroux, and Catroux'a subsequent conversation with Spears on 
the 20th. At the same time it weighed up the submissions of MacMillan, 
who had now entered the reinstatement debate as a counterweight to 
Casey. On the 20th, Macmillan had given Casey's aide-memoire to 
Massigli, who remarked that it used the term "release" at one point 
and "revert to their status" at another. What was meant? Macmillan 
himself was unsure: 
This appears to be a new and equivocal point.... 
It would seem ... dangerous to risk future of Anglo- 
French relations on a point so ill-defined and on 
which we appear to be so undecided. 
2'F6 
In a further wire, Macmillan asked whether London considered Riad 
Solh's Reform Bill of 8 November "a fait accompli" and whether it 
thought "that any subsequent negotiations should proceed on basis 
of validity of that bill? I presume not". In yet another wire, 
Macmillan reported that the Committee had now recommended the 
immediate recall of Helleu, as well as the reinstatement of the 
President and the release of the Ministers. The composition of the 
restored Cabinet could he negotiated, Macmillan argued, if Britain 
did not insist on immediate reinstatement of the old Riad Solh 
Cabinet. "I urge you even now to consider most seriously acceptance 
of such a solution". * It was not unreasonable, given "that we 
ourselves take the view that Prime Minister acted precipitately in 
passing Reform Bill". Finally, Macmillan urged London to at least 
consider the postponement of British martial law in the Lebanon. 
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In London, it was decided that Macmillan's main plea could 
not be entertained. Eden, now a convert to the Casey line, said that 
any Franco-Lebanese negotiations after the release could only be 
conducted with the legitimate Government, and this meant of course 
the reinstatement of the imprisoned Ministers. He made it sound so 
logical that it may well be asked why the Foreign Office had not 
seen this all along. Nevertheless it was decided that the general 
tendency of the Algiers Committee justified the postponement of 
the time-limit, which was extended for another 48 hours. Casey was 
duly informed, and Macmillan was told that "the French proposal to 
release the Ministers but not to recognise them... constitutes no 
solution", and that this must be made clear to Massigli without 
delay. 45 
Nevertheless, on the morning of the 22nd, the President and 
Ministers were released by Catroux in Beirut, to the tune of the 
Algiers communique which stated that the President was reinstated 
"Running away", commented Spears on his copy of the telegram. 
Settling this old score in his memoirs (p. 272), Spears claims 
that Macmillan "wilted" in de Gaulle's "overpowering presence". 
But Macmillan was asking London for a sop to encourage the 
Committee's tendency to defy de Gaulle. 
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and, less clearly, that the "former Lebanese Ministers" were 
"set free". At the same time Catroux handed Spears a stiff and 
proper repudiation of the British ultimatum. 
46 The French had 
still not conceded the reinstatement of the Riad Solh Cabinet, 
but within 48 hours the unmistakeable feelings and intentions of 
the Beirut crowds convinced Catroux that he would have to allow 
this. The released Ministers found themselves upon an even greater 
wave of enthusiasm and emotion than that which they rode before 
11 November. Catroux made one last effort to detach Khoury from 
the others, an effort which was treated with contempt. He then 
retreated, waiting for Algiers to endorse his subsequent suggestion 
that the reinstatement of Riad Solh's Government was now unavoidable. 
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London began to wobble on the 23rd, backing away from its own 
stated intention of declaring martial law on the 24th. In Cairo, 
where Churchill was now ensconced in Casey's villa, there was no 
such wavering. The Prime Minister told Casey that he had received 
some "wishy-washy" wires from London. 
48 Casey, keeping up with 
events in Beirut through Spears, brought in General Wilson and the 
three men concluded that the Riad Solh Cabinet "may very likely 
resume their functions as a Government during the day". Churchill 
therefore informed Attlee, his London deputy, that 
If French wisely abstain from violent inter- 
ference either towards members of Government... 
or against population, we shall in fact have 
obtained satisfaction.... Our declaration of 
martial law will remain in suspense. At any 
moment however French by firing on crowd or by 
some other imprudence may incite a renewal of 
crisis... in which case LBritishj troops will 
have to move in. 49 
This was a good assessment of the situation, for in Beirut the un- 
quenchable crowds simply bore their heroes back to Parliament 
unopposed. The hated Marines and Senegalese were nowhere to be seen, 
and a great tide of humanity filled the streets, its tributaries 
pouring down from the smallest mountain villages to join the stream 
of jubi$ution.. The Riad Solh Government, carried along by the 
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Lebanese people, had reinstated itself. 
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On the 24th, Catroux accepted this fait accompli (at which 
he probably connived by ensuring that Riad Solh's re-entry of 
Parliament was unopposed) and called officially on the President 
and Ministers in their offices. Helleu had gone off to Algiers, 
and Catroux prepared to follow him, having appointed a Monsieur 
Chataigneaa (actually "liked and admired" by Spears! ) as the 
temporary Delegate-General. The shops in Beirut, which "had 
closed their iron shutters with the smart unanimity of alarmed 
oysters", were all open again. The immediate crisis had passed. 
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At a press conference on 29 November the Lebanese Prime 
Minister stated that "negotiations for normalisation of Franco- 
Lebanese relations" had not yet begun. He added that such talks 
"will not take place on the basis of the mandate, but on that of 
equality and independence". Questioned on the 'status of the con- 
stitutional amendments of 8 November, Riad Solh stated that these 
still stood. 
52 The same theme was emphasised in Damascus. On the 
27th, during a debate in the Syrian Chamber, it was repeatedly 
stated that the mandate had never been recognised by the Syrians 
themselves and was an unacceptable basis of negotiation. These 
noises culminated in a statement by the Syrian Prime Minister on 
1 December, which brought the two Levant States openly into line 
against the French mandate. Syria, he declared, did not recognise 
the French mandate. His government's policy was recognition of 
Syrian independence by the United Nations, and Syrian readiness to 
put its territory and communications at the disposal of the Allied 
war effort. There were some interests which Syria shared with 
Lebanon, such as the I1te4tS'Communs* and Customs, and these 
should now pass into the hands of the Levantines, Syria would make 
no treaty incompatible with "real independence", and therefore 
could not accept that the French might use some of these rights 
as bargaining counters. 
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The Interets Communs were revenues derived mainly from customs. 
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These open challenges, made when the French were in some 
disarray and when the British were still prepared to declare 
martial law, were not publicly disputed by the French. Yet in the 
aftermath of the crisis, the French lost less ground than many 
suggested or assumed. Spears certainly claimed too much in saying 
that "there was a sound as of falling chains" all over the Middle 
East. 
54 For when the dust settled, the French were still there, 
grimly holding on and refusing to be drawn. Yet local French 
officials and soldiers were in an ugly frame of mind. Their 
attitude was "that of a slave merchant to an escaped slave". They 
were biding their time, and they would not or could not accept 
Syrian or Lebanese independence. Indeed, when Spears urged Catroux 
to rescind Helleu's decree nullifying Riad Solh's amendments, the 
wily Frenchman gave the local French attitude as his reason for 
postponing this bitter pill. 
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Thus, when Catroux returned to Algiers, the position was that 
the French still formally rejected any repudiation of the mandate. 
And when Catroux gave his parting exhortation to the French 
community, he counselled a calculating sort of patience rather 
than any acceptance of the inevitable. Claiming that the British 
had inflicted "a second Fashoda" upon them, Catroux said that 
it would be necessary to manifest "a new attitude" in the Levant 
States. But it was an act rather than a change of heart which 
Catroux seemed to be suggesting, for he added a prophetic rider: 
"Until France was restored, they had no alternative but to accept 
the present situation". 
56 So it was back to the old game at which 
Catroux himself excelled - holding on, conceding a little now and 
then, waiting for a change of circumstances. Such a chance might 
well come when France itself was rid of the Germans. 
At the end of November, Spears was beginning to realise 
that if any chains were falling in the Middle East, they were not 
those which bound him, however imperfectly, to the Foreign Office. 
It was soon apparent that the "Fashoda" scene with Catroux had been 
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the high tide of the Casey-Spears-Churchill combination in the 
Levant. A wire from Eden showed how the tide was turning: 
I have been considering with Casey and Macmillan 
what is the best line to follow in the Levant now 
that recent crisis is over.... 
It should be our objective to bring about treaties 
between France and Lebanon and Syria under which 
France will have a position in Levant broadly 
corresponding to ours in Iraq. Recent events will 
have worsened French chance of negotiating such 
a treaty but having regard to our own position 
elsewhere it is not in our interest that Levant 
States should by unilateral action succeed in 
breaking all political ties-with France.... 
Formal execution of treaties must await re- 
establishment of peace when. " . France will regain 
formal authority for treaty making. Meanwhile 
what is needed is a modus vivendi approaching as 
near as possible to projected terms of treaty.... 
. If the Lebanese, as I expect, adopt a stiff 
attitude towards the French, the only people who 
can break the deadlock are ourselves. Wd may be 
in a position to help the French to save something 
out of the wreck of their position in the Levant. 
It is to our interest to do this.... 
If situation deteriorates... British martial law 
still remains open to us as a last resort, but 
this will only be adopted if security position 
imperatively demands. Prime Minister concurs. 57 
In vain did Spears reply that the Levantines were simply not 
prepared to consider a treaty with France: "it is apparent either 
that I have failed to make clear to you the strength of Syrian and 
Lebanese determination to avoid... treaties with France at any stage, 
or alternatively that you appreciate this fact®r but consider it 
of no importance". It was a bit of both. London did not really 
trust Spears' accounts of the Levantine attitude, and failed to 
realise just how misleading the Iraq analogy was - and, accordingly, 
felt that something could still be done for the French if Britain 
offered to play the "honest broker". Spears retorted that the 
Levantines would "merely query the adjective and reject the offer". 
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After this exchange, in which Spears' own previous record ob- 
scured from the Foreign Office the truth of his report, communications 
between Beirut and London deteriorated into arid, fault-finding 
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post-mortems of the recent crisis. 
59 The fundamental position 
was brought home to Spears once more during a meeting in Cairo 
on 6 December. There he was confronted by a galaxy of Foreign 
Office personnel, from Eden and Cadogan down, on their way back 
from Teheran. The "general feeling of the meeting", Lampson 
recorded, "was that the Lebanese would now have to put a little 
water in their wine". They must not "take the bit too much 
between their teeth and run amuck". Lampson himself repeated the 
well-worn maxim that "the precedent of tearing up a mandate uni- 
-laterally might easily have awkward repercussions for us", 
elsewhere in the Middle East. Spears saw no point in batting on 
this wicket, and after a few pro-Lebanese noises he said that he 
could maintain the status quo in the Levant until the war's 
end provided that there was no attempt to coerce the Levantines 
into signing some binding treaty before then. There the meeting 
ended, and Lampson rightly observed that "I do not know that it 
got us very far". 
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It was Catroux, that sensitive monitor of prevailing conditions, 
who most clearly saw which way the wind was blowing in the Levant. 
He was quickly convinced that treaty negotiations were out of the 
question for the time being, and contented himself with some 
fussing over French cultural interests. Having returned to the 
Levant with full powers, Catroux went about exuding goodwill, 
fortified by the noticeable change in London's demeanour since 
Helleu's dismissal. In the Commons, Eden expressed the hope that 
Catroux's negotiations would lead to an early agreement. London 
in turn was encouraged to hear from Spears that Catroux was being 
"most satisfactory and fiiendly" and enjoyed the "full support" 
of the Algiers Committee. 
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On 22 December it was announced in Damascus that the Syrians 
and Lebanese had reached an agreement with Catroux regarding the 
transfer of "powers exercised in their name by the French 
authorities". This impressive statement did not mean that Catroux 
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had handed over everything, least of all the French mandatory 
claim itself. Basically it meant that the Interets Communs, 
"together with their personnel, will be transferred to the Syrian 
and Lebanese States with the right of enacting laws and regulations, 
as from January 1st next". 
62 The arch-procrastinator had put off 
the evil day once more, assisted by London's goodwill and the 
Levantine wish to avoid any sort of treaty negotiations. By parad- 
ing his readiness not to press this question, Catroux had scrambled 
out of the Helleu fiasco at a remarkably low price - conceding a 
service which had been the subject of Levantine demands for the 
last eighteen months in any case! 
As far as negotiations, agreements, and any modus vivendi 
were concerned, this was the only formal result of the Lebanese 
crisis. Beneath all the fine words, Catroux and the Levantines had 
agreed to disagree. Nothing was settled on the issue of the mandate. 
On the French side, Helleu's decree concerning Riad Solh's Reform 
Bill was not rescinded, while the Lebanese regarded the decree as 
ultra vires. Both parties tacitly waited on future events and forces 
to settle the whole status of the Levant once and for all. 
Psychologically, 'however the crisis had some profound effects. 
On the French side, there was a lingering sense of defeat and humili- 
ation, a resentment of the British, neatly expressed in the Fashoda 
slogan; there was a failure to realise that London wanted the French 
to retain a position in the Levant. (Given the behaviour of Church- 
ill, Casey and Spears, it is hardly surprising that the French did 
not see the Foreign Office position very clearly). It was assumed, 
disastrously, that the French mandate would have to be reaffirmed 
by the hard men. - French troops would be heavily reinforced and the 
impertinent Levantines would be compelled to negotiate a suitable 
treaty. In the mind of de Gaulle, in the thinking of French soldiers 
and officials in the Levant, the crisis had greatly intensified a 
siege mentality and a smouldering resentment. 
" 
For the peoples of the Levant, the crisis had given a stagger- 
ing boost to nationalist sentiment. The Lebanese were proud of their 
successful defiance and felt an enormous new confidence in them- 
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selves. Having closed ranks as never before in the face of 
French threats, they discovered a new sense of unity among 
themselves and with the Syrians. France would henceforth have 
to contend with a vigorous political will in the Levant States 
which dwarfed anything that the British had faced in Egypt or 
Iraq when their treaties were negotiated. Hatred of the French 
was almost universal. The idea of independence had taken root and 
captured the simplest imaginations throughout the Levant, and the 
French were powerless to exorcise it. This was the most profound 
result of the crisis - independence had become a grassroots belief, 
a faith, and there could be no return to the pre-war euphemism 
which the French and the Foreign Office called independence - not 
without much bloodshed and repression, anyway. 
For the majority of the Levantines, November 1943 meant that 
they had asserted their independence before the world and the French 
had been unable to stop them. For the French, it meant a deadly 
insult and a temporary reverse which would have to be remedied at 
a more suitable time. What it really signified was that the old 
order of mandatory treaties was a thing of the past - but at the end 
of 1943, neither the French nor the Foreign Office understood this. 
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Chapter Eight H0LDING0N 
One thought alone preoccupies the submerged 
mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to 
die, how to prolong its era. J. M. Coetzee* 
Let him go as a scapegoat into the wilderness. 
Leviticus xvi. 10 
On the surface, the year 1944 was relatively uneventful in 
the Levant, and from an Allied point of view a satisfactory level 
of order was maintained. The war itself moved ever westward. Italy 
had surrendered, and the Germans had been driven back through the 
Ukraine by the Red Army. The Levant was no longer threatened, and 
the Middle East was now a staging-post for Allied supplies and 
communications. The Free French were largely preoccupied with the 
great events culminating in the Normandy landings, the liberation 
of France and the establishment of de Gaulle's provisional govern- 
ment in Paris. The Syrians and Lebanese avoided spectacular 
confrontations with the French, quietly consolidated their gains, 
and made further requests in a more restrained manner. The Levant 
States kept out of the world headlines. 
Yet these calm appearances were deceptive. Beneath the 
surface, the Levant was seething with unsettled questions. The 
local gendarmerie, endeavouring to cope with a volatile and well- 
armed populace, needed newer and better weapons - but the control 
of this police force, and the nature of its weaponry, became an 
endless three-way dispute between the Levantines, the French and 
the British. Likewise the transfer of the locally-stationed levies, 
the Troupes SpEciales, was the subject of futile representations 
throughout the year. Behind these specific issues lurked the 
fundamental Franco-Levantine deadlock over the validity of the 
mandate and the negotiation of a treaty. From time to time the tick- 
ing of this time-bomb could be heard above the daily concerns-6f 
the Levant, whereupon both sides simply repeated their views and 
* Waiting fOr the Berbariens (1980), p. 133. 
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postponed the inevitable confrontation. The Syrians and Lebanese, 
their governments recognised by Britain, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, China and many other states, were confident that the 
international Allied community would soon guarantee and ratify 
their independence. The Levantines therefore confined themselves 
to "putting at [the] disposal of Allies" their territory and com- 
munications, consolidating their position and pursuing the transfer 
of the gendarmerie, the Troupes Speciales and a few less-controversial 
1 
services. 
Holding actions were an even more fundamental tactic for both 
the French and Spears himself in 1944. General Beynet, the new 
French Delegate-General in the Levant, strove to maintain the status 
quo without further concessions, stubbornly denying that the mandate 
was a dead letter or that Levantine independence could be finalised 
without a Franco-Levantine treaty. On the whole, however, he held 
these views in a quiet and unobtrusive manner, and seemed content 
to play the game suggested by Catroux - accepting the situation 
"until France was restored". There were ominous undertones to 
Beynet's apparent calm and moderation, as his occasional outbursts 
revealed. 
These considerations were not lost on Spears, who was anxious 
to remain in the Levant, to support the republics against any French 
retaliation, and to render Syrian and Lebanese independence 
irreversible. As 1944 progressed, however, Spears found it in- 
creasingly difficult to continue in his old style, for his many 
opponents were closing in, hampering his movements, and preparing 
the ground for his dismissal. Spears was therefore obliged to fight 
a desperate holding action of his own. Casey had gone, and although 
Lord Moyne (Casey's replacement) continued to be sympathetic on the 
whole, time was running out for Spears. There were signs that Eden 
was finally penetrating the armour of Churchillian comradeship 
which had protected the Beirut Minister for so long. Churchill 
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himself had nearly broken with de Gaulle on several occasions, 
he admired Spears for his unflinching way with the French, and he 
had long rejected Eden's complaints as either Gaullist-inspired 
or as echoes of Whitehall's professional jealousy. But even the 
Prime Minister was slowly perceiving that Spears, despite his 
past, had become a Francophobe and a partisan of Levantine indepen- 
dence. Churchill began to rebuke Spears, who fought desperately 
to defend and retain his position until the dangerous ambiguities 
had been removed from the situation in the Levant. In 1944 Spears, 
like the French in the Levant, found himself grimly holding on. 
In the aftermath of the Lebanese crisis and the negotiations 
with Catroux, the Levantines and the French went quietly about 
their own affairs in the early months of 1944. Spears also enjoyed 
the comparative calm after the hectic activities of the previous 
months, and he was basking in the warmth of Churchill's continued 
approval. In December the Prime Minister, returning from Teheran, 
had seen Spears in Cairo and congratulated him for his handling 
of the Lebanese crisis. As Spears noted: 
He was very friendly... 
He told me that I had done very well in extremely 
difficult circumstances. He said I had shown 
restraint and judgment and had found a solution 
on democratic lines. He said I must remain in the 
Levant to carry on my difficult task. 
I told him how I was sniped at constantly by the 
Foreign Office and he seemed to be fully alive to 
this (having-been coached by Casey)., he said this 
was the way with people who were not of their own 
kind... 
Gratified by this. welcome support, Spears missed the significance of 
a warning note which. Churchill included in his remarks, a note 
which indicated where he and Spears parted company over the French 
mandatory position: 
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He spoke to me of the dangers inherent in... 
the Levant which might raise issues of positive 
danger to ourselves in other parts of the world. 
What people might learn to do against the French 
in the Levant might be turned to account against 
us later. We should discourage the throwing of 
stones since we had greenhouses of our own - acres 
and acres of them, he said. 2 
Spears had just heard the same argument from Lampson and the 
Foreign Office mandarins in Cairo, but if he saw the point he 
seems to have been either unwilling or unable to let it alter 
his style. 
It was still Churchill's fundamental support, rather than 
his. mild warning, which impressed Spears in the early stages of 
1944, and he would have been further gratified to hear the 
Prime Minister tell de Gaulle in January that the "sudden and 
violent action which [Helleu] had taken in [the Lebanon had 
produced a deplorable impression". 
3 This remark was reported to 
the Foreign Office by Duff Cooper, who had just gone out to Algiers 
as Ambassador to the French National Committee. Duff Cooper had 
had much in common with Spears until 1941. Unlike Spears, however, 
he was convinced that de Gaulle was "the only possible leader" 
for the new France, and he strove to improve Anglo-Gaullist 
relations. He also believed'that 
The conduct of General Spears [suggested] that 
it was his policy to drive the French out of 
Syria and the Lebanon, with the assistance of 
the natives, in order that the British should 
take their place there. This was not the policy 
of the Foreign Office, nor of the Prime Minister, 
but to attempt to persuade the French of this 
was [a] waste of time, so long as Spears re- 
mained at Beirut. 
Thus, although he described Spears as "a good friend", Duff Cooper 
now considered him "a fatal impediment to improved Anglo-French 
relations ". 
4 
The Algiers Ambassador was not the man to admit impediments, 
and in February he wrote to Churchill: 
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Lady Spears has paid us an unexpected visit 
this week, and... has left me in no doubt that... 
her husband [means to] maintain the rights of 
the native populations of the Levant against the 
dominant Power, and even to encourage natives to 
assert these rights.... We have surely enough 
native problems of our own to face without 
stirring up native problems for others.... Spears, 
owing to what I think is a mistaken view of his 
local objective, seems to have altered the whole 
of his European policy and to have become defin- 
itely, if not violently, francophobe. He is 
certainly considered so by all the many branches 
of French opinion.... I do not believe there will 
be peace in the Levant so long as CSpears] remains 
there. 
... perhaps consideration could be given to the 
three years' disfranchisement that has befallen 
the burghers of Carlisle. * 
No doubt Spears would have felt vindicated if be had seen 
Churchill's terse reply to this remarkable request: "Nothing doing 
about the burghers of Carlisle". 
5 
As it was, Spears never saw this 
correspondence until it appeared in Duff Cooper's memoirs, and his 
own eventual comment was that "Winston continued to stand by me". 
6 
This was not entirely true, even in the immediate sense, for 
within three weeks of Duff Cooper's letter, Spears received a 
serious and unexpected rebuke from the Prime Minister. Churchill 
had never had the time or inclination to look at detailed material 
on the Levant, but this time - possibly troubled by Duff Cooper's 
letter - he looked into a bulky Lebanese crisis file, which in- 
cluded some of Spears' wildest anti-French and anti-Whitehall 
telegrams.? Greatly disturbed, Churchill sent Spears a signal 
on 10 March, using language remarkably similar to that of Duff 
Cooper: 
From your long series of telegrams which I have 
read you seem drawn too much to a pro-native and 
anti-French line. I told you in Cairo that I had 
no wish to destroy French influence in Syria.... 
You are however going further than I wish and 
anyone can see you have became bitterly anti-French. 
Our relations- with the French National Committee 
are improving. [De Gaulle] has become more reasonable 
and my relations with him are much-better. 
* Spears' Parliamentary constituency. 
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"You should be careful to avoid an anti-French policy in Syria", 
Churchill concluded. "Admire efficiency and vigilance of your work 
but "surtout pas trop de zele". 
Spears was astonished and dismayed. "Greatly depressed by your 
telegram", he replied; 
You told me in Cairo that I had done well in a 
difficult situation, and this was the greatest 
encouragement to me. I said it would be my 
endeavour to keep things ticking over until the 
end of the war. This I have been endeavouring to 
do, and I can honestly say that I have done 
nothing to make the position of the French more 
difficult. 8 
This claim was too much for Eden, who commented to Churchill that 
Spears' Francophobia was a by-word in the Middle East, and that his 
reputation prevented London from maintaining adequate contacts with 
the French in the Levant, as the French would not confide in Spears. 
Seizing his opportunity, Eden argued that since the French had im- 
proved their behaviour and dismissed some undesirable officials in 
the Levant, it was an appropriate time to replace Spears. Churchill, 
however, was anxious to give his old comrade a chance to heed his 
warning. On 2 April he refused Eden's request. 
9 
A month later, 
commenting on Spears' report of French troops firing on the Lebanese 
Parliament buildings during a riot, Churchill told Eden that "I 
have warned Spears about taking a too pro-Lebanese and anti-French 
view; but... he is quite justified in reporting these facts. After all, 
we are pledged to the cause of Lebanese independence". For the time 
being Eden, who no longer trusted Spears' reports, held his peace. 
10 
The Foreign Secretary soon found fresh anti-Spears material in 
the controversy which had been developing in the Levant over the 
re-arming of the gendarmerie and the transfer of the Troupes Speciales 
to the control of the Syrian and Lebanese governments. In both these 
issues, he held, Spears had exceeded his authority and injected his 
own policy objectives, complicating relatively simple questions and 
inflaming Anglo-French relations. Whether these issues were really 
so simple, and whether a more neutral British Minister could have 
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resolved them satisfactorily, is doubtful, to say the least. But 
by 1944 the Foreign Office had developed a Spears fixation, and 
his role in these labyrinthine disputes was greatly exaggerated 
in London. * 
Obsessed with Spears, Eastern Department failed to appreciate 
the extent to which the Levantine and French attitudes rendered the 
latest disputes interminable. For the Syrians and Lebanese were 
demanding their "rights" in a hard and steely manner, and the 
French were plainly determined to make no more piecemeal concessions 
without a treaty. These frustrating realities were frequently over- 
looked at the Foreign Office, where perspectives on the Levant were 
distorted by the Eurocentric overview which made Anglo-Gaullist co- 
operation essential. 
11 Eastern Depazvtment, the self-confessed 
Cinderella of this policy,. was therefore saddled with a preconceived 
approach to any problem in the Levant,,, and its inability to satisfy 
Whitehall's higher considerationiseems to be reflected in its 
flustered handling of the current disputes and its tendency to use 
Spears as a scapegoat for all its troubles. Personal animosities 
between Peterson and his subordinates on one side, and Spears on the 
other, simply thickened the fog of pre-conceptions through which 
London peered towards the Levant. 
12 
Whether Whitehall liked it or not, the Syrians and Lebanese 
had a particularly. strong case in the matter of the gendarmerie, and 
the initial French response to this question was clearly. inadequate 
and irresponsible. The fact was that the maintenance of basic law 
and order, and the enforcement of any particular edicts from Beirut 
and Damascus, was a dangerous proposition in many parts of the Levant. 
In the Lebanese region north of Baalbek, well-armed tribes carried on 
a semi-independent existence. The same was true of the Alaouite 
region, (a mountainous area near the Syrian coast), the Jebel Druse 
and the vast desert areas of Syria. The immediate responsibility for 
This was virtually inevitable after all the confrontations of 
1943 (See Ch. 6). 
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policing all these areas lay with the gendarmerie, who were under 
the practical control of the Syrian and Lebanese governments. 
Early in 1944, the plight of this force was revealed by its inability 
to deal with a number of serious disturbances. 
13 The situation had 
become completely absurd by May 1944. In that month the gendarmerie 
had to call on regular troops to help them quell what even Eastern 
Department admitted was "a minor civil war" in northern Lebanon, 
whilst in Syria the gendarmerie had been seen off by an Alaouite 
chieftain called Suliman Murshid, whose arsenal included automatic 
weapons and a cannon* 
14 
It was against this background that the Levantine governments 
had originally approached Spears and Holmes with a request for 
assistance in re-arming the gendarmerie, whose weapons and equipment 
were patently obsolete. The Levantines were duly and properly 
referred to the French, and failed to get any effective response. 
At this point Holmes, who had certainly never lent himself to Spears' 
personal aspirations for the Levant, felt that something had to be 
done. As the Allied Commander in the Levant, ultimately responsible 
for all security and order, Holmes had seen enough to be convinced 
that the gendarmerie must be quickly re-armed and improved. He 
therefore asked the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to press for 
the provision of arms from French resources. 
15 
The need for such action was underlined by the French response 
to an emergency request for an advance of 1,000 rifles for the 7,000 
gendarmerie. * The French offered the Syrians a mere 200 obsolete 
carbines (made in 1907) at an exorbitant price. "This", Hankey 
admitted three months later, "has made everyone doubt their good 
faith". 16 At-time, however, the Foreign Office simply overlooked 
these eloquent facts. It was pre-occupied with the diplomatic im- 
proprieties which were now committed by the exasperated British 
authorities in the Middle East: 
* As Lord Moyne pointed out to the Foreign Office, "7000 Gendarmerie 
seems a moderate force as compared with about 9000 regular police 
in Palestine.... Levant States have more than double population of 
Palestine" - Moyne tel., 23 July 1943, F0371/40316/E5031. 
2-g s- 
On 20 June 1944, at the request of [Middle East 
Command] HM Minister [Spears] informed the Syrian 
and Lebanese Governments and the French that as 
the French authorities could not supply the arms 
and equipment required, the British would do so... 17 
"Sir E. Spears has gone off the rails", exclaimed Peterson, who 
promptly assumed that the British offer to the Levant governments was 
another Spears manouevre. Peterson simply did not believe that 
Spears had acted on behalf of the British military authorities, 
(which was, after all, one of his twin tasks in the Levant). It was 
to become clear that Peterson's assumption was false, but in the 
meantime his suspicions were elevated into official Foreign Office 
indignation. "It certainly does seem to me highly undesirable that 
General Spears should cook up with the local Governments ... provisions 
which must be seriously distasteful to the French", minuted Cadogan, 
blindly following Peterson. 
i8 
This unwarranted conclusion was taken up by Eden to be used 
as fresh evidence against Spears. On 29 June the Foreign Secretary 
wrote to Churchill and tried again: 
I have mentioned to you on several occasions the 
unfortunate and continuous tension which prevails 
in the Levant owing to the conviction which the 
French entertain sincerely and not without justifi- 
cation that Spears' objective is to get them out 
altogether. 
Having neatly laid all Levantine difficulties at Spears' door, Eden 
complained that Spears had made an "unauthorised" offer to supply arms 
to the gendazv*rie. This was technically justified, since the 
Levantine governments themselves controlled the gendarmerie, but 
Eden argued that "from the diplomatic point of view there is 
absolutely nothing to be said for Spears' method of procedure". 
Moreover, Eden complained, Spears had burgled certain nego- 
tiations over the Troupes Speciales. "Entirely of his own volition 
he appears to have inserted a clause which will debar the French 
henceforward fron maintaining more troops in the Levant States than 
they have there already". The French would be furious, Eden said, 
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and since Britain also maintained troops in Iraq and Egypt, it was 
"an unhealthy precedent". This accusation was also based on nothing 
more solid than Peterson's suspicions, which completely under- 
estimated the Syrian and Lebanese politicians and attributed all 
anti-French strategy to Spears alone. By the previous standards of 
the mandatory powers in the Middle East, an undertaking not to 
increase French forces in the Levant was certainly an "extraordinary 
stipulation" - but Peterson's assumption that the offending clause 
was simply a product of Spears' "own initiative" showed how far 
Eastern Department was out of touch with Levantine realities. The 
Syrians and Lebanese themselves were convinced that a resurgent 
France would eventually attempt to impose a settlement in the Levant, 
and they were leaving no stone unturned to counter this possibility 
or at least to expose French intentions. Obviously the French would 
be unable to dictate to the Levantines if the 24,000 Troupes Speciales 
were locally-controlled and the French were unable to disembark 
further troops. Nevertheless Peterson promptly ascribed this ploy to 
Spears, and Eden repeated the charge in his petition to Churchill. 
The Foreign Secretary concluded by asking that Spears be brought 
home "for consultation" and told "not to undermine the French in the 
Levant"* 19 
"By all means bring him home for consultation", Churchill 
replied puckishly: "Not being a Foreign Office official is of course 
a disadvantage, but no-one has stood up better for British interests. 
I hope there will be no change in policy while he is away'. '. 
20 This 
last remark was perhaps more pertinent than Churchill. realised, for 
the Foreign Office seems to have arranged a little undermining of 
its own. Several career diplomats had already been transferred away 
from Beirut, including Spears' indispensable lieutenant, Lascelles. 
While Spears was in London, a new Charge d'Affaires took over in 
Beirut, and proceeded to gather what evidence he could that Spears had 
been pursuing an anti-French policy. This unedifying affair revealed 
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the extent of London's Spears-fixation, and its firm intention to 
scuttle its rogue diplomat. 
21 
This attitude was reflected in the strength of Eden's 
retort to Churchill: 
Many who are not Foreign Office officials have 
contrived to work quite happily under the Foreign 
Secretary... Nor am I clear what are the British 
interests for which Spears has stood up... On any 
long view I do not believe [his conduct to be to 
our advantage.... neighbouring Middle East states 
may... try to imitate the success of the Syrians 
and Lebanese in ridding themselves of all foreign 
associations. 
My object [is] to impress upon Spears) that 
while we must fulfil the pledges we have given 
to Syria and Lebanon, we do not want to go beyond 
that and weaken the French in these areas for the 
fun of the thing. If you would join me in such a 
lecture it would be worth while to have him back. 
on 15 July Churchill replied that he had warned Spears some time 
ago and would repeat his "advice" if Spears was recalled to London 
for discussions. 22 
In the meantime, the question of re-arming the gendarmerie had 
become hopelessly deadlocked. In London's view - echoed and confirmed 
by Duff Cooper in Algiers - this was almost entirely the fault of 
Spears. Their view was based on the fact that Spears virtually ig- 
nored and frustrated a Foreign Office signal that the question 
should be referred to an Anglo-French Committee* But this view itself 
ignored the fact that the issue was being strongly pressed by both 
Paget (the British Carder-in-Chief' in Cairo) and Holmes, and that 
Spears claimed to be wearing his military hat in this affair. As 
head of the Spears (military) Mission in the Levant, Spears was 
responsible for conveying the wishes of the Allied Commander to the 
subordinate French General, Humblot. In reality, this whole affair 
had become a first-class dot crcation dispute. The British military 
authorities considered that the French were being thoroughly unco- 
operative in a serious matter of order and security. The French 
looked on it as a political issue, in which British aims were being 
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pursued under a military guise. When the Foreign Office did 
recognise that it was not simply Spears, but Holmes, Paget and 
the War Office who had to be dealt with, they took the view that 
the soldiers were being high-handed and politically naive,, and 
would have to be put in their place. 
In the midst of all this stood that dual being, Major-General 
Sir Edward Spears. By a piece of Manichaean bureaucracy, he had 
been made Sir Edward Jekyll and General Hyde with the blessing of 
Eden himself, and the folly of this dual appointment was now pain- 
fully evident. Spears himself had admittedly sought and welcomed 
his double authority, but it was Eden and the War Office who had 
arranged this curious appointment. In all the wrangling over the 
gendarmerie, however, the Foreign Office seemed to ignore Spears' 
military position, and all his activities were interpreted as 
though the man was subordinate to the Foreign Office alone, and 
had no business to be collaborating with Holmes and Paget. Ironically, 
had Spears insisted on the primacy of politics, taken the matter away 
from the soldiers and entrusted it to an Anglo-French Committee, he 
would probably have been accused by the British military authorities 
of failing as Head of the Spears Mission. In the past, the Foreign 
Office had shown equal readiness to condemn Spears whenever he 
upset Holmes or Middle East Coimend. The fundamental problem, as 
usual, lay in the ambiguous Anglo-French presence in the Levant. 
Spears' own dual appointment was a microcosm of this whole contra- 
dictory arrangement. 
On 3 July Spears had informed the Foreign Office that he was 
unable to refer the gendarmerie issue to an Anglo-French Committee, 
and invoked Paget's authority. The Foreign Office then sought, 
without success, to have Paget brought to heel by means of the 
Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement. On 11 July, Holmes met Humblot in Beirut 
and advised him that Paget had decided to equip and re-arm the 
gendarmerie. Two days later Paget himself conferred with Humblot 
and the two Generals agreed that the gendarmerie should be equipped 
on the scale of other such forces in the Middle East. On the 17th, 
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however, the French suddenly announced that they had been forbidden 
to discuss the matter any further. Algiers had now stepped in. 
23 
These developments inspired a flurry of telegrams from London, 
Beirut, Cairo and Algiers. On 14 July Spears complained of the 
increasing tendency of French to take up matters 
in Algiers without attempting to get them settled 
locally; and, without even informing themselves 
of the facts, to plunge in with hot protests. 24 
Unfortunately for Spears, London itself had now developed this same 
tendency, and the overriding consideration at the Foreign Office was 
the existence of a thorny Anglo-French problem. On the 17th the 
Free French in London complained to the Foreign Office that Humblot 
had not been consulted but simply informed of British decisions, and 
that a considerable quantity of arms had been duly handed over to 
the gendarmerie by the British. On the same day Duff Cooper wired 
that "It is now plain that there has been no consultation with the 
French as was promised but that General Humblot was sent for by his 
superior officer 
[Paget 
and simply informed". Lord Moyne, on the 
other hand, wired from Cairo that Paget had stated "that during his 
recent meeting with Humblot at Beirut, the French never disputed 
the necessity for re-arming the gendarmerie ". 
2S 
It was the Algiers emphasis which Impressed the Foreign Office.. 
despite the facts reported by'Speere on 18 July: 
No (repeat no) area have yet been issued to the 
gendarmerie; nor has any of the, equipment of 
which the army Commander gave the French [a] 
list on July 11th.... French statement to the 
contrary is typical example of the sort of 
garbling that seems inevitable when [storiesa 
reach you through French sources in Algiers.... 
Spears went on to report that he had duly informed the Levantine 
governments of the Paget-Humblot agreement to supply arms to the 
gendarmerie, and pointed out that 
The locals are at the moment extremely suspicious 
öf the French, owing`to recent difficulties over 
[Troupes Sp6ciales, wham the French flatly refused 
to hand over') . If the French were now to procure 
a hold-up in re-equipping of gendarmerie their 
feelings will inevitably be exacerbated... 
27c 
In a separate wire Spears amplified the local suspicion that "the 
French do not wish the gendarmerie to be adequately armed so that 
there should be no local force capable of resisting a coup if and 
when it suits the French to attempt another one". 
26 
This sinister possibility was pooh-poohed in Eastern Depart- 
ment, where it was glibly argued that the French had only three 
battalions in the Levant. This ignored the fact that they still 
controlled, officered and paid the 24,000 Troupes Speeiales, and 
completely overlooked the possibility that the French might attempt 
to disembark fresh troops in the future. In fact the Foreign Office 
continued to discount this possibility for some time. In July 1944 
Spears' warning was dismissed as a "diatribe" by Hankey, who was 
more interested in asserting that the Levantine governments should 
not have been Informed of the arrangements for arming the 
gendarmerie. "This is absolute insubordination", he fumed, begging. 
the question of Spears' exact subordination in this case. 
27 
Peterson agreed that Spears was "jumping the fences for us 
in a quite unjustifiable way". Sir Maurice had now discovered that 
the gendarmerie dispute was not, as he had originally claimed, 
purely the work of Spears - but he neatly shifted his ground 
without altering his basic premise: 
The whole trouble is not only that our Generals 
have. been stupid but that if and when they have 
sought for political guidance they have... sought 
it frag a man who is a great deal more than 
stupid. 
This judo Me't was once more passed on to Eden, and Spears was duly 
told that His Majesty's Government*could not endorse his action 
in informing the Levantine governments, and that he should make 
sure that no arms were delivered until London said so. 
28 
Cairo now made its own attempts to account for the muddle, 
but in trying to strike a balance Lord Moyne telegraphed sets of 
isolated statements from which Eastern Department selected 
suitable sentences. On 19 July he first implied that the French 
were too hard to please and that recent military discussions should 
27 
have "constituted consultation sufficient to save everyone's 
face". Then he said that Spears had ignored a Foreign Office 
instruction, and finally he stated that the British commanders 
seemed to be treating the French soldiers as mere subordinates - 
a curious complaint in view of the Allied chain of command. In a 
subsequent wire Moyne alleged that Spears had "stimulated the 
instinctive army dislike of decisions affecting security being 
questioned in war time", but concluded that while "I mit not in 
agreement with the way Spears has handled the matter, the French 
themselves have been very difficult". 
29 
Spears himself believed there was a root cause of the 
controversy. In his view it was the imposition of external 
desiderata from London and Algiers: 
the very simply question of the rearming of the 
gendarmerie has assumed such inordinate proportions 
because it has become the subject of a triangular 
controversy instead of being handled locally as a 
military matter.... a solution would have been 
found by now but for the interference of Algiers. 
You are attempting to deal with this small 
matter 3000 miles away. 30 
When due allowance is made for the likelihood that neither Spears 
nor the British commanders employed sufficient tact with the local 
French, it must be said that Spears had a strong point, though it 
did nothing to raise his rock-bottom popularity in the Foreign 
Office. Security and order in thee Levant States was exceedingly 
dubious, and would remain so until the gendaxmerie could compete 
with local bandits and heavily-armed tribes. This point was under- 
lined by Lord Moyne on 23 July: 
armament and motor transport must be superior to 
that of tribes with whom gendarmerie have to deal. 
Failure at Beirut to bring about agreement by 
consultation with the French... does not affect 
yielding on main issue. 
Offer by French of obsolete carbines at 41 times 
the price of a new Enfield rifle has already 
provoked great alarm as to French intentions after 
our departure. 31 
This local situation was, however, set aside for the moment. 
It was the wider question of Anglo-French discord and the concept 
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of Spears as the culprit which was dominant in the Foreign Office. 
On the 19th Duff Cooper had reported Massigli's protests that 
Beynet and Humblot had been dictated to by Spears and Holmes, and 
that "British policy... as I had described it to him, was not being 
carried out". Tellingly, Duff Cooper added that he had been acutely 
embarrassed: "I cannot admit to Massigli that [Spears] has failed 
to carry out policy of His Majesty's Government, whereas I cannot 
conceal (this] from myself". 
32 This wire, and Moyne's statement 
that Spears had ignored Foreign Office instructions, were now 
flourished in Eastern Department as proof-texts for the prevailing 
view: "We shall never make sense of the Levant while Sir E. Spears 
is there", declared Hankey, and Baxter added that "but for (Spearsj 
deplorable methods of handling the French there is no reason whatever 
why this trivial question should ever have produced a crisis". 
33 
No good reason, perhaps, but in all the apoplexy over Spears' 
"insubordination" - an inadequate complaint - London missed the 
causal fact that the urgent needs of the gendarmerie had been 
arbitrarily dismissed by the French, whose future calculations were 
but thinly concealed. 
The "prevailing wind" from Algiers was now blowing harder than 
ever. On 20 July Duff Cooper wrote to Eden and reported another 
awkward encounter with Massigli. The latter asked that the following 
questions be put personally to Eden: 
(1) Was the policy of His Majesty's Government 
being 
. carried. out 
in the Levant? If so the 
French would have to reconsider the whole 
position. 
(2) If not, what steps did we propose to. take to 
ensure that our policy should be carried out 
there? 
Duff Cooper dissuaded Massigli from putting these blunt questions 
officially, but of course in this unofficial form they could be 
taken seriously without loss of face. The Ambassador also forwarded 
a personal note to-Eden from Massigli who ccrplained about the 
gendarmerie dispute and repeated his questions on what policy was 
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being pursued at Beirut. Duff Cooper added that "I think you are 
as convinced as I am that things can only go from bad to worse 
in the Levant. so long as Spears remains. there''. This was certainly 
Eden's view although this despatch was bad form by diplomatic 
standards. Nevertheless Eden was content to tell Massigli at 
their next meeting that he was "rather sorry" to receive the 
letter, and conspicuously avoided defending Spears at all. 
34 
By this time Eden had told Spears to "return to London 
immediately for... consultation. Prime Minister and I are concerned 
over the new difficulties which are springing up with the French". 
Spears reluctantly left Beirut on 24 July35 ' I. n . 
London be found 
himself effectively isolated and idle until the latter part of 
August. This time there were no pleasant sessions with Churchill, 
who was either unavailable or out of the country throughout 
August. Spears was kept on ice while the Foreign Office suspended 
further action over the gendarmerie and arranged top level Anglo- 
French talks on the Levant. All he could do before these talks was 
to write to Eden, urging him "to make it clear to the French now 
that our pledge of independence to the Levant States is a permanent 
feature of British policy", which would persuade the French to 
"abandon hope of putting the clock back by violent means". Spears 
considered this necessary because 
the Algiers committee is thinking in terms of 
re-establishing their position by force when... 
a suitable opportunity presents itself. They... 
believe that, presented by a fait accompli, we 
should not react, 
tbecauss93 the importance of 
good Anglo-French relations in a wider sphere 
would make it difficult for us to do so.... this 
is clearly a most dangerous situation. 36 
Eden was not impressed. "I cannot bring myself to believe that the 
policy of recovering by force what has been given up will be adopted 
by any future French Govt", he replied. Eden argued that a 
liberated France would be overwhelmed with internal problems and 
"adventures abroad" would be ruled out. (This vastly under- 
estimated de Gaulle's determination-to resurrect the entire French 
Empire, as far away as Indochina). As for the Levant, Eden now 
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thought that the French themselves were in some danger, for the 
Lebanese crisis had "tilted the balance somewhat unduly against 
them". 
37 
This gave Spears a good indication of the prevailing wind, 
and the conversations which began for him on 24 August soon 
confirmed his worst fears. * There he found General Holmes on good 
terms with his arch-enemy Peterson, who was flanked by Baxter and 
Hankey. Also present were Beynet's adviser, Ostrorog, and Humblot's 
Chief of Staff, Bapst. This wicket proved just as st; c ky as it 
looked. In return for a pledge to ask Massigli to agree to the 
issue of 2,000 rifles to the gendarmerie, Ostrorog was allowed to 
dispute the legitimacy of the Spears Mission. As Peterson reported 
to Eden: 
Ostrorog developed in detail an attack an this 
organisation as being unnecessary, as tending 
to maintain the impression that we were competing 
with the French and as being at best greatly 
overstaffed for any legitimate duties which it 
might have... 
Ostrorog roundly alleged that the Spears Mission was "in more than 
diplomatic contact with the local Governments", and suggested that 
the mission's "political officers" simply encouraged the idea of 
Anglo-French competition. Peterson reported that "when General 
Spears claimed that these officers were serving the needs of our 
military authorities, General Holmes, wig I invited to supply 
confirmation, avoided doing so". In fact, Holmes said that these 
officers were not helping him and should be absorbed into Middle 
East Command. 
The impression given was as damaging as it was misleading. 
As Sir William Croft (who was no Spears sympathiser) had explained 
to Moyne, the apparent size of the Spears Mission was "responsible 
for a good deal of misunderstanding". There were over a hundred men 
involved, but of these, some sixty belonged to the O. C. P. - an 
Anglo-French co-operative project. Of the rest, over thirty belonged 
to the Economic section, which was really part of M. E. S. C. t There 
e Spears was not invited to participate in the top-drawer discussions 
between Eden and Massigli on the 23rd, though Peterson was there. 
Middle East Supply Centrs,, an area of Middle East Ccm®and. 
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were a mere seventeen Political Officers scattered throughout 
the major towns of the Levant. Their orders were to defer to the 
local French authorities and to report politico-military matters 
to Spears. He in turn reported relevant questions - such as local 
disorders - to Holmes. There was nothing sinister in all this, 
and Holmes' remarks were thoroughly mischievous. It was only Spears' 
centralist methods to which Holmes could really object, for whoever 
controlled these seventeen officers, their reports were clearly 
necessary as long as the British were ultimately responsible for 
security in the Levant. In the context of the meeting, however, 
Holmes had lent himself to the eternal allegation that the Spears 
Mission was a sinister anti-French organisation. 
9 
Under these circumstances Eastern Department had heard from 
Ostrorog and Holmes what it wanted to hear, and the 24 August 
meeting was yet another blow to Spears' hopes of retaining his 
position in the Levant. As for the top-level talks between Eden 
and Massigli, and the subsequent toings and froings - from which 
Spears was excluded - these amounted to a meaningless exchange of 
generalities, which achieved nothing except to prove that the 
Foreign Office was anxious to placate Massigli. London had originally 
disapproved of a strong note fz Massigli which. made a clear 
reference to Spears' machinations, but when Massigli stood his 
ground and threatened "to consider his mission to London a failure", 
the Foreign Office hastily revised its note and handed Massigli an 
anodyne recitation of all the old platitudes, together with an 
interesting pledge to attempt to reduce British organisations in 
the Levant. Spears, who obviously had no choice, was asked to 
approve this note. 
40 
On the same day, Spears wrote to Eden again: "The meetings 
we have had with the French ... have done nothing to allay my 
apprehensions concerning their inability to learn 
[from' 
past 
experience"., he said, and warned Eden of the Levantines' 
extraordinary depth of feeling [against a treaty. 
The Syrian President (said he would rather cut 
off his right hand than sign one with the French, 
and. the-Lebanese that he would rather return to 
Rachaya... for the rest of his life. It is, therefore, 
to nurse an illusion to believe that the States will 
sign one while they feel as they do at present... 41 
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Unfortunately for Spears, this was precisely the illusion which 
London was determined to nurse, and its complete distrust of Spears 
obscured the hail facts in the Levant until he was removed. 
On 1 September Spears had a crucial interview with Eden, in 
which he discovered that his own advice counted for nothing and 
his personal position was even more precarious than he had thought. 
Eden stressed that the position between the Levantines and the 
French "must be properly regularised... by a treaty or some 
analagous arrangement" and that Spears "must work to this end and 
not encourage the Syrians or the Lebanese to flout the French 
on this issue". Eden was in an uncompromising mood. There were too 
many political officers in the Levant, he continued, and the 
Spears Mission staff was too large. Spears was therefore told to 
"pave the way" for a Franco-Levantine treaty and to reduce the 
Spears Mission with a view to its eventual disappearance. 
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Worse was to follow. Eden spoke of his desire to make many 
new diplamatia-appointments in preparation for the post-war period, 
and announced that Spears' return to the Levant "should be limited 
to about two months" or a little more. Spears was astonished, and 
"objected strongly", as he subsequently informed Churchill. But 
Spears did not realise that his brief return was a compromise 
arrangement between Churchill and Eden, and that the latter had 
pressed for Spears' immediate replacement. Spears immediately 
wrote to Churchill, asking him "to ensure that I am *not asked to 
leave my post until the end of the wer with Germany", and 
reminding the Prime Minister that be had often expressed great 
satisfaction with Spears' work. 
43 
The chilling reply revealed the full extent of Spears' 
isolation. The game was up, and in personal terms Churchill's 
letter was the unkindest cut of all: 
I had great difficulty in securing your return... 
You did not take. my advice to try to keep your 
Francophobia within reasonable bounds and there 
is no doubt that great irritation is felt by the 
French.... I agree with Anthony that it would be 
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a good thing to make new arrangements in the 
Levant [when there is] a more representative 
French Government.... I think you must take it 
that two or three months will be the limit of 
your tenure out there.... when the time comes, 
you will be given opportunity of asking to be 
relieved instead of being abruptly superseded. 
This is the best I can do... 44 
On that note, Spears made his disillusioned way back to the Levant, 
carrying instructions which he considered ill-advised, and which he 
would find highly distasteful to carry out. 
**** 
August 19+14 had been a disastrous month for Spears. The 
Prime Minister, clearly swayed by the Foreign Office case against 
Spears, had now accused his old comrade of unbridled Francophobia 
and given him a few months' notice. The Foreign Office itself, 
bent on what it called restoring the balance, officially favoured 
the French desire for a post-mandatory treaty and gave Spears 
the strictest instructions to recommend this to the Syrians and 
Lebanese. From Spears' point of view, that "prevailing wind" was 
now approaching gale force. On 26 August de Gaulle himself strode 
through Paris in triumph. In his epic journey to the Liberation he 
had left a trail of outwitted rivals and'enemies behind him, and 
it could be only a matter of weeks now before the Allies were 
obliged to recognise a Gaullist government in Paris. There would 
then be a proper French authority ready to sign a treaty with the 
Levant States and,. despita the internal chaos in France, determined 
to re-assert French "rights" in, the Levant and elsewhere. 
Grimly, Spears proceeded to obey Eden's instructions, 
"impressing on the local Governments that. the conclusion of an 
agreement with the French is in [Britain's] view not only the best 
but perhaps the sole method of securing full and unchallenged 
independence". 45 On 11 September he conveyed this to the Syrian 
President, and recited the "advantages" of a treaty with France. 
The President replied that such a treaty was simply "a licence to 
plunder". On the 13th Spears saw the Syrian President. Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister, and repeated his piece again. The retort was 
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impressive: in 1919 Britain had betrayed the Arabs, who were 
just beginning to trust Britain again. London was now throwing 
away this goodwill on behalf of a country which at a perilous 
moment had invited the Germans into the Levant. As Spears informed 
London, "I had not thought... that these men who were my personal 
friends would have expressed their views with such brutal 
frankness". 46 
The Syiiänn attitude was precisely what Spears had always 
reported it to be. Indeed, throughout August Spears had attempted 
to tell the Foreign Office that no Syrian or Lebanese leader 
would consider the idea of a treaty. But Eastern Department still 
refused to believe this unpalatable evidence that it was out of 
touch with Levantine attitudes. On 25 September it fastened the 
blame on Spears' own attitude: 
Spears has consistently maintained that the 
French should be thrown out of Syria. He seems 
to have carried out his instructions about the 
necessity for a Syrian-French treaty in such a 
way that it has been the biggest possible 
shock to the Syrians.... If we leave Sir E. Spears 
there, Lit is] almost certain that there will 
never be any understanding between the French 
and the Levant States. 47 
This simplistic obsession continued to blind the Foreign Office to 
the unswerving attitude of the Levantines and to their increasing 
capabilities. Obviously Spears found-it distasteful to convey 
London's views, and he did so without visible enthusiasm, but it 
was ludicrous to suggest that this had determined the Syrian 
attitude. On the contrary, the fact that Spears himself had to 
convey this message must have left the 'Syrians in no doubt that 
London wanted a Franco-Levantine treaty.. Spears' private reflections 
on this affair are enlightening:. 
the proposals to sign a treaty which I had 
been ordered to make were not only not 
accepted... it was only the fact that I had 
made them that prevented the States going off 
the deep end. 48 
There was something in this which the Foreign Office never recognised, 
for the considerable influence which Spears still had enabled him 
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to moderate the response of the Levantines, who were now in an 
angry and dangerous mood. 
Tension was mounting in the Levant. The French were pressing 
the Levantines to sign a treaty, and were now claiming London's 
support in their representations. Spears told the Foreign Office 
that with the Syrians refusing to budge, Britian was simply 
getting the worst of both worlds. 
49 At the end of September he 
found an unexpected ally in Ernest Bevin: "Having made use of these 
people during the war we are now deserting them and forcing them 
to accept the French", min nwmAl3 told Eden. "It appears to me that 
we are trying to put the block back to 1919". The enibattltd Ede. , 
who waz now getting into deep waters, clutched at Eastern 
Department's straw and suggested too Churchill that Spears had 
deliberately sabotaged a policy he disliked, and ought to be re- 
called immediately. But the Prime Minister had developed his own 
misgivings about recent events. "I am sure we are under no 
obligation to struggle for an exceptional position for the French", 
he told Eden, and refused to shorten the period promised to Spears. 
50 
Feelings were now running high in the Levant, and there were 
ominous signs on both sides that the forces of confrontation were 
preparing themselves. On 30 September Moyne reported to Eden that 
the French had now officially proposed "to use the 
[Levant] States 
as a Transit Base for French troops to the Far East". Paget was 
alarmed, and Moyne said that in view of 
the increasing tension of which I have had 
ample evidence in my talks, with the Syrian and 
Lebanese [leaders this week I [agree that very 
serious developments... might be expected from 
the arrival of any considerable number of French 
troops. 51 
At the same time, the Syrians were becomiing restive over the 
continued refusal of the French to transfer the Troupes Speciales, 
and Spears had been ordered to stop asking the French to do so. With 
the Syrian Chamber about to re-convene, this deadlock seemed likely 
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to cause serious trouble. Churchill personally wired on 3 October 
to say that he counted on Spears to avert any further crisis in 
the Levant. Spears promptly replied that he would intervene, using 
Churchill's good name, despite the fact that the Foreign Office's 
bewildering changes of policy had seriously damaged Britain's 
influence and prestige in the Levant. 
52 
Spears then told the 
Foreign Office that the Syrian President had agreed to restrain 
his colleagues "a little longer", but he expected in return that 
"Mr. Churchill will obtain for us the army 
Ci. 
e., Troupes Speciales' 
that was promised". 
53 
Early in October Churchill and'Eden made a brief stopover in 
Cairo on their way to Moscow, and the Foreign Secretary had a talk 
with Moyne and Paget. Moyne - who privately relayed this 
conversation to Spears - reported the threatening and reactionary 
attitude now being shown by French officers, and the "hatred of the 
French" which all the Arab leaders were now showing. Eden's reply 
stressed French rights in the Levant. Eden himself reported this 
conversation to Cadogan, stating that the situation "is a stubborn 
one and full of menace 
[which might cause real trouble throughout 
the Middle East". He added that "further difficulties" had been 
created by Spears, a view which he bad evidently exported from 
London, for it was certainly not expressed by Moyne or Paget. Finally 
Eden asked the Foreign Office to telegraph its suggestions. 
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"We are of course painfully aware how much the Syrians and 
Lebanese hate the French", Cadogan replied on 15 October. He now 
recognised that "unless we get an agreement of some sort between 
them... especially over the location and strength of any French 
forces... there will sooner or later be a clash which will upset the 
Middle East". British influence must therefore be used to obtain a 
Franco-Levantine agreement "While we still have troops in the 
Levant States". Given the unyielding rejection of any such agreement 
by the Levantines, Cadogan's answer was hardly adequate - indeed, 
with the Levanti es flatly rejecting any treaty with the French, 
and the latter bent. on reinforcing their mandatory position, 
satisfactory answers ware elusive. The only i9amediate step which 
Cadogan suggested concerned the old red herring: 
23 j 
I greatly hope... that you will be able to arrange 
departure of Spears. He has already mis-managed the 
situation badly, and is obviously out of sympathy 
with any policy except throwing the French out. It 
is true that he has great influence, but he will 
not use it in the way we require. 55 
This recommendation embodied Eastern Department's views and was 
the only concrete measure suggested to Eden. 
A few days later Churchill, Eden, Moyne and Paget met in 
Cairo to discuss the deteriorating situation in the Levant. The 
latest developments, set out by Moyne, were certainly alarming. 
The recent Arab Congress at Alexandria had prominently endorsed 
Lebanese independence as asserted by the Riad Solb government, and 
had passed a resolution that while its member states were free to 
conclude their own treaties, these should not be detrimental to Arab 
interests or the Arab movement. Beynet had promptly called on the 
Lebanese President and stated that these resolutions precluded any 
Franco-Levantine treaty and France might therefore consider Catroux's 
independence proclamations invalid! Moreover, the French had just 
rejected in toto the demand for the transfer of the Troupes Speciales. 
Finally, in "the exercise of... his discretion", Paget had already 
held up four attempts to reinforce French troops in the Levant. 
There were fears of another co v, Moyne reported, "and the arrival 
of further French forces would probably cause a clash with disastrous 
complications". What was to be, done, he asked, if the French made a 
determined and unauthorised bid to disembark troops at Lebanese ports? 
The ensuing discussion of this menacing situation was curiously 
vague and futile. Churchill thought that any French "gatecrashing" 
was unlikely, but that Paget'should have discretion on security 
grounds to go on refusing' French reinforcements. Moyne apparently 
thought that both France and Britain should move out altogether, but 
Harvey (accompanying Eden) argued that this would weaken Britain's 
own mandatory position. ". 
Churcbill suddenly declared that the Arabs 
On 14 October Hankey minuted that Eden had heard from Churchill who 
said that he "hesitated to let 
[Eden] tell Spears to send in his 
resignation because he was a powerful personality and a crisis. was 
impending, and it seemed questionable whether this was the 
moment to make a change. But the whole trouble is that, so long 
as Sir E. Spears is in. Beirut, there is sure to be one crisis after 
another. (I hope the P. M. isn't going to rat on us! )" - F0371/40318/E6370. 
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had done nothing for Britain "except to revolt. .. in Iraq". Eden 
added that he personally had "little faith in Middle East 
democracies", and advised support for the French if they were 
"reasonable". 56 Subsequent reactions at the Foreign Office were, 
on this occasion, more realistic. As Hankey minuted: 
It is not clear why the Prime Minister concludes 
that the French will not gatecrash the ports... 
It seems prima facie to be just what they will do, 
especially if they get to hear of this decision. 
We really are sitting on a volcano in Beirut. 57 
While this imperial volcano continued to smoulder through 
the autumn of 1944, European priorities were being re-asserted in 
Paris. De Gaulle's government had been recognised, and Churchill 
was invited to Paris for Armistice Day celebrations. "We all 
tremble for the result", wrote Harvey, noting that Churchill was 
still "violently anti-de Gaulle". These anxieties were soon allayed, 
for de Gaulle had prepared a magnificent reception for the British 
Prime Minister. At 11 am on 11 November the two leaders drove past 
cheering multitudes along the Champs Elysees, which rang with 
Churchill's name. At the luncheon which followed, de Gaulle himself 
made "a most flattering speech" in honour of Churchill. It was a 
great day for Francophiles, as Harvey noted: 
Prime Minister's visit to Paris an out- 
standing success and all our forebodings 
dispelled. He and [Eden] had an over- 
whelming reception and its warmth melted 
the old man as well as de Gaulle. 
Churchill himself later informed de Gaulle that 11 November had been 
"one of the proudest and most moving occasions of my life". 
58 
The heady wine was still circulating on 11 November when 
Churchill and de Gaulle, flanked by their Foreign Ministers, had 
a general conversation which included the Levant. More detailed 
talks were held on the 12th between Eden, Cadogan, Bidault and 
Massigli. Churchill and'de Gaulle had been content to agree on the 
hoary old Iraqi analogy, and their subordinates did not get much 
further. Speaking as the new Foreign Minister, Bidault said that 
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France would carry out the independence pledge and also retain 
her special rights in the Levant. Eden suggested a compromise over 
the Troupes Speciales and said that the arrival of French re- 
inforcements would be "unfortunate". Nevertheless he thought that 
"there was no essential difference" between the British and French 
views. Both prescribed a Franco-Levantine treaty. 
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These conversations were remarkable for their evasions, omissions 
and sheer remoteness. The harsh facts were that the Levant States 
repudiated the French mandate and had ruled out the idea of a treaty; 
Beynet's alarming statement had not been withdrawn tht 
Troupes Speciales had not been transferred; the gendarmerie were still 
not properly equipped; and French reinforcements were knocking on the 
door. Eden's mild protests hardly touched all this, and the Levant 
situation was now, if anything, mare menacing than ever, for the 
French could not have missed the token nature of the British repre- 
sentations. This timidity was perhaps understandable: Eden had 
endured much to cement Anglo-Gaullist relations and his hour had 
come round at last. He was not disposed to spoil it for those Middle 
East democracies in which he did not believe. At best, however, he 
and Cadogan seriously under-estimated the French resolve to make a 
comeback in the Levant. A lot more than half-hearted objections were 
required to deflect the French fron this purpose. 
This November detente, so welcome to Eden and the Foreign 
Office, boded ill for the Levant and for Spears himself. On 24 
October the Beirut Minister had written again to Churchill: 
Few people out here would deny that I have 
done a good job for England.... 
You dubbed me a franc ophobe but] the rehabil- 
itation of France, and Frenc policy in the 
Levant, are two separate and distinct problems.... 
It has meant no small sacrifice to take a stand 
against the French.... whenever their policy was 
reasonably co-operative I have got on with them; 
but when our war effort was hampered I have re- 
ported it and fought to put things right.... 
I do not believe'You wish me to be a burnt offer- 
ing to de Gaulle. All I am asking for is... time 
to prevent the work I have done being destroyed.... 60 
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There had been a chance that this appeal might succeed. Churchill 
had recently told Eden that with a crisis impending in the Levant, 
it was a bad time to remove a strong personality like Spears. * And 
the latter had recently satisfied Churchill's personal appeal to 
keep the Syrians in line for the sake of the war effort. But 
Armistice Day changed the odds c(xnpletely. The old France of 
Churchill's deepest sentiments had materialised before his eyes 
and saluted him. He had came to terms with de Gaulle, and Spears 
was to learn that he had asked in vain. 
By December 1944, as though delivered frae its Spears 
fixation)+ , Eastern Department at last perceived the enormity of 
Britain's predicament in the Levant. The alarming evidence had 
had its effect, and the authentic Levantine voice cap the mandate/ 
treaty issue was finally heard. Spears' reports on this matter had 
been persistently treated as his own views writ large, but on 28 
November Hankey heard them from the now Lebanese Charge d'Affaires, 
H. Khoury. Hankey was told that "a predominant position for 
France necessarily meant the infringement of Lebanese independence". 
Asked if "a few French advisers" were really such a threat, Khoury 
retorted that "the French could not get away from mandatory 
mentality or the idea of a secular mission. And when they ran the 
country, they did not even run it well". Khoury stressed that the 
Levant States rejected any ex-mandatory treaty with France, and he 
denied that there was any true analogy with the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. 
When Hankey's account of this conversation was circulated, 
one of the old school declared with some irritation that "the 
Levant States will have to accept a French position there similar 
to ours in Iraq". But such imperious decrees were no longer possible. 
Hankey himself replied on 10 December : 
* See p. 28I footnote. 
t The autumn appointment of Sir M. Peterson as Ambassador to Turkey 
seems to have removed some of the Spears monomania from Eastern 
Department. 
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I think it is going to be a matter of extreme 
difficulty to get the Levant States and the 
French to agree on anything.... the French will 
be lucky to get half what we have in Iraq.... 
As I see it we cannot afford either 
(a) to have the French just chucked out. This 
would be bad for us in Iraq or Egypt; 
(b) to have the French get more than Arab opinion 
thinks reasonable... and lead to their saying that 
we have not kept our promises, as in 1920. This is 
extremely little for the French; 
or c to have a complete breakdown and a resort to 
arms in which we shall almost inevitably have to 
intervene forcibly in order to maintain order in 
the Arab world.... 61 
There, at last, was Britain's threefold predicament in the Levant 
recognised, without illusiaos, within the Foreign Office. 
Unfortunately this clarity of vision had come desperately 
late in the day. It came even later to Eden, and last of all to 
Churchill himself. With the Levantines flatly denying the concept 
of French rights, and the French insisting on far more than the 
Arab world would tolerate, there was little time left to avert 
an armed clash. In the Levant, the breathing-space was almost 
finished, like- the time of grace given to Spears himself. Franco- 
Syrian relations were deteriorating rapidly, and on both sides 
the period of holding operatio s, was drawing to a close. The 
reckoning was near. 
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Chapter Nine END OF A MISSION, END OF A MANDATE 
Its n'ont rien appris, ni rien oublie. 
Talleyrand 
my alliance with the guardians of the Empire 
is over, I have set myself in opposition, 
the bond is broken, I am a free man. 
J. M. Coetzee* 
As the Syrian situation deteriorated through the autumn of 
1944, Spears was beginning to think that his personal bid to stay 
on in the Levant might succeed after all. He had made a strong appeal 
appeal to Churchill in October, and as time passed his hopes grew, 
encouraged by a copy of Moyne's letter of 1 November to Eden: 
+ 
we should avoid any action which appears to en- 
dorse Beynet's suggestion that the French should 
go back on their promise of independence.... 
the French want the excuse of disorder to justify 
military reoccupation to maintain order. The acid 
test of French intentions seems to be the Troupes 
Speciales and Gendarmerie controversies.... 
it seems to me that the departure of Spears at 
this time would be unfortunate.... On the part of 
the States it might be taken to confirm the sug- 
gestion of a change in our policy and provoke an 
explosion. I think therefore that he should remain 
at his post until these burning controversies 
are quenched. 1 
As November went by, with its omens of a fresh conflict in the 
Levant, Spears became convinced that the appeals to Churchill and 
Eden, and the disturbing developments in the Levant, had secured 
an extension of his original time-limit. 
Assuming that London's silence was a good sign, Spears was 
unprepared for the worst, as his diary reveals: 
I had felt convinced that as since I returned from 
England all my prognostications had proved to be 
so accurate, and the refusal of the locals to sign 
treaties was so unanimous and so well backed by the 
other Arab states, that Winston and Anthony would 
feel it was necessary I should stay on. 
* Waiting for the*Bärbärians (1980), p. 78. 
+ It was one of Lord Moyne's last acts. On 6 November 1944 he 
was shot and killed by Zionist assassins. 
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But however well Spears had read the Levant situation, he had 
completely misinterpreted London's silence: "It came therefore as 
a great shock to me when on November 23rd I received a telegram 
from Winston suggesting I should resign". 
2 
Perhaps the most galling feature of this telegram was the 
linking of Spears' recall to the recognition of de Gaulle's 
provisional government in Paris: 
[In September] I indicated certain conditions 
which I thought should be fulfilled for your 
return home, in particular the broadening of 
the de Gaulle government... so that we could 
recognise it.... This has been achieved and I 
feel your mission has now been accomplished. 
I am sure you would be wise to come home now 
in view of impending general election. Please 
send your resignation to take effect from 
December 15th. This will I am sure be thought 
a natural step to be taken by any member of 
Parliament... if he desires to stand again. 3 
Bitterly, Spears concluded that this message was the upshot of 
Churchill's visit to Paris, where "he had had his head somewhat 
turned". 
4 This was a shrewd guess, for Armistice Day had a profound 
effect upon Churchill, and produced a temporary thaw in his relations 
with de Gaulle. On returning from Paris, Eden took the opportunity 
to remind Churchill that Spears' time was up and that the other 
condition - recognition of the French government - was happily 
fulfilled. To this Churchill at last agreed, dropping his recent 
view that Spears was needed in Beirut as long as a crisis was immi- 
nent. 
5 Within two months the Prime Minister was to regret his assent. 
On 5 December a Foreign Office communique announced the 
resignation of Spears and the appointment of his replacement, Mr 
Terence Shone (a career diplomat). It was emphasised that Spears' 
departure meant "no change in British policy" and was "solely due to 
[his] desire to resume his Parliamentary duties". 
6 In the Levant, 
however, this sounded hollow and convinced nobody. The French were 
still withholding the transfer of the Troupes Speciales until the 
Levantines signed a treaty which they had publicly abominated, the 
British had been urging the Syrians to be more flexible, the French 
were plainly bent on reinforcing their military positions in the 
Levant - and at this precise moment London announced the recall of 
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the man who embodied Britain's pledge to guarantee the independ- 
ence of the Levant States. 
The Syrian and Lebanese leaders feared the worst. When 
Spears broke the news personally to the two Heads of State, the 
Lebanese President "collapsed and wept like a child" and President 
Quwatli, although "more manly", was visibly upset. 
7 
It was not 
only the indigenous politicians who mourned the departure of Spears. 
Furlonge recalled the considerable apprehension among the old hands 
at the British Legation and Consulate, who knew that the move had 
been "engineered" by those who "blamed Spears personally" for the 
Levantine imbroglio. 
8 Throughout Beirut and Damascus there were 
fears that the sudden departure of Spears would be followed by the 
arrival of an unsympathetic Minister and a change of attitude to- 
wards Levantine independence. The inevitable gloating of the local 
French authorities did nothing to allay these fears. Nor did the 
arrival of a French cruiser and the despatch of twenty French tanks 
to Damascus, within days of Spears' departure. 
9 
Furlonge and his colleagues were not the only uneasy Britons. 
Throughout the Middle East British authorities were apprehensive 
about London's policy. On 23 December Lord Killearn* warned the 
Foreign Office that it was pursuing two conflicting policies in the 
Middle East. On one hand it was promoting Arab unity, but on the 
other it was supporting Zionism in Palestine and "French predomi- 
nance in Syria". Killearn argued that even lip-service to the 
French desire for a post-mandatory treaty might be a fatal mistake: 
If we support the French, 
ItheyT are bound to go ahead 
energetically with the business and if opposition is 
encountered the chances are that General de Gaulle 
with his well-known inclination towards drastic methods 
will use force at least against the Lebanon.... If we 
allow the French to impose a treaty on the Lebanon by 
force we shall become involved in a conflict with 90% 
of the Arab world and sooner or later we shall end by 
losing the Middle East.... All sorts of nationalist 
problems are boiling up in the Middle East and even 
without the millstonesot French and Zionists around 
our neck we shall have quite enough to handle. 
* Sir Miles Lampson, now elevated to the peerage as Lord Killearn. 
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A rather offended Foreign Office told itself that Lord 
Killearn had misunderstood the position, that it did have a co- 
hesive policy for the Middle East, and that "the departure of the 
forceful personality of Sir E. Spears" did not mean that London 
was backsliding in the Levant. But if London had such a policy, it 
must rank among the best-kept secrets of the Second World War. It 
was certainly not evident to Killearn, who was probably the most 
experienced and prominent British diplomat in the Middle East. 
London's reply was unconvincing, and amounted to an insistence on 
reconciling the irreconcilable. On 5 January 1945 the Foreign 
Office repeated to Killearn its support for Arab unity, effectively 
admitted that no firm decisions had been made on Palestine, and 
stated that there was no intention of pressing the Levant States 
to sign away their independence. But London did want the Levantines 
"to reach agreement with the French as to the nature of their 
future relations". Admitting that de Gaulle might try to use force 
and that this would create a worse crisis than November 1943, 
London nevertheless argued that 
the possibility of it is precisely the reason why 
an agreement seems to us so necessary. We have not 
said that the Syrians and Lebanese must concede 
everything.... But they are not facing the need 
for an agreement at all and do not even know what 
the French proposals are. 
This sounded impressive enough, but the Foreign Office conspicuously 
failed to add that London itself had no knowledge of the French 
proposals! London was therefore urging the Levantine's to explore an 
agreement with the French on the exceedingly dubious assumption 
that French proposals would not involve any "real derogation" from 
the States' independence. iO 
In the light of recent events and attitudes in the Levant, 
this assumption was hopelessly naive, and it was soon evident that 
Levantine instincts on the nature of French proposals were more 
realistic. Zn fact, if the Foreign Office really believed its own 
reply to Killearn, it was indulging in sheer self-delusion. For 
Eastern Department had recently bad a fruitless. discussion with the 
slippery Ostrorog on the very question of French proposals. Baxter 
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and Hankey had given Ostrorog "several chances to say what the 
French intended the treaties should contain, but he did not give 
any indication". Ostrorog had indeed been evasive. "These things 
could not be hurried in the East", he had breezed. "The French 
would wait till the States saw the need for such agreements". 
This remark proved to be a euphemism worthy of Helleu, and one 
commentator shrewdly minuted: "He may wish to wait also until 
British troops have cleared out". And yet, despite this completely 
unsatisfactory session with Ostrorog, London was continuing to 
commend to the Levantines an agreement with the French. 
11 By lending 
its good offices too readily, the Foreign Office was giving fresh 
hostages to fortune in a region where, as Killearn had remarked, 
Britain had quite enough to handle already. It was also arousing 
genuine fears in the Levant of another sellout of 1919 proportions. 
Rumours of a sellout mobilised Spears in all his old style 
during the final days of his Ministry. Once informed of his dis- 
missal, he removed the diplomatic gloves. "From that time on", 
he recalled without undue modesty, 
I considered myself a free man and began to make 
very open speeches. They were really very good 
speeches and made a profound impression.... This 
counter-acted the French propaganda that it was 
owing to their efforts that I had been recalled. 12 
At the same time Spears tried to get some helpful public statement 
from London to discourage the general interpretation of his recall. 
On 1 December he sent 70th birthday congratulations to Churchill 
and asked for an emphatic statement that there would be no change 
in British policy. But the Prime Minister sought Eden's advice 
and Spears' request was denied. * 
13 
The final chapter of Spears' memoirs does not reveal the story of 
his dismissal. This may-well have been the express wish of General 
Spears, whose esteem for Churchill somehow survived. On the other 
hand it is stated in the Editorial Note to'Fulfilment that the final 
chapter was completed by his. wife after the death off Spears in 1974. 
In its final form, Fulfilment simply follows the old official 
communique, stressing Spears' wish to resume his Parliamentary 
duties as the reason for his "resignation". But any desire not to 
open old wounds had already been frustrated by the publication of 
Woodward's Official History in 1975. His account tends to canonise 
the Foreign Office version of events and, as history, it is both 
slanted and inadequate. I have therefore attempted to provide a 
more broadly-based and balanced account of the sFFatr) from its or; ys^s, 
29 
A few days before his departure Spears was infuriated by a 
report on his "recall" in the Palestine Post, which was quoting the 
Times, and he fired off one last telegram to the Foreign Office: 
I must ask you to issue an immediate explanation 
that the word "recall" was incorrectly used.... 
If [the Levantines] feel that they have been misled 
about my resignation so they will feel that they 
have been fooled by promise that there would be no 
change of policy.... Local French can be relied on 
to exploit the Times statement Land Arab suspicion] 
that your real object was... to hand them over to 
the French will become a certainty. Against this 
fate they are prepared to go down fighting. 14 
This request was also denied, and Eden's subsequent instructions 
to the new man, Shone, showed that London was still motivated by 
a very different set of priorities: 
French and British interests in the Levant States 
are not fundamentally opposed, so long as the 
French Government follow a policy in accordance 
with their obligations and promises.... There is 
however a long heritage of bad relations between 
France and Great Britain in the Levant. 
It was this Anglo-French discord which concerned Eden above all else. 
"I am anxious to bring this state of affairs to an end", he told 
Shone. "lIt hass had a disproportionate influence on Anglo-French 
relations". 
15 With this prdörity in mind, Eden had no intention of 
issuing any statement which minimised the mileage he hoped to ob- 
tain with the French through the departure of Spears. 
Amid scenes of great emotion Spears left the Levant, deeply 
moved by the "unanimous reaction" of the Levantines: 
Quite regardless of consequences they vied with each 
other in giving me the most loyal signs of affection 
... A street had already been named after me 
in 
Beirut. Damascus followed suit. [I was] made a citizen 
of the Lebanon.... [In Damascus] I was also given a 
great banquet in the Serail, which had only been used 
twice before for this purpose, once when a dinner was 
given to Lord Allenby, and once to King Feisal. The 
President... contrary to all protocol, attended and 
conferred on me the highest Syrian order, the Ommayed 
with diamonds. The Lebanese also conferred their 
highest decoration on me. 
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Showered with honours and beautiful gifts, Spears left Beirut 
and was escorted to the Palestine border by the Lebanese. 16 
The Scourge of the Francophiles had finally been removed, 
but as the esteemed champion of the Levant States he was by 
no means eliminated from public affairs. Having once been known 
to the House of Commons as the Member for Paris, he was returning 
to Westminster to play the Member for Beirut and Damascus. In the 
meantime he made his intentions perfectly clear. Killearn was 
soon reporting from Cairo that Spears was giving the censors a 
headache with his controversial press interviews: 
The gist of 
[it] is that Arab and Moslem world 
opinion is waiting to see whether British will 
keep their word to Levantine States or whether in 
the interests of good relations with French they 
will force the States to make concessions... 
"No doubt the line Sir E. Spears will take in Parliament", Hankey 
commented. "It was grossly improper", declared Butler, Peterson's 
replacement. 
17 But Spears, who was feeling "a bitter sense of 
grievance at Anthony's and Winston's behaviour" in sacking him, 
was in no mood to defer to Foreign Office proprieties. 
18 
On 24 December 1944 Spears opened-his'campaign in England 
with an interview published in the Sunday Express. Confessing him- 
self amazed at certain British press remarks about handing Syria 
back to the French, Spears said that this would amount to the rape 
of the Levant States. "In the' name of what principle that we are 
fighting for can a treaty be imposed on them? ", he asked: 
The Arab nations ... arºe well disposed and 
friendly to us today, but they will not remain 
so if we allow any members of their group to 
be bullied. If we forfeit their friendship, it 
will be lost for good.... If we held the ring 
while pressure was put on friendly little people, 
then. indeed the outcry would know no-bounds. 
There were wider dangers, Spears addedt"Should the Arabs lose 
faith in us over... the Levant, then the chances of an extremely 
serious crisis arising in Palestine will increase immensely". 
19 
Having publicly provided this taste of what was to come, 
Spears wrote to Churchill and served notice of his intentions in 
Parliament: "Now that I ain returning to, the House of Commons, I 
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shall feel it my duty to do all I can to ensure that British 
policy towards the Middle East, an area most vital to the Empire, 
does not develop on lines which will destroy all that those of 
us who have been upholding British interests there have been able 
to achieve". 
20 
Both in and beyond Parliament, Spears was as good as his 
word. On 17 January, in a well-publicised speech to the Royal 
Empire Society, he aired his fundamental formula: Britain's 
position in the Middle East was crucial to the Empire, and this 
position could not be maintained without the goodwill and co- 
operation of the Arabs; but their friendship could be forfeited 
if London supported the French in Syria or the Zionists in Palestine. 
Thus, given the unmistakable attitude of the French, it was both 
right and necessary to defend the independence of the Levant States, 
which Britain had guaranteed in 1941.21 As for the friendship of 
France, which some thought more important than that of the Arabs, 
Spears insisted that this could not be acceptable at the expense 
of the Levant States. De Gaulle, he alleged, was asking Britain to 
tear up a "solemn guarantee" to Syria and Lebanon in return for a 
comprehensive Anglo-French treaty. This was unacceptable, because 
there are vast British interests in the Middle 
East, whereas those of the French are slight and 
concerned mainly with prestige. Should French 
policy... lead to her elimination from the Middle 
East, she might smart, but the Metropolis would 
be no worse off. 
If, on the other hand, Britaih "forfeited the confidence of the 
Arab world", the Empire would be finished. Therefore, "the greatest 
possible goodwill towards France would not justify us in running 
the risk" * 
22 
While it was too easy for an. Englishman to dismiss French 
interests in the Levant as slight, Spears' remarks were to 
receive: partial confirmation from an unexpected quarter - de Gaulle 
himself. In his memoirs, the General later admitted that Parisian 
reactions to the Syrian crisis of May-June 1945 had disappointed him. 
The French had been apathetic on the whole, and where they showed 
any strong feelings, these tended to be directed against de Gaulle, 
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who was blamed for allowing an ugly crisis to mar Anglo-French 
relations in the year of Allied victory. Ironically, as de Gaulle 
recalled, most French diplomats and politicians took the view that 
the friendship of Great Britain was more important than peripheral 
French interests in the Levant. In this respect, the Quai d'Orsay 
and the Consultative Assembly in Paris adopted a set of priorities 
which closely resembled those of Whitehall. 
23 In January, however, 
London could not have known that metropolitan France would be so 
relatively unconcerned about the Levant. 
What could be foreseen in January 1945 was that the Gaullists 
were bent on securing some form of continuing French privilege in 
the Levant, that the Syrians were utterly opposed to this, and that 
the British were likely to be caught in the middle of an ugly clash. 
All this was becoming painfully obvious to Shone, the unlucky new 
Minister to Syria and the Lebanon, who found that he had no room 
to manoeuvre, and that Eden's instructions amounted to a demand for 
the miraculous. It was idle to say, as Eden had said to Shone, that 
Anglo-French interests in the Levant were harmonious so long as the 
French abided by their obligations and promises. The whole drift of 
French behaviour in the Levant had been to dismiss or whittle away 
these promises. This attitude was bound to lead to a further Anglo- 
French collision unless the British backed away from their own 
pledge. The Syrians, well aware of Britain's need to retain the 
goodwill of the Arab world, refused to be intimidated into a treaty 
with France, leaving London the stark choice of honouring or evading 
its guarantee of Syrian independence in the event of Franco- 
Syrian hostilities. 
This menacing situation impressed and alarmed Shone, and his 
wires to London destroyed any comfort the Foreign Office may have 
derived from the dismissal of Spears. As Furlonge recalled, Shone 
"was soon convinced that Spews bad been right in maintaining that 
to insist on a special. position for the French was no longer 
realistic". * The dismissal of Spears. had therefore changed nothing. 
Furlonge was Shone's chief tide it both Syria and Lebanon. 
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His successor was rapidly convinced that it was too late for 
the French in the Levant, and that "the only thing to do was 
to support the Syrians". 
24 
Thus the Foreign Office found that, 
while the Gaullists' scapegoat had been removed and while his 
successor's reports avoided polemical excesses, the Levantine 
problem was as bad as ever. There could be no mistaking the 
drift of Shone's telegrams, beneath the man's professional 
restraint. At the beginning of January he reported that the 
Syrian and Lebanese Ministers were manifesting an "even harder" 
attitude than he had expected. A week later he stated that this 
attitude made it extremely difficult to make any progress towards 
a Franco-Syrian understanding without forfeiting the confidence 
of the Levant States. 
25 
Such reports - emanating from a career diplomat not given 
to espousing causes - had a sobering effect in London. The point 
was further underlined by Moyne's successor, Sir E. Grigg. On 
23 January, following a brief visit to the Levant, he sent a grim 
report to Eden. "I feel certain", he said pointedly, "that you... 
realise what a terribly difficult job Terence Shone has to carry 
out the instructions which he has been given 
[because] 
no man 
can reconcile the irreconcilable". 
26 
The implications of this deteriorating situation were not 
lost on Churchill, who had reluctantly agreed to remove Spears in 
the name of improved relations in the Levant, and was currently 
enduring the outspoken reproaches of his old comrade in the 
corridors of Parliament. * Churchill had long resisted Foreign 
Office complaints about Spears, and by the end of January 1945 he 
suspected that his unpleasont decision had achieved nothing. His 
resentment surfaced when he saw an anti-Spears remark passing 
from Eden to Duff Cooper, and he rounded on his Foreign Secretary: 
To meet your personal wishes and the Foreign 
Office prejudice against Sir Louis Spears I 
have agreed to his recall.... At the same time, 
it is not true or just to lay the burden, as 
On one such occasion, as Spears recorded, "I told [Churchill] 
I had been treated shamefully and that it was particularly object- 
ionable that he should thus have dealt with me because I... was such 
an old friend. He either misunderstood this or pretended to". - 
Spears Diary extract, SPRS I/1. 
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some seem inclined to do, for the position in 
the Levant upon him. The fact that Mr. Shone 
takes up exactly, or very nearly, this attitude 
is impressive.... The whole affairs in the 
Levant were imperilled by de Gaulle's attempted 
coup d'etat at the end of 1943. I object ex- 
tremely to the theme on which the Foreign Office 
has now apparently set to work, that all the 
troubles have arisen through Spears' excessive 
championship of the Lebanese and Syrian interests. 
This among other things is a reflection on me. 27 
The current realities in the Levant were certainly a reflection 
on the platitudinous policy which Churchill and Eden had recited for 
the past four years. The inadequacy of their formula was at last be- 
coming evident to them. Eden, finally admitting a dilemma which 
Spears had endeavoured to explain to him in 1943, minuted that "if the 
Syrians won't have a treaty we cannot compel them to it". 
28 The 
shortcomings of their old formula were now worrying both Churchill 
and Eden. In mid-February, on their return from Yalta, they had a 
long talk with Syria's President Quwatli in Cairo. 
In a preliminary discussion, attended by Grigg, Cadogan and 
Shone, Quwatli told Eden that although the Syrians wanted peace and 
quiet, they had been greatly provoked and might well revolt. The 
French were still hanging onto the Troupes Speciales and insisting 
on a privileged position in the Levant, which was a standing provo- 
cation, as Syria preferred the Arab bloc and refused to be part of 
some French imperial system. Churchill then arrived and insisted that 
the Syrians must not "throw the French out altogether", but Quwatli 
replied that while the French were welcome to continue with their 
hospitals and schools, no privileged position could be accepted. Syria 
could not be regarded as a French sphere of influence, the President 
pointedly stressed. 
29 
This had a telling effect upon Churchill, perhaps because it 
echoed a point of view which was being stressed by both the Soviet 
Union and the United States. Flourishing their respective anti- 
colonial myths (and despite their own flagrant double standards), both 
Moscow and Washington took a dim view of privileged positions being 
granted to former imperial and mandatory powers, and of late they had 
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made it clear that their recognition of Syrian and Lebanese inde- 
pendence did not include any recognition that the Levant was 
primarily a French sphere of influence. 
30 In any case, within ten 
days of meeting Quwatli, Churchill addressed the House of Commons 
once more on the Levant question. This time, despite some familiar 
phrases, it was obvious that he had made a significant adjustment 
to his view of French privilege: 
His Majesty's Government have made it clear 
that they would never seek to supplant French 
influence... in the Levant States. We are deter- 
mined also to respect the independence of these 
States and to use our best endeavours to preserve 
a special position for France.... We hope that 
it may be possible for the French to preserve 
that special position.... 
However, I must make it clear that it is not 
for us alone to defend by force either Syrian or 
Lebanese independence or French privilege.... 
Too much must not be placed therefore upon the 
shoulders of Great Britain alone. We have to take 
note of the fact that Russia and the United States 
have recognised and favour Syrian and Lebanese 
independence, but do not favour any special 
position for any other foreign country. 31 
The French could hardly have missed the significance of this 
statement, especially as it coincided with M. Bidault's visit to 
London at the end of February. Nevertheless the Gaullists appeared 
to be impervious to external appeals, hints or pressures, and to 
be labouring under the delusion that time had stood still in the 
Levant since 1936. Having told Duff Cooper that the Levant was 
still a French responsibility, Bidault came to London and told Eden 
that France only wanted a position in Syria comparable to that of 
Britain in Iraq. 
32 This breath-taking blindness to the limited 
possibilities in the Levant was to prove disastrous. It was all the 
more astonishing, as Kirk has pointed out, at a time when "French 
leader-writers were appreciatively recording that the Egyptian and 
Iraqi nationalists were already agitating for the revision of their 
pre-war treaties with Britain". 
33 
If that was so, how did a dis- 
credited France expect to impose new limitations upon the triumph- 
ant nationalists in the Levant? 
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This was clearly not the sort of question the Gaullists 
were asking themselves. In fact, it was precisely because France 
had been dishonoured and tainted that these tortured patriots 
felt compelled to re-assert the power and prestige of France in 
all her old imperial haunts, as well as in Europe. Thus, despite 
all the nationalist ferment in the Middle East, despite all that 
had changed in the Levant, the Gaullists were bent on imposing a 
political anachronism in Syria and the Lebanon. Insofar as they 
had noticed the Levantine attitude, as they had been forced to do 
in 1943, the French had drawn all the wrong conclusions. Now that 
France itself was liberated, they were eager to demonstrate that 
she was once again a force to be reckoned with. For many of the 
French within the Levant, it was time to satisfy all the burning 
resentment they had nursed since the humiliation of the Lebanese 
crisis. As one such officer had told Richard Pearse: 
I am leaving the Lebanon.... But we will come 
back, and come back not with a soft Mandate, but 
as a colonising power. We will show those bloody 
Arabs who are their bosses.... And we will give 
the English a lesson in Colonial rule. 34 
For de Gaulle himself - and there seems to be no escaping this 
conclusion - it was time to activate his impossible dream of resur- 
recting every square metre of the French Empire. 
As the helmsman of France, de Gaulle was on a collision course 
with the Syrians and the British in the Levant, and in the spring of 
1945 he confirmed this course and rang for full steam. If the first 
major sign of this was the intransigence of Bidault, the second was 
the prolonged absence of Beynet. from the Levant. Early in March. 
Shone had actually persuaded the Syrians and Lebanese to enter into 
exploratory negotiations with the French over outstanding differ- 
ences. Beynet had promptly retired to Paris, ostensibly to receive 
instructions and draft French terms. He was to have returned in a 
fortnight, but - as if imitating Catroux's tactics - he was still in 
Paris on 6 May. On that fateful day, a French cruiser arrived at 
35 
Beirut and the first French reinforcements began to disembark 
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London had made several vain attempts to convince de Gaulle 
that there could be no more disastrous coincidence than the arrival 
of French troops at a time when French terms were being communicated 
to the Levantines, who could hardly fail to see this as a form of 
pressure. These counsels were rejected by de Gaulle. On 30 April, 
Duff Cooper's pleas to this effect fell on deaf ears, and merely 
provoked a paranoid retort about British intentions. This greatly 
alarmed the Foreign Office, and Churchill was asked to intervene to 
prevent the arrival of French ships and troops - precisely the sort 
of "gatecrashing" which he had dismissed as unlikely in October 1944. 
The Prime Minister, at first unwilling to appeal to de Gaulle (on the 
grounds that he would only receive "same insulting answer"), was 
finally persuaded to make the effort. Having reiterated that Britain 
had no designs on the Levant, Churchill offered to withdraw British 
troops from the Levant as soon as France concluded an amicable treaty 
with the Levant States, but warned: 
If you reinforce your troops at this moment the 
Levant States, who have been waiting for treaty 
proposals for some time past, may well suppose 
that you are preparing a settlement to be con- 
cluded under duress. This might... poison the atmos- 
phere for the negotiations you are about to begin. 
The response was as predicted. Asserting that France merely wished 
to secure her cultural, economic and strategic interests, de Gaulle 
alleged that "this mattet, could already have been cleared up, if the 
[Levantines had not gathered] ¬hat'they could get out of any engage- 
ments by relying on your support against us. The presence of your 
troops and the attitude of your agents assisted them". 
36 
As if it were any compensation, de Gaulle added that for 
Churchill's sake he had issued a communique that Beynet was returning to 
the Levant immediately to negotiate. But since this coincided with the 
despatch of three battalions aboard French cruisers, it merely assured 
that the simultaneous arrivals of'terms and troops would be regarded as 
blatant coercion. Indeed, the Gaullists, who had evidently learned 
nothing useful from the Lebanese crisis, had clearly decided on a 
little old-fashioned persuasion. 
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Their tactics backfired completely. On 18 May Beynet met 
Syrian and Lebanese Ministers in Damascus and presented his op- 
timistic list of French requirements. Apart from extensive 
commercial and cultural concessions, these included transport 
facilities to the Far East, military bases, naval bases and 
continued authority over the Troupes Speciales! Beynet was virtually 
asking for a return to 1936, and even as he did so more French troops 
were arriving at Beirut. Furiously rejecting the French terms as 
"absolutely incompatible with... sovereignty and independence", the 
Levantines broke off the negotiations as a protest against the 
French reinforcements. 
37 
Thereafter the situation rapidly deteriorated into open 
conflict. A general strike was proclaimed in Damascus and Beirut 
and once more the shops were shuttered, while anti-French demonstra- 
tions quickly led to rioting and a savage reaction from French troops. 
A brief lull in hostilities was followed by a greater explosion of 
violence in the Syrian cities of Homs, Hama and Damascus. French 
convoys were attacked, vehicles ambushed and burned, and beleaguered 
French troops had to beat off determined assaults. In Damascus the 
French gradually gained the upper hand and drove their adversaries 
back into the cover of public buildings, including the Syrian 
Parliament and police headquarters. Whereupon Oliva-Roget, the 
somewhat unstable French commander, ordered the general shelling 
and bombardment which resulted in terrible civilian casualties 
and the destruction of Parliament, a mosque, and many houses. As in 
1943, the behaviour of French troops was brutal and undisciplined. 
On one occasion, Furlongs and Shone desperately took cover while 
Shone's official residence was shot up. One bullet passed between the 
two men. 
38 
All this provided the sort of publicity which the French 
simply could not afford, and the world press had a field day during 
the Syrian crisis. The shelling of Damascus and the wild allegations 
of Oliva-Roget, who thought he detected a vast army of British 
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agents in disguise, were only the loudest of many sensational 
headlines, most of which condemned the French in some way. This 
greatly embarrassed French delegates at the United Nations Con- 
ference at San Francisco, where the concept of Trusteeships was 
being aired as a replacement for the discredited League of Nations 
mandates. If anyone needed a reminder that mandates had been 
cynically abused, it was provided by the news that the French 
were shelling Damascus. Delegates from the Arab states lost no 
time in alleging that the French were trying to batter the Levant 
States into submission, and the French were roundly condemned for 
contradicting their own high-sounding case for Trusteeships to 
succeed former mandates. In Washington, the French were handed a 
stiff request to review their Syrian activities in the light of 
United Nations principles. 
39 
Meanwhile the shelling, bombardment and wild machine-gunning 
went on in the streets of Damascus and other Syrian cities. -French 
encampments in outlying areas were besieged, and in Deraa - near 
the Jebel Druse -a Syrian force overwhelmed and captured the 500 
strong French garrison. 
40 In Damascus itself, the shelling 
continued through the night of 30-31 May, after a brief armistice 
on the afternoon of the 30th for the evacuation of British and 
American communities. And during all this time, the British 9th Army 
had not moved - as even de Gaulle admits: "the British had not 
stirred. In Cairo, 
[Grigg and Paget had remained impassive. In the 
Levant, General Pilleau, commanding the British Ninth Army, had made 
no move ". 
41 Yet the British were now under great pressure to inter- 
vene. Furlonge, on Shone's'behalf, had to make daily visits to 
President Quwatli, which became increasingly unpleasant as Britain 
continued to do nothing. Quwatli bitterly declared that Damascus 
was being destroyed while the British failed to keep their promise. 
42 
On 30 May Shone urged London to intervene and stop "this 
ruthless bombardment of an open city", and sent on Quwatli's own 
appeal to Churchill, who had promised that Syria would not be 
coerced into a treaty with-France. -Paget was also urging that he should 
? os 
assume command of all troops in the Levant, since Beynet could 
not or would not restrain Oliva-Roget. On the evening of 30 May, 
Shone sent another wire -a personal appeal to Eden: 
The French have instituted nothing short of a 
reign of terror in Damascus. Apart from indis- 
criminate shelling, their troops, black and white, 
are behaving like madmen, spraying the streets 
with machine-gun fire.... They do not spare 
vehicles flying the British flag... [*] 
It is useless to appeal to the French authori- 
ties who are clearly out to win a merciless war 
on the Syrians. I have often reported before on 
the chaotic French disorganisation here, and even 
if they had control of their troops they cannot 
or will not exercise it. [A brief armistice) is now almost over, and 
there is no doubt that the horror will begin again. 
But even during the alleged armistice there has 
still been firing by the French... 
... At an interview I have just had with the 
Syrian President... there were the first signs of 
something like animosity to us. That will in- 
evitably increase hourly if we fail to intervene, 
and will surely spread throughout the... Middle East. 
I can only put this to you and implore His 
Majesty's Government to allow the Commander-in- 
Chief to intervene without delay. 43 
In London, Churchill's previous insistence that British troops 
alone should not be expected to police the Levant dispute - not 
without Washington's public support, at least - was being overcome 
by the sheer extremity of the situation. Shone's messages convinced 
the Cabinet that British forces would have to intervene. Straight 
after this evening decision, Churchill and Eden informed Massigli 
that orders were being issued to Paget, and President Truman was to 
be asked to support this decision. The Frenchman, striving to salvage 
what he could of Anglo-French relations, pleaded that British inter- 
vention should be explained in terms of protecting lines of 
communication to the Far East war. Churchill then wired to Truman 
that he was prepared to order Paget to intervene in Syria to restore 
order and to protect Allied communications. He asked for the 
44 
President's support before he took this final step. 
* Furionge himself, in a British vehicle, was fired on by the French. 
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By noon on the 31st no reply had come in from Truman, and 
Churchill (with cabinet approval) ordered Paget to intervene by 
assuming command of all Allied troops in the Levant and ordering 
the French to retire to barracks. At the same time the Prime Minister 
sent a message to de Gaulle, and this was read to the House of 
Commons at 3.45 pm by Eden: 
In view of the grave situation which has arisen 
between your troops and the Levant States, and 
the severe fighting which has broken out, we have 
with profound regret ordered the Commander-in- 
Chief Middle East to intervene... in the interests 
of the security of the whole Middle East, which 
involves communications for the war against Japan. 
In order to avoid collision between British and 
French forces, we request you immediately to order 
the French troops to cease fire and to withdraw 
to their barracks. 
Unfortunately this message - which Duff Cooper declined to deliver 
personally - did not reach de Gaulle until about 5 pm. Naturally 
the Frenchman regarded this as a further insult added to the 
"insolence" of Churchill's telegram, and he later claimed that the 
delay had been meant to prevent him from announcing a retort that 
fighting had already stopped in Damascus* 
45 
This was unlikely, since London had no reason to believe that 
anything had changed for the better in Syria. In Paris, however, de 
Gaulle had taken a quick and highly unpalatable decision around 
midnight on the 30th. Having received Massigli's urgent report of 
his interview with Churchill and Eden, de Gaulle somehow mastered 
his initial furious instinct to offer resistance to Paget's soldiers. 
As the dismayed Bidault pleaded with de Gaulle to avoid the unthink- 
able, the General himself also considered the inadequacy of his 
small forces in Syria, and reluctantly deferred to his Foreign 
Minister. He allowed Bidault to contact Beynet, instructing him to 
order a cease-fire and the maintaining of all French positions as 
they stood. At sgane stage on the 31st, Massigli was duly informed, but 
time had run out for the unlucky, French Ambassador. The Cabinet 
decision was taken, Paget was unleashed, and the House of Commons 
was informed before Massigli had time to see Eden. 
46 
* It was sent at 2.40 pul with the instruction "Please deliver... 
immediately". - Foreign Office tel., 31 May 1945, F0954/xv. 4. 
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In any case, de Gaulle's claim that fighting had already 
ceased in Damascus is dubious. Shelling had been resumed on the 
evening of the 30th, and there was no respite the next morning. 
If Beynet really did accept Bidault's instructions on the telephone, 
as de Gaulle claims, then the situation in Damascus on the 31st 
seems to vindicate the local British view that Oliva-Roget's men 
were virtually uncontrollable. Radio Levant, on the evening of the 
31st, implied that the French forces had been fighting during the 
day and were just concluding their operations. This French source 
also admitted that there were still areas where Beynet's writ did 
not run. De Gaulle himself admitted this in a Paris coumunique. 
Associated Press, evading French measures to suppress all outside 
journalism, reported that fighting had continued "all during the 
night... through to 4 pm today 
[31st] ". Thus, the subsequent 
chronological claims made by de Gaulle and Oliva-Roget, in somewhat 
theatrical press conferences, were of little value. Given that 
French forces were still being successfully defied in many areas, 
and in a few cases had been captured or besieged, nothing short of 
outside intervention could have prevented another lapse into 
hostilities. For the British, who had the only immediately available 
troops in the area, the stark choice was to enforce, a cease-fire 
throughout the Levant or to allow the French to bludgeon Syria into 
submission. 
It is significant that de Gaulle's account makes no mention 
of the appalling realities of the shelling and shooting, the many 
hundreds of civilian casualties, or the fact that Truman's approval 
of Churchill's intervention was announced at a Washington press 
conference on 31 May. 
47 This is not to deny that Britain's anxiety 
for her own standing in the Arab world was a strong determinant in 
the decision to intervene. But Churchill clearly kept out of the 
conflict for as long as possible,. and when he did move it was not only 
to save the British image in the Middle East. It must also be said 
that what the French were doing was a public affront to every civilised 
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value for which the Western Allies were supposed to be fighting. 
Even if we allow Churchill, Eden and Truman no spark of humanitarian 
motivation, the Atlantic Charter powers could hardly do nothing while 
the newspapers screamed that the French were shelling and bombing the 
urban population of Syria, whose independence had been recognised by all 
the Allies and guaranteed by Britain. De Gaulle's highly selective 
account avoids the fact that Truman supported Churchill's decision 
despite America's deep-seated suspicions of British imperialism; it 
also implies that Churchill should have allowed the French to carry 
on their barbaric work, which was by no means finished when Paget 
intervened. De Gaulle, of course, tries to pass off Oliva-Roget's 
behaviour as a conventional military operation, but the contemporary 
press did not fail to juxtapose this ruthless repression with France's 
own experience of Nazi domination, and her claim to a so-called 
"civilising mission" in the Levant. * 
48 
By the evening of 31 May, in anticipation of Paget's arrival, 
Beynet had prevailed upon Oliva-Boget to observe a cease-fire and 
to hold existing positions in Damascus and other cities in Syria. 
Paget, having communicated his intentions and requests to Beynet on 
the 31st, arrived in Beirut the following day with a formidable escort 
of tanks and combat vehicles, whose gunners held firing positions as 
they passed French troops. This "outrageous military display", as de 
Gaulle called it, reflected Paget's consistently low opinion of Oliva- 
Roget's troops, whose attitude and intentions had exasperated the 
British Commander-in-Chief for the past eighteen months. At Beynet's 
residence, Paget personally. repeated his demand that French troops 
should return to their barracks under his orders, and that British 
troops should henceforth be responsible for keeping order in Damascus 
and elsewhere. He added menacingly that if any French troops opened 
fire, their barracks would be bombarded by the British. "No French 
soldier will go out into the streets without my authorisation", he 
9 
concluded. 
Spears publicly condemned Oliva-Roget as a Vichyite who had fought 
on the wrong side in Syria in 1941.6-his "contribution to the war 
effort, as far as we have exp4rienced it, is therefore to have taken 
up arms against us in our hour of dire need"; he had since been 
"promoted by de Gaulle". - Sunday Express , 10 June 1945. 
30ý 
Beynet smoothly replied that all this was unnecessary, since 
a cease-fire was already in effect, and he declined to formally 
accept an ultimatum from Paget. Nevertheless, British troops were 
free to come and go as they liked, of course. This attitude reflected 
the instructions which de Gaulle had cabled, instructions which 
sounded firm but allowed Beynet to discreetly avoid armed confront- 
ation. While Beynet was told not to tolerate any disarming of French 
troops, and to maintain French positions "where English troops do not 
in fact appear", he was also given discretion to move French troops 
and to allow the British to patrol where they would. As a result, 
though Beynet continued his face-saving device of refusing to accept 
the authority of Paget, French troops gradually retired to barracks 
and later moved out of the Syrian cities to outlying encampments. 
British units occupied major buildings and strongpoints throughout 
the Levant, and entirely took over the maintenance of public order* 
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With these developments, the street war in Syria. gave way to 
a war of words in Paris and London. On 2 June, de Gaulle gave "the 
most remarkable Press Conference of his career", as a seasoned 
journalist put it. 
51 It was his public retaliation for the Churchill 
telegram in the Commons, his compensation for lack of support from 
the French press and his justification of French actions in Syria. 
With great rhetorical skill and-considerable bias, de Gaulle took his 
audience through the sorry saga of Anglo-French relations in the Levant 
since 1917. Arriving at 1941, he declared that "Free France.... taking 
with her Great Britain" had rescued Syria from Vichy treachery only 
to inherit fresh British intrigues. This "mass of complications" was 
caused by "a considerable number of. agents on the spot". Nevertheless, 
de Gaulle asserted, France tried to ignore these machinations, 
complete the independence of the Levant States, and subordinate her 
local anxieties to the all-important war effort in Europe. Thus 
omitting the Lebanese crisis altoget er, de Gaulle came to the 
current flare-up, which he attributed to ill-disposed groups in 
possession of British weapons. He had, however, ordered a cease-fire 
on 30 May to avoid the "monstrous absurdity" of Anglo-French hostilities. 
Thus, Churchill's publicised telegram of the 31st "did not change 
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anything and it will not change anything". 
De Gaulle concluded this brilliant litany of half-truths with 
a call for all the Allies to discuss the status of the entire Arab 
world together, thus raising such questions as Egypt and Palestine 
as well as Syria, and questioning the immense British hold on the 
Middle East. In the question-time which followed, de Gaulle stated 
that spears "represented his country at Beirut for three years. It 
is diffult for me to imagine that... he followed any policy but 
that of his Government'. 
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As a footnote to this performance, de Gaulle summoned Duff 
Cooper to a stormy interview on 4 June. "He could not have been 
more stiff if he had been declaring wary", the British Ambassador 
recalled, noting that de Gaulle seemed convinced that the British 
were about to complete France's long-prepared eviction. Bitter and 
hostile, de Gaulle dismissed the Englishman with a prophetic vow: 
"We are not, i admit, in a position to open hostilities against you 
at the present time. But you have insulted France and betrayed the 
West. This cannot be forgotten". 
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In a later decade, General de 
Gaulle remembered only too well. 
On the other side of the Channel, Spears had plunged into the 
fray. On 27 May he accused de Gaulle of asking Britain to tear up a 
solemn promise to the Levant St4tea. In Parliament he gleefully 
assailed the embattled Eden, demanding to know If the Levantines 
were "expected to negotiate while the French are shelling them, and 
should not French withdrawal precede negotiations? ". In June, 
responding to de Gaulle's. public allegations, Spears published another 
article, giving an alternative-vevsion of how France acquired and 
enforced its mandate in the Levant. He went on to describe de Gaulle's 
account of British intrigue as an "absurd accusation", as the 
French had brought trouble on themselves by their domineering and 
corrupt behaviour in the Levant i 
Churchill himself, stung by. de Gaulle's public attacks and 




some length in a speech to the Commons on 5 June. Stating that the 
situation had got completely out of hand, and citing stiff casualty 
figures, the Prime Minister said that it was "a pity", if de Gaulle 
really did order a cease-fire, that London was not informed 
immediately. On the other hand, he pointed out, Damascus was still 
being shelled on the 31st, whatever de Gaulle said. For good measure 
Churchill took up the torch for Spears, "my honourable and gallant 
friend", and reminded the House that Spears, who had a long and 
brave record in Anglo-French military liaison, had helped de Gaulle 
to London in 1940. General Spears had certainly not been recalled 
from Beirut to please de Gaulle, Churchill insisted. 
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These sentiments must have pleased Spears as much as they dis- 
mayed the Foreign Office, which was desperately looking to end such 
bitter exchanges and to defuse the tension over the Levant. But, as 
de Gaulle remarked, Anglo-French relations "remained in the refrig- 
erator" and bad feeling spilled over into petty public snubs. De 
Gaulle was due to confer French decorations on some high-ranking 
British officers, but he cancelled the ceremony and simultaneously 
ordered his own Generals not to accept the decorations which Britain 
was about to confer on them. And at the 18 June parade, when de 
Gaulle spotted Lady Spears' ambulance, he ordered it out of the 
procession and demanded the repatriatiou, of its British members. The 
Spears Ambulance had cared for thousands of French wounded on many 
fronts, but that name, and some little Union Jacks on the vehicles, 
were too much for de Gaulle. 
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The last big salvo in this war of words and personalities was 
fired by de Gaulle on 19 June, during the debate on Syria in the 
Consultative Assembly. ' Britain, he charged, aimed "to polarise upon 
eA minor fusillade of emotive accusations was fired at a Paris press 
conference on the 7th by Oliva-Roget, who had been sent hone by Beynet. 
The embattled General proceeded to blame all his woes on the British: 
they had threatened to shell his troops; they had made no allowance 
for his acts of "self defence" after Syrian insurgents started all the 
shooting (he alleged); they were employing agents-provocateurs to stir 
up the Syrians. One such man was Colonel Stirling, one of Spears' 
field officers. This theatrical performance inspired a rash of in- 
accurate and melodramatic stories about Stirling (William F., once a 
companion of Lawrence), who was promptly confused with David, of S. A. S. 
fame, and thereby regarded.. with. awe. and suspicion until the facts were 
checked. - See'Times, Mýufeh6stbd-'GUaridian, 'DailV*Express, New York Times, 
Daily Mails Sun I, 8-11 June 1945. 
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France the hostile movements of opinion in the Near East", and, 
incidentally, to control the Syrian oil pipelines. The British, by 
supporting "native demands that they had instigated themselves", 
and by employing agents "who can be recognised or disowned by 
London as occasion demands", had sought "the progressive eviction 
of France". As for the current situation, de Gaulle declared that 
France in no way accepted what had been "put over at her expense". 
This was immediately contradicted by subsequent speakers, and the 
Assembly called for friendly negotiations over Syria, despite de 
Gaulle's protest that "a compromise in the name of friendship must 
not always be sought at the expense of France". 
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There was a final characteristic retort from Carlisle, where 
Spears was belatedly calling on his constituents to re-elect him. 
From the campaign trail, Spears rebutted the Gaullist accusation, 
condemned Oliva-Roget and his ilk as tainted Vichyites, and declared 
that the British had done more to help the Levant States in four 
years than the French had done in twenty-five. 
58 But the burghers 
of Carlisle were not greatly moved by these remote issues, and a 
month later Spears lost his seat in Parliament. That may have been 
part of the price he paid for taking the road to Damascus. 
Even as the last ecboee of the Spears Mission faded from 
public life, the remaining traces of the French mandate in Syria 
were being erased by the de facto authority of Paget's British 
forces. Though the last French soldiers did not leave the Lebanon 
until August 1946, the French mandate in the Levant was effectively 
obliterated in June 1945. Insofar as French authority still existed 
on 31 May, it was nullified by the arrival of Paget, who deprived the 
French Delegate-General of the, means to enforce French decrees. In 
the wake of Paget's uncompromising directives, and Beynet's formal 
refusal to accept the Englishman's authority, no-one pretended any 
longer to observe the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement. By this agreement 
France retained the civil authority in the Levant, while the Delegate- 
General recognised the ultimate military authority of the Commander- 
in-Chief, Middle East. Between them, Paget and Beynet finally destroyed 
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this outdated pact, and with it went the last vestiges of French 
civil authority. The last French claims to a civilising mission in 
the Levant had already been exploded by Oliva-Roget's indiscriminate 
artillery. 
As Furlonge observed on the spot, "June 1945... was perhaps 
the high point of British influence in the Levant States". While 
Paget's troops controlled the cities and enjoyed the sympathetic 
co-operation of the Syrians, most of the French military and 
civilian personnel withdrew into the Lebanon in the summer of 1945. 
If there was any intention of making a redoubt of the less-hostile 
Lebanon, this was frustrated in December when Pilleau (9th Army) 
revealed that British troops in Syria would be retiring into the 
Lebanon in the wake of the French. 
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In such decisions the British revealed both their unrelenting 
vigilance towards the French forces and their resolve not to seek a 
disguised mandate of their own in the Levant. It was made clear that 
they were leaving, as long as the French did. In Furlonge's words, 
"it would have been easy for the British during those ... months to 
replace the French in almost every sphere of activity provided that 
they were prepared to bear the considerable cost in money and tech- 
nical manpower". Britain, however, had no such intention, and was 
too thinly stretched in any case. Above all, London could not have 
paid the diplomatic price, which would probably have been a monumental 
breach in Anglo-French relati-oas, Thus, as evidence to Paris of its 
honourable intentions, London pledged itself to a policy of "non- 
substitution", and did not fill the vacuum of practicalities created 
by the withdrawal of French services and installations, 
60 
The rest is a mere footnote to the decisive British interven- 
tion of June 1945. The final Anglo-French quarrel erupted in 
December over an abortive agreement that both sides should evacuate 
Syria. When it became clear that Pilleau's 9th Army was to follow the 
French into the Lebanon, de Gaulle exploded. If France was to be 
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ushered out of the Middle East altogether, by British forces which 
could then retire to their own extensive territories to the south - 
or even remain in the Lebanon, a possibility which de Gaulle 
naturally refused to discount - it would not be while Charles de 
Gaulle could still speak for France. He was right. A final agreement 
on the joint evacuation of the Levant was only put together after de 
Gaulle himself resigned on 20 January, 1946. He had had enough of 
"the exclusive regime of parties", and his position had been seriously 
eroded. The last straw, ironically, was the possibility of another 
Anglo-French crisis in the Lebanon, which could have isolated de 
Gaulle altogether. Silent and dignified, Cincinnatus withdrew - until 
France was in danger again. 
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De Gaulle's resignation enabled Bidault to come to terms with 
the presence of the British army in the Lebanon, and at last an 
agreement for the simultaneous evacuation of the Levant was achieved. 
It was none too soon, for the Syrians and Lebanese had now switched 
their attention to the United Nations, where the Soviet Union happily 
supported their demand for the rapid departure of all foreign troops. 
In the end, France was bundled out of the Lebanon with undignified 
haste and a last reminder that she was not trusted in the Levant. 
London announced that British troops would be gone by the end of 
June 1946, but in Paris it was stated that logistical difficulties 
would delay the final French departure until April 1947. This ex- 
planation was flatly and openly rejected in Beirut, and the French 
were obliged to revise their timetables. In the event, their last 
soldiers had left the Lebanon by 31 August, 1946.62 
So ended, at least in the Levant, "the vision... of an in- 
dissoluble link between France and the colonies". 
63 For the idea of 
the French empire and the myth of a civilising mission had placed 
men like Catroux and de Gaulle in profound conflict with the roots 
of that nationalism to which-they-had fatefully appealed in 1941. 
By the most curious, convoluted and controversial chain of events, 
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and despite the rather different intentions of the man himself, 
General Catroux's proclamation was literally fulfilled at last: 
SYRIENS ET LIBANAIS! 
0; 0 j'abolis le Mandat et je vous proclame libres 
eindependants. 
Vous "etes donc desormais des peuples souverains 
et independants... 64 
And at last, Spears claimed, "I could say that the Mission given 
to me... had been fulfilled'!. If that was so, it had not happened 
without serious Anglo-French estrangements and without personal 
tragedy for Spears, in whom this Anglo-French schism had become 
strangely incarnate. As he recalled many years later, "it has been 
a very bitter experience to find myself opposed and having to 
oppose French policy so often. That is the tragedy of my life". 
6S 
The other side of this tragedy, given the recent events in the 
Levant, is contained in the final words of Spears' memoirs: "Syria 
66 
and the Lebanon had come into their own", 
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C0NCLUS10N 
History is lived forwards but it is written in 
retrospect. We know the end before we consider 
the beginning and we can never wholly recapture 
what it was to know the beginning only. 
C. Y. Wedgwood 
The more light that can be shed on the circumstances 
in which impressions were formed, decisions and 
actions taken, the better... 
Oliver Harvey 
The most substantial aim of the present thesis has been to 
take the Levant dispute out of the realms of autobiography, polemics 
and special pleading, and to move beyond the simplistic interpret- 
ations which have often been placed upon this complicated affair. 
There has been no shortage of writings which have claimed to reveal 
what really happened in the Levant. Many of them are personal memoirs. 
Yet most of this material has merely served to deepen the mystery and 
to raise the question in a more acute form. The literature of the 
Levant affair has been riddled with a cavalier attitude to facts, and 
has generally succumbed to the distortions of hindsights and over- 
simplification. The most basic 
purpose of this thesis has therefore 
been to establish as far as possible the thoughts and actions and 
calculations of the time, to show how things came to happen, to 
recognise a number of cause, and to provide a more accurate picture 
of the whole situation. 
It has been said that historians are sinking without trace 
in an ocean of facts, their little rafts overloaded with a cargo of 
documents: therefore the historian,, looking beyond the eternal accumu- 
lation of facts, should incessantly ask=the question 'Why? '. 
' In the 
broadest context, this point is no doubt valid, but the would-be 
historian of the Levant dispute in confronted with a rather different 
e Willi-am the Silent (1944), p. 35. 
+ The War Diaries' Of'Oliver'N*3ýyey (1978), p. 12. 
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problem. He is surrounded, as it were, by people who immediately 
offer to reveal the meaning of the whole affair. None of them, 
however, seem too keen on establishing an adequate historical 
basis for their revelations. The problem in this case is not that 
interpretations have been lacking, but that the would-be interpre- 
ters have been jumping to conclusions which are superficial and 
unreliable. The literature of the Levant dispute contains its fair 
share of fallacies, but a slavish deference to historical facts is 
not one of them. 
A serious attempt to establish the facts and terms of the 
dispute must therefore precede any worthwhile interpretations of the 
Levant affair. For this reason, much space has been devoted in these 
pages to explaining what happened in a series of controversial 
events and circumstances. The way was then open to ask how such 
things came to happen, and so, eventually, 'Why? '. And here again, 
many of the answers were to be found only by interrogating the 
documents and diaries of the day. Lord Harvey's comment on his own 
diary is true of the whole range of documents on the Levant affair: 
Its whole value... lies in its "hotness", in the 
immediate impression and atmosphere.... This is 
how we. saw things at the time. 
... The more light that can be shed on the cir- 
cumstances in which impressions were formed, 
decisions and actions taken, the better... 2 
It is on this basis, for example 'that the present thesis concludes 
that some of the most unfortunate British actions and decisions were 
the result of human limitations and blunders rather than the more 
sinister causes which have ofte -been suggested. The bungled affair 
of the Acre Convention is a casein point. It would be rather silly 
to suggest that Wilson, ä breezy character with the professional 
soldier's dislike of polities, wäa pursuing some sinister political 
design. It is clear, on the other hand, that Wilson's insular military 
pre-occupations led him into-Serious diplomatic blunders. 
Such interpretations ºe not been prompted by any desire or 
need to cling to the middle of the road. They are the result of a 
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detailed inquiry into the circumstances. It is on the basis of 
such inquiries that interpretation, comment and analysis have 
been present throughout these pages. Nevertheless, while much may 
be explained along the way, there remains a danger of not seeing 
below the surface events, of failing to look beyond the immediate 
origins of numerous disputes to the fundamental problems of the 
whole Anglo-French presence in the Levant. Indeed, one of the flaws 
in the partisan versions has been such a failure to see the forest 
for the trees. Thus, having followed events on an almost day to day 
basis, it remains to stand back and see the whole affair in broader 
terms, and to identify the general determinants behind all the 
disputes and crises. 
The first point which must be emphasised is that the Anglo- 
Free French occupation of the Levant was a maladroit improvisation, 
thrown together in response to a desperate military situation. While 
this should be clear from the present account, many statements of 
the Levant affair, beset by hindsight and the quest for a scapegoat, 
have obscured the importance of this fundamental fact. In the 
spring of 1941, Britain had no major allies, and she was faced with 
a series of military disasters and emergencies in the eastern Med- 
iterranean. Driven out of Greece-and Crete with heavy losses in men, 
material and ships, menaced by Rcmel'8 advance, surprised by the 
Iraqi revolt and alarmed by the arrival of Axis aircraft in the 
Levant, the British hurriedly reversed their Syrian policy. The Free 
French welcomed this volts-face and accepted a fighting role in 
Operation Exporter. 
In this hurried response to sudden new developments, neither 
the British nor the Free French were sufficiently prepared for the 
problems inherent in their joint occupation of Syria. "we were all 
in our war-time infancy", as Chiwchill later remarked, and the 
growing-up process was to be. swift and disillusioning. 
3 As the dust 
began to settle in the Levant, the implications began to dawn on de 
Gaulle and the British, and all the liabilities and disadvantages 
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of their venture began to emerge. The haste and confusion of 
Exporter placed impossible strains upon the feeble structure of 
liaison and communications, and serious misunderstandings pro- 
liferated. 
The worst problem of all proved to be the political 
basis of the campaign, Catroux's pledge of Syrian and Lebanese 
independence. This idea arose from the Free French anxiety to gain 
the Levant and its well-equipped garrison. It was a desperate 
expedient, ill-considered and loaded with potential trouble. 
Nevertheless, even while Dentz was being politely tolerated, 
Catroux's idea had tacitly become the nucleus of an audacious 
alternative policy. When British policy suddenly changed, his 
tactic was promptly wheeled out to play its fateful part. It was 
at best a calculated risk, and its author's calculations were upset 
by the extent to which the Levantines, with a degree of British 
blessing, managed to claim Catroux's promise. The British, shaken 
by an Arab revolt at a critical stage of the war, felt obliged to 
announce their guarantee of Catroux's pledge and to give it the 
weight of a recognised government. In doing so, however, they also 
reckoned without the Levantine nationalists, who saw and seized 
this golden opportunity to play the British off against the French. 
From the outset, the old spectre of Anglo-French rivalry in the 
Levant came forth to haunt and confound the joint occupants. 
In retrospect it is clear that Operation Exporter was an 
unhappy improvisation, riddled with practical shortcomings and 
political pitfalls. These have produced rueful noises and bitter 
recriminations in the memoirs of those involved, but such sentiments 
tend to obscure the fact that Britain and Free France were very 
short of options in the spring of 1941. They were not to know that 
Hitler would expend his might in Russia, and never again pose a 
threat to the Levant. All the circumstances suggested that the 
Rashid Ali revolt was part of an overall Axis thrust towards the 
Suez canal. Everywhere the tide of battle seemed to be flowing 
against Britain and Free France, and any action, however desperate, 
seemed better than an Axis walkover in the Levant. On this point 
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Churchill and de Gaulle were emphatically agreed, and this was 
the fundamental priority at the time. 
The issue in May 1941 was survival. Thus, to argue that 
the political minefields of the Levant should have been foreseen 
and avoided is to fall into the fallacy of hindsight. Insofar as 
the British and Free French were aware of these pitfalls, they 
saw no choice but to accept them as the price of a military 
emergency. This situation has been obscured by an epidemic of 
hindsight which has afflicted many interpreters of the Levant 
affair. The Gaullists, lamenting the loss of the French mandates, 
have looked back and seen the British guarantee as a premeditated 
anti-French device, while some Arabophiles have sighed that Britain 
should have gone into the Levant without the Free French. Such 
unrealistic statements ignore the actual conditions of the Syrian 
venture. The concern at the time was to make a quick and viable 
attempt to secure the Levant by combining whatever resources there 
were and hoping that Catroux's political stroke would compensate 
for military inadequacies. 
One of the major determinants of the whole Anglo-Free 
French problem in the Levant was therefore their improvised re- 
sponse to the threat envisaged. Faced with the disastrous possibi- 
lity of a German takeover in the Levant, the British and Free French 
had to employ desperate measures, and to shelve any misgivings 
about future arrangements in the Levant. Unfortunately these 
improvisations and expedients were loaded with political dynamite, 
and created the terms of an endless series of disputes. 
Once the Levant had been occupied, the fundamental tensions 
and contradictions of the new situation made themselves felt. The 
British and Free French had now to face the results of the actions 
they had taken in response to their military predicament. With the 
war effort taking priority over earlier considerations in the region, 
the British now found themselves involved in the once forbidden 
French mandates. As the senior power in an unequal alliance, they 
3 2ýc 
were henceforth far more visible and impressive than the Free 
French, who were scarcely distinguishable from their Vichy 
predecessors. Moreover, the repatriation of Vichy troops greatly 
reduced the sheer physical presence of France in the Levant. For 
the Levantines, the defeat of a French army by a multi-racial and 
largely British force must have had a profound effect on the 
official French image of a powerful and superior civilisation. 
By contrast, the British image was enhanced, and even such innocent 
practices as the resting and training of British battalions in 
Syria contributed to the impression that it was the British who 
really mattered now, not the French. Hence the many tales of rather 
bewildered Syrians being referred to the French civil authority when 
they approached the British with their petitions and requests. 
4 
Such gradual and intangible effects at a grassroots level 
were bad enough for the Idea of the French mandate, but the joint 
occupation confronted the Free French with more immediate and 
sharply-defined embarrassments. Three distinct groups were now 
thrown together in the simmering intrigue of Levantine politics - 
the British, the Free French and the indigenous leaders. Most of 
the Syrian and Lebanese politicians were now taking a nationalist 
line, and they welcomed the opportunity to play a more public role. 
Catroux quickly discovered that his independence pledge had opened 
a Pandora's Box of troubles with the British and the local politi- 
cians, the latter exploiting the divergent aspirations behind the 
Anglo-Free French promise. The Levantines soon exposed the fact that 
Britain looked for a greater degree of independence in the Levant 
than Catroux had intended, or could afford, to concede. This under- 
mined Foreign Office hopes tbat, the cracks in the Levantine 
arrangement might be papered over. An exasperated Harvey called 
the Levantines "a cartload of monkeys, alive to all the tricks of 
playing off the French against the English". 
5 In the political terms 
of Operation Exporter, the nationalists saw a clear opportunity to 
advance their aspirations by exploiting Anglo-French differences. 
The Free French sought to maintain the mandate; the British wanted 
military security, Arab goodwill and satisfactory relations with 
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Free France; the nationalists, who wanted to be rid of the French, 
sought to frustrate Free French intentions by creating a threat 
to the first two British requirements. In this endeavour they 
enjoyed much success. Operation Exporter had produced a three- 
cornered game in which the Levantines, whose skill had been under- 
rated, were dealt some excellent cards. This three-sided game 
influenced all the Anglo-Free French disputes in the Levant. 
Another important aspect of the dispute was the nature of 
the policies adopted by the British and the Free French. Neither 
seemed to appreciate the 'pace of political evolution in the Middle 
East, or the forces they had unleashed, and amidst all their heated 
disagreements they shared a kind of anachronism in their formulation 
of the problem and the required policies. It is hard to say, in 
retrospect, whose policies were the more outmoded and unrealistic. 
If de Gaulle persisted in calling for a 1936-model deal, despite 
the estrangements which had followed that abortive affair, the 
British for their part were blind to the fallacy in their own for- 
mula. It was, of course, quickly spotted by the Arabophiles, but 
their views did not prevail in London. As Glubb wrote at the time, 
Mr Churchill was uttering a paradox when he said 
that Syria would be granted her aspirations but 
France would, at the same time, retain her pre- 
eminence in Syria. The chief and principal Syrian 
aspiration is to get rid of the French. 6 
Churchill's thinking, as Furlonge remarked, "had not proceeded 
beyond the conception to which, tbeAaglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 had 
given expression':.? The truth of. this is evident at a number of 
points in the preceding chapters, where Churchill'is to be seen 
reiterating, with some irritation, that France was to have in Syria 
no more or less than the position Britain had in Iraq. . 
While the contradictions and anachronisms of British policy 
in the Levant have already been stated, one point may be underlined 
here: the concept of 'British policy' is really a euphemistic short- 
hand expression. It does not indicate any wisely distilled, properly 
debated, collective decision in London. British policy contained too 
326 
much of the workings and limitations of Churchill's own mind. 
From his position as Prime Minister and Defence Minister, armed 
with his formidable personality, Churchill imposed his own will 
on the direction of the war to an extent which was often dangerous. 
8 
This has been discussed in wider contexts, but it was also a factor 
in the Levant affair. Thus, in demanding an assault on Syria, the 
Prime Minister was prompted by dubious independent reports to over- 
rule Wavell and his supporters in London. In this case, his im- 
pulsive methods had a lucky result, but Churchill's dominance had 
a less happy effect on subsequent Anglo-Free French affairs in the 
Levant. His inadequate understanding of the Middle East inspired 
the futile repetition of an unsatisfactory policy, for Churchill, 
despite his pre-occupation with more central war issues, still had 
the last word on the Levant. Behind the woolly terms of Britain's 
official stance in the Levant, and behind its irrelevant longevity. 
lay the disproportionate influence of the Prime Minister. 
This is not to suggest that the flaws in British and Free 
French policy may be attributed purely to the anachronistic thinking 
of Churchill and de Gaulle. Wider considerations, both in and beyond 
the Middle East, had a strong determining effect upon the policies 
of both sides. In this sense, the policies of Britain and Free 
France were attempts to rationalise the predicament in which they 
found themselves in the aftermath of Exporter. For de Gaulle, the 
dilemma was particularly acute. Free France was striving to justify 
its claim to speak in the name of France itself, and to sign away 
France's hard-won and jealously-guarded rights in the Levant was 
unthinkable. The Free French,, labelled as traitors and renegades 
by their own countrymen, were under intense pressure to prove that 
they were not condoning British encroachments on the French empire. 
This pressure was bound to make de Gaulle a difficult partner in 
the Middle East. Moreover, his ultimate aim - to resurrect France 
and its empire - did not allow the Levant situation to be treated 
on its local merits, for de Gaulle was bound to insist upon the 
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continuing validity of the mandate and the limited possibilities 
of Syrian independence. The Free French regarded the empire as an 
essential arm of France. They saw themselves as the guardians of 
this inheritance, not its liquidators; they had neither the desire 
nor the option to relinquish the'French position in the Levant. 
These were the realities behind the lofty rhetoric employed by de 
Gaulle and Catroux in the Levant. 
The British were also rationalising a position in which 
they had little room for manoeuvre. While the Free French were 
obliged to equivocate, the British tried to be all things to all 
men. Their involvement with de Gaulle and their own mandatory 
position determined their technical support for the French mandate, 
but their Arab interests forced them, in accordance with their 
guarantee, to make gestures in favour of Levantine independence. 
This attempt to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds was 
frustrated by the local nationalists and their external supporters. 
The independence pledge was an. awkward commitment, for the degree 
of independence necessary to salvage British integrity depended on 
how exacting the Arab world chose to be. Unfortunately for Britain, 
the nationalists demanded a more-genuine independence than Catroux 
had envisaged, and the Arabs in the British sphere refused to 
recognise Catroux's nominal republics-. This has been represented 
by de Gaulle as the concerted response of British puppets, but in 
reality the British themselves were neatly trapped. They were forced 
to go further in their commitment to Levantine independence - and to 
Collide inevitably with the Free French, who had gone as far as 
they intended to go. British and Free French policies were vain 
attempts to reconcile the contradictions of their respective positions 
in the Levant and their essential requirements elsewhere. These 
policies provided the nationalists with endless opportunities to 
set the British against the Free French for their. own purposes. 
It is in this context that we must understand the significance 
of Sir Edward Spears. His presence, constituted a dualism within an 
ambiguity. If the ambiguity, was- British policy itself, the dualism 
was Spears' official obligation to be two beings in one, an aim never 
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achieved outside of Greek theology. Since his two responsibilities - 
liaison with the Free French and relations with the Levantines - 
were engaged in most disputes, and since the requirements of each 
tended to collide, Spears had to come down on one side or the other 
in nearly every case. It was a hopeless conflict of duties, and one 
which was clearly anticipated by Cadogan in September 1941: 
if we appoint a separate representative in Syria, 
alongside General Spears, who represents us with 
the Free French, there may be a conflict.... but 
it could be resolved.... If one and the same man 
assumes both roles, the conflict will be in his 
breast, and he will resolve it, and one function 
or other will suffer.... 9 
This advice was swept under the rug by a deal in which the Foreign 
Office took over from the Spears Mission as the official channel of 
Anglo-Free French liaison. This move was so overdue that the price 
seemed a small one. In return Spears received Churchill's warmest 
thanks for his labours, a knighthood, and a more important position 
in the Levant. 
In these circumstances Spears returned to the Levant with 
responsibilities which no man, however well-disposed and impartial, 
could have reconciled. As Cadogan saw, one function or the other 
was bound to suffer when they collided, and in the prevailing 
conditions they were bound to collide continually. Spears' dual 
position became one more awkward factor in the Levant affair. His 
personal decision to favour the Levant States has sometimes obscured 
the fact that very little neutral ground existed. Had his priorities 
gone the other way, he would have been similarly execrated for 
harming Anglo-Arab relations. Spears himself, a forceful pragmatist, 
dismissed the dilemma of his` double role and welcomed the initiative 
it allowed him. In doing so he set himself a third task, to make the 
Levant a solid asset- to the Allies. Here he enjoyed great success, 
and a rare degree of co-operation with the Free French. Yet the one 
case in which he achieved some Angle-French unity was also the only 
time that he dealt severely with the Levantines. Nowhere did it seem 
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possible to reconcile his two positions to the satisfaction of all 
parties. 
Entrusted with irreconcilable duties, asked to follow a 
policy of paradox, Spears found his own ruthless solution by 
deciding where British interests lay in the Middle East, and finding 
in Churchill's statements a heavier emphasis on the Syrian side of 
British policy. He was not the man to sigh helplessly over the 
muddled contradictions of British affairs in the Middle East. If 
London could not get it right, he would help them to get it right. 
It never occurred to Spears that his forceful contributions might 
not be welcomed. Nor did he think it possible that he might be 
mistaken. His approach was unsuitable, for in retrospect it would 
seem that the fundamental British desire was to keep the Levant 
quiet and to postpone the problems. The rest was obligatory rhetoric. 
But this subconscious feeling in London was never officially imparted 
to Spears, whose instructions from Eden included a serious and quite 
literal view of the independence pledge. 
The blame which has been attached to Spears has been out of 
all proportion to the deeper determinants of the affair. He was 
often tiresome and overbearing, he was an idealist where London 
needed a Talleyrand, and his personal crisis drove him too far to- 
wards the Levantines. It also clouded his view of wider horizons, 
for Spears failed to see that the forces unleashed against French 
rule in the Levant would soon be turned against the British. Yet, 
despite his pro-Arab approach and his barnstorming methods, it is 
a mistake to follow the Gaullists and Francophiles in their sweeping 
indictment against him. Their, argument ignores all the built-in 
troubles of the Anglo-Free French occupation, and consistently 
underrates the skill and resources of the Levantine nationalists. 
They saw their opportunity and seized it. Yet to listen to Spears' 
accusers, one would almost think'that the Syrians and Lebanese 
would have been insignificant without him. 
On the contrary, Spears had his most harmful effect in 
London, and that unwittingly.. His astonishing feud with the Foreign 
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Office, and his wounding attacks on the remote and feeble views 
of Eastern Department, blinded London to the most vital point which 
Spears was striving to make. In this sense he was his own worst 
enemy. As Furlonge put it, 
We on the spot realised almost from the first 
day that... the home policy was anachronistic 
and unrealistic, and said it in every way we 
could: Spears probably too intemperately to 
be convincing... 10 
In the light of the documents, it is certain rather than probable 
that Spears was too intemperate. This behaviour in a lesser man would 
have ensured his rapid removal, but Spears was a special case, and 
Churchill would not hear of his removal until 1944. The trail, once 
more, swings back to the influence of Churchill. One of the most 
suspicious circumstances of the Levant dispute, and one of the more 
impressive Gaullist deductions, has focussed on the length of time 
" that the outspoken Spears was left at Beirut. It is now clear, however, 
that this was one more instance of human error rather than sinister 
intentions. Churchill's own stormy experiences with de Gaulle, and 
his admiration for Spears, prevented him from taking a more considered 
view of his old comrade's unsuitable position. 
In concentrating on Spears, it is easy to lose all sense of 
proportion and perspective in the Levent affair, for the Anglo-Free 
French collision had more profound causes than the personal influence 
and policy of General Spears. He did not create the terms on which 
Britain and Free France entered the Levant., or the three-sided 
struggle which ensued. Nor did he create the flaws in British and 
Free French policy, and the-wider pressures which lay behind them. 
Above all he did not create or control the resourceful nationalist 
movement in the Levant. These, considerations take us back to the more 
fundamental features of te Levan t ,, affair. Moreover, the built-in 
problems and tensions which. lave bee. identified were themselves the 
products of a more deep-seated at4 universal dialectic. These re- 
flections must therefore conclude by recognising the overall imperial 
process in which this whole affair belongs. 
. ý__'. 
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Two of the truisms of contemporary history are that the 
revolt against European hegemony is one of the most fundamental 
themes of the twentieth century, and that the Second World War 
hastened this universal process. Neither of these insights has been 
sufficiently stressed in the Levant debate. Throughout the colonial 
period, the European powers were caught in a dialectic of their own 
making. All their efforts to open up, exploit and modernise their 
territories tended to foster elements which would sooner or later 
assert their ability and right to political modernity and sovereignty. 
None of the expedients employed by the colonising powers escaped this 
dialectic. At best, they postponed the final reckoning with the pro- 
ll gressive elements which the Europeans themselves had called into being. 
This universal process was certainly at work in the Levant, 
and it overtook the Anglo-French endeavour to maintain the old conditions 
of European privilege. In Syria and the Lebanon the final reckoning 
was already near when Britain and France went to war with Hitler. By 
September 1939 the French were living on borrowed time in the Levant. 
Their last real chance of acquiring some sort of transitional deal 
slipped away when the 1936 negotiations were allowed to break down. 
Thereafter the nationalists lost all desire to treat with France, 
and the French fell back upon repression and military reinforcement 
to maintain the status quo in the Levant. 
The French mandate. was henceforth under siege, and the fall of 
metropolitan France proved fatal to French attempts to hold on in 
Syria and the Lebanon. The Levantine were soon extracting political 
concessions from the embattled Dentz. Their supreme opportunity came 
with Operation Exporter, and none of the nationalist leaders were 
taken in by de Gaulle's attempts to salvage the prestige and authority 
of France. Her time was up in the Levant, and the idea of treaty nego- 
tiations was dropped when de Gaulle could find. no popular Levantine 
leaders who were prepared to treat with him. He fell back upon Catroux's 
political charades and a series of procrastinations, but these could 
only have worked with a generous measure of Levantine goodwill. Insofar 
as this had existed in the past, its stocks were virtually exhausted 
before Exporter b*gan. 
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In the final analysis, the Levant affair must be placed in 
the context of the whole anti-imperial process. France was already 
on borrowed time in the Levant, and the winds of war blew away her 
last barriers against the future. Here was a case in which the 
Second World War clearly accelerated an anti-imperial trend. From 
a French view, the loss of the mandates may be counted among the 
casualties of 1940. The fall of France and the Vichy-Gaullist 
contest were events which the French imperialists never dreamed of 
when they rejected the 1936 negotiations. France thereWy . 
lost the 
last chance to extend her sojourn in Syria. By a strange irony one 
great European war established France in the Levant while the next, 
despite Gaullist aims, destroyed the French position in Syria and 
the Lebanon. A similar fate rapidly overtook the British in the 
Middle East. "Empire", as one of its novelists observed, "dooms 
12 itself to live in history and plot against history". 
1 E. H. Carr, What Is History? (1961), pp. 15f., 86f. 
2 Harvey, War Diaries, p. 12.. 
3 Churchill, 11.423. This remark was made about the Dakar 
expedition, but it is equally appropriate for Operation 
Exporter. 
4 Pearse, passim. 
5 Harvey, War Diaries; p. 321. 
6 "A Note on a Visit to Damascus", November 1941, CO831/58/ 
77065. 
7 Furlonge paper, p. 5. 
8 See Harvey, 'War'Diaries, pp. 22,26, for examples of this. 
9 Cadogan minute, 28 September 1941, F0371/27310/E6021. 
10 Furlonge paper, p. 12f. 
11 Barraciough, pp. 153-198. 
12 J. M. Coetzee, Waiting'. for the Barbarians (1980), p. 133. 
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Appendix A: SPEARS' REPORTS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO LONDON 
In denying that he had been influenced by alternative reports 
from the Gaullist lobby, Churchill was unconvincing. It is quite clear 
that he had been strongly influenced on several occasions by Spears' 
telegram on Syrian strategy. Churchill realised that this situation was 
unacceptable to a Commander-in-Chief. On the very day when he denied 
Wavell's charge, Churchill instructed Dill to inform Spears that all 
signals relating to military matters must be sent through Middle East 
Command. 
Spears was upset by this instruction, and attempted to have 
Churchill's decision reversed or watered down. "As every single question 
Lhas\ some bearing.... on military matters, this order deprives me of all 
power of independent comment 
[and] is in evident contradiction with the 
Charter of my Mission [which'j lays down.... that on military matters I 
am to report to the Minister of Defence 
[i. e., Churchill 3l', he argued, 
through Churchill's secretary: "Is it his intention to alter a practice 
which has worked well for a year? ". Spears added that there was "much 
trouble ahead" in Free French issues. "My power of dealing with these 
has been greatly reduced as it is, owing to 
[Wavell's3 determination 
to deal on most occasions with de Gaulle alone. The inevitable result 
is that latter plays one authority against the other and there is already 
considerable confusion.... So long as I held all threads in my hand I was 
able to cope with situation". 
l 
It was a good try, and Spears evidently felt that Wavell was. 
also guilty of trespassing on another man's bailiwick. Nevertheless 
Churchill insisted that Spears obey Dill's instruction. On 6 June he 
replied that the original arrangement cited by Spears 
worked all right 'when you and de Gaulle were in 
... Central Africa, but cannot be continued while 
you are at Cairo or in Wavell's area. He took great 
offence at the idea that we were being influenced 
by advice contrary to his own, the tenor of which 
he did not know. I myself asked Chief of Imperial 
General Staff to tell you that your telegrams should 
in future go through Commander in Chief if they 
touched military matters.... You may still send 
telegrams about de Gaulle's movements or Free 
French personal issues through the Ambassador. 2 
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Thirty-five years later, Spears described this telegram as 
"a blow which hurt me so much that I can recall its pain today". His 
first reaction, he wrote, "was to demand my recall, throw in the sponge, 
and see the rest of the war from my seat in the House of Commons". In 
a contest of appeals to Churchill, "Wavell had won his point", and 
Spears saw this as a personal rebuff from his old comrade and Parlia- 
mentary colleague. 
, 
Yet the talk of resignation actually came later. At first, 
Spears sought a way around the edict by re-interpreting it as an 
instruction to send signals to London "via the War Office" rather than 
through the Cairo Embassy. 
3 He therefore sent several important signals 
from Jerusalem between 11 and 17 June on the subject of an armistice 
with Dentz. (See Chapter 3). His way of acknowledging Dill's instruction 
was to send his telegrams from Wilson's Headquarters in Jerusalem to 
the War Office, and repeat them to Wavell's Command in Cairo. 
This method clearly subverted the spirit of the edict and when 
Wavell's staff saw what Spears was doing they invoked Dill's signal. It 
was then that Spears realised the game was up and felt like throwing in 
the towel. His diary makes this plain: 
A very nasty telegram from the Middle East on the 
subject of Armistice negotiations. They are swine.... 
de Gaulle looks to me to communicate to London on his 
behalf. He would object very strongly if his communications 
were vetted by Middle East and refuse to use me. These 
people make me sick at heart. I want to have the oppor- 
tunity of telling Winston I am fed up, works very hard 
and no thank you's.... His telegram [of 6 June cut me 
to the heart. 4 
After a final attempt to outwit Middle East Command, all in a tone of 
injured innocence, Spears was forced to go through the proper channels. 
All this had a most iniquitous effect on the question of the 
Syrian armistice, for Spears had evidently pulled off an agreement 
between General Wilson and de Gaulle on the terms of the armistice. This 
provided better conditions for the Free French than those which de 
Gaulle had to accept in Cairo on 19 June, let alone the disastrous terms 
signed in Acre on 14 July. Even if this original Wilson-de Gaulle under- 
standing had had to be watered down, which was very likely, the Free 
French would have had little cause for complaint. As it was, all Spears' 
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good work went for nothing. In disavowing his activities and 
communications from Jerusalem, Cairo threw the baby out with the 
bathwater. 
It is ironical that Spears himself must take a large share 
of the blame for this little tragedy. By his own maverick methods and 
his abrasive vigour, he had succeeded in alienating just about every- 
body in Cairo, and was regarded with suspicion and irritation in 
military circles. Finding himself cut out, forced to watch while the 
armistice question became increasingly muddled, Spears finally ex- 
pressed his feelings to Churchill on 21 June: 
the effect of your telegram has been to weaken my 
position in the most marked degree and it has made 
me doubt whether I can now carry on to any useful 
purpose.... I find practically all means of action 
withdrawn from me [and fee at least justified in 
asking to be relieved of my duties. 
I have told General de Gaulle that I intended 
doing this.... he refused to contemplate the idea 
and on the contrary asked in what way my position 
could be strengthened. 
... It is my hope that work with executive powers 
may be found me.... something useful to do, the 
more difficult, and if possible the more dangerous, 
the better. 5 
Churchill did not take kindly to talk of resignation, as Wavell had 
lately discovered, but he sent no retort - or reply - in this case. 
As for Spears, he soon found a new ally and lifelong friend in the 
Minister of State, Oliver Lyttelton, who arrived in Cairo on 5 July, 
determined to keep the "soldiers" in their place. Spears was given a 
new charter for action, and soon had more than enough to do. 
1. Spears tel., 4 June 1941, SPRS 11/5. 
2. Churchill tel., 6 June 1941, SPRS 11/7 and 11/5. 
3. Spears, Fulfilment, p. 94 
4. Spears Diary, 15 June 1941. 
5. Spears tel., 21 June 1941, SPRS 11/7. 
Sý 
Appendix $: THE VALIDITY OF THE FRENCH MANDATE 
The day after Churchill claimed that the French mandate 
had lapsed, the Colonial Secretary sent the following signal to 
MacMichael in Jerusalem: 
The fact that Vichy Government have given notice 
of withdrawal from the League of Nations does not 
have any effect upon French Mandate for Syria. 
Notice cannot legally take effect for two years. 
Moreover, even when French resignation does take 
effect, it will not necessarily terminate the 
Mandate: c. f. decision that Japanese withdrawal 
from the League did not in itself terminate Japan's 
Mandate over Pacific Islands. 
When Churchill saw this academic contradiction of what he thought 
was a useful fact, he sent a terse note to the Colonial Secretary, 
Lord Moyne: "Why make all these admissions? Please report". The 
information in Moyne's telegram had been provided by the Foreign 
Office, who were uneasy about MacMichael's attitude to the French 
position in the Levant. Moype therefore replied to Churchill: 
When I saw this telegram I queried it myself. It 
was sent at the request of the Foreign Office. It 
was intended to be merely a statement of the legal 
position. I am [informing MacMichael] that no 
public use should be made of these facts. 
These facts were endorsed by various disinterested 
authorities. Two months later the Foreign Research and Press 
Service acknowledged the legal position in its Notes on the 
Problems connected with A Settlement in Syria, prepared for the 
further guidance of. the Foreign Office: "It is true that the 
juridical status of Syria cannot be definitively settled until 
the end of the war. But in the meantime more immediate action can 
be taken to convince the Syrians that the Free French are both 
able and willing to honour their word. The process of handing over 
administrative powers to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, 
which was begun 
[by] the Treaties of 1936 and reversed in 1939, 
can be resumed... ". 2 
1 PREM 3 422/14. 
2 F0371/27346. 
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Appendix C: SPEARS AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF SYRIA AND LEBANON 
The idea of British association with the Free French 
proclamation was so well aired in British circles that the origin 
of the independence tactic itself has not always been clear in 
later accounts. The realities are hopelessly blurred in Spears' 
memoirs. Without mentioning Catroux, MacMichael, Lampson or 
Wavell - who had all long since discussed the idea with London - 
Spears tells how he "sent a long signal to London on 17 May 
[1941] " 
urging that Arab support be gained by 
the Free French and ourselves giving the most 
solemn guarantee of absolute independence to the 
Levant States... subject only to maintaining there 
such troops as might be required by military 
necessity for the duration of the war... 1 
Spears' treatment of this subject is quite misleading, and 
gives him undue credit for an idea which proved decisive to the 
future of Syria and Lebanon. The omissions and alterations in his 
account are crucial in this respect. From the very signal he cites, 
Spears omits this confession: "So far I have felt native feeling 
could be largely disregarded". In taking the natives" seriously, 
he was therefore six months behind Catroux and his British confidants. 
A more serious distortion occurs when Spears manipulates this 
signal in relation to the declaration of independence actually made. 
His wire simply did not say "absolute independence to the Levant 
States". It called for "absolute Syrian independence" whereas 
"question of Lebanon would be reserved. The Christian population 
in any case not anxious to be included Moslem block". This distinction 
was drawn in response to the current rumour that the Vichy forces 
intended to abandon Syria and concentrate in the rugged Lebanon. 2 
Spears therefore suggested this adaptation of the independence 
tactic as a counter-measure to assist the Allies to occupy Syria. 
That was the point of his wire. Even then, when the exasperated 
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Wavell saw this signal he fired off another, declaring that 
"at this stage exclusion of Lebanon will defeat our object" and 
implying that Spears had gone off half-cocked. 3 
In the light of these documents, Spears' later version of 
the independence device is largely humbug. It exemplifies one 
of the worst features of personal memoirs. The same may be said 
of the passage on page 96f. of Spears' memoirs, where he speaks 
of "my proposal" and by a convenient ambiguity of style gives 
the impression that he initiated the independence idea itself. 
It is a pity that Spears was not content with his actual 
achievement, which the bony hand of the h. storian cannot touch. 
This was to do more than any other man to ensure that the 
promise of independence to the Levant: States 'was'-. honoured. For 
this he earned the lasting gratitude of the Syrian and Lebanese 
leaders, and the everlasting wrath of Gaullists and British 
Francophiles. 
1 Spears, Fulfilment, p. 83. 
2 Spears tel., 17 May 1941, SPRS IA. 
3 Wavell'tel., 19 May 1941, SPRS IC/I. 
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Appendix D: OLD FRENCH WINE IN NEW BRITISH BOTTLES: 
THE MICKELSEN VERSION OF THE LEVANT AFFAIR, 1941. 
In 1976, Martin L. Mickelsen published an article entitled 
"Another Fashoda: The Anglo-Free French Conflict over the Levant, 
May-September 1941". 
1 Quoting "original British Foreign Office 
records", Mickelsen argued that "the British inflicted another 
Fashoda on the Free French and on France". Behind the origins and 
the aftermath of Operation Exporter, Mickelsen claimed, there was 
a distinct and concerted British plan to dash Free French hopes and 
to sacrifice the French mandates to the demands of Arab nationalism. 
This scheme was allegedly masterminded by Churchill and implemented 
by all the major British authorities in the Middle East. "Taking 
advantage of the helplessness of France", Mickelsen concluded, "the 
British government inflicted another Fashoda on their erstwhile ally". 
2 
There is nothing essentially new about Mickelsen's argument, 
which more or less re-states the Gaullist version of 1941. The new 
feature is Mickelsen's use of the recently-opened Foreign Office 
documents to support and restate the old accusations. These seem far 
more formidable and worthy of fresh consideration when they re-appear 
bristling with archival footnotes. 
Yet when the whole question is weighed and investigated, it 
must be said without hesitation that Mickelsen does not deserve to be 
taken seriously. No careful examination of the files quoted by Mickelsen - 
let alone all the other British documents which he did not consult - and 
no adequate inquiry into the contemporary circumstances, can possibly 
endorse his superficial case. Mickelsen's argument rests on glaring 
factual errors, unfounded assertions, serious documentary omissions, 
misleading methods, and what must be called a half-baked and highly 
selective approach to the archives. It is a truism that one can prove 
almost anything from a revered source if the fundamental principles of 
interpretation are set aside. What Mickelsen has really proved is that 
this old truism, however boring and familiar, cannot be ignored. While 
it would be pointless to list every single transgression, the following 
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paragraphs should be sufficient to illustrate that the above remarks 
are not unwarranted. 
Serious factual errors are plentiful. For example, Mickelsen 
states that "de Gaulle was finally compelled to accept the reference to 
the British guarantee in the Free French proclamation" (i. e., Catroux's 
announcement of 8 June 1941 to the Levantines). This is sheer fiction. 
De Gaulle, in fact, successfully insisted that the Free French statement 
would contain no reference to any British guarantee, which he considered 
an insult to the integrity of France. (See Chapter 2). Mickelsen had 
only to read de Gaulle's memoirs to be alerted to this, and he could have 
verified it in F0371/27302/E4169, which gives the texts of Catroux's 
proclamation and the separate statement which the British issued in its 
wake. Mickelsen, incidentally, cites no source at all for his unique 
assertion. 
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Again, he states that Catroux signed the secret protocol of the 
Acre Convention. This is equally astonishing. Catroux was not even allowed 
to sign the main agreement, thanks to General Wilson's efforts to satisfy 
de Verdilhac. Mickelsen bases this novel claim on an ambiguous minute 
by C. W. Baxter, whom he follows in misinterpreting the Cairo cables to 
which it was attached. 
4 These telegrams refer 'vaguely to Catroux without 
ever saying that he signed anything. Yet it is quite clear from neigh- 
bouring files, (e. g., F0371/27300/E3877), that Catroux merely signed a 
letter saying that he agreed with the main Convention itself. (See 
Chapter 3). Mickelsen compounds this error by claiming that Spears was 
then sent hurrying to Acre to prevent Catroux from "repudiating his act". 
Not surprisingly, no source is given for this strange assertion, since 
Catroux did not sign the protocol at all and Spears never went to Acre 
in July 1941. In fact, Spears was furious that the Free French had been 
so neglected and let down, and he promptly volunteered to go to the 
Levant to correct Wilson's blunders and to rescue Free French requirements. 
In this he had the full blessing of Lyttelton, who was equally upset by 
Wilson's follies. Spears flew to Beirut and went directly to Ain Sofar, 
where he confronted Wilson with the disastrous implications of his 
blunderings. 5 (See Chapter 3). 
Such mistakes are blended with a series of distortions, for 
Mickelsen confines himself to the events and documents which seem to 
support his case. Having done this, he either asserts that some act or 
statement was decisive, or suggests that some convenient document was 
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definitive of the British approach. An example of the former option 
is his version of the row over the occupation of Soueida. Quoting 
Spears' bluster to Catroux about cutting off Free French finances if 
Catroux did not back down, Mickelsen claims that "this threat... had 
the desired effect". It did not. Lyttelton actually told Spears that 
Wilson must "issue categorical instructions to all concerned to 
collaborate fully with the Free French and give generous effect to their 
wishes". (See Chapter 4). As a result, it was the British who had to pull 
out of the Residency in Soueida. 
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The suggestion that some document, isolated from its context 
and its subsequent fate, was definitive of the British attitude, is 
another dubious method employed by Mickelsen. Thus he readily quotes 
Churchill's crass paper of 19 May on Syrian policy, in which the Prime 
Minister claimed that the French mandate had lapsed, and generally went 
off half-cocked. But Mickelsen does not tell us what became of this 
nonsense. Churchill may perhaps be forgiven for dashing off a few bloody- 
minded and silly ideas at a most frantic and desperate moment of the war, 
Less forgiveable is Mickelsen's use of this document to define subsequent 
British policy in the Levant. The document will not bear the weight of 
this interpretation, for the official British position throughout the 
war was that the French mandate was still valid. In a matter of days 
Eden had begun to guide Churchill away from his hasty fallacies. Mickelsen 
ignores this, and omits scores of other documents which must be digested 
in any adequate treatment of British policy in the Levant. 
7 (See Chapter 2). 
Even those documents which are quoted are frequently stood on 
their heads or treated in a cavalier fashion. In quoting War Cabinet 
Conclusions of 28 August, Mickelsen has Churchill saying that the Free 
French cause had been "an embarrassing commitment". But the record does' 
not attribute this expression to Churchill, or any other individual, but 
to the general "discussion". Indeed, from the context it would seem that 
this view was put to Churchill and Eden in the form of a challenge by 
other members of the Cabinet, for the record states that "THE PRIME 
MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN SECRETARY explained... our policy in this 
matter". Churchill and Eden were obliged to repeat to the Cabinet, and 
re-assert, the standard British formula that the Syrians were to receive 
their independence but that France was to retain a privileged position 
3 ý, 
in the Levant. 
8 
The Mickelsen version will not stand a thorough examination 
of all the available documents and a serious attempt to understand them 
in their context. It is clear that most of the relevant documents have 
either been overlooked entirely or coolly set aside. Those which are 
used seem to have been chosen on the basis of a simplistic bias, and 
are by no means properly handled in any case. Nor does Mickelsen show 
much appreciation of the exceedingly complicated, confused, and impro- 
vised nature of the whole affair. He imposes a simple conspiracy theory 
upon the complex and muddled realities of the spring and summer of 1941, 
and gathers into the fellowship of a Churchillian plot some unlikely 
conspirators: Wavell, who wanted to keep out of Syria anyway; Spears, 
a fierce champion of Free French aims until the end of July; Lampson, 
who helped Catroux and stressed Britain's pledge to respect the French 
empire: Lyttelton, who personally travelled through the Levant to see 
that the Free French were properly installed; and Auchinleck, the most 
unlikely political conspirator. Indeed, Mickelsen does not seem to have 
encumbered himself with very much information at all. While confidently 
referring to "Churchill's intentions", he does not even make use of the 
Prime Minister's (PREM) files. 
9 
The crowning error is the claim that Britain inflicted "another 
Fashoda" on the French by insisting in September 1941 that Catroux should 
"honor his pledge to the Levant States by granting independence immediately". 
According to Mickelsen, the measures by which Catroux established his so- 
called republics in Syria and the Lebanon were a disaster for France, 
imposed on her by perfidious Albion. This is untrue. Quite apart from 
the fact that Catroux himself initiated the whole idea of proclaiming 
independence for tactical purposes (which Mickelsen fails to acknowledge 
anywhere in his article), Catroux's measures legitimised the Free French 
control of the Levant States. Mickelsen seems to have taken "independence" 
literally and assumed that this is what Catroux granted in the autumn of 
1941. He could hardly be more mistaken in this assumption. Catroux's 
version of independence was a gigantic euphemism behind which the Free 
French managed to maintain the old system virtually intact. (See 
Chapters 4 and 5). To use the emotive analogy of Fashoda is to quite 
misunderstand the nature of Catroux's measures. At Fashoda in 1898 the 
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British forced the French to withdraw: at Beirut and Damascus in 1941, 
the British lent their official recognition to a mere parody of inde- 
pendence and a continuation of French predominance in the Levant. While 
all this eventually backfired on Catroux and de Gaulle, the end result 
cannot be attributed to some vast British plot. 
10 
Mickelsen's account of the Levant affair in 1941 is superficial 
and misleading, and his argument cannot be taken too seriously. It is 
built on outright errors, dubious methods, slick research and an 
arbitrary choice of evidence. It rips from its context one easily- 
distorted aspect of a many-sided problem, and magnifies it out of all 
proportion. Advancing on his target in this fashion, Mickelsen shoots 
from the hip - and misses by a wide margin. 
1 Revue Francaise d'histoire d'Outre-Mer, Vol. LXIII, 1976. 
2 Ibid., pp. 100,76,98f. 
3 Ibid., p. 81. 
4 Ibid., p. 87n. 
5 Ibid., p. 86f. 
6 Ibid., P. 90. 
7 Ibid., p. 77f. 
8 Ibid., p. 95 and 95, note 46. (upper case as in document). 
9. Ibid., pp. 81,76. 
10 Ibid., p. 98f. 
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Appendix E: ALTERNATIVE ADVICE ON BRITISH POLICY IN THE LEVANT 
Some of the problems and pitfalls of Britain's hastily- 
improvised venture in the Levant were being pointed out to the 
Foreign Office before Churchill made his statement of 9 September 
in Parliament. Between 23 July and 3 September, several advisory 
papers by Professor H. A. R. Gibb, of the Foreign Research and 
Press Service, were received. In these papers the Professor ex- 
plained the problems created by the Anglo-Free French position, 
and how hard it would be to satisfy all parties - the French, the 
local peoples, the Arab world and the British - in the light of 
the independence promises. He showed how easily the most serious 
mistakes could be made. Finally, he recommended that several 
decisive steps should be taken to avoid serious trouble and to 
secure the future political stability of the whole Anglo-French 
position in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
None of this was pointed out to the Prime Minister. Within 
the Foreign Office itself there was a reluctance to believe that 
the problems were really as acute or urgent as Gibb suggested, 
while his recommendations were too sweeping to be pursued by any 
but the most far-seeing and resolute people. This effectively 
doomed Gibb's contribution to oblivion, for his papers came to 
Eastern Department's C. W. Baxter, arguably the most inadequate 
man in the Foreign Office. Baxter confined himself to affixing such 
polite comments as "very interesting", and nothing more was heard 
of Gibb's papers! Consequently, when Churchill's proposed policy 
statement passed through Eastern Department it was not exposed to 
any alternative argument, despite the fact that Churchill's text 
embodied some of the blunders of which Gibb had warned. 
It would not have been easy; admittedly, to present Gibb's 
case in the current circumstances. There was a general tendency in 
London to fight shy of any long-range decisions on Arab affairs and 
the Eastern Mediterranean, and the gravity of the war situation in 
the summer of 1941 made procrastination only too easy. In addition, 
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Churchill and Eden did not appear very receptive to broad decisions 
affecting the future of the whole Arab world. In August, for 
instance, it was pointed out in a War Cabinet meeting that 
Free French policy in Syria had been, from some 
points of view, an embarrassing commitment. If 
we could take a new view of the position in Syria 
we might be able to reach a general settlement with 
the Arab countries... 
Churchill and Eden replied by simply reiterating British policy in 
the Levant and adding that "a settlement of the Arab question 
generally raised far more difficult issues, and it would probably 
be premature to attempt to deal with it". 
2' 
It was thus an unsympathetic climate in which to press any 
long-range measures concerning the Middle East. Nevertheless there 
was surely some dereliction of duty in the Foreign Office when the 
Prime Minister, on asking whether there were any objections to his 
proposed Parliamentary statement, was given none what"soever. As it 
was, the warnings expressed by Gibb were not heard and some of his 
worst fears were actualised in British policy and practices. 
Churchill's repeated insistence that the satisfaction of the Arab 
world was Britain's chief priority, to be pursued whether the Free 
French liked it or not, contrasts starkly. with the following passages 
from two of Gibb's papers: 
French and British interests in the whole area of Syria- 
Palestine are either identical or closely parallel.... 
The only possible conclusion to be drawn is that France 
and Great Britain must in this area either stand together 
or both go out. The solution [is that they should 
(a) either maintain joint bases or jointly garrison 
certain internationalised zones within a strategic scheme 
which embraces the whole Eastern Mediterranean area... 
and (b) outside these bases or zones give the fullest 
measure of independence to the Arab countries, with 
adequate guarantees for the Lebanese Christian] and 
Zionists. 2 
It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the problem of 
a settlement in Syria is at bottom a British rather than 
a French problem, and cannot be solved by insisting on 
one-sided concessions by the French. + 
.s 
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In the event, the problems and dangers which Gibb had 
identified, including "the old spectre of Anglo-French rivalry 
in the Levant", proved to be every bit as serious as he had 
suggested. 
5 
None of his ideas reached the top of the policy-making 
tree. The old muddle-through tradition of localised running repairs 
prevailed, while the basis of the whole Anglo-French edifice in the 
Middle East was steadily being eroded. This is not to lament a 
lost empire, or to suggest that Gibb's ideas would have allowed 
everyone to live happily ever after. But just about any attempt at 
a gradual Anglo-French devolution in the Eastern Mediterranean 
would have been an improvement on what happened. As it was, first 
France and then Britain departed against a background of violent 
and inconclusive upheavals. Quite apart from the damage done to 
Anglo-French relations, these events left permanent scars on the 
peoples whom Britain and France were supposed to have reared to 
maturity in the name of progress. 
1 Baxter minute, September 1941, F0371/27308/E5450. 
2 Extract from War Cabinet Conclusions, 28 August 1941, F0371/ 
27308/E5339. 
3 Gibb paper, "French interests in Syria", 12 August 1941, 
F0371/27308/E5450. 
4 Gibb paper, "Syria: the Problem of Bases", 3 September 1941, 
F0371/27308/E5450. 
5 Gibb paper, "Notes on the Problems connected with a Settlement 
in Syria", 23 July 1941, F0371/27346. 
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